LECTURES ON CROSS-BORDER GOVERNANCE
CENTRAL EUROPEAN SERVICE FOR CROSS-BORDER INITIATIVES

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We start our introduction by the well-known quote from the pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Heraclitus, “everything changes and nothing stands still.” This means that life is subject of ceaseless and unavoidable changes and alterations instead of rigid and strict fixation. This axiom is true for all aspects of life, including the issues of social sciences and international relations, too.

We have entered into a period at the end of the 20th and at the beginning of the 21st century when borders, boundaries and/or frontiers are in the process of profound alteration. Not only physical borders are objects of these deep changes, but also implicit and internal borders of society itself. Communities and societies have begun to disintegrate and individualization have been promoted. Subsequently, powerful processes that recalibrate societies have unavoidable effects on borders, either internal or external, and they dismantle the old borders and create new ones.
Zygmunt Bauman (2011) notes that we are the eyewitness how the previously extraordinarily protected spaces and strict boundaries of life became more and more public, more and more open, thus dismantling the long existing border frames between private and public. Spheres of intimacy have been entirely opened, like explicit speaking about sexuality in public and/or appearance of post-modern art with use of human blood. Borders as meta-space have attained liquid nature without clear boundaries at the end of the 20th century.

The bipolar world order with strictly allocated roles (e.g. see Bull, 1977) and with geopolitical predictability came to an end. The regime of two super-powers has become substituted by one super-power and with dominance of its specific political and economic constellation based on liberal democracy and free market capitalism. This unipolar world order with euphoric and pervasive mood of liberalism, openness and deregulation became the mainstream at the twilight of the millennia. It can be expressed that the notion of ‘openness’ temporarily occupied the space of ‘empty/ floating signifier’ with celebration of the ideas of globalization, cosmopolitanism, transnationalism and/or supra-nationalism.

Openness and liberal world order was powerfully narrated and popularized by Francis Fukuyama and through his opinions about the end of history, last man and/or liberal democracy. In 1989 he wrote (p. 1), “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Simply, this powerful ecstasy of endism and openness became the mainstream idea, hence promoting globalization and global deregulation that lead to compression of time and space (Bauman, 2000). Subsequently, opinions appeared that the long awaited ‘Kantian paradise’ with peace and prosperity has arrived and it has substituted the brutish, harsh, violent, short and nasty ‘Hobbesian world’, namely all juridical legislation of people must be based on a definite constitution which is a republican one (Kant, 1917), hence republican constitution is the only form of constitution which can generate peaceful federation among people of the world.
The idea of liberalism, liberal democracy, openness, free movement and free market trade seemed to embody the republican dream of Immanuel Kant and his idea about ‘perpetual peace’.

We can assume that the powerful idea of openness, globalization, deregulation, liberalism and free market approach formed itself as an ‘enjoyment’, as a specific fiction and/or as a specific fantasy during the last few decades. As Alain Grosrichard (1998) or Slovaj Žižek (2008) note that the act of ‘enjoyment’ itself becomes a political factor and when enjoyment itself becomes political then the given subject simply cannot escape from it, this enjoyment is powerfully maintained, preserved and reimagined over and over. This means that the Western culture is somehow obsessed with endism of History based on Western European notions, either in the writings of Kant, where the republican constitution should be the ‘end’, in the writings of Hegel, where the Prussian state should be the ‘end’, in the writings of Marx, where communism should be the ‘end’, in the writing of Fukuyama, where liberal democracy should be the ‘end’. This means that the modernist approach of the West is obsessed with the need to propose a ‘Messianic reality’ of the New times/ modernity that is also visible in the writing of Habermas (1990, 6), “because the new, the modern world is distinguished from the old by the fact that it opens itself to the future, the epochal new beginning is rendered constant with each moment that gives birth to the new.” Nevertheless, this fiction of endism was powerfully undermined and challenged by the terrorist attacks and the following geopolitical events. Prior to attacks, it was Samuel P. Huntington who profoundly opposed to Fukuyama with his idea of clashing civilizations. During the last decade numerous writers expressed their disagreement with the hypothesis about the ‘End of History’. Robert Kagan (2008) reacted to the new geopolitical constellation that ‘history has returned and there is end of dreams’, thus signalling that the attractive idea of global openness and end of history is flawed. Alain Badiou (2012), the radical French philosopher, claimed that we experience the rebirth of history during the times of riots and uprisings. Seumas Milne (2012) wrote about the revenge of history and ‘passing of the unipolar moment’, while Savoj Žižek (2014) wrote about «trouble in paradise». What is more, even Fukuyama
himself acknowledged imperfectness of his own ideas of openness and he dropped his idea of the ‘End of History’.

What has happened since the millennia? Our world has taken a very rapid change and there is no doubt that we are at the forefront of deep and profound changes, like rise of economic and political power of the BRICS countries, slow but undeniable shift in the global leadership position of the USA, dual demographic changes – overgrowth in certain regions, while negative demographic crisis in other places, long standing crisis of the European integration, global environmental threats, conflicts over natural resources, economic crisis related to inability to continue accumulation of compound growth, etc.

In other words, return of history has brought us back the question about the role and function of borders, too. At this point, opinions about borders oscillate between two profoundly different twitching of the same pendulum. Namely, one is the idea of ‘global flattening’ which was described by Friedman (2005) that supports interoperability and extremely soft borders, while another one is the new ‘renaissance of heavy borders’, either in Europe (e.g. Carr, 2012) or the barrier/border dichotomy between the ‘locals’ and the ‘globals’ (Blij, 2009). Without any doubt, we are the eyewitness of a determinative meta-fight about the nature, character and future of the borders. Consequently, the question about borders and their future shape is going to be determined during the upcoming years.

These two profoundly different paths have a zero-sum game relationship towards each other, thus we can apply the terminology of Slavoj Žižek (2006) in explaining the present constellation, namely there is an insurmountable ‘parallax gap’ between those voices who call for more flexible and open borders and those who call for more securitization and strict borders, hence fundamental antimony appears that cannot be mediated between them. The two narratives are expelled from each other’s ‘symbolical space’, hence falling into a specific form of hostile and antagonist relationship of the political.

This duality of border narratives has unquestionable effect and consequence on cross-border governance and/or on territorial
sovereignty. The idea of flexible and permeable borders favours cross-border cooperation, because it is the basic precondition of economic, cultural, social, environmental or other kinds of cross-border contacts. It is important to underline that cross-border cooperation does not aim to remove territorial sovereignty, but rather it tries to positively intervene into those peripheral regions and territories which are overshadowed by the limiting existence of border institutions of territorial sovereignty, thus allowing them to undertake joint development of border regions across the borders.

On the other side, application of rigid border approach, which principally reinforces the traditional, Westphalian understanding of territorial sovereignty, is more severe towards cross-border cooperation and it establishes a framework which is less supportive and fruitful for successful cooperation and development between border areas.

In 2017 and 2018, the Central European Service for Cross-border Initiatives (CESCI) co-organized a series of governance workshops with the National University of Public Service within the frames of the project KÖFOP-2.1.2 – VEKOP-15-2016-00001. Aim of this cooperation and series of workshops was to reflect on this significant debate and meta-fight over the borders by inviting those scholars who have the most influence and impact within the domain of border studies, thus introducing their opinions, hypothesis, knowledge, experience about borders and enriching the audience of the workshop.

Six governance workshops were organized between the period of September 2017 and May 2018. The first five workshops were co-organized by the two partners, while the sixth one, which was the closing workshop, was organized only by CESCI. The series aimed to analyze those topics which are linked to cross-border issues and cross-border governance, like borders, border areas, state sovereignty, cross-border cooperation, geopolitics, Brexit and even post-colonialism. During the workshops, the audience had real possibilities to participate at deep-going debates about border issues, geopolitics and/or cross-border cooperation with the invited lecturers.
The first governance lecture was given by Jean Peyrony, Director General of the Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière in France. He presented the institutional aspects of cross-border governance from practical point of view. The lecturer presented the clash between two different territorial orders that coexist with each other. On the one side, there is the so called Westphalian order with nested governments. However, new structures and frames, which go beyond pure Westphalian logic, already exist on the other side, like supranational integration, macro- and cross-border regions, metropolitan areas and neighbourhoods. These two different aspects of governance, which often compete for the same competencies, have to be managed side by side and this may generate interesting developments, constellations and shifts from a simple government toward a more flexible and multi-level governance. Consequently, cross-border cooperation is understood as a multi-level approach. Successful examples of cross-border interactions were introduced, like the Greater Geneva region, tramline between the French city of Strasbourg and the German city of Kehl, and the cross-border hospital of Cerdanya, located at the border between France and Spain.

The second lecturer was James W. Scott, Professor of Regional and Border Studies at the Karelian Institute at the University of Eastern Finland. The lecturer underlined the significance of borders and their effects in physical, mental and narrative spaces. The process of (de)bordering and the development of different forms of cross-border cooperation show that we experience a shift in understanding of borders and border relations. Cross-border cooperation can be essentially supported by building of mutual trust between the cooperating parties and their needs. This is the real essence and spirit of cross-border cooperation, but this cannot be purely measured by quantitative indicators and this puts cross-border cooperation under several pressures.

Cross-border cooperation is characterized by synergies, complementarities, pragmatic approaches, solutions to problems and problem solving mechanisms. Cooperation is not only about economic development and growth, but also about how citizens and inhabitants of border regions deal with everyday problems that are created by the borders or the border stops them from dealing with.
James Scott underlined that cooperation across the borders did not come from the European Union itself, but it appeared from the grassroots, from local level creativities and initiatives, basically from the battlefields of World War II. Consequently, the European Union has gradually and systematically incorporated the sphere of cross-border cooperation into its own repertoire of integration policies.

Anssi Paasi, Professor in Geography at Geography Research Unit, University of Oulu (Finland) was the third lecturer. The third workshop concentrated on regions, territories, borders and identity. Mr Paasi emphasized that states and regions move towards an increasingly relational world and the formerly closed spaces have become ‘softer’. This significant shift generates considerable push to look at the world more openly and widely as a constellation of networks, nodes and connectivities that go beyond rigid bounded territorial spaces, hence these changes suggest alterations within the ideas of regions and territories, borders, identities and relevant forms of governance, as well as concrete practices of regional planning. This challenge is apparent at various spatial scales, from local to regional and from national to supra-national.

The guest lecturer of the fourth governance workshop was David Newman, Professor of the Ben Gurion University, Israel. His lecture looked at the borders and border issues from geopolitical angles, where power structures play major role and they are part of everyday politics. Moreover, he reflected on the visible shift between the two powerful discourses, namely borderless world vs. securitization and re-emergence of borders. The first narrative is powerfully influenced by globalization, open borders and easing of cross-border movements. Nevertheless, securitization discourse has appeared as powerful narration during the last two decades, resulting in reclosing of borders, construction of new borders and application of more stringent border management procedures, thus making it more difficult to cross the borders. Discourse of security focusses on notions of threat and fear, like physical security (terrorism and violence) or economic security (unlimited migration from poorer countries). These two discourses are not separated, but they are parallel with each other. They operate at the same time,
in the same spaces and they often compete for political hegemony amongst governmental and decision making elites.

The fifth guest of the series of workshops was Katy Hayward from Queen’s University Belfast (Ireland). She presented the issue of cross-border governance within the frames of the process of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union and the future status of the Irish border – the land border between the United Kingdom and Ireland that crosses the island of Ireland – as the external frontier of the EU. The Northern Ireland borders were explained, like the demarcation in 1921, the gradual layering of controls across it, including customs and security, then the UK and Ireland’s accession to the European Economic Community in 1973. The lecture dealt with the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement and its impact on the conflict in Northern Ireland, namely it introduced multilevel modes of governance across the island of Ireland and between the UK and Ireland. The workshop reflected the development of new forms of governance across the Irish border that have developed during the twenty years since the Agreement, like local authority cooperation and the functioning of the so-called ‘implementation bodies’ for managing cross-border cooperation in several areas. Moreover, Hayward outlined the main options that have been set out for the future management of the UK’s borders with the EU, specifically at the Irish border.

Finally, the closing governance lecture was presented by Olivier Thomas Kramsch from Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. This workshop was rather theoretical and it applied theoretical point of view. The concept of ‘b/ordering space’ was thoroughly explained, namely moving away from hegemonic naturalism, which was dominant within the field of border studies, and introduction of social constructivist lenses, thus borders are not seen from pure materialist angles, namely interpreting borders as strict ‘lines’, but rather they embody powerful and deep-going social constructions, imaginations, narrative sociabilities, clashes between us/them, ‘purification’ of space and performances. In other words, the issue of border is seen as a constant renegotiation process between the involved parties and power relations. The governance workshop introduced two other elements next to the
bordering concept, like ‘horizon’ and ‘vanishing points’, where the political potential of horizon are spaces that have vanishing points. Those vanishing points often have the potential to develop/ rethink the relationship of the Self/Other nexus. Moreover, the workshop combined border theories with postcolonial theories, thus articulating strong criticism of the EU because of its strategy of conditionality and the accession process, where the new and candidate countries are object to strong power relations.

The current book contains all the presented lectures at the series of governance workshops between the period of September 2017 and May 2018. The performed governance workshops were recorded with the approval of the lecturers. The oral presentations were typed into written form and they were edited by the lecturers themselves. The presented lectures in this book preserved the original style of the oral presentation which makes the lectures more readable and enjoyable.

The book is primarily recommended for the academic community, for students of geography and political sciences, and for those readers who are interested in topics, like cross-border cooperation, cross-border governance, borders, boundaries, frontiers, identity, sovereignty, geopolitics, international relations and/or Brexit.
Bibliography


Jean Peyrony is the Director General of the Paris-based Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière, the MOT which is a think-tank established by the French Government to support cross-border cooperation around France. Jean Peyrony has been coordinating the work of the MOT since 2011. Before his current position, he was already employed by the MOT between 2006 and 2008 as the director of development. Subsequently, he worked at the DG REGIO as a desk officer of European urban policy between 2008 and 2011. From 1992 to 1999, he managed the work of the regional observation group at Île-de-France directorate general and shortly in Réunion. He was responsible for the territorial cooperation and cohesion policy related activities of the DATAR, the interministerial delegation of spatial planning and regional attractiveness of France, between 1999 and 2005.
I will address cross-border governance through different aspects. First, I will give an introduction about the three levels of cross-border governance, and I will give three concrete examples. One example is the case of a cross-border territory, which is Greater Geneva at the border between France and Switzerland. Then, I will speak about 2 other examples of cross-border public services: the tramway between Strasbourg and Kehl at the French German border, and the hospital of Cerdanya between Spain and France.

Then, I will move to actual happenings. There is a new narrative about cross-border cooperation, which is linked with obstacles and solutions, thus I will try to explain this new context, and I will go through the tool box of cross-border governance in this new context. There are 3 big dimensions. First is the governance of cross-border territories with the support of legal tools, like EGTCs, which are well known in Hungary. Second, there is the topic of coordination at the scale of the border, particularly as regards the legal and institutional issues. And the third tool is the Interreg which provides projects with financial support from the EU. That means we really need to address these 3 different aspects in order to have a clear and complete picture on cross-border cooperation. I will finish my presentation by giving some future perspectives on cross-border cooperation and borders.

I am fully aware that I speak within an academic context now. However, I am a practitioner, as the role of the Mission opérationnelle transfrontalière (MOT) is to help to develop cross-border projects for the inhabitants of the border regions. But I think that it is very important to discuss these topics between practitioners and researchers, especially when they are interested in concrete developments. Subsequently, my presentation will be rather practical. Sometimes I like to refer to academics and their scientific approaches, but I will not develop this path during the workshop; nevertheless, if you are interested, we can also have a theoretical discussion after, too.

The MOT has around 70 members, mainly located on the French borders, on the two sides of the border. Our headquarters are located in Paris, but we do not defend the French interests.
Rather, we defend and promote cross-border interests. We have members, mainly local authorities that are French, but also Belgian, Luxemburgish, German, Swiss, Italian and Spanish. Furthermore, we have also a good number of cross-border groupings, like EGTCs and others. The MOT has also the strong support of French national institutions (certain ministries, and Caisse des dépôts, the national promotional bank). What is more, 3 states are members of the MOT: Luxemburg, Monaco and Andorra. The last two mentioned states are really small ones, but for them it is important to be involved in this discussion of cross-border cooperation not only locally. Moreover, we maintain good relations with the EU institutions. We will discuss later our common projects with the Commission, where CESCI is also involved.

Around 40% of the territory of Europe is directly concerned by cross-border cooperation- figure based on the areas eligible to Interreg A programmes. There are 37 cross-border conurbations in Europe. You have 20,000 km of internal EU borders; 1 European from 3 citizens live in border areas and there are 2 million cross-border workers in the EU, i.e. people who cross the border between their house and work more than once a week. 20% of these cross-border workers live in France. This is very specific and is one of the main reasons why cross-border cooperation is really important in France.

Source: MOT – www.espaces-transfrontaliers.eu
For us, cross-border cooperation is first a local issue. In many territories of Europe we can find a city with surroundings, but it is crossed by the border. To a certain extent it’s an ordinary city. There is a river which is the border, but there is a bridge on the river, thus people cross the border in order to go to work or go to the hospital. There are cross border flows, trains and other cross border services, giving shape to “cross border territories”. But, there is still a border which generates obstacles, and this leads to the second level of cross-border cooperation.

Even if, due to the European integration process, there is free movement between countries, member states are still there; the border is a national institution and in reality we are not without borders. The borders are there and we have to live with them. The basic point is that border territories in each nation state are considered as peripheral areas and this fact is simply evidence. Subsequently, cross-border territories are not always taken into account by national policies with that specificity, even if they are a resource not only for the local authority, for the states as such.

Cross-border cooperation: a multi-level approach

National level

- Peripheral areas
- Areas that are not taken into account by national policies
- Areas where the border is a resource (cross-border workers, common use of equipments...)
- A place of coexistence for two or more systems

Source: MOT – www.espaces-transfrontaliers.eu

The border is not only a physical line, it is really the place, where two or more systems coexist with each other. Moreover, understanding of the reality is done through the conceptions of policies which are framed within national context, so on each border we have to deal with this encounter of different national systems.
And, of course we have the European level which is a facilitator of cross-border cooperation for two reasons. The first reason is that the aim of the European Union is not to destroy the borders, but to open them and to allow free circulation, to facilitate cross-border cooperation and interactions. The second reason is that the EU has developed specific instruments, like Interreg, to facilitate cross border cooperation which is well known by you. Without any doubts, cross-border territories appear as experimental sites of the European construction.

From the public policy point of view, there are different duties for the administrations at different levels. It is clear that the local level is on the front line, as these territories have to be managed by local authorities. In the MOT we believe that it is up to the local stakeholders, local administrations and local mayors or politicians to deal with cross-border cooperation and to develop projects. But, you also need to have the national level in order to support cooperation of local and regional stakeholders, to manage cooperation between them in their field of competences because the states keep their competences, notably as regards sovereignty - the police and security. This is still a duty of states. States have to coordinate their activities across the borders, in cooperation with local authorities. And at the European level, policies are not fully “territorially aware” of the
reality of border regions, so there is a need to develop territorial impact assessment of sectoral policies, beyond Interreg funding. The EU has also the responsibility to develop legal tools like EGTC, and networking frames to facilitate exchanges and capitalization about borders all over Europe with programs like Interact and so on.

**From government to flexible multi-level governance**

We have two different territorial orders that coexist with each other in our modern life in Europe. On the left of the schema, you may see the classical, so called Westphalian order with nested governments. All the countries are different and the EU does not make any legislation about the internal organization of the country. States keep the “competence of competence”, as German lawyers say. But basically, you have always municipalities and sometimes intermediate authorities. This is the classical approach what we have been taught. However, on the right of the schema you can see that new things are in move, due to increasing mobility across administrative and sometimes national borders that create “functional territories”,

*Source: "Cities of tomorrow: Challenges, visions, ways forward", European Union – Regional Policy, October 2011*
and are the field of soft governance. For example, there are the metropolitan areas like Budapest, Paris, Geneva as well, and these areas generally go across the administrative borders as the cities grow and the institutions do not follow the reality of life. Sometimes you can make reforms in order to fit the reality better, but you cannot modify the institutions every day, because life is simply changing. Subsequently, you have these metropolitan areas and some tend to be cross-border in their activity. And nobody intends to change national borders, just because of the growth of a city.

At an upper level, you have also some cross-border regions or even some macro-regions. You have been working hard in this part of Europe with the Danube strategy. These regions are relevant to deal with some policy aspects, like the management of a river, of big transport infrastructure, cooperation between cities in economic development and other interactions. These areas are important, but they do not replace the states because nobody intends to change the borders of the states in order to manage a river. And even at the European level, there are institutions which have significant impact and influence, but the European Union as such is often considered as a soft institution. It is not an institution which is similar to regular state structures. It has a variable geometry (Schengen, the Eurozone, etc.), its member states can leave the Union and the Brexit exactly demonstrates this aspect of the European Union. What is important here is not that this new soft approach has replaced the hard and older approach. In fact, both approaches coexist and interact with each other at various moments. Thus, there are always two sides of the coin. I do not want to bring too much theory, but there is a quite interesting academic literature, i.e. Hooghe and Marks, who have been publishing together for more than 10 years about the mentioned two types of governance and the manners of their mutual complement. And, this literature is fully operative about cross-border cooperation, alongside governance of metropolitan areas, and governance of the EU.

Now, I will try to be more concrete and test my hypothesis. I will speak about a fascinating cross-border territory, which is the Greater Geneva. This territory is located between Switzerland and France.
It is just at the end of the lac Léman; just above Genève you have the district of Nyon, which is in the canton of Vaud, another Swiss canton. Nevertheless, this part of the canton is in fact a suburb of Genève. And all the territories in grey are French territories that surround Genève. This border has been designed in 1815 in the Vienna Congress, after the defeat of France. Probably, the border could have been made further away from the centre of Genève, however, this was a Calvinist city and at this time it wanted to stay within religious homogeneity. The border is there and nobody wants to change this border now. Subsequently, there is a need to manage the territory that goes across the national border.

More than 100,000 people move from France to Genève every day in order to work. Many of them are French people, but not all of them. You have also Swiss citizens who live on the French side, which is a classical phenomenon around metropolises, because the city is dense and the surrounding peripheral area with mountains is cheaper and very nice since it is near to the Mount Blanc. So some Swiss people prefer to have a nice house in France and they commute to work every day back to Genève. Consequently, a tremendous flow of people needs to be organized in some way through public transport, because it turns into a nightmare if everybody use their own car.
Cross border governance

Source: www.grand-geneve.org/
This huge flow of people has generated significant cooperation with planning exercise and experience. I will not present this planning in details, but here you can see the master plan of the Greater Geneva which has been elaborated by both Swiss and French authorities, with the specificity that regulatory urban planning remains a national competence. However, it does not prevent to coordinate the plans and to implement a cross-border master plan. The most important aspect is that this master plan is successfully implemented and I will give you an example later in my presentation.

Source: www.grand-geneve.org
Management of cross-border governance also plays a crucial role. The CRFG – Comité régional franco-genevois was established in 1973 between Switzerland and France and between the local authorities that existed at that time - specifically 2 Départements in France, and the canton of Genève in Switzerland. The committee was established because the commuters pay their revenue taxation in Switzerland which is unfair, to a certain extent, to the French side. Thus, the Swiss authorities agreed to refund to France a certain amount on the basis of the number of cross-border workers. This is a quite interesting agreement and it is managed by this binational committee.

On the French side, a decentralisation process was launched in 1982. For instance, the local authorities gained more power in the field of urban planning. Since then, the local authorities make their plans and deal with their public services, etc. So, these local authorities have created together with Swiss authorities a cross-border organization which is the LGCC (Local Grouping of Cross border Cooperation). It is basically like an EGTC. It is a legal tool that existed before the EGTC, according to the Karlsruhe Agreement between France, Switzerland, Germany and Luxembourg, in the framework of the Council of Europe’s Madrid Convention. I will come back to that issue later.

What does the LGCC of the Greater Geneva do? First, it has a political assembly that brings together the mayors from the Swiss and French sides; and there is a technical team, but it is important to underline that this is not a big team. It is something like 20 people. Their duty is to make coordination between the 3 sides of the border (France, Genève and Vaud). They manage the Greater Geneva, but when you manage big cities, like Budapest or Lyon, there are thousands of people who work on the management. Here, there are only 20 people. There is also the Agglomeration Forum, which is a sort of economic and social committee involving cross border stakeholders. So the governance for cross-border cooperation is very specific, but it works and it produces projects.
Probably, the most fascinating project is the cross border regional train, the “Leman Express”. Historically there is the French railway system and the Swiss railway system, and the train coming from Paris to Genève. But that was all, the 2 systems were not connected with each other. The regional train will be opened at the end of 2019 between the airport of Genève and Annemasse, which is a French city, part of these Genevan suburbs. This is a short railway - 16 km, but it fully connects the two national train systems. In other words, the reality will be a regional express network (230 km and 45 stations), thus making regular relations between the 2 parts of the cross border territory. This development will be very important for the agglomeration and also for the cities which are further away from Genève, like Annecy or Lausanne. They will be directly interconnected and it will lead to a new extension of Greater Geneva.

The French side also intends to develop its own attractiveness, but the metropolis of Geneva, which has a global dimension with international organisations like UNO, is an opportunity for the French side, too. Hence, it is good that there is this connection.
between them. If appropriate public policy is implemented, then it can be a win-win game for both sides. Further interesting aspect is the investment that is shared between the two sides of the border, the national levels contribute and even the Swiss federal level contributes, also on the French territory. Subsequently, it mirrors that the whole issue of cooperation is not left solely to the local authorities.

In conclusion of this case of Greater Geneva, I would like to give a theoretical insight. Two French sociologists, Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot¹, have shown that in democratic countries, the coordination of actors is based on 6 registers of justification that they call “cities”: the city market; the industrial (or functional) city; the civic city; the city of opinion; the inspired city; and the domestic city (city based of individual links). These “cities” coexist, they enter into conflicts and compromises. These 6 dimensions exist in each country - with arrangements which are specific to each country; but also at the European level and also within a cross-border territory like Greater Geneva. That means that there is a sort of parallel, which I use as a narrative. Europe, specifically the European Union, has been built first as a common, then as Single market, and an industrial and functional entity (transport networks, etc.). Europe has been progressively built as a civic and political entity (see for example the European Parliament). A Europe of media and a Europe of culture (“moral and spiritual heritage”) are also already there, or they are under construction. Even, people often say it is not enough what you have now, more interpersonal aspects, like Erasmus, should be promoted. It is funny to see the ways how the European Commission tries to communicate about Erasmus, counting the number of marriages that were generated by the Erasmus students. We feel that Europe is something which is connected with human relations.

These 6 dimensions exist also in the cross-border territories. Market of course: cross-border workers and consumers, cross-border territories are also local markets. There is a functional reality, or there

should be a functional reality of cross-border public services, such as trains, hospitals, etc. There is also a civic reality which is a little bit paradoxical, because civic realities are generally caught in national systems; but cross-border territories want to create a governance, involving the citizens and the elected people. The aim would be to have some kind of cross-border media, it is not obvious, but it certainly would be a progress. Furthermore, we need to have cross-border people to people projects, i.e. to make sure that people meet and know each other. This should be natural, but it requires to be accompanied. In many border areas, there is a withdrawal of the knowledge of the other side. For instance, if you take France and Germany in a region like Alsace, the traditional language was very close to the German language. And you might think that we are in peace now, it is good for the people of Alsace to learn German and so to be able go to Germany, or to Switzerland since there is a German speaking part of Switzerland around Basel, to get jobs or simply to meet other people and the same the other way round. But it is not the case, as the knowledge of the German language by the French is falling down and the reverse in Germany for French is also true. Thus, there is really something to be done, namely support the people to people interaction and also the dimension of culture and communication. If we come back to Geneva, there is no language problem, but there have been populistic movements since a couple of years in Switzerland. In 2014, there was a “votation” following a citizen’s initiative, a referendum about the limitation of work migration - including cross-border work. And the Swiss people voted against the federal government, so to limit work migration. This is an economic absurdity because Switzerland and its economy need this cross-border workforce, but people voted in the other direction. We cannot change the people, as Bertolt Brecht said, so we have to live with that. Consequently, these issues have being progressively solved now. The Swiss administration has found a way to make modifications in these areas, but without really preventing cross border work. So, this is becoming quieter now. The good news is that the real life goes on, people still cross the border in order to go to their workplace and the technical projects go on, too. In other words, the market city and the functional city are in
better shape than the civic city. You have always a sort of balance between these different dimensions. On the other hand, if there is too much separation between people, in their representations, in the way how they see the world, then problems may easily appear. The cross border civic, inspired, informed and interpersonal cities remain to be built.

In the French journal “le Monde”, there was an interview with a UK citizen one year after the Brexit. The journalist asked ‘how did you vote and what do you think now about your vote’. The English guy said that he had voted for Brexit. He said that his heart voted for Brexit, his portfolio wanted to vote against Brexit and his head did not know. It is absolutely the same in the cross-border territories. Our representations of life are generally made within national contexts, within our states. The reality can be that we have good reasons to cross the borders, and it is a win-win game. However, you have a conflict between different narratives. There is a need to reconcile personal and collective narratives, today mainly national, across borders and in overall Europe.

Another example which is at the border between France and Germany is a tramline between the French city of Strasbourg and the German city of Kehl, just the other side of the Rhine.

The big German cities are farther from the border. There is a natural expansion of the city of Strasbourg, thus Kehl can be considered as a suburb area of Strasbourg. There were bus connections, but there was no tramway connection between the two cities. Strasbourg has a very efficient city tramway system and the idea was to assure that this tramway crosses the Rhine. It was inaugurated in May 2017. It is not only a transport project, but it is also an urban project, because it was an opportunity to develop new districts on the French bank of the Rhine.

This is the technical organisation and the funding organisation of the tramway project. (which is different from the governance of the agglomeration, based on an EGTC.) You have the two public authorities at the top, it is Eurométropole de Strasbourg (EMS), the local authority in France managing Strasbourg, and it is the city of Kehl in Germany. There is a convention between EMS and Kehl
to organise the cooperation about this project. Then, the problem was who will fund and manage the tramway. It is a French tramway: one of the lines of the tramway crosses the Rhine, but it is a very minor part of the system. The real authority for this project is CTS, Compagnie des Transport Strasbourgeois that means Strasbourg Transport Company which manages all the system of transport of Strasbourg. The two sides of the border contracted with this transport company, located in France, with the aim to develop the project. As for the infrastructure, it had 3 subparts: the French part, the German part, and the bridge itself.

The funding of the project is also quite interesting. It is a project which cost around 105 million Euros. There were the local authorities, putting some 70 million Euros from the Eurométropole Strasbourg, around 26 million Euros from the city of Kehl. The German side pays a smaller part since the German territory involved in the project is smaller than the French part. And there is additional funding, from the French state, from the Land and also from the Bund, the federal level in Germany. There is 3 million Euro from Interreg. It means only 3 percent of the project are funded by
Interreg. The point is that the Interreg program in the area of upper Rhine that has something like 200 million Euros (ERDF + co-financing) for the whole programming period for the whole region. If you would have funded the whole tramway, it would have been one half of the program. So, it is not realistic. People would say, we need more money, more Interreg, and I am not against that, but on the other hand, we have to consider things differently. Interreg has
to facilitate cross border projects, for instance to make the studies. Nevertheless, if we have strategic projects which aim is to co-develop the two sides of the border, then we also need to have national or regional funding, not only Interreg. This may be true in the context of Hungary: you have some money from the regional programmes; in some cases, it could be interesting that part of these regional programmes fund cross-border projects. This topic is important for the future of Interreg. Should Interreg fund the whole projects, or should regional programmes also contribute? This is a real issue.

Different difficulties are met in such a project, like different cultures and/or administrative procedures on the 2 sides of the border. For instance, the public consultation processes are different in France and in Germany, so in that case it was necessary to coordinate the 2 processes. There was also the financial issue, namely who pays for what? They found a solution, not only to fund the infrastructure, but also to define a ticketing system. In Strasbourg, you can pay for one travel, one day, one week for the overall transport system. But, can the German people have access to this? They do not just cross the bridge. The interest is that we can travel in all Strasbourg areas, so they had to find an agreement. They found a way that is acceptable for both parties. The lesson of this project is that it is a success, but basically it took 10-12 years and probably it could have been faster.

There are new ideas, proposed by Luxembourg, to develop a new legal tool – the “European Cross Border Convention” to facilitate such projects, by a sort of local mutual recognition of the norms across the border. I will explain this later.

Third presented example, which is also quite interesting, is the cross-border hospital of Cerdanya. It is located at the border between France and Spain. Cerdanya is a very nice cross border mountainous area near Andorra, a plateau with many tourists in the summer and in winter. Historically, there is no hospital on the French side and there was an old hospital on the Spanish side, which was no longer financially sustainable. Subsequently, the idea was to promote a cross-border hospital between Spain and France with a funding from Interreg. The attempt was successful and the hospital opened in 2014.
The French people previously had to go to Perpignan which is the city on the sea shore that can be reached by car in two hours, hence in case of illness this distance is too much for the patients. Currently, the cross-border hospital allows health care treatment for both the French and Spanish patients. And this works.

The hospital is not only about walls and infrastructure constructions. These were not the most difficult domains of project realisation. The building of the hospital was funded with the help of the Interreg. The hospital is managed by an EGTC, which shows that the EGTC can be utilized for territorial government, but also for management of public services. The hospital itself is located in Puigcerdà, on the Spanish side. The 2 main partners of the project are, the Ministry of Health of the Generalitat of Catalonia for the Spanish side, since Catalonia has the competency of health. For the French side, it is the Government of the French Republic, because health is a national competence in France. (Namely, it is the regional agency of health, which is a national, de-concentrated agency.) This demonstrates that dissymmetry very often appears in the context of cross-border cooperation. The added value of the EGTC is that
it allows to involve local and national members as well. And in that case it was necessary.

The hospital is in Spain and the majority of activities are performed in Spain. The statutes of the EGTC specify that there is a 60/40 share between Spain and France, as well for financing of the investments and functioning. Simply, the cross-border hospital is a French hospital for the French people, and it is a Catalan hospital for the Catalan people.

The investment which was 30 million Euro was funded by Interreg, with a rate of 65 % of the investment. However, a hospital is not only about walls, but it needs nurses, medicines, etc. Hence, assuring the functional part of the health care system was the trickiest part. I will develop this aspect.

Again, I take the 6 dimensions for coordination of actors, the Boltanski and Thévenot approach. In a normal, domestic hospital, you have already these 6 dimensions. A hospital is something functional, it needs technical and administrative arrangements, because it is about health care, you need to define the procedures of health care, use of machines, protocols, etc.

Moreover, a hospital is an economic thing. That means: costs of health care have to be covered. The question is the following, who will pay the costs? Will it be the market, public system or a combination of both? Furthermore, there is also a civic dimension of the hospital, i.e. local and regional politicians have their say in the issues of the hospital: notably its location. These domains are the basic issues that are needed to be solved.

You have also other issues that relate to the hospital, like the dimension of information and opinion. There are different opinions about health, like how should we cure, should we make this care or not, etc. Besides of these, interpersonal matters also appear as important aspect. It is also a relationship between nurses, doctors and patients. In each country you have a national medical order which is a sort of confraternity, with the Hippocratic Oath, this very old Greek vow, where the doctors promise to cure the people. All these different spheres (functional, economic, civic, opinion, cultural, interpersonal) coexist in a hospital. The life of a hospital
Health is priceless, but not costless, so we have to take decisions. What do we do? For example, how long will we maintain artificially the care of a very old person? There are trade-offs between economic and functional considerations on one side, and interpersonal and civic considerations on the other side. Another question is can we keep the local hospital or should we suppress the hospital and ask the people to travel 20 km away to go to a more efficient hospital? You have economic versus civic, interpersonal and ethical issues. In a domestic hospital, there is the national framework that shapes the decision process. For the economic versus functional discussion, you have a national social security system: the national administration decides which health care interventions can be made; it will be reimbursed this amount, no more, no less. Moreover, there is a health spatial planning, which gives shape to the discussion whether to keep this hospital or to merge two hospitals into one hospital. These questions are decided in a national framework. Some people complain, but decisions are taken, and they are legitimate. A national ethic committee exists that gives rules about how to decide for expensive caring in case when the treated person is not conscious, etc. These discussions exist in every country, and they are not easy questions, but there is a frame, where these discussions take place.

If there is a cross-border hospital then suddenly there are 2 systems. In France, the social security system is Bismarckian: it is not a state system. Decisions are taken by the representatives of the employers and employees. In Spain, it is the Beveridgian system, the English system, thus it is more a state system. Subsequently, the 2 systems coexist. It does not mean that the issues are different, because the cross-border hospital has to deal with the same issues of life and death, which are common to the whole humanity. The main difference is that there is a need to build a third frame, a cross-border frame instead of the two national frames. In the case of the Cerdanya hospital, some issues are already solved, but some issues have not been solved, yet. For instance, the doctors have to pay fee to their national professional order, and there is a big difference between the fees in France and in Spain, which is not
Fair. Functional decisions have to be taken: what are the norms of the caring, how the diploma should be acknowledged on the other side of the border? In this case, the question of acknowledgment has been basically solved by empirical decisions, admitting that the French nurses can be acknowledged within the Catalonian health system. This question is not solved at the European level, thus there is a need to make decision on how to acknowledge diplomas and certifications on the other side.

There are the civic issues, e.g. can the police perform an inquiry after a traffic accident on the other side of the border? To be more specific, if there is a car accident in France when the patients are taken into the hospital, can the French police go to the hospital to interview the people? At the moment, there is no possibility to do that, since this issue is unsolved.

Further question is that of economic wages. How much the workers are going to be paid? There are people who work permanently in the hospital, so they are hired by the EGTC, but there are also the doctors from the French side who work only for two days in the hospital. The solution is empirical. Why? Because the economies of the two sides are different, hence there is no ideal solution. Furthermore, there was the question of lunch break. The lunch break is different in Spain and in France. In France, people eat generally at noon or at 1 PM, but in the hospital it is usually 11:30. In Spain, people eat quite late, around 1:30 PM. So they had to decide. Subsequently, a middle ground was found between the two habits and they decided that the lunch break will be at 12:30, which is a reasonable solution. However, this was not the most difficult issue to solve.

There are further problems linked with individuals, e.g. to declare the birth when you have a French baby born in Spain. The general rule for a baby born abroad is that you have to go to the closest Consulate. But the Consulate of France is in Barcelona. So, they had to find a system which allows that the declaration can be done in the hospital. Moreover, there was also a problem with the dead people. The general rule for people dying abroad is that the dead body needs to be taken across the border within a sealed coffin, which is more expensive. It took several years to reach an agreement saying that
for every person who dies in France or in Spain and he/she is a citizen of the other country, there is no need of a sealed coffin. Miracle! In that case the hospital has provoked a general bilateral agreement valid for the two countries and not only for the case of the hospital. It really shows that such cross-border public services are real “laboratories”, machines to solve obstacles. Here it works, because the patients want to live, the doctors want to cure and there is a team which cooperates. Cooperation is heavily based on human factor and willingness.

The EU has helped, Interreg has funded, but the transaction costs have been heavy. It took more than 10 years, and it was very difficult. There are still grey areas concerning the legal security of certain arrangements. This is where we think that the new tool proposed by Luxembourg should be considered, I will come back to this.

Most probably, the national health systems will go on and we will not have a fully European interoperable health system soon, thus the basic aim is not to harmonize, but to coordinate the national health systems and to bridge them across on the borders.

Now, I move to the new paradigm of cross-border cooperation. We have something interesting in the Treaty of Lisbon, which is the issue of territorial cohesion. The article 174 says that cross-border regions are areas of interest where we want to realize territorial cohesion. The framework is clear, Europe is a single market and it supports the freedom of movement, but Europe also aims to achieve cohesion, meaning public intervention for the solidarity and cooperation.

Something happened in 2015. It was the 25th birthday of Interreg. The Commission launched the cross-border review. There were big European consultation and studies, CESCI and MOT were involved as stakeholders. The Commission published a communication with proposals of new policies at the EU, national and local level. Another thing happened in 2015, there was the Luxemburg Presidency of the Council and Luxemburg put the cross-border question at the top of its priorities. Cross-border cooperation was discussed in the General Affairs Council, gathering the Ministers in charge of European Affairs, and it does not happen every day. I think it
was even the first time. Moreover, there was a ministerial meeting on territorial cohesion which discussed cross-border cooperation, where Luxembourg made a proposal for a new tool. They launched a working group about innovative solutions towards cross-border obstacles. This working group has met several times, and it has gathered ten to twelve countries, including France, Hungary, etc., and the EU institutions. Participation in this working group is based on a voluntary basis. AEBR, CESCI, MOT are present as stakeholders, and we produced a report that is available on the website of MOT, who keeps the secretariat of the group. This working group made 2 things, a review of obstacles and solutions was made, and we developed two new ideas.

First, let us say few words about the Commission Consultation. So, the Commission asked people what are the obstacles on the borders? The following results were found: the first category of obstacles is linked with legal and administrative dimensions. It was not a surprise. The second dimension of obstacles is generated by different languages and cultures. It was a surprise neither for you nor for us, but it was a surprise for the Commission. The Commission works in strong English-speaking environment and they think that everybody can speak English. However, people expressed that the best way for cross-border cooperation is to speak the language of the neighbour. The third dimension is the issue of physical access. Once again, this was not a surprise. Some borders are indeed very tough.

Now, I move to the work of the working group and to the process of obstacle mapping. This issue is not new. The Council of Europe has been working hard on these topics. There was a consultation, around 2010. All the countries of the Council of Europe were asked to list obstacles and solutions. And this led to a very good analysis, which can be found on the website of the Council of Europe and of the ISIG institute, based in Gorizia, at the border between Italy and Slovenia. CESCI and MOT have been working with these topics, too. If you want to build a typology of cross-border obstacles, you can identify different borders and different geographical areas, mountains, cross-border agglomerations, etc. There are also different levels of solutions, i.e. some obstacles have to be solved locally and some obstacles require national ore even European intervention.
Moreover, obstacles are linked with certain sectorial policies, like employment, transport, etc. ISIG also identified what they call the nature of obstacles. They identified 6 types of obstacles which are the following ones: technical and administrative obstacles, legal and institutional obstacles, economic obstacles, cultural obstacles, obstacles linked with lack of knowledge, and obstacles linked with lack of propensity to cooperate. I like this because it simply fits with the 6 categories issued from the two French sociologists, Boltanski and Thévenot. These 6 categories of obstacles more or less correspond to functional, civic, market, inspired, opinion and interpersonal dimensions. Typologies are never perfect, but it really shows, that when we make public policies, we are very much (and it is normal) in the topic of institutions, legislation, technical rules, political discussion or market. We are less aware about the other dimensions that are the culture, the shared information, or simply the relations between people. And if you miss these dimensions, things will not work either at European or at local level.

Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly is one of the leading academics dealing with the issue of the borders. He lives in Canada, and he elaborated a general theory of borders. He works mainly in English language, where there are several words which describe the border itself, like border, frontier and boundary. He recalls that ‘boundary’ is linked with ‘bind’. And, boundaries bind nation-states. It is very important to understand that. Before being a limit with the other country, boundary is something that is directed inwards, a thing that binds a country. It is the national system that frames our daily life and also the way how we think. Boltanski says that states do not only have the monopole of violence – as Max Weber said, but also the monopole of evidence. The problem is not so much that we do not like our neighbours. We like the neighbours very often, but our attention concentrates on our fellow citizens.

Basically, the working group elaborated on 3 big categories of obstacles leading to 3 categories of public policies. One category of obstacles is linked with economic costs, supposed to be addressed by financial support, like Interreg. Obstacles linked with institutional dimension can be solved for example through the instrument of
EGTC. Administrative and legal obstacles are category of obstacles for which there is no specific European tool at the moment.

Now, I will present these 3 categories and go through tools providing institutional solutions, e.g. EGTCs and others. Then, I will move to tools which provide legal and administrative solutions. And, then I will speak about financial solutions, because there is also something to tell about the future of Interreg.

I will address first the classical legal theory of cross-border governance. In the so-called Westphalian order, cross-border cooperation is basically a form of relations between the neighbours that are developed by local authorities and local groupings on both sides of the border. That means it is a method how local actors exercise their competences within the national systems, and it definitely does not provide new competences to the local authorities. This is very important. The fact that you cooperate does not give you any new competences, but it is a possibility to jointly exercise your competences. It is based on volunteering and of course it is not compulsory. Local authorities and their groupings cooperate in their common areas and cooperation respects national legislation. Local partners do not have regulatory functions which remain at the state level.

How can local authorities and groupings formalise their cooperation? There are different ways to do that. They can make a convention which is the ordinary process. That means it is not always necessary to establish an EGTC. Nevertheless, in some cases there is a need to make legal structures with legal personality and this is when EGTCs are formed. In other cases, other legal frameworks might be applied, like associations or EEIG, European Economic Interest Grouping. There are also bilateral agreements signed by neighbouring states that create a certain form of cooperation, and you have also the internal law of local authorities in every country that can describe such tools. In any case, these structures have to use the law of the country, where their seat is located. It is important to underline that local authorities cannot go beyond their internal competences and prerogatives.
Before the EGTC, there was the Madrid Outline Convention, a convention of the Council of Europe. It gives a general framework to define bilateral or multilateral agreements concerning cross border cooperation. For instance, we have as many agreements as neighbouring countries in France. We have an agreement between France and Belgium; an agreement which is multilateral with Luxemburg, Germany, and Switzerland, which is the Karlsruhe Agreement. There is an agreement with Italy, and one with Spain. All these agreements existed before the formulation of the EGTC by the European Union.

There was the LGCC in the Karlsruhe Agreement, the Consorcio between France and Spain, etc. If you take French borders, the different cross-border territories and the different equipment have taken this or that legal form. That means there is a toolbox. For instance let’s consider the cross-border Chamber of Commerce between France and Spain in Pays Basque. The French Chambers of Commerce are public entities, but they are private in Spain, and in that case they used the EEIG, the EU legal tool for cooperation between private entities, because they could not use the EGTC. In some cases, the EGTC is used and other forms are used in other cases.

I am going to tell some words about EGTCs, since I think it is a cross-border tool that interests you. EGTC can have an annual budget, voted by an assembly. It can apply for Interreg subsidies, but it is not necessarily linked with Interreg. It can employ staff, for example, as I explained in the case of cross-border hospital, there is the permanent staff of the EGTC. Moreover, the EGTC can enter into contracts in order to acquire goods and services, thus it can be considered as a very good tool of cross-border interaction. The members can be local authorities, their groupings or even states. More widely, it can be any legal person that applies the rules of public procurement; that means public authorities, not only strictly national or regional authorities, and can be also associations of these authorities and non-EU legal entities under certain conditions. For example, it is possible to have an EGTC with Switzerland now in France. The EGTC can manage cross-border cooperation programmes and projects with or without European funding. Each
member state is competent to define the EGTC system, to interpret the regulation, to define the EGTC liability system and to authorize the establishment of EGTC or to suggest any changes. It is really a possibility for national governments to control that the local authorities do not do things that are not allowed to do and which go beyond their competences.

There are two EGTC champions in Europe, one is Hungary and another one is France. In France, we favour public approach of public services, and we think that such public services require some institutional building; the first EGTC was decided by Pierre Mauroy, who was a former Prime Minister. He was a great politician, who made decentralisation in France and he was also very much European. As Mayor of Lille, he wanted to establish the first EGTC in order to govern the metropolis of Lille with Kortrijk and Tournai in Belgium. His political view was that cross borders territories require public governance, based on the common commitment of politicians on both sides of the border, working with a public cross-border team to manage the territory. On other European borders, you have more private or soft arrangements. It does not mean that cooperation is bad, but it reflects different traditions.

I would like to mention a nice project that we had with Hungary. It was the moment when we met Gyula and then it led to the creation of CESCI. The project was about the governance of transfrontier conurbations (so the acronym was EGTC), within the URBACT programme. The lessons of this project was that you need to develop these cross-border conurbations, both political commitment and technical work, but you also need to give a space for the population, thus connecting the leaders and the citizens and to develop a sense of cross-border community. It is once again those 6 dimensions and you cannot leave them only to the politicians or to the technicians.

Now, I move to legal and administrative obstacles and to solutions that consist in coordination of public policies regarding the borders, which necessarily involve states at the national level.
On the French-Belgian border, there has been a good example of such a coordination, involving local, as well national authorities on the 3 sides of the border (France; Wallonia and Flanders for Belgium), supported by MOT. You, with CESCI, did interesting things in the domain of obstacles around Hungary. You cannot just leave it to the local authorities. You need to involve national administrations, too.

A good example is what Germany does. Germany is a federal country, so the Länder and the local authorities are even more in charge of the cross-border cooperation than the local authorities in France. On the other hand, the federal level also actively works on cross-border cooperation. At first, they have worked on the so-called polycentric metropolitan regions. Within Germany, some of them cross the borders of the Länder, for example in the case of Hamburg. Hamburg is a big city, but its functional urban region covers 3 Länder, and they do not want to change the borders of the Länder. At the federal level, they have launched “MORO” projects, on the basis of call for projects, with the federal technical office, the BBSR, providing assistance. It helped to improve the governance of metropolitan regions around Hamburg or Mannheim. The second step was to make it within the cross-border context, with a new call for projects, where CB regions, like Euroregion Maas-Rhine involving Belgium and the Netherlands, Greater region involving Belgium, Luxembourg and France, Upper Rhine with France and Switzerland, and so on.

It also led to a map included in a federal plan which is in fact co-decided by the Bund and the Länder in Germany. And this plan acknowledges the reality of cross-border metropolitan regions. It is interesting to see a federal government that acknowledges such a reality.

Furthermore, Germany also has a pilot project with Poland, aiming at cross border planning for the Brandenburg in Germany and the Polish border regions. Again, this is a commitment of the Bund, the federal level. It shows that even in a country which is fully aware of subsidiarity feels the need to act at national level.
Source: BBSR (Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development), Germany
I finally move to the third category of obstacles and answer about the funding of cross border cooperation and support tools, like Interreg. I do not insist, as you know Interreg. I just want to mention a quite promising approach, the ITI (Integrated Territorial Investment). Why is it a promising approach? Because it allows reconciliation of a territorial, integrated approach with sectorial approaches, basically the Europe 2020 objectives with these big vertical priorities, like low-carbon, employment, education, etc. Theoretically, the ITI is a good tool, but it has not been fully implemented at the moment. Subsequently, we need to think about better implementation of the regulation in the future.

Now, I propose to have a look into the future, keeping in mind my 6 dimensions of cohesion and obstacles. What do we want for the future of cooperation? We want market cross-border regions, we want to help cross-border workers, consumers, SMEs, etc. We want functional cross-border regions with cross-border public services, strategies and planning vision of territories. Moreover, we want civic cross-border regions with political leaders and citizens who are engaged in a common development. However, we need the other dimensions of cooperation, too. We need informed cross-border regions, with cross-border media, democracy within cross-border context, knowledge of the territory, cross-border maps; tools such as the Euro-Institute between France and Germany in Kehl. There is a network of Euro-institutes at the European level. CESCI is also working with them and you are entering into the club.

Furthermore, cross-border regions need also to be human. There is a need for people to people projects. These can go through micro-projects. We need to have people on board. And we also need what I call inspired cross-border regions and this is probably the most difficult. Common visions are achievable, but you often have to cure the “scars of history” that are linked with borders, for instance through cross-border education projects. For example, Presidents Chirac and Schröder decided in 2003, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of Élysée Treaty (reconciliation between France and Germany) to realise a common history book for schools, and now the book exists. The main aim is to contribute to a common understanding of history, while respecting approaches that may differ on the other side of the border and try to progress in common areas. Interreg has to support also such projects.
I end my presentation with the idea of a new legal tool proposed by Luxembourg. It is inspired by the real case of the cross-border tramway between France and Germany. The tramway now exists and it works, but it would have been possible to save time and money. The idea of the ECBC, the European Cross-Border Convention, the proposal made by Luxembourg, would facilitate CB projects, like this tramway, with the EU legislation that could allow local partners to propose a technical solution to the two countries concerned. The two countries can say yes or no, eventually propose other solutions, but they have to explain the reason of their position. Basically the question is the following, was it really necessary to modify the French tramway, just crossing the river and running only for 2 km in Germany, and to add some technical devices in order to conform to the German legislation? The German people could survive on the French tramway of Strasbourg, it is not dangerous. It would be a sort of local mutual recognition in technical issues.

You know that mutual recognition already exists in case of goods, such as food. That means we are confident that the goods from other member states are safe, e.g. when we buy a German cheese or a Hungarian wine. Thus, similar logic could be installed in the issue of cross border public services. Unfortunately, this kind of trust and agreement do not exist at the moment. It would be a sort of fast track...
process that could allow local authorities to propose solutions and national authorities can express their agreement or denial, and the EU would monitor the whole system. The communication, which will be published on September 20th, 2017 by the Commission, will say that it will consider the Luxembourg proposal positively.

You have to act on each border, but you can exchange also between borders. You have to act at the level of governments, i.e. in Budapest, in Paris, in Berlin, and there is a need to bring the ministries on board. Furthermore, there is something to be done either in Brussels with the Commission and the Parliament or in the intergovernmental process. It is good to have the working group, because we have there different states that want to work together on the cross-border issue.

The second, which is in the working group report, is to create a platform at the European level that would coordinate all the organisations which work in order to facilitate cross border cooperation, like CESCI, MOT, diverse organisations in other parts of Europe, and the AEBR (Association of European Border Regions) which is a sort of umbrella for all of our organisations. We could act together, exchange information and create a sort of common database serving cross-border stakeholders.
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Before I begin, maybe I should provide a kind of conclusion at the very beginning. I have been looking at cross-border cooperation processes for quite some time. Increasingly, I have done this from a very critical standpoint, questioning the normative language of the EU and also the normative language of national governments, trying to see how in fact cross-border cooperation can develop as a more organic process. I think, the challenge is to relate CBC to the idea of bordering which has become a central aspect of border studies. Borders are not a noun, they are a verb, because you create borders as part of everyday life. Of course, the physical border has in no way disappeared, but our research perspectives increasingly focus attention on the practical and symbolic properties of borders. We ask what the border means; what is really about? How it is being made by people? How do people see and use the border? How do people interpret the border?

Whether you cross the border or not is a personal decision. Nobody is forcing you to cross the border. You make the border, even if it is not a sharply defined but rather fluid one, by moving through space, you are bordering by making places and giving meaning to spaces. And bordering takes place at many different levels, namely at the local, at the regional, and of course as part of border politics. You know, when Hungary engages in ethno-political practices with its neighbours, the idea of nation beyond territorial borders is emphasised. Excuse me if I say something wrong, and I am not necessarily saying this is bad, I am just saying that it is a fact. That it is a kind of state ordering process of reconceptualising nation within Europe, beyond the confines of territorially defined borders.

The national border does not necessarily mean being confined to a singular space and then a limitation to a singular citizenship. This is not just the case here. There are many places in the world where there are networked diaspora relationships across national borders. These are often challenged by processes of state-level bordering. At the geo-political level we see what is happening between Finland and Russia with sanctions policies and political tensions between Russia and the European Union. You know, Finland is not always in agreement with sanctions, but as an EU member it is automatically locked in to geopolitical bordering processes with the Russian
Federation and of course it very much has an impact at the local level. So, the idea I am developing here is that borders are not just given, but that they are made. What does this mean when we look at cross-border cooperation? For example, CBC as a programme and something that the EU has been trying to promote as part of the vision of more integrated, more cohesive European space. How do you translate bordering into a policy relevant message? But maybe I should phrase this differently. Policy is often dependent on quantitative indicators like, flows, GDP, unemployment rates, demographics, etc. You can try to quantify networks, studying networks relationships across borders. Oftentimes you have to use a quantifiable model to do this. But, how you take the idea of bordering and use it methodologically and empirically in a way that can also feed into a policy process? Because you do not deal necessarily with numbers, tables or positivistic policy indicators, but with humans and very socially defined issues. I am not saying that there is only one way to do this. We have to find a solution in which we can complement the traditional tools which are about indicators, benchmarks, and quantitative measurements of performance with qualitative, more narrative style analysis.

My point is that without border narratives you do not understand how bordering is taking place, and you do not understand what is happening in the heads of people.

So, you can all go now, because that was the message!

Well, that is not quite true, but I decided to begin with that statement, based on what Gyula Ocskay was saying. I think it is a very relevant message and something that gives us a goal to work towards in the future. When we think of how we can improve cross-border cooperation in policy terms and also widen our research horizons. What I will try to do in this talk is to try to deal with a number of issues that I consider important.

Building up my argumentation, I claim that cross-border cooperation is important partly because it is an element of the European Union’s identity. If the European Union wants to be something different, it has to have a specific exceptionalist narrative and integration is one of those.
I have some background information which might unfortunately bore you because you all know this: the development and coverage of CBC instruments. I will just try to describe certain patterns, which reflect somewhat dramatized divergent East-West patterns regarding cohesions. Perhaps it is better to frame it as a question of old vis-à-vis new Member States. That is probably a better way of putting this than referring to east-west divides, which I think is a bit problematic. Based on that, what have been the benefits of cross-border cooperation? As you know, CBC has become part of Cohesion Policy through Interreg, etc. It is about development. This is something that the EU would like to think that it has been promoting. I emphasize this point, because it is important. Cross-border cooperation is not just there because Brussels bureaucrats decided that there is a need for a new kind of regional development programme that deals with specific regions and people. CBC is also part of a historical move to eliminate the possibility of conflict between European states. The strong European post-world war front bloc to be strong and united against new threats that were seem to develop, to emerge with the Cold War.

The European Union was born out of this situation. Number 1: never again war on European soil, and hence a turn away from militarism, a lack of dialogue and cultural chauvinism. All these evils which made Europe a bad place were to be fought against through a more unified Europe. Number 2: creating a unified continent able to deal with external threats. Creating the foundation of peace, political stability and economic prosperity, that are basically the foundation of a resilient Europe. One way to achieve this has been a project of political and economic integration, and other forms of integration which have since the very beginnings of the European Union intensified. In fact, since the historical events in 1989 and 1991, has intensified the gradual enlargement and integration of new member states and now with the name of the program, the extension of the EU’s ideas outside its external borders.

One important issue that I would like to emphasize in this context is that integration of the European Union was managed between states and it was a very statist project from the beginning. It was really about nations coming together to develop a consensus on
shared responsibilities and designing ways to share specific aspects of national sovereignty, which was an unheard thing before. But slow realisation, I think, if you really want integration in terms of social, cultural and not just economic and political cooperation. You also have to look below the level of the nation state. You have to look regionally and locally, so it does not take place between states or between state actors.

In the 1950s, bottom-up initiatives were already addressing the need for a local level interpersonal, and intercultural dialogue. And this is where this model of the Euroregion concept was invented at the Dutch-German border. In 1957, the communities on the border decided that we have to do something because Europe is moving to another direction, but in terms of the neighbourhood, the animosity between Dutch and Germans was still very palpable, the memories of the war were very strong and nothing was really happening to break down these barriers. Subsequently, local and regional cross-border cooperation emerged as a new level of European policy.

Cooperation across borders did not come from the European Union, but it came from the grass roots, from local level initiatives, from basically the battlefields of World War II. Then the European Union slowly incorporated it into its own repertoire of integration policies. It has become a very important brand, an identity constituting factor of the European Union. It has become something specific that European Union does, but nobody else does that the EU even can export and have to export to places outside of its borders.

There are a lot of practical reasons why the European Union has been promoting cross-border cooperation. Based on a number of assumptions that are actually complementary, it is seen as on the one hand a local level instrument of integration and dialogue. But it also brings a lot of development benefits. The EU narrative is as well: if we want an integrated space we need cohesion: it is called cohesion policy and good governance, of course. Then we need to deal with imbalance, with inequality and with lack of spatial equilibrium. We need to develop it further. Cross-border cooperation brings a lot of benefits, not just symbolically, but for example it promotes economic complementarities and synergies. If you join forces across
the border there are many ways you could share resources. In public services, you do not have to build two headquarters just build one. Fire services, hospitals public services of all different kinds could share their catchment basin, rather than having two parallel systems twice at cost. Or, you can have space on one side and capacities on the other side and you can create cross-border industrial spaces and industrial parks. This is similar to what happens at the U.S.-Mexican border, but I am not going to speak about that region here.

Simply: synergy, complementarity, addressing pragmatic issues, solutions to problems, problem solving mechanism characterise cross-border cooperation. It is not just about economic development, but also about how you deal with everyday problems that the border creates or the border stops us from dealing with. For example, you have a flood. We have quite strong floods here in Central Europe couple of years ago on the Elbe, on the Danube and on other rivers, and these are border-rivers, right? And, you have devastation on both sides. We saw that the emergency services on both sides of the border worked together to deal with the catastrophe. It could be the same with fire services, could be the same with other emergency services. It needs to be underlined that these problems are of a long-term nature, so it does not help if you just go there at time of crises, but you have to develop a long-term formal cooperation in order to be prepared to the next catastrophe. This is a very clear issue and problem solving is highly important.

Creating a sense of a shared region is another aspect. Probably it is the hardest thing on this list. Everything else seems a little bit more technical, more pragmatic with economic standards than creating a sense of a shared region, a common economic space or common historical space as a side of cross-border integration. Moreover, a narrative is also very important, a story of how we can create a sense of regional identity that uses the border. And then finally, and I guess the core purpose of the shared region is getting rid of the negative border effects.

I think the EU also realised that among the reasons why economic development often lags behind in border regions is because people do not use the border, they do not see it as a resource, they do not
cross the border. This is not the case in all border regions. There are very dynamic cross-border interactions in many regions, like shopping, working or labour markets. In other regions on the other hand, you do not see this activity. Henk van Houtum wrote his Ph.D. about the lack of economic networking between the Netherlands and Belgium where you find the same currency, same language, same dialect, same religion, same regional and same historical emergence, but people do not cross the border. What it this? This does not square with the assumption that all you have to do is get rid of borders and all sort of magic things will happen, like economic equilibrium and markets. No, this did not happen. Why do border effects continue? In many border regions, the mental-physical aspect of the border is still there and that is the phenomenon that the EU has been trying to remove. Cross-border cooperation is therefore not always understood as a resource.

Another point I would like to bring up is the fact that, from its very beginnings, European integration has been largely a statist project and this perhaps of necessity. The EU’s gradual is a story of nations coming together to develop a consensus on shared responsibilities and designing ways to share specific aspects of national sovereignty, a project often discussed in the past but never successfully put into operation. Nevertheless, integration in terms of social, cultural and not just economic and political cooperation, requires action below the level of the nation state. In the 1950s, bottom-up initiatives were already addressing the need for a local-level interpersonal, and intercultural dialogue. And this is where this model of the Euroregion concept was invented at the Dutch-German border. In 1957, the communities on the border decided to do something because while Europe was clearly moving in new directions, everyday animosity between Dutch and Germans was still very palpable. Subsequently, local and regional cross-border cooperation emerged as a new level of European policy. The EU has appropriated local level cross-border cooperation, proclaiming, as it were: “this is really a good idea, thank you guys on the Dutch-German border for giving us this inspiration.”

Thus, cooperation across the borders did not come from the European Union but from the grassroots, from local level initiatives,
basically from the battlefields of World War II. Since then, the European Union has gradually and systematically incorporated CBC into its own repertoire of integration policies. People from the Committee of the Regions also have said that we need new European Union programmes that deal with borders. Up to now, it has been mainly about regional investment, physical infrastructure, and more traditional development. The EU finally realises that this is a good time to deal with local-level CBC. Even before 1989 and 1986/7, private projects emerged, pre-Interreg, and in the last 20 years we see that there has been a gradual appropriation, institutionalisation, and increase in complexity in the programs that the EU has been funding which targeted cross-border cooperation. CBC has become a very important brand, an identity-constituting factor for the EU. It has become something specific that European Union does, but nobody else does, that the EU even can export and has exported to places outside of its borders.

Finally, the last step is the creation of the neighbourhood policy instrument, which is in a state of crisis right now because it works at the external borders of the European Union which are rather problematic at this time. But that is the point. It is a gradual development of instruments of cross-border cooperation as a part of European construction. The EU is very proud of this since it is a brand. This is one of the things that make the EU special. They were celebrating 25 years of Interreg, I am not exactly sure, if it was in 2015, depending when we start counting. But, we see the progression of the Interreg program, in terms of how many states are involved, a project that was actually committed by the EU: it does include national, regional co-financing, so the actual budgets are more than this. It is the money that the EU itself has been contributing. This current program phase ends in 2020, we have a total Interreg budget of 10.1 billion Euros and involvement of 28 Member States. It looks like a lot of money, but compared to the overall budget of structural funds, it is a drop in the bucket. But the story is that we are growing, we are getting bigger and larger and more effective.

EUROREGIONS are another important aspect. The Euroregion is another brand or part of the EU’s identity. This is something
we develop in Europe that will be exported to other places. Started formally and created in 1959 between Gronau and Enschede on the Dutch-German border and it is gradually incorporated within the structures of European governments thinking as a model of para-diplomacy, local para-diplomacy. These are local non-state cross-border cooperation with various forms of institutionalisation, legal formulisation. This model is basically exported to all borders within the EU and surprisingly outside the EU, as well. For example, you find euroregions between the Ukraine and Russia in very strange places. Probably, they still exist despite the ongoing tensions. The euroregion models have been exported to almost all border regions within the EU and beyond.

We like to use maps and representations, because they tell stories. As I said, administratively speaking it is not a level of formal governance within the German-Dutch context, but it is still important, because the German state and the German and Dutch governments have given the Euroregion some responsibilities in terms of local services and local development. They have recognised their joint, what we could call a local parliament, cross-border parliament, where they discuss solutions of local problems and the development of common projects, etc. I think it is a legally recognised institution, so it is beyond the informality that most euroregions have and it is actually enshrined in legal documents. Still it is not a level of state administration.

The EU is very much about slogans, about images, about posters, about advertising what it funds and what it does. Interreg connects Europe by different projects. The Bone project which is about technical development, it is a high-tech oriented project that the North-West Europe program of Interreg is funding and which involves Maastrich University, a Danish company, the University of Lille, etc.: a network of innovation being funded in the North-West. Here is one example: the Danube GeoTour which is a very popular instrument. It includes geo-tourism, environmental sustainability linked with tourism, like rehabilitating natural cultural landscapes in border regions. This is something that the Interreg program has invested a quite a bit of money. But the region I have drawn up
here is this PR, this public relations exercise the EU is involved in: «this is what we are doing». Very understandable, the EU is really proud of this.

And another INTERREG marketing image: United by borders, here Estonia, Latvia, Russia. Despite all the issues, despite all the tensions between these three countries, they still have this program. So this is the ENPI, the neighbourhood program.

When you think about Interreg, all the projects, networks and activities: Europe is making a difference. EU seems to be very serious about cross-border cooperation for a number of reasons. One of these is that CBC has been intrinsic to what the EU is about: a kind of supranational political community that has its own social economic and cultural identity, and maybe its historical identity as well.

At some point one of the rationales of Interreg is we have to think about the level between nation states and local, regional and between different parts of Europe. Thus, the macro-regional perspective came in. Cross-border cooperation is conceptualised by the EU as a multiscale operation from the micro to the macro level, just to impact a large bit of commitment from the part of the European Union to the development and more fruitful interactions across borders. Consequently, creating Europe, not a Europe of nations, but a supranational, even a post-national, Europe. It is something new out of what already exists.

However, and this is something that you will all agree with, in one way or the other, after 25 years, or probably more of this activity, quite a bit of money was invested in cross-border cooperation, well over 15 billion Euros since 1989. We find very uneven patterns because of its use and impact. What has it actually done, how have the actual beneficiaries appropriated cross-border cooperation, how they understood and used it. I think that you can agree that in general terms, the physical concrete regional development impact has been minimal, even in these cases. True cross-border projects should be generated, even today. CBC is often simulated in order to satisfy the EU. Both sides would simulate cross-border cooperation in order to get money. So I’m writing the proposal where I state
that sure, we are in a very close cooperation with our neighbours, but basically what often happens is that you have parallel agendas and both meet their budgetary requirements. There is a certain degree of cooperation that takes place but the projects themselves, not always but oftentimes, are not truly cross-border in the sense of creating these government structures, informal governments or networks across the border. A focus of physical investment and structural cooperation perseveres in the new member states, but also in other places.

You are familiar with the idea that regional development is about roads, bridges, concrete things that you can actually see and touch, unlike intangibles such as trust. I experienced this in East-Germany when I was working there, by talking to people, to regional development agencies at the level of counties or the economic development offices of major cities. And they were involved in INTERREG since the ‘90s. However, these agencies did not understand this person to person and cultural aspect of CBC; to them that was philosophy or about poetry. The stated: “we need border crossings, we need cross-border industrial parks, etc.” It was really hard to get the point across that you cannot have real development unless you understand, communicate with and trust your neighbour. Who is going to put 200 million Euros in an East-German desert if you do not have any respective prospects of developing in market in any specific directions, because you do not know what is on the other side, you do not speak the languages and you do not trust the people.

Yes, the focus of physical investment is still there and it is still very strong. We understand that that is important, but other studies are important as well, like the social, the soft or cultural. Tourism is a lot about soft. In older EU states cross-border cooperation is more generally understood in micro-political pragmatic ways, creating networks of social capital in order to deal with these problems. So, if you are on the Dutch-German border you say I do not necessarily have to be a big fan of Germany, but I know that I cannot deal with my everyday issues if I do not talk to my neighbour.
At some point, on a personal basis, we as cooperation partners are almost friends, perhaps. I mean, I know we need to develop a common agenda in certain areas in order to deal with our common problems. So it is a kind of pragmatic approach, but then we understand that we have to create these networks of social capital if anything is to happen. We have information, we have local knowledge and then we might even have investors coming and asking to invest on this or the other side. I also get money from your side to contribute to developing this start-up area. And in the German-Dutch case, these things do happen. So, it is a very uneven pattern of appropriation and impact. Generally speaking, if you are expecting hard-core regional development, beautiful buildings like this on the border, yes, the EU has funded those, but do not expect funding for massive redevelopment projects in border cities.

Now, I come to my next point. CBC has a mixed record depending on where it has been applied and depending on what you expect from cooperation. It is not all bad, it is not all good, and the question is how it can be improved. And I make the argument that cohesion objectives themselves, which are really involved in creating cohesive European states, marginalised this cross-border cooperation, especially in problem regions. I made a distinct point to emphasize how cross-border cooperation is part of the Europeans’ identity and identity building projects. However, when you look at what cohesion is trying to establish it is very much state-oriented, it is nationally oriented. It is about state-centric, it’s about national blocks being linked together.

Cross-border cooperation should serve to develop a more comprehensive idea of neighbourhood. If we take the main cohesion goals into consideration and if we are a bit more critical, let’s say towards neo-liberal economic policies, which are very much about competition and strengthening competitiveness, where do you find them? Do you find them in border regions? No, you do not find them there. What do cohesion goals take into consideration? Sustainable development, the capacity of resources, social capital. These are more available in dynamic centres, in functional urban regions in Western Europe, and generally they are not available at the borders. We are talking about all Europe again. Balanced developments are
redistributed measures sustainable in peripheral border areas. I mean national governments have been taking EU money, not just Interreg, I am talking about cohesion money and billions of Euros have been invested into developing infrastructures in border regions. It is a redistributive measure, but these measures are not sustainable at some point. That is the way how the things happen.

Balanced development is possible, when we cannot depend on redistribution. Again, a neo-liberal conceptualisation of economic policy, at some point deemphasizes redistribution to certain degrees.

What about accessibility? We still have this divide and perhaps for financial reasons we still do not have a decent railway connection between Berlin and Budapest for example. The route takes just as long as it did 30 years ago, 14 hours, 15 hours. There are connections between Vienna and Budapest or between Berlin and Warsaw. However, we still do not have a decent railway connection between Berlin and Szczecin which is only 120 km away on the Polish side and which is a major Polish metropolis. When you want to travel between these two cities you still have to take those old trains.

All these proclamations of Trans-European networks, Trans-European motorways and Trans-European railways are without materialisation and these networks are not there and they probably will not come. Networking, physical and interactive connections are hindered by borders, poverty of connectivity and sparse of settlements, so this is the problem with the more peripheral border regions. I would say, most of the border regions not only in Central and Eastern Europe are called rural or semi-rural peripheries. Subsequently, it could be claimed that in cross-border cooperation appears merely to fill the gaps between different national cohesion projects. There are the national blocks, little spaces in between, little amount of money in order to make closer the gaps, that’s cross-border cooperation in the massive financial resource called cohesion policy. If you realise this, you start thinking about the actual potential of cross-border cooperation. I am not saying that we need 250 billion Euros a year for cross-border cooperation. That is not the argument I am trying to make here.
Anyway, we have very dynamic cross-border cooperating regions, but where are they? You know we have five of them. There is the one Vienna-Bratislava area. There is one also between Silesia. Others include the Øresund region, Grande Région with Luxembourg and these are major areas along the border of the Rhine River between Switzerland and Germany, France and the Netherlands. And, this is where the cross-border dynamism is. Differential patterns of Europeanisation and there is, I would argue, a notable east-west divide in the acceptance and adaptation of cross-border cooperation set of development and even government practices. I am going to jump in a simplified conclusion which leaves out a lot of important detail. Generally speaking, in a core Europe, which is represented by France, Benelux and Germany, we have network hubs, scrutinised cooperation, embedded within multi-level government structures and they became part of everyday working routines. Even if you do not get money, you still do it, because that’s part of your administrative function and because your administrate responsibilities have evolved. Basically, you have to be cross-border in terms of what you’re doing.

However, in the newer member states this evolutionary tradition of cross-border cooperation has never really been able to take hold. If you think about the long period between 1945 and 1989, there was hardly any real functioning cooperation between such European states. It was all about creating national economies, and there was very little what we call cross-border cooperation. There was some, but I think the national development objective is one of the main issues here. Thus, you did not see a kind of slow/soft development formula or tool in terms of nurturing local cooperation and indeed, Central and Eastern European concerns have been quite different in terms of cohesion. In countries like Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, it’s really about nation building within a, say, post-socialist context.

In other words, in this part of Europe I would argue that you see minimalist instrumental approaches to cross-border cooperation which are subordinated to goals of national consolidation, creating national status and repositioning nations within the new European context. I think one of the reasons why EGTCs are important here in this part of Central Europe is because the Euroregion has
more or less died. In the Hungarian case, I don’t know if you have a really functioning Euroregion anymore. This has to do with the fact that local government and decentralisation of local government administration activities has taken away much of the ability of these municipalities to engage in cross-border activities. So, there are differential patterns of Europeanisation which is also one of the realisations of 25 years of experimentation with cross-border cooperation. And you might correct me on this. On my part it is too simplistic, so I would sustain those criticisms, I think.

What are the benefits of cross-border cooperation actually? What I want to ask is, how can we take CBC further when social funds and project development are limited. However, does greater support come? Probably greater support does not come, especially in the fortress Europe for example on the Finnish-Russian, Estonia-Russian border. So, what do we got from here? Local options, but I think it is something that has not been tested, yet. I think it has not started to be tested since I have no information about this. The new instruments that have been introduced within the new programming period of Interreg in integrated territorial investments, the community-based development mechanisms which are real innovations in terms of decentralising and in the whole process of cohesion policy, and incorporating more local participation and local initiative. The fact is that if you are involved in an integrated territorial investment you do share budgets. Place-based strategies can be viable. How can they be viable? Embedded with an EGTC for example, these instruments provide a new horizon, a new way of developing networks that might even improve prospects for appropriate investment, not just social networks and other kinds of investment. But all of this is a little unsure to speculate on. None of these opportunity structures are rather new. I am not totally aware yet of studies that have been done on cross-border ITI or this community based development projects.

I bring now the case of the German-Polish border region for one specific reason. What are the benefits of cross-border cooperation? I think that the German-Polish experience is provides a perspective on CBC contexts that could be helpful. On the one hand, this cooperation was about Europeanisation, creating Euroregions,
creating cross-border planning tool in order to coordinate the
development of former East Germany and Poland’s western border
regions’ development, but it also aimed to facilitate European
integration, like preparing Poland for accession and getting Poland
into the network of European policies. Cross-border cooperation,
however, at the very beginning was advertised as the beginning of a
new European order, setting grounds for integration, stabilisation,
reconciliation, normalising the relationship, so it is a big deal. Once
the common border was recognised as the permanent border
between Germany and Poland in 1990, they said: “we’re not going to
debate this, we are not going to measure or negotiate this. We have
to do what is supportive in the context of good neighbourhood and
good neighbourly relations.”

At the same time, they were trying to address regional development
issues, which is quite a package. As a result of European integration
the legacy of state socialism that both sides shared, the collapse of
state-run agriculture on both sides, on the western Polish region; but
there was no, or there was only very little private ownership, because
that was new territory that was transferred to Poland from Germany
after 1945. So there was no traditional state developed economy of
Western Poland and East German economy as well. Hardcore state
socialist models collapsed on both sides. Subsequently, economic
development of these parts of Europe, as well as taking care of
unresolved national tensions and historical memories. The basic
problem is that a cross-border region today remains peripheral
with unclear development prospects. And some people could argue
that cross-border cooperation is a total waste of time. You look at
the region now, unemployment is low because people have left. In
Germany, everybody is „gone”. Everybody is in Frankfurt, in Berlin
or in Hamburg, cities like Frankfurt/Oder have lost almost half of
their population. They are shrinking and on the Polish side cities are
doing a bit better, especially Szczecin which is prospering.

What can we say, what is the lesson from and for cross-border
cooperation? The number 1 lesson is that CBC has helped normalise
everyday relations and everyday interaction, hence this is a very
important part of cross-border cooperation. Creating a higher level
of mutual trust and getting over historical hangups, animosities that
were very strong and the tensions still can be found in the region. Moreover, institutional learning also appears as important part, especially for Poland. There are some very important questions that relate to cross-border cooperation. How do you get European money? How do you work with European structures? How do the governance in terms of learning new development strategies?

Developing local cross-border economies, urban societies and trust are also very important, they are operated at the micro level. They were very important in cases like Frankfurt/Oder, which despite all challenges are very much trying to develop for cross-border economic relations on the Polish side, as well. This is not a big story, this is not massive regional development history, but it is very important for the local people. The Polish cities are now using European funding professionally and they have a

So what was the benefit of CBC actually? The main benefit, I think, was the establishment of networks of social and cultural capital across the borders. The political orchestration of CBC might have been important for a certain period, and in a certain context, as when binational regional development discourse was proclaiming a need for common economic zones like those on the U.S.-Mexican border. You have cheap labour on the one side and you have high-tech on the other. Putting together labour and high-tech could create a new Singapore. These models were seriously debated in the 1990’s on the German-Polish border. What worked was the institutional learning and the creation of social, cultural capital. That is the point. I want to come straight to this message, because it comes back to the initial comments. What are the consequences for research agendas in the generation of policy-relevant knowledge?

This is my own personal assessment based on what I have read and seen. It is in many ways subjective and not totally objective. Still, I think I am making some observations that are partly relevant. As research shows, the main benefit of CBC lies in the development of social, cultural and political capital in the sense of volume. In other words, the networks are trustful and I think this is something that worked by Katja Mirwaldt, Sarah Svensson and Gergő Medve-Bálint and Jaroslaw Jańczak, who has been looking at the Polish border
cities and he has published his analysis in the Yearbook, too. I think it was published last year.

The small project facility that was funded and still is funded by Interreg, really does mean something. However, the level of local autonomy is important. How important are cities for their regions? What decision making powers are locally embedded? The stronger the local authority is the more cross-border significance is. Tiny communities have much harder time in managing cross-border cooperation than the communities that have well-established administration routines and have a lot of administrative capacity. That means smaller towns have to team up, they have to make partnerships with larger communities. Good sustainable cross-border cooperation depends on depoliticised political environments. If you really want long-term cross-border cooperation then do not politicise the relationship with your neighbour. Use the EU’s cooperation incentives to fit cooperation and you might work towards many things that you are trying to achieve.

But the minute you start bringing in political discourses that create too much controversy you run the risk of poisoning the cooperation environment. I think it is one of the reasons that Euroregions in Central Europe has not done so well comparatively speaking. The aim of CBC, and this is a bit of a philosophical statement, should be making good places. CBC is about making good places across borders - places where things happen, where people understand each other and making economy to emerge and people can learn things, people can do things. That is of course a bit philosophical, but I think it is relevant.

Before studying the borders in terms of political status, policy message, you know is it the simple border itself, the line or the thing on the map that we are interested in? Or is it the borderland that might have an economic effect that can be studied. Or, maybe is it rather the processes that we want to understand, the processes behind the making and the remaking of borders and borderlands that we should be looking at. Borders as indicators and reflections of socio-spatial dynamics. It is the border itself and the border effect that you can count, like the traffic. You can count the
number of vehicles, also you can try to estimate the value of goods flowing across the border. And how delays at the border can be translated into economic losses? How border regulations influence the economic interactions across the border in creating barriers. You still have to have that information about what borders doing in physical, structural-physical terms. But, I think the tough part is getting at those processes behind the making and remaking of borders, the social and spatial dynamics. A lot more has to do on what is going on in people’s heads and in people’s memories. That is not easy if we want to convert that in some kind of a policy-relevant, acknowledged let’s say. We have to do both.

Borders become institutionalised. In fact they are institutions that are understood as systems, rules, norms by the use of symbols and have specific findings. But here I am, understanding institutions as both formal, state, legal and informal ways of doing conventions, ways of understanding that are much more informal than everyday. And things are tacitly done by people. My Mum told me not to cross the border, so I’m not gonna do that. That is my thing how institutions are working. But that is tricky, I agree. Because how do you bring those rules, aspects together?

So, data harmonisation challenges. Do the data fit the question? And I think most of us if I interpret correctly how border studies, cross-border cooperation lead such a thing evolving. It is really about what is going on in people’s heads. Why do they actually get involved? What do they do? What are their underline motivations? There might be clearly understandable political arguments behind it, but there could be other motivations that are much more difficult to grasp on, and some motivations that might not be easy to have people admit to, like in an interview situation, because they do not know what they politically should say. But this is not new, I think all of you are familiar with this kind of dilemma.

What data help you to assess the local effects of CBC? On a very technical level, and this is something that Gyula know and MOT and CESCI just have been fighting with. I am not arguing that the statistics are no more important, of course they are. You need to have those basic data, the structural data, demographic, economic,
getting to kind of know what is going on, but oftentimes the levels of aggregation, the degree of detail and the periodisation, I mean the years in which data statement is recorded, are not comparable. So you often do not have equal sets of data to compare. To create one cross-border space you’d like to have unified statistical bases. That is still a big problem. Some people are experimenting with a bottom-up approach. So at the micro level developing new databases based on micro censuses in cross-border and in urban context. Very tricky thing, because at some point you do need official statistics. How you select the categories of data? This is another problem that you have asymmetry in what is actually recorded, what is actually available in statistics. Sometimes the information is too general and not precise enough to your purposes. Oftentimes the restricted access to databases is a common problem. For example, informal economy. Now, this is something we were experiencing between Ukraine and Poland, and partly on the Finnish-Russian border, formal economy is very important, but nobody wants to leave informal economy because it has that feeling of smuggling, illegality, corruption, maffia. People live, on the Ukrainian-Polish border, people live of border trade, like cigars, alcohol and other small goods. They are normal people. Living in the border region, going through the trouble, and going through maybe Lviv, going to the Polish border and it is still lucrative enough to do this every day. But it’s tricky to ask these people in interviews, you really have to do this. You have to be there embedded long-term to get trust with these people and you might in certain context, be putting yourself in situation of danger. It was stricky, but rich stores of information.

The idea is that you have to compensate through undercover work roughly saying, and getting local knowledge about cross-border cooperation, local knowledge about networks. There is no way to avoid good qualitative data, interview seminars, media analysis in order to understand the border region, not from above, but from the grassroots. Even getting that good qualitative data it is incredibly challenging. A lot of research, thinking in terms of qualitative data because you do not have the access you want. People are not going to get open to you as you invite, usually because they are not from there, there might be linguistic issues and definitely trust issues.
And, even if you talk to local authorities they might be reluctant to answer the question because they do not exactly know where those information is going to end up, and where it will be recorded, something that they might be in trouble later. I am not saying that this is something easy, it is just a realisation that local knowledge, you have to somehow compensate for the lack of hard quantitative data, not only compensate, you have to complement hard data with the data about networks, interactions and mentalities, narratives about the borders.

These methodological issues were something that we kept dealing with in our porject. We are constantly challenged with this problem and we have had methodological debate, because we have varied people in our consortium, we have economists and sociologists then you can imagine that kind of a mess. They call you, ‘hey, you guys are doing some pretty dirty interview here at the borders’ as sociologists might say. That means we have to be very clear on methods. So, we have improvised a lot, we have to develop a consensus that we had to gather local knowledge in terms of compensating for the lack of access to the field. Subsequently, we developed case studies. Case studies are absolutely essential to understand the dynamics.

In the border studies debate, which has been rather dynamic in the last 10-15 years, we have this rather controversial discussion about theory versus empirical research. It sounds weird now, but the idea has been out there you have to somehow decide between the two. There were some people that were saying, ”if I read another case study about the Slovakian-Hungarian border I am going to scream. All this local information and I do not know how to process a local situation that has nothing to do with any other kind of border region. It is very specific information, it is very descriptive and it is not helping me understand what borders do in a more abstract matter, in a theoretical sense. So, more theory, less case studies. Case studies are boring, descriptive, just accumulation of local facts that do not have any kind of larger meaning.” There are people who were saying that. If you want to develop border studies you need to work theoretically, and there were even some people who were saying that we need grand theory of borders.
Working on that point, I think there is now the realisation that we are not going to get the totalising theory that connects all border regions and forms of CBC to a set of central principles. I think it is a complete illusion. We therefore need case studies, but we need sophisticated case studies perhaps. And it is not just a question of accumulating factors, it is also the process of interpretation, let’s say. Organising, interpreting what is the significance of what case studies are saying. That is what is important. And the case studies I think can be developed to reflect basic social functions of bordering, focus on the border making process at different scales by different actors. Border creation maintains that change, highlighting micro level processes of border politics. I consider cross-border cooperation as a form of border politics, as I think that certain of you as well do. Explaining more its resources and borders as instruments of power and oftentimes these go closely together. Case studies are very useful and can be developed to indicate how borders are, or are not seen as resources for different groups that engage in the social-spatial negotiation of different aspirations.

We will encounter different types of people who engage in different ways with the border. Some do not even dare to cross the border, they do not want to cross the border because they either do not like the other side or are afraid of crossing, or have never done it and never would. While there are other people, for them it is part of their everyday existence, its their strategy, economic strategy. They are visiting relatives, or they are visiting holy places, churches, cemeteries that are on the other side of the border. You see how different border narratives in terms of the resources can merge not just the rationality of social-economic benefit, but also cultural issues come in, social issues, historical issues, and religious issues, as well. Case studies can help us understand why certain uses of border succeed and others do not; why some projects prosper and others just never really take off. And, with the EUBORDERREGIONS project we were trying to develop case studies that went in this direction. I am not sure how successful we were. If we could do it all over again, we would completely redesign the whole empirical template. Nevertheless, we did get some I think good information about how borderland case studies inform us about the rationalities
behind spatially framed politics understood as a state, as an everyday activity. I am making this statement clear. Every day is very important and it can be very political as well.

With empirical case studies then, I suggest that we can develop an even greater number of partial models and explanations, partial accounts of specific border related phenomena, which will help us interpret local situations and connect them to wider, geopolitical or political contexts, and that is perhaps even a better option than trying to find, totalising, understandings of border realities in terms of one big theory.

The question is, how can we relate very different border situations to each other? Because they are going to be very different historically, conceptually, in terms of the economic situations, the morphology of the region, etc. Many different factors play a role but still we should also study how different border region situations can speak to each other. One strategy can be of searching for the contextual picture behind borders and social relations and understand local situations through political languages of borders and cross-border cooperation. How do people appropriate borders and for what reasons? And this means a shift towards ethno-symbolic, ideological and cultural, as well as economic and political rationalities behind specific framings of borders.

That is the idea, that we have to bring in narrative, qualitative, even ethnographic research into the policy debate. I do not think it is been done really that much in any area of study. Number 1, it is very difficult to do. Number 2, it is not always accepted as a legitimate form of knowledge for regional and other policy development processes. How can you develop your indicators based on ethnographic interviews and stories of how people use the border, understand the border? We need to work on this rather than neglect the challenge.

I am not solving this problem, because I am not giving you any answers. However, border narratives, I think would be very nice way of developing this. The border narrative is not a typical policy performance indicator, but personal stories of residence in border regions involve understanding a greater depth, the relative importance of the border in shaping everyday life and local
identities. That means narratives tell something about local needs, what do people actually want, what do they expect. These issues are very important, if you try to develop policies that target local well-being. What are people lacking and sometimes if you ask them, they will not be able to answer the question. That is something when you just use a questionnaire to approach people: ‘what are you missing’, ‘what is lacking’. You only get the answers through narrative approach reflecting on this. But information only comes out in the part of a larger story.

Narratives could revive evidence regarding the everyday making of borders through mobility, through attitudes, preferences, processes of interaction, etc. It also can be reflected on the impact of European policy, national politics and geopolitical situations. I think narratives could provide an additional method or tool in order to better interpret the dynamics of CBC and in order to understand its potential significance as a development resource as well. Now here we are not really that far in developing border narratives as a policy-informing method, these are of course important tools for ethnographers who study border communities, for example the Estonian-Russian border. However, these people are generally not involved in policy discussions. Many times, these researchers do not want to be involved in any kind of policies, discussions, because there are afraid that it will jeopardise what they are doing. It is a pure scientific entreprise, and I understand that rationale, but also for reasons of research ethnics; you do not want to compromise the security of people who you are living with, for example as a photographer in a border community or somebody else in a Euroregion. Nevertheless, at some point I think we have to think beyond the box and appreciate the significance of this kind of information, because I think it is vital to understand regional development outcomes and thus more effectively influence the policy development process.

What is the solution? Do not forget that cross-border cooperation is more than just cooperation in a formal sense (see: INTERREG), it is really a multilevel, complex and very distinct field of research that has to be maintained and we have to maintain its present momentum. So, thank you.
Anssi Paasi graduated at the University of Joensuu as a Bachelor of Philosophy in 1979, as licentiate in 1981 and he received his doctoral degree in 1986. He defended his dissertation thesis, *The institutionalizations of regions: Theory and comparative case studies*. Anssi Paasi held numerous research positions, like a research assistant at the Academy of Finland and a visiting researcher at the University of California in Los Angeles. He has been a professor since 1987. His research interest focuses on the issues of political geography, especially in themes which relate to territory/territoriality and borders, question of identity, theory of regions, power-knowledge relations, production of space, theory and practice of the “region”.

3rd Governance Workshop: **Bounded spaces challenged – regions, borders and identity in a relational world**

Budapest, 16th of November 2017

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Introduction

The demise of the region was forecasted already in the 19th century in the context of the consolidating state- and nation-building processes (Keating, 1998; Paasi, 2009; Augusteijn and Storm, 2012). Yet, since those days the region has been stubbornly present in both academic debates and social practices, such as planning and regional governance, and also in discussions about culture and identity. Indeed, it may be argued that there has been a major resurgence of both regions and regional concepts in the academia and in wider societal circles since the 1990s. Geographers, international studies scholars and political scientists, for example have shown considerable interest in regions (Paasi, Harrison and Jones, 2018). Likewise, the concept of territory has become highly significant in both theoretical and practical terms (Elden, 2013). At the same time, the interpretations of both regions and territories as mere neutral backgrounds or settings for wider socio-economic, political and governmental processes have transformed. Both regions and territories are nowadays understood in much more dynamic ways so that they are seen to both constitute and be constituted by complex socio-spatial practices, processes and discourses.

This article discusses the possible directions into which the debates on and practices with the region and territory are moving. It draws on and synthetises the research work that I have carried out since the early 1980s and sets this work in the context of wider literature. My research work has focused both conceptually and empirically on regions, spatial borders, and regional/territorial identities, with the aim to reflect the changes in these concepts, redefining them and to examine the relations of these changes to broader societal processes. One of the major changes has been the ‘opening’ of the scope of these concept: closed and fenced national spaces or static and bounded planning units, for example, have been objects of increasing academic critique, reflecting the processes of globalisation, increasing interactions and networking across borders (Paasi and Zimmerbauer, 2016). Respectively, recent research suggests that states and regions are moving towards an increasingly relational world and that formerly closed spaces have now ‘softer’
borders. These claims suggest that the changing ideas of regions and territories, borders, identities and relevant forms of governance, as well as concrete practices of regional planning, force researchers to look at the world more openly as a constellation of networks, nodes and connectivities that is beyond rigid bounded territorial spaces. This challenge is today apparent at various spatial scales, from local to regional and from national to supra-national scales.

Contrary to academic, economy-driven debates on the emergence of a borderless world (Ohmae, 1990), in practice ‘geography’ (e.g. uneven development), national spaces and state borders seem to be increasingly important in the contemporary world. Hence, contrary to borderless world thinking, the hardening of national borders has occurred also in many European states and elsewhere and several borders walls have been erected and are under construction around the world, a tendency that is often justified by anti-immigrant attitudes and the fear of terrorism (Jones, 2015). Contrary to this, as far as sub-state regional level is concerned, in both planning theory and practice traditional hard planning spaces are ever more often turning into so-called ‘soft spaces’ that have fuzzy borders and that may be more temporary than traditional territorial planning spaces. Yet, in practice both territorial types are continuously used in planning practice (Paasi and Zimmerbauer, 2016).

Regions and territories are not the same thing. It is critical to understand that while all bounded territories are regions, not all regions are territories. A key feature of a territory is that power-holding actors use its borders in the control of mobilities between this territory and its external environment as well as in the control of the resources and people living in a specific territory. Borders are thus in effective use as tools of control and management. Regional borders, for their part, do not usually have such strict control functions but are more porous (Sack, 1986), especially in the current relational world characterized by all kinds of interactions and networks.

The structure of this article goes as follows. At first, I will problematize what it means to argue that regions and territories exist as ‘social constructs’ and that these entities are persistently in the process of becoming rather than just being. In the next section, I try to position
Regions and territories are social constructs: the institutionalization of spatial units

Most scholars, especially geographers and other social scientists working with regions and territories suggest nowadays that regions are not passive entities; rather various actors, individuals, social groupings and social classes representing diverging social and political interests construct them and make them to function and ‘work’ actively. This means that regions are best understood as social constructs that bring together ideas, material processes and frequently contested struggles over resources, capital and ideas. Further, regions and territories do not have any permanent essence or identity – in spite of the fact that power holding actors in states and regions often construct essentialist identity narratives regarding national or regional identities, for example, often drawing on imaginings of the heroic past of the spatial unit in question. Respectively it is more beneficial to see these spatial entities as social processes that may become institutionalised as a result of active agency and struggles carried out by individual actors and social collectives. This also means that regions are historically contingent: they emerge and may exist some time and finally disappear as part of the ceaseless regional transformation (Paasi and Metzger, 2017). One instrument in the making of regions is statistical information that is bound to territorial units. Current European Union’s NUTS system is a fitting illustration of this.
Social construction of regions can refer to two directions (Paasi, 2010). On the one hand, scholars may be interested in the ‘end products’ of such construction processes that is in regions or territories that have an attained an established role in the territorial system, for example, as units of governance. On the other hand, researchers may be attentive to the process itself, that is how regions ‘become’. I have tried to bring these two horizons into the same conceptual framework by theorizing and analysing empirically what I have labelled as the institutionalisation of regions (Paasi, 1986).

Four sub-processes can be analytically abstracted from the institutionalization process. At first, territorial shaping during which the regional or territorial entity attains its boundaries that can be at the one end fuzzy and permeable, on the other end rather clear-cut and explicit. The second sub-process is the symbolic shaping during which the spatial entity in question achieves its name and diverging symbols that come to characterize and distinguish that entity from other entities. Name is doubtless the major symbol and often contested among various territorial interest groups that may have ethnic, cultural or political motivations. In areas occupied and annexed during wars, place and street names are often the first symbols that are changed. Important symbols also can consists of flags, coats of arms, natural and cultural elements, for instance. The third abstraction is institutional shape, which refers to a number of economic, cultural, political, governmental or communication-related (media) institutions and organizations that are in a critical position in shaping and maintaining the territorial and symbolic shapes. The fourth abstraction is the establishment of the region. At this stage the region achieves an accepted position in the regional system of governance and gradually also in the social consciousness of the citizens. It is important to recognize that in concrete region-building processes these stages do not follow neatly each other but their order can vary.

I have used and developed this framework further in my research work that has focused on various spatial scales. At first I studied and tested this geo-historical framework by analysing the making and establishment of four Finnish provinces by using diverging empirical materials such as newspapers and media content, surveys
for citizens and archive materials, cartographic materials from various historical periods, committee reports etc. (Paasi, 1986). At the next stage I moved to analyse how Finland, as a national state, had been constructed as a territorial entity in the long run and what was the specific role of Finnish-Russian border in that material and symbolic construction work. As a local case study I examined simultaneously the institutionalization of Värtsilä municipality that was split after World War II by the new Finnish-Soviet border and when two-thirds of the region was ceded and annexed to Soviet Union (Paasi, 1996).

The following stage was to analyse how regional planning and governance organizations, Finnish Regional Councils, use the ideas associated with regional identity in their planning processes (Paasi, 2013). Finland became a member of the European Union in 1995 and Finnish provinces were transformed to NUTS 3 level regions and respective Regional Councils were given new responsibilities in regional and land-use planning and in coordinating regional development funds. Since this project, we have studied municipality mergers in Finland together with my colleagues. The number of municipalities was cut dramatically in Finland at the turn of 2010 for mainly economic reasons that were hidden in the rhetoric of effectiveness. We analysed, by using media texts (newspapers) and internet discussion forum materials how municipality amalgamations gave rise to struggles between those who supported this process and who did not and how regional identity ‘card’ was used in debates (Zimmerbauer and Paasi, 2013). Later we also continued our work with Finnish Regional Councils (provinces), since they are again becoming very topical (Paasi and Zimmerbauer, 2016). Current government aims to change the role of these regions to a coordinator of many formerly municipal responsibilities in health care issues, for example. Similarly these regions will finally get a political decision making body elected by citizens after 150 years of discussions about this politically hot topic (various parties have differing opinions on the need of provincial self-governance). That is certainly an exciting but undoubtedly also complex development. It is sure that it will provide a lot of new research material for regional scientists interested in regional governance and related political struggles.
Political regions in transformation

What do these developments in the Finnish regional system demonstrate us in terms of wider regional changes or transformations? Previous studies focusing on Finnish examples clearly confirm that it is beneficial to understand a region as a process that emerges from active agency and cultural, political, and governance-related struggles, and that always reflects wider social and political developments (like the EU context) but also the spatial division of labour in economic life. These developments also display that the role of regions for states is not a constant since both regions and states transform incessantly and some regions transform faster, some with a slower speed.

In order to understand the state level changes historically, it is useful to distinguish analytically between two forms of the ‘social’, the geopolitical social and the geo-economic social (Moisio and Paasi, 2013). The former points to the underlying effort to make state space as cohesive productive unit as possible and to build welfare systems to support the biopolitical project of the state in making healthy citizens and in creating harmony and ‘consent’ among the population. In this approach it has been the state’s responsibility to keep this geopolitical social as one coherent entity. This is something that has been constructed in the Finnish case especially since the 19th century within the state and nation building processes. Now, while we still have seeds of this thinking in current national social practices and discourses, the state has moved to the stage of the geo-economic social, which stresses new kinds of state functions and forms of state transformation. State spaces are challenged almost around the world by complex networks and all kinds of flows (capital, ideas, migrants, asylum seekers). More and more often states operate like enterprises, and adopt business-like models for their action. At the same time many sectors of society (like healthcare systems) become increasingly privatised and international companies become an important part of their governance and ownership. The state is also outsourcing its old responsibilities to external powers, which means that states are more open in economic terms, even if the state as a sovereign entity can still control and even close formally its borders.
and cross-border flows if needed. In practice this situation is more complex and more diversified, of course. All around the world, not least in the European Union, states have been actively building cross-border regions to lower the confrontations between states and to promote local and national economies.

In a sense, the territorial trap, an idea developed by John Agnew (1994) is changing. Territorial trap in which we are living in states, is based on the assumptions that have become almost self-evident in our spatial imagination. This thinking assumes at first that sovereignty requires clearly bounded territorial spaces which implies a clear distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. In this thinking territorial state acts as the geographical container of modern society. This means that also the key territorial identities are characteristically associated with the state level. This state-centric thinking is now a challenge and we should not take the state, not to talk about the ‘nation-state’, as a self-evident entity since states are all the time more complex and open entities. The world harbours about 200 states, but there are 600-800 nations in the world.

The production and manifestations of state spatialities

How does the spatiality of the state manifest itself today? There are many forms and processes where this becomes obvious. The first point is related to the increasingly complex governance and institutions that are operating across scales. Nowadays, states more and more often distribute or devolve part of their power to regional and local scales. Furthermore, border-crossings, borders and identity are critical issues almost everywhere. Regional policies are perpetually critical in the governance and regulation of state spatialities. Regional infrastructures are also crucial manifestations of such spatialities, especially transport and telecommunications facilities and regionalized public services. As noted above, many states are witnessing a neoliberal tendency to promote economic growth at the expense of welfare policies which has led to the privatization of formerly public facilities. Perhaps, the newest idea
within the academic discussions is city regionalism that is more and more often becoming an instrument of competitiveness in many countries. There were debates in the 1990’s about the significance of regions in many states, but now city regions are seen as engines for regional development (Moisio, 2018). This is of course as such not a new idea among urban geographers but shows how also ideas have their life cycles and old ideas may gain new significance in new societal situations.

How does the national state create an understanding of its ‘national space’? To answer this question I have leaned on a fruitful idea presented by the sociologist Rob Shields (1991). He speaks about social spatialisation that refers to the ongoing social construction of the spatial at the level of social imaginary, as well as to concrete interventions in the landscape. A further important question related to such imagination is how do we become members of national communities? To answer to this question, I have developed Shield’s idea further and outlined the concept of spatial socialisation (Paasi, 1996). It refers to the process through which people become members of territorially bounded entities and adopt territorial identities, and ideas of what is a territorial/regional tradition. Such modification of spatial imagination is to certain extent a hegemonic project organized by the state through the control of education and national media. It is particularly beneficial to understand that education and media are in a critical position in this process and this idea helps us to understand how the territorialisation, internal region building and bordering of the state takes place in various practices. In many European states leading political parties have taken steps towards the control media content and even re-written national histories anew to support their ideological views.

Why are region building and border issues so important today? I think there are many backgrounds: new global divisions of space that have emerged; globalisation that supports the debates on the relatively borderless world (that are often against our everyday observations), global environmental problems that have become critical and similarly the debates on risk society. Regionalisation and region-building processes (regionalism) on supra-state level are
also an important phenomenon around the world (Paasi, Harrison and Jones, 2018).

The rise of nationalism and dynamic autonomy and independence movements are also phenomena that make regions/territories and their borders significant, as well as the accelerating flows of migration. We often witness that state independence relates to the separation of a nation from an existing larger territorial entity. These separation processes have been characteristic particularly in Eastern European nation-building processes, but the state of Finland also belongs in this group; its independence was the product of separation from Russian Empire (Paasi, 2016). Separation is often violent which means that the emerging manifestations of national identity and celebrations of independence are often closely associated with conflicts and wars. In my recent article on Finland’s independence, I was surprised how few theoretical publications have been written on independence issue. Political scientists have written few books, but political geographers have not so much. Yet this theme is becoming ever more important when we think examples like Scotland or Catalonia where various circles have been struggling for independence for a long time, similarly in many other European contexts this issue is very hot at the moment.

**Mobilizing regional identities**

Regional identity has a long history as an idea in many countries but it has gained some new currency in the context of new regionalism and especially in the European Union. Respectively regional identities have been found important in the spheres of planning and marketing. At the turn of the Millennium, Romano Prodi, the Chairman of the European Commission, made a list of important things to which European Union should pay attention and regional identity appeared on his list as one of those significant elements (Paasi, 2000a; 2000b; 2013). Since then this idea rapidly spread into policy practices and planning documents in various European states. While the idea of regional identity is not a new one, regional identity is now seen as a means of mobilising human resources in regional development and in strengthening competitiveness (Paasi, 2013).
Regional identity in this new planning-related sense is one of the extensively adopted ideas that can be labelled as ‘travelling concepts’. There exist a whole new vocabulary related to regional development (soft planning, culture, social capital, trust, institutional thickness or creativity) that are used widely around the world.

What kind of elements belong to ‘regional identity’, which is definitely a much used but yet a rather poorly determined concept? Natural or cultural traits and landscapes are often used as symbols of identity, not only at regional but also at national scale. It has been suggested that every mature nation has a symbolic landscape that has been constructed as part of this nation building process (Paasi, 1996). Also dialects, local foods, place names and the names of firms may be important in identity building projects. Likewise, the narratives that circulate in media, novels, poems and cultural events are also important. These kind of regional identity elements are increasingly used in regional promotion projects. Thus, they have become economically more significant rather than being purely ideological categories.

How regional identity can be implemented in planning and governance? I wrote some years ago a research article that was based on the analysis of plans and on the interviews of planners in all Finnish Regional Councils (Paasi, 2013). These planners were partly responsible for making the regional plan that is renewed after four year periods. As one part of the interviews, I asked from planners: ’What is the role of regional identity for regional planning?’ I was particularly interested in seeing how they implement Romano Prodi’s ideas. I asked then ‘Do you use the idea of regional identity in this plan?’ and, finally, I asked: ‘Can you explain what do you mean by regional identity?’ In all, planners used the term regional identity in their plans but often rather loosely. Some interviewees even said: ‘I just mentioned this idea. Actually, it has no meaning.’ For some interviewees regional identity was a bad and exclusionist idea. These observations of course raises a question, what is the level of commitment in planning, development work and governance? Do key actors use currently popular words, terms and ideas that they really don’t believe? Romano Prodi’s commission suggested that regional identity is important hence planners thought that it should
be part of the plan text somehow, even if they really did not believe in importance of that idea. This is also one dimension, where we can problematise the planning process more widely. I think is the increasingly important to analyse these governmental processes contextually and empirically instead of making huge generalizations, for example, on the power of regional identity.

The scaling of territorial identities

Similarly as state spaces, spatial identities are also ‘scaled’ as part of the continual region-building projects. According to such scalar logic, people tend to feel belonging simultaneously to several overlapping territorial and regional entities. The observations of Eurobarometer studies make this obvious. Most European citizens feel themselves nowadays as both national and European citizens, which is evident not least because this fact is placed in the cover of the EU passport! Barometers also show that the emphasis on home state is stronger among unemployed and pensioned people. It also seems that people who have poorer links to economic life and social projects tend to trust on old states more than on the wider European project, which is more future oriented and that appears as a more positive construct to young people.

According to the Eurobarometer survey, Euro currency, the value of democracy and freedom seem to be the key factors on which the European identity is founded (cf. Raento et al. 2004). One observation in a recent barometer study was that when we talk about integration, people seem to put more emphasis on factors that bring Europeans together rather than on factors that distinguish them from each other. This is quite interesting issue at the moment, when many countries have parties, which actively want to their state to get free from the European Union. This relatively new phenomenon has become stronger after the economic recession in 2008. For example, we have had in Finland hundreds of thousands of unemployed people and the situation has not dramatically improved in the course of years, which has given fuel to populist movements and critical attitudes against migrants as ‘Others’.
What about the national borders inside of this European identity? I think that this is a critical issue. A study from the Finnish-Swedish border and the cross-border interactions in this context displayed that whatever people are doing in their daily life, they tend think along the national terms (Paasi and Prokkola, 2008). Finnish people compare what the Swedish people seem to do in different ways and what they do similarly as Finns. There is a sort of border identity, creating not a barrier, but a field of interaction. People associate borders with their own national identity and cross-border links and connections do not remove these elements of national identity; various forms of interaction are bound to national frameworks in comparisons on what and how we are doing things on our side and what and how they are doing similar things on the other side. This is of course a very banal example but most of our daily life is mundane and takes place in small everyday things and practices. What the leading politicians talk about identity festively in their offices and speeches, is often different and far away from what is going on at local spaces. Observations from the Netherlands-German border (Strüver, 2005) are rather similar compared with the Finnish-Swedish border and both of these are examples of borders that are old. While people can freely move and cooperate across these borders, a national link seems to be continuously there.

**Old and new regions**

Region-building is not always occurring by following the same historical pattern or trajectory. It is therefore useful to make a distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ regions. Old regions have become typically institutionalised as part of the rising spatial divisions of labour inside states and reflect changes in state’s spaces as well as the rise of city-hinterland relations. These are typically long historical process and therefore history and heritage can be very strong components in the regional/national identities of ordinary people. They can be important also for those who operate in regional planning circles, regional development, media sector and cultural and economic promotion of the region e.g. in tourism.
sector. Simply, this process often takes it power and significance from history that is used in the development of territorial identities. It is evident that at the moment we are in new situation. Old institutionalized regions are still significant in most states, but we have also a new-fangled form of regionality that can maybe be labelled as ‘new regions’ (Paasi, 2009). A representative and topical example could be various *ad hoc* project regions that have been and are perpetually constructed for the purposes of governance and for mobilising certain territory’s material and symbolic resources for different purposes or, at times, to achieve financial resources, e.g. from the European Union’s funding mechanisms. A fitting example of new regions are the cross-border regions that have been established in Europe (Deas and Lord, 2006).

What are the main differences between ‘new’ and ‘old’ regions? Doubtless, we can argue that contrary the old institutionalized regions, which may have a long history, new regions are in common ahistorical bureaucratic constructs that have been invented and produced for specific purposes. Respectively they may be quite separate from the daily life of ordinary people and people do not often identify with them. Because such regions are mobilized above all in planning, regional development and more widely, in governance, many people do not in fact recognize that such regions exist at all, even if they live their mundane life in the middle of these spatial frameworks, and which may have some kind of loose borders. Nevertheless, their somewhat fuzzy character does not mean that such regions are totally without ‘identities’. These regions can namely be significant elements in institutional identity discourses that regional elites, and governance and marketing circles invent and use successfully to promote the region for various purposes, for example tourism. Hence, it is clear that the institutionalization of old and new regions are very different processes and display diverging historical time-scales.

How are new regions invented and by whom? Both old and new regions require a group of advocates and activist who work in various sectors of the society to build regions. Similarly as in the institutionalization processes of old historical regions also in
the making of new regions there are different stages that we can analytically distinguish from this invention and region building process. At first, there must be some actor or a group of actors who at first invent an idea of a region, perhaps thinking that ‘why not to make a cross-border region here? Why not to apply money from European Union for this project, because they generally support cross-border policies to lower the barriers between states? At the next stage this idea must be advanced and developed further in the context wider political, economic and cultural discourses and launched in media to make it familiar and popular. Very typically, we see at this stage cartographic representations, where perhaps rather vague regional ideas are literally put on maps and they become ‘objectified’. Scholars who have studied the power of maps argue that such visualizations make the past, present and future observable at the same time; hence maps project our future expectations in a visible form to the present (Wood, 1992). Next, maps can give rise to a set of practices that are related to the process of region building: preliminary shaping of borders, outlining of possible soft spaces, development corridors, and infrastructure. There must also be a ‘meaning’ making process, which load the region with symbolic meanings and even concrete symbols, such as logos or flags, etc. Like in the building of old regions, also new regions need institutions and some kind of mutual, shared trust based on such institutions that actors create together. In addition, also borders are designed. New regions are rarely permanent, since they are crafted ad hoc for some specific purpose or projects, for example, to achieve resources that are available in cross-border programmes. Following from this logic the European Union in particular has become a very dynamic constellation of ad hoc regions and old established regional units (Deas and Lord, 2006).

**Borders and their future**

What are the processes that maintain bounded spaces and borders in contemporary world? We have many ongoing processes that are ever more important for governance. The state is rescaled all around the world, for example, and new regions are built or old ones are
merged together. During these processes bounded spaces, regions and territories become *questions* in social practices and discourse. The European Union’s rhetorical practice related to regions, especially the idea of the ‘Europe of regions’ means that the EU actively creates an understanding of the existence bounded regional spaces. This is strengthened by the use of the NUTS classification in governance and in directing support to these regions in the form of structural funds, support that is bound to regional spaces and their borders. If your locality happens to be on the wrong side of the border, it does not get support, but if it is on the right side, it will get, again maintaining an understanding of borders and bounded spaces. Network and multi-scalar governance are increasingly important and they partly challenge the construction of bounded spaces but do not abolish them. Finally, the migration across borders clearly contests regional governance but at the same time keeps bounded spaces alive.

This article has so far scrutinized the transformation of states, regions, identities, and bounded spaces in general but not yet the ‘border’ itself. What are borders, and how and where are they? Next, I want to expand a bit how borders are understood. We have certainly continuously linear borders that exist stubbornly. As far as states are concerned, such border structures are canonized in the practices of international law and the concept of sovereignty is substantially defined by such premises, even if the practices of sovereignty may vary in individual states. Border regions are clearly among the key sites very sovereignty practices condensate. This background firmly exists, even if many academic theoreticians have expressed since the 1990s that we moving towards a borderless world (Paasi, 2019).

A border can be seen narrowly as a line, border landscape, or zone. In a wider context, border is something that resonates with immigration, biographies of human beings moving in space and wider borderscapes. Borders can also be seen as results of flows and networks. Borders and networks are not opposites, as much of border thinking seems to suggest. In practice we have borders and we have flows, but actually borders are typically results of flows and networks. Borders are often mobile and are increasingly biometric borders associated with human bodies (e.g. fingerprints, irises), so
one could argue that mobile people themselves become borders. Borders can also be seen as an important part of aesthetic experience and at times geopolitical and artistic propaganda. Borders are thus also representations, symbols, institutions, even performances that can manifest themselves far away from proper border lines. Ethics is becoming an increasingly important part of border thinking especially in the context of migration (Paasi et al. 2019).

Contrary to the ideas of a borderless world, borders have become harder, especially in the context of economy and security. Nowadays, we have more than 50 walls between states around the world and, as we all know, building walls and barbed-wire entanglements is not at all an uncommon phenomenon even inside the Europe Union. Beside physical control and monitoring of borders, we have the control of ideas and minds and this is something that has not so far been deeply discussed within the context of borders. Freedom of speech and free networking across borders should be basic human rights and freedoms. Furthermore, we have witnessed border militarisation and the outsourcing of border control, so borders seem to be stretching out of the formal state space in many ways. These examples show that thinking about borders as mere lines dividing state spaces is definitely an out-dated approach.

I have been trying to develop some ideas for understanding borders more broadly in my recent works. One idea is so-called ‘discursive landscape of social power’ which resonates with borders, collective memory, and hence also with the idea of banal nationalism. In his famous book on *Banal Nationalism* (1995) Michael Billig explored the reasons of why do we use nationalistic thinking as a self-evident and taken for granted element in our daily lives (cf. Koch and Paasi, 2016). He argued, for example, that when we watch television, we see weather forecast maps, which create certain national border lines in our mind and we also tend to think in national terms in many kinds of daily routines. In Finland, for example, we have the military oath that is important for banal forms of nationalism. Every young male (for females it is voluntary) fulfils military service or civil service in Finland, and they swear the military oath to show that they are faithful citizens. You can see this as a kind of family event, which creates an idea of a bordered state territory that our young men are
protecting (Paasi, 2016). Landscapes of social power show where the borders are. They are not only pure borderlines, but they also represent memories and they are embedded within wider national cultural memorial practices and performances.

It is also important to recognize the significance of technical landscapes of power. This idea refers to the technological apparatus that often spreads the border far beyond border lines and inside the state territory. Increasingly technical instruments used in border control mean that states do not need so many border guards as they used to have earlier, because protecting borders is largely high-tech-based action where diverging sensors, cameras and other technical equipment are used. These landscapes are related to the securitisation of state spaces and control of mobilities. Graham (2010: 89) argues that “… states are becoming internationally organised systems geared towards trying to separate people in circulations deemed risky or malign from those deemed risk-free or worthy of protection. This process increasingly occurs both inside and outside territorial boundaries between states, resulting in blurring between international borders and urban/ local borders”.

**Borders and mobilities: conclusions**

Today borders are crossed by various kind of flows which are governed in many ways – economic flows, migrants, refugees and tourists (Paasi et al. 2019). These flows have different relations to borders. Economic flows often cross borders rather freely in various forms reflecting cooperation, investments, research and development, or the actions of individual investors. In tourism we can perhaps talk about semi-permeable borders. Tourism is a sector that most states are willing to develop, since states are many times very dependent on the tourism. We have seen quite dramatic rise of tourism and in 2014 more than one billion international tourists crossed state borders. Critical voices have emerged in many European countries against so-called ‘overtourism’ and local people even have attacked in some places against tourism business, expressing that they do not want masses of tourists to their cities or neighbourhoods. Tourism cannot expand itself without limits, without borders, and it seems that such a limit has been achieved in some places. This puts pressures on tourism planning and governance.
Then, we have also various kinds of borders, which are mobilized to govern the flows of migration. Economic, touristic and immigration borders exist simultaneously. They overlap with each other and may have different functions. Despite all these flows, it is well-known that only around 3% of the world’s population lives outside of the state where they have been born, so it is still quite a small number. Currently 75% of the immigrants live in 28 states; developed countries host only one third of the immigrants and two thirds of immigrants are placed in less developed countries. The pressures in Central Africa are definitely huge. Conflicts and wars are acute problems and people move, or escape, from one country to another across the borders. This is a new situation that has been experienced as threatening in current rather peaceful Europe. Yet we notice this movement through the increasing numbers of asylum-seekers to Europe. Climate change and rising sea levels, for example, will create climate refugees whose numbers may be huge. Climate change turns many African areas hotter, it raises the sea level in Bangladesh and in other coastal cities. If the sea level raises with just one meter millions of people are forced to leave their homes and home-countries. In many European countries migration is more and more often seen as a security issue that rises the risk of terrorism and insecurity. Increasingly mobile people will be a huge challenge for the future of European governance.

There is one issue that has been raised by the European Union and by many national authorities: What will happen to the European population in the future? Population and demographic forecasts show that the older population strata in European societies becomes larger and there is will be a lack of young labour force in the future. The population rates and birth rates in many developed countries are low and they not high enough that these nations would be able to reproduce themselves. On the other hand, more and more migrants are willing to come to Europe and to other developed states. What could be the solution? What should the states do? These will be key issues in European (border) governance and also for the future life of European nations. Short sighted populist, anti-immigrant policy is not a solution for such long-term problems.
References


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You remember that village where the border ran
Down the middle of the street,
With the butcher and baker in different states?
Today he remarked how a shower of rain
Had stopped so cleanly across Golightly’s lane
It might have been a shower of glass
That had toppled over. He stood there, for ages,
To wonder which side, if any, he should be on.

(Paul Muldoon: The Boundary Commission from Why Brownlee Left)

I have been working on topic of borders for many, many years. During the first 5-10 minutes of my presentation, I will speak about the renaissance of border studies in the past 20 years, both as an academic discipline and also as something that is a great importance for practitioners. One of the most important things of border studies in the past 20 years has been the fact that the scholars who were engaged in studying the borders have crossed their own disciplinary borders between geography and political science, sociology, anthropology, law and international law.

There has been a lot of crossings of borders, notably crossing of borders between academics and practitioners, and as I understand it, both of these communities are represented around the table. When you look at the Government, often you see that the scientists are there, practitioners are over there and a big “Berlin Wall” is in the middle between them. I think to certain extent that we have succeeded in crossing those borders and discussing the changing dynamics of borders in Europe and in the world. It is important to draw a wider picture also from a very local context.

I have lived just south from the West Bank and I spend a lot of time driving between my home and Jerusalem. When I leave my home, a community called Meitar, I have two options to drive to Jerusalem. I can immediately turn right, go straight and drive 70 kilometres, 1 hour and 10 minutes and I am in Jerusalem, but it means that I
have to cross the West Bank. I have an alternative, I can drive 120 kilometres on a big motorway. It takes the same amount of time because the roads are better, but driving double distance without crossing the West Bank. 98% of people do not drive through the West Bank and the only Israelis who drive to the West Bank are either the settlers or the people doing their military duty. They feel that it is too dangerous, rightly or wrongly. I am one of the crazy guys, who does it, but I have to be very careful and I have to know when it is possible and not possible to drive across the West Bank. But if I do, I drive through a border, one in and one out. The Israeli Government does not like to call it as border, it calls it as separation barrier, a security barrier, a security fence. It is about semantics.

One of the main thing that I want to talk today is the issue that: what happened in the world, and not just in Israel-Palestine, but in North America, in Western and Central Europe? We had this lovely idea of openness in our head for 20-30 years, namely the notion of a borderless world, a world of harmony, peace and stability. The EU was expanding and the Berlin Wall fell down. Consequently, much of our research and studies dealt with one topic only, specifically 'how do we open the borders, how we make them easier to negotiate, what are the dynamics of crossing the borders?'

Source: https://www.totalpolitics.com/articles/news/nigel-farages-anti-eu-poster-compared-nazi-propaganda
However, we are beginning to think in terms of security and borders once again. The last five to ten years, actually since 9/11, the issue of securitization has come back in a very big way. We build new fences, we build new walls either because we are afraid of ISIS coming to Europe or we do not want migrants who ’take away our jobs, economy’. Just look at how these issues have been central to the BREXIT debate which is taking place in the UK.

We have to understand that borders are very dynamic processes, they change quickly. Two weeks ago, there was an article in the Le Monde about all the new walls, all the new fences that have been built in the world, particularly in Europe. You may ask many of my colleagues from North America, who are members of ABS (Association of Borderland Studies) and who publish the journal of Borderland Studies about the changes in research orientations they have experienced over the past 20 years. Many of them will tell you that if they wanted to get public, institutional funding for their research on borders 20 or 30 years ago they would have applied for research grant to the Free Trade Association, NAFTA or to related organisations. The main research questions that were raised related to the issue how to make borders easier to cross, what to do with bureaucracy, politics, surveillance so people and goods can go through borders much easier and faster. However, if they want to get funding today they tell different story. Today, they get funding from Department of Homeland Security and the questions that they want to know is how to make borders more secure, how to assure that procedures are stricter.

World today experiences dynamics and this reflects on the way how borders are managed and how the political power is used, which takes place at borders. Moreover, it raises further important questions: who determines the procedures for crossing the borders, what sort of surveillance is there, who is allowed in and who is not allowed in? There are the questions that we thought we no longer will have to deal with. These issues and questions have come back in a very big way and they seem to be at the main table in a time to come.

I am very interested in border caricatures. I have around 150 of them. The caricature on this particular slide is my favourite border
Managing Borders in a Contrasting Era of Globalization and Conflict

This very simple caricature tells us everything about borders. What do we see here? We see two people on a small deserted island in a very European, not North American way. What is the first thing that they do? They built a fence, a border. They staked out their territories. It tells us that this behaviour is very territorial. This is the way how we think, we have to stakeout our territory. But, wait a minute, it tells as something quite the opposite. Look, there are two people on a deserted island, we do not know how long have been they there, but there is a fence, a 'Berlin Wall', between them and they are beginning to reach out, they are beginning to know each other, to speak and listen to each other. If we come back 5 years in a time and if they are still on an island then there will be no border anymore. These represent the two mega narratives of borders today.

Border studies have developed greatly over the past 30 - 40 years. There has been a huge renaissance what is reflected in number of scholars, number of disciplines, number of journals, number of conferences and workshops what we have. Often, we have workshops and conferences at border locations, so one of the rituals of border seminar is to cross the border.

We have many different borders around the world. Normally, the borders are easy to cross, rather than difficult. I would say what just has happened in the world of borders. Where we have arrived with my colleagues, like James W. Scott, Anssi Paasi, Henk van Houtum, who represent the mainstream of border studies, that today we are interested in two parallel border discourses. The first one which
brought us together was the discourse that started in the 80s, early 90s. It was the idea of a borderless world, a world without borders. Political contingency, globalization, internet and web do not take borders into account. There are few countries in the world which try to put up borders against internet, but they are not very successful. Many of you know, who have been to China, it is very hard to use Google search there, because they do not like Google; nevertheless, it overrules 95% of the world and forget about borders, guards, fences because we cross the borders. We no longer live in a world of economic isolationism and even if there are security borders they do not bring us back to isolationism from the rest of the world. Economics, web, dissemination of information, political contingency, historical contingency, fall of the Berlin Wall, widening of the EU and Schengen have generated a specific type of discourse that is called as a ’borderless world’.

Borders and their functions are changing, but not disappearing altogether. They are becoming more open, they are easier to cross, they are easier to negotiate, but they do not disappear. You do not have to have a fence, or a wall in order to have a border. We often forget about more important borders, which are not necessarily the borders between countries, but often the internal borders between which we live our lives. We live with educational borders, metropolitan borders, police borders, particularly in America where the metropolitan fragmentation is strongly present. These are the borders that determine our taxes, where we send our kids to school, or what our transportation zone is. We often forget that these borders govern our lives on daily basis, but we do not see them. These borders are not immediately visible. Definitely, borders exist, they are there, they impact us, but we do not see them.

We have shifted the focus of border studies from only looking at borders between states to many other sociological, geographical, planning and metropolitan borders which govern our everyday lives. This has been a very important lesson for many of us. Even though what interests us the most is the borders between states. This is what interests us the most.
There are many countries in the world, where borders can be quite tough, but they do not necessarily need fences or walls. For many of us the borders are not the edge of the country. When we are walking into the airport in Budapest or in Heathrow and we want to flight to the United States of America then the border is there in Hungary, it is there in London. That means they decide in Budapest or in London whether we can go in, or not go in to the USA. In some cases, I have experienced it in Dublin, and in some cases in Canada or in Ireland, the whole border functions have been shifted out of America into the airports. As you know the USA is very strict and you cannot bring in any food stuff and if you bring in even one apple or one orange without declaring it, you may feel as a criminal. Simply, the borders have been shifted, thus border is not only a fence at the territorial edge of the state. We often negotiate borders, we often cross borders in the heart of our capital cities and airports.

However, it is fair to say that in the last 20 years the whole direction of border studies were directed towards opening, disappearance, removal of walls and fences, free movement because of history and because of globalization. Starting with 9/11 and lasting until today, an opposite direction and path is visible in border discourse. We have a discourse of securitization, homeland security and these discourses have led us to create new fences and new walls for two reasons. One, because we are fearful of violence, terrorism coming from outside. Although, we have a discourse of securitization, homeland security and these discourses have led us to create new fences and new walls for two reasons. One, because we are fearful of violence, terrorism coming from outside. Although, we often forget that violence and terrorism often happen because of the way globalization crosses borders through internet. You do not have to have people physically crossing the borders to learn how to be a terrorist, but a terrorist can be a person who was born and educated in the home society, and learnt how to carry out their evil actions through an internet and a cyberspace which crosses borders, but the people do not. Subsequently, the British people one day in 2005 woke up in a great shock, “hey, the people who bombed out our metro in London did not come from Syria, they did not come somewhere else from the Middle East, but they grew up inside England”. Cross-border
globalization resulted in the fact that information is disseminated across the borders.

We have to remember that internet or web are not by definition good or bad, they are technologies that can be used for good things or bad things, but the technology is there. Technology will not disappear. Even though that we moved back to build fences and walls it does not mean regarding technology that we moved back 50 years in time. Technology is still there, it still crosses the borders whether there are walls or whether there are no walls. That means walls and fences can prevent physical movement of people, but they cannot prevent dissemination of technology and information that happened decades before in the Soviet Block or in other areas of the world.

Reconstruction of borders happens because of fear from terrorism and violence. The other reason is the way the borders were opened to the world, hence supporting free migration and free movement. I do not judge any morality of these arguments, but many groups and many states express that there are too many migrants, too many poor migrants, they take away jobs, they have different culture and different religion and we need to put a break into it. Naturally, it is a very big discussion in the EU and it played a major role in the Brexit events in England.

It is always easier to use the securitization argument when you want to create new borders, rather than the migration argument. The security argument is always easier and more acceptable instead xenophobic, anti-migration arguments. Thus, convincing the general audience is much better with the issues of securitization and arguments. This argument is sold much better on the streets. People who are within the centre of the political spectrum, they can be easily convinced with securitization narratives. If I sell you an argument which says that if I do not have a new border and strong homeland security then maybe tomorrow someone will come and bomb your bus or bomb your shopping mall (these are the arguments which were used in Israel and in the West Bank when the separation barrier was set up to prevent people coming into Israel), this is a much more powerful argument, it buys much more supporters than economic
or migration arguments. Sometimes the securitization argument is magnified in order to achieve different objectives.

When we look at the world today, when we look at Europe, it is not a question whether do we believe in the idea and argument of a borderless world, or do we believe in securitization and border reconstruction argument. We can be binary, we cannot just chose one or another. We live in a world, where both processes are going on at the same time.

If the US wants to build a wall between the US territory and Mexico, it does not mean it will close down economic cooperation with South America. NAFTA is still very important in many aspects. The great challenge that practitioners, dealing with cross-border dynamism, face today is how to negotiate both of these discourses in the same place and at the same time, allowing cross-border practices to be more open for culture, for economics and other issues of that nature, but to be more difficult and tougher for illegal migration. This is the great challenge for border discourses which frames the set of questions for the next generation of border scholars and practitioners in the next 10 or 20 years.

We have borders everywhere. We have borders at home, we have borders in our neighbourhood. For example in London, I do not know how many of you know London, when I walk to the University of London to the British Library from my apartment, I walk between two neighbouring municipal councils, one is Westminster, while the other is called Camden. They do not want to see each other. Thus, borders exist in all different scales from home, individual, neighbourhood to the state, where we start thinking so much about borders. We just build and build against immigration, against trade, against global warming.

Coming back to Europe, 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall it is very similar. I remember, 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we had conferences everywhere in the world, and we discussed what was the significances of falling of the Berlin Wall, how boundaries were opened throughout the world. When we got to 20 years, we already asked new questions. When we will get to 30 years anniversary, it will reflect, maybe I exaggerate now, how do we think about borders in
contemporary world. It is a parallel discourse since you do not close down the EU, all the great cooperation, the economics; nevertheless, we think great deal of borders much more.

The wall is the ugly, visible sign of a barrier that people cannot physically cross. Jerusalem has lot of walls because when you have a wall and not a fence in the urban neighbourhood, somebody may fire a rifle gun or throw a grenade against people, thus you have very physical wall that prevents people from the other side. As I said earlier, sometimes you do not know that there is a border. This is a satellite photo that you can see on the slide and you can see Gaza Strip, you can see difference because of policies how you manage environment, the landscape, where Bedouin flocks can graze or cannot graze.

When we want to know the impact of borders, we need to think much more about functions instead of location. What are those things that happen differently on both sides of the border and where cooperation across the borders allow to obliterate the border? If you go on Google and look at the satellite photos, look for those areas where there are no necessarily fences or walls, but you will see the border very clearly.

We have come back to the world of securitization and we have a new element, specifically President Trump. Trump wants to build a new wall between the US and Mexico and the Great Wall of China is one of his models. He wants walls that protect the US from everything, from terrorists. He wants to build walls not just in the South of the country, but in the North as well. They have just realised that the problem of fundamentalism can come from anywhere, from the South and from the North.

I was on a meeting of border scholars some 10-12 years ago in Las Cruces in New Mexico at the US-Mexican border. We had a meeting of scholars and practitioners. First day we were talking about opening of borders, about a borderless world, making the US-Mexican border easier. The second day we had a senior from the Department of Homeland Security from Washington. He came, listened to us and he expressed the following, ’I will tell you how we in the Department of Homeland Security in Washington perceive
the US-Mexican borders. For us in the Department of Homeland Security everyone of a million Mexican, who crossed the borders every month are potential terrorists unless they prove otherwise.

Now, America has big issues with Mexico regarding illegal migration, illegal work, smuggling, all sorts of drugs, but no Mexican has ever been stopped or arrested for being a potential terrorist. There were indeed examples, not because of terrible rifle shootings at schools because of gun policy, of fundamentalist terrorism coming to the US and causing havoc. The two best known cases came through the Canadian borders and not through the Mexican borders, and the reasons of it is that the Canadian border was much easier to cross than the Mexican border. That means people 'from the third world with different colour' coming from Mexico (it may sound politically incorrect), but people like us, English speaking, white, Western, come from Canada. In other words, it was not expected that they will come across the Canadian borders.

Today, even when you go through the US-Canadian border you have to go through very serious border checks and controls. I was once in a situation, which happened before the securitization discourses, but it goes back almost 20 years. I was with my children when they were young and we were spending some time in Toronto. I have a brother in New Jersey, so we were driving for a week to get to New Jersey from Toronto and we crossed the American border. Crossing the border with British passports, visas and everything; nevertheless, we understood we did not have to bring a car. At that morning when we left our house in Toronto, I had some American dollars and I put them into my passport. When I presented my passport to the US border patrol police, the police guy saw those dollars and he expressed whether I realized that it was a crime to try to bribe a border official. This event took me 15 minutes to make him understand that there is no reason to bribe because I had everything well. Finally, his superior let us through. And this event happened before securitization debate. Today it is very difficult, let ask some Canadians about it and they say that even for them it is sometimes very problematic to cross the US-Canadian borders. Many of them say that they used to spend their vacation in Canada, but now they fly to Europe because it is less problematic with borders and visas.
It is interesting that 7 or 8 years ago, again because of the securitization dilemma, the Americans who went to Canada and to Mexico were told that it is no longer sufficient to go with your driving license, but you have to have passport. Number one, passport is a very expensive issue for those people who cannot afford it. Number two, it shows that around 15% of the Americans have ever left the US. We think that it is a huge number because the country is so big. However, 85% of the Americans did not need or desired to have passport because they never leave the USA, the country which to a certain extent determines many international and global policies. That was a very interesting perspective on who crosses the borders, where and when.

What is interesting is the result of this process. Mexico wants to build a border wall with Central America in order to keep out the immigrants from Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. This reflects that countries on the periphery have very problematic policies concerning the borders. Mexico tells, ’it is not our fault, but of people who come from Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, thus we have to build a wall in order to have a more acceptable policy and relationship with the US. It is for us more important to have good economic relations with the US.’

European policy is changing. It is impacted by economic realities, security realities, rise of fundamentalism and its importation from other regions of the world to Europe. To a certain extent, the debate has been impacted also by Brexit. It does not mean that countries want to leave the EU, like the British people. Now, I would like to speak about this mistaken vote to leave the EU. I was a child in Britain in the 60s when Britain joined the EU (1973?). At that time, there was exactly the same debate. Questions emerged, what do we want from the EU? Simply, the same debate at that time. It was interesting that those people who had generated the debate at that time, many of them persuaded to vote against the EU two years ago, too. That means it was mainly the older generations who voted for leaving the EU, and the younger generations, whose future is in Europe, mainly voted for the EU. Naturally, it is not one hundred percent, it is a very complex question taking into account that London and the South voted for remaining, while the North for
leaving. We have to be very careful because of hidden xenophobia and latent racism that appeared during these narratives.

The questions that were raised during the Brexit debate were in great extent about borders and migration. The big issues that came up with Brexit about borders and cross-border management is Ireland. The North will not be part of the EU, while the Republic of Ireland will be part of the EU. In addition to the membership of the EU, there is still a major conflict about the future of Northern Ireland, whether will it always be part of the United Kingdom, or it will leave the United Kingdom one day and become part of the Republic of Ireland depending on the catholic and protestant discussion. However, what they achieved in the last 20 years, was to break down the borders. Today, if you travel around Ireland you are not even aware that you cross the borders, but actually you become aware of it because the speed limits are different in Ireland and in Northern Ireland, and the currency can be different because you can still use sterling in Northern Ireland and you can only use Euro in the Republic.

Source: PA Images, the national photography agency of Britain, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-42180074
It was quite interesting, when you talk about cross-border governance prior to the removal of the border, cross-border governance in Ireland was reflected in the most local and domestic issues that can you think of. One of the great British institution is the pub. Although, pubs throughout the United Kingdom had to close at eleven o’clock in the evening some 10 or 15 years ago, but pubs in Ireland were opened for 24 hours. Now, it is the same in the United Kingdom as well. Another important policy concerning pubs is that it is no longer allowed to smoke in any pubs today. However, this was not a policy in the United Kingdom 7 or 10 years before, but it was a policy in Ireland. That means before the border was removed, people living in small village went into the north of the street so they could go to the pub, where they could smoke inside and when those pubs were closed at 11 o’clock, then they moved to another side of the street, where the pubs were open for 24 hours a day, so they could continue drinking, but without smoking. These are very funny things, but border governance is also about these very local issues.

We usually think about big things, about state, security, but 98% of population think about where they can smoke in a pub, where they can get cheaper gasoline and where customs and taxes are less. Most people are not involved in big and global issues. We have to remember that when we talk about cross-border governance and practices, then local issues are primarily important.
Ireland, which is much more peaceful today than Israel-Palestine, knows how to blend the two, the security with domestic, and there are very big questions concerning what will be the status of borders between northern and southern part of Ireland after Brexit. Because of the migration issue which was indeed one of the major issues that came up in the Brexit, southern part of Ireland may be a place for many migrants to come who will then move into north and cross freely the UK. All the people, who were in favour of Brexit, see this as a defeat. But if you close the borders and when you build new fences and new walls you raise all the old political issues about the status of Northern Ireland about Catholics and Protestants that no one wants to do in the UK and Ireland. Thus, it is a major dilemma and everything else concerning Brexit in the UK. The British Government has no idea what to do about it. One thing is clear, namely a country went into a new policy, the citizens, with very small margin, voted for a new policy to leave the EU without really ever having discussed what it means for the UK, what are the main political, economic implications and how will it affect migration. When you follow news in Britain they are very boring, because there is one debate after other in Parliament, like what is going to happen in Brexit, when will it be, what will it be, how will it be, what will the status be and no one really knows the answer because it was never really discussed and debated. People tell that they do not want hard border between Northern and Southern Ireland.

A year ago, Donald Trump visited Israel in a month after he became the President of the USA. He was the first President of the United States who visited the old city. The previous past presidents of the US did not undertake that visit because of the legal status as occupied territory and as a jurisdiction that has to be determined.

You know or you may see it on TV, when people go to the Western Wall they write little notes and they put them into the wall because they believe that God is reading their notes. Once a week or once a month, the attendance come around late at night and they clean out all the inserted notes, because you cannot have endless number of notes. I do not know what do they do with them, whether they throw them away or bury them, I do not know.
When the US President visited the Wall, everybody was thinking what did Donald Trump write on the note. It nobody knows, but his note could be the following, 'this wall lasted three thousand years, I want to build a wall like that between the USA and Mexico, please let me have the name of your contractor, I want to contact him, so he can build me a wall'. This was one of the caricature that appeared that time, but it reflects a certain way of thinking among many leading politicians today.

![Caricature of Donald Trump and the Wall](https://images.dailykos.com/images/404045/story_image/TRUMP_Holy_Wall_SendWeb.jpg?1495479087)


When we do create security borders, we create invisibility and this is something that we often forget. Think about the separation barrier between Israel and Palestine in the West Bank. It was built rightly or wrongly to prevent Palestinian violence, terrorism into Israel. When you look at the statistics, you can argue that the wall, barrier, fence was a great success, but do not forget that when you build walls and when people cannot physically cross the borders then they
cannot see what is going on the other side. It creates serious lack of knowledge, they do not know the people beyond the wall, they do not know what do they do. Lack of knowledge creates invisibility and invisibility creates threat, perception of fear. Simply, you do not know what is there and you are not aware of the real threats. That means you exchange one sort of threat, physical threat, with another sort of threat where you do not know what is going to be.

I remember when the borders were opened for the first time in Nicosia, in Cyprus. There was a lovely article in the New York Times about a gentleman who lived in southern part of Nicosia and he was born around 1974, around the time of invasion and division of the Island between the Turks and the Greeks. He lived in a house on a road, where there was a wall at the end of the road that divided

Source: https://englishvillage.wordpress.com/2012/09/21/education-can-give-you-a-better-perspective/
Nicosia. He always wanted to know what is happening on the other side because the press told them that there are monsters and tanks. When the border was opened for few days, he was among the first people who crossed the border. The New York Times interviewed him after he returned and he expressed that he was expected to find terrible people on the other side, but he found people who looked like him, he found mothers who looked like his mother, children who looked like his children, they eat very similar food and they thought that there were lived monsters on the other side of the wall.

Invisibility creates new form of threats when you close the borders and when you do not cross them. Within the EU funded EUROBORDERS research project, we produced a video about the impact of the separation barrier on children in the West Bank. The children were ten or eleven years old and the separation barrier has been standing for ten years already. They actually live inside the West Bank with walls and fences and we wanted to know what do they think about the other side of the wall. Before the separation barrier the Israelis and Palestinians hated each other, but the children played football together on the street, but they cannot do it now. What was very pessimistic about the film was that they have a mirror image about the other side, they were both convinced that the other side is evil, dangerous and dirty. The only common thing was that they both thought in the same way.

To know what is happening, having knowledge, on the other side of the border is critical to understanding the dynamics of cross-border relations. This is the reason why the EU has been very successful in opening up of its border regions, not signalling that borders have disappeared, but pouring lot of investments into the idea that long before a country joins to the EU it starts to have cross-border regions and establish relationships. Joint commercial ventures, joint tourism, joint culture, hence people may know what is happening on the other side. No question that satellite TV helped in this domain when you watch the soap opera on the other side of the border.

How do you cross the borders? There are many ways to do it. It can happen by a ladder. You can cross borders by digging tunnels, e.g.
Gaza in Israel is a good example of it. This is what happening at the moment, they dig tunnels below the border.

There are of course various ways to reach beyond the borders. For example a beautiful example can be seen on a slide, there are two graves, a grave of a couple who were buried in different time and the graves are divided by borders, but the top of the graves are connected, thus traversing borders.


Europe is united by borders as we all know. Our borders unite us rather than divide us. There is a famous example between Belgium and Holland, namely Baarle-Hertog, where you have a small piece of Belgium inside Holland and in the village again the town is divided between Belgium and Holland. You have the borders between the houses. That is where we were 20-30 years ago in parts of Western Europe. In number of places, we are still right that. This is great for tourism. What happened to many EU countries when all the borders were coming down, suddenly came the tourism industry and said, leave a bit of the wall, leave the signs on the road, because this is a great commercial for tourism. Actually, borders are phantastic places for tourism.

We sometimes have the wrong perception of what it means to cross the border which used to be closed and which is now open. The concept of border is often associated with the concept of difference.
It is true that there are many borders in the world which cut through ethnic homogenous regions. The West Bank is a classic example of this and where you have Arabs and Palestinians on both sides of the border, before 1949 there was no difference. Once they set up the West Bank in 1949 somebody became a citizen of Israel, somebody became a stateless Palestinian.

We all know what happened with the borders hundred years ago in Central and Eastern Europe. Borders were drawn and often separated ethnic groups. You have many Hungarian speakers on the Romanian side of the border. You have the Kurds, who were cut up between Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, rather than giving them their own territory. They remain the largest national territorial ethnic group in the world today without their own state. It looks like that in the post-ISIS, the world is going to sell them down again as they did it hundred years ago for the sake of realpolitik and geopolitics.

Moreover, you have the classic examples, like Korea, West-East Germany and other areas, where homogenous cultural groups have been cut into two by borders. So, when the borders are eventually removed, there may be many economic differences and educational differences, but the basic language and culture is the same. The process of crossing borders and getting together again is partly easy in these cross-border zones. I do not say that it is easy, but it is easier than in other areas.

We often have the wrong perception that when you open the border you also remove difference, but you never remove difference. What we have when people cross the borders, when the borders are open? We come back to the notion of visibility, hence the other side becomes visible, they are visible to each other. The other side is no longer invisible; subsequently, it no longer presents a threat.

We are familiar, we cross the borders whenever we want. We may cross every Sunday to buy cheaper gasoline. Or, as I experienced not a long ago on the border between Estonia and Latvia, there used to be a big border crossing point and now it is probably the biggest alcohol supermarket anywhere I have seen in the world. People come from Finland, they drive through Estonia to the borders with Latvia with big vans. They load the vans and they drive back to
Finland through the EU. We have anecdotes about cheaper gasoline, cheaper alcohol. They once told me in Holland that they used to send their children to the schools in Belgium just ten minutes away because the discipline was better there.

There was once a series of program about frontiers on the BBC and someone said that he grew up in the Pyrenees. Once a month on Sunday, or during the weekend, the family drove from the Spanish side to the French side, because the cuisine was better there. The same story with the pubs and so on.

When you cross the border it does not mean that you remove difference, but difference is no longer a threat and it becomes celebrated. It is the way that somebody comes home and says, ’we went to Belgium yesterday, we did this and we did that, we had better food, we had cheaper this, we saw something different.’ Simply, difference becomes something to be celebrated rather than to be feared and this is one of the most important elements of border opening between different countries and different societies.

We would speak about a borderless world in a utopian world, let’s get rid of borders. Israelis and Palestinians are so intend to work out one meter in this way and other five hundred metres that way, they lose track of what they really want to achieve and they are unable to establish a shared living space. However, we do not live in this utopian world today. Not only that we are not there in many respects, but borders are being reconstructed in Western Europe and North America which are considered as bastions of democracy. Simply, we have to think how do we continue to negotiate crossing of borders in an era when securitization has taken over the public debate and when many areas experience rebuilding of fences, walls. We still live in an era of globalisation and we have to figure out how do we negotiate these two different discourses at the same time and the same place.

Thank you very much for your attention!

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Introduction

Thank you very much for inviting me to participate at Governance Workshop series in Budapest. It is an incredible honour to be here, talking to you about this topic which involves several levels of governance: within Northern Ireland, across the Irish border, in the United Kingdom and the European Union.

I am part of a project, *Borders in Globalization* (funded by the SSHRC in Canada) which is led by Professor Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly and for which I lead the case study on the Irish border. When we were putting together the funding proposal in 2013, we said that the Irish border functions very well: cross-border levels of governance are steadily increasing, cooperation and contacts are very good and they are positively interlinked with fairly successful peace process. However, the shock of the Brexit referendum outcome brought with it serious implications for the Irish border as we have come to know it. Indeed the logic of Brexit itself forces a focus on national sovereignty and an unrealistic image of ‘border control’. This means an erosion of ambiguity and a derogation of cooperation - both of which have been essential to the transformation of the Irish border.

This is a very interesting process for people all around Europe to think about. One thing that I have realised from happenings related to Brexit is that things are very fragile. We often take the achievements of peaceful cooperation for granted. We came to assume in Ireland, for example, that multiple layers of governance, sets of shared practices, and habits of working together were only going to increase. We often think the success and accomplishments of cross-border governance are locked and built upon, rather than open to challenge.

However, the event of Brexit has shown us that these things are very fragile in reality and the fact is that the achievements of cooperation are not automatically secure, instead they depend on continued cooperation and trust between the key players. The Brexit process has already provoked some breakdown in trust and confidence in the British-Irish intergovernmental relationship and this has direct effects on the Irish border region.
Border regimes

One thing that is very important in the process of Brexit is the idea of governance, particularly as it is conceived by the UK Government for the Irish border. This idea of governance is undifferentiated and it is highly centred on the Westphalian idea and notion of national state sovereignty. This means a very clear definition of state borders as defining the scope and scale of state power itself. Subsequently, notions of governance that recognize cross-border connections, contacts, negotiations and decision-making seem to be set aside in this new political environment and constellation. This shift is quite remarkable, not least because it does not tally with our understanding of how borders actually function today.

Border regimes operate at several levels at any one time. Border regimes might involve direct governance, institutions, laws, jurisdiction, mobility of people, and the flow of information. At its core, the most important point about border regimes is not inclusion/exclusion, but rather the hierarchies of rights and treatment within a jurisdiction.

Many of the problems of the Brexit process so far have been generated by different interpretation and narration of borders between various actors. To be more specific, the Irish Government and the EU think about borders in much more multi-layered way, especially when dealing with the Irish border, while the UK thinks about borders only within the frames of the UK. Thus the Irish border is primarily understood by the UK as a domestic matter.

According to the logic of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, Northern Ireland is in the United Kingdom, thus what the UK decides will simply apply to Northern Ireland. This reflects a simple understanding of national sovereignty – one which has motivated the process of Brexit itself. But when we look at border regimes in Northern Ireland then we see that they are much more nuanced and much more multi layered. Northern Ireland is part of the UK, but it is part of the Island of Ireland, too. The many UK/Ireland border regimes significantly affect the area and the people of both states, their work, movement and rights. Framing all of this are the effects of the European Union and its acquis. The challenge for the
UK and the EU in the Brexit negotiations is to preserve the benefits of common EU membership for the Irish border whilst one side extricates itself from the conditions and rules that make such an open border possible.

James Anderson and Liam O’Dowd (1999) noted that ‘the political, cultural, symbolic, & military salience of the border has varied over time, affected by the relative power of British/Irish governments and Unionism/Nationalism’. The Irish border has undergone several iterations: from enforcement of customs to active military/paramilitary presence on the border. Anderson and O’Dowd underline that salience of the borders is directly affected by the happenings and relationship between the British and the Irish governments. In this way, the border is a fascinating barometer for the relationship between the British and the Irish.

For example, in the 1930s, the British and the Irish governments went into a trade war and custom borders had to be enforced. The British put tariffs on agricultural products coming from Ireland and the Irish state put tariffs on British coal. The subsequent customs infrastructure on the border profoundly altered border relations and the experience of border crossing.

More recently, the Irish border reflects the severe consequences of an escalation in the conflictual relationship between the British and Irish government in the 1970s. More barriers and checkpoints were installed and smaller border roads were made impassable by the British Army installing spikes and digging craters. Local people – who relied on being able to cross the border easily for their business, social and family commitments – organised to remove these spikes and fill these craters. The British army consequently used more permanent measures in order to ensure that roads remained closed.

Next came the securitization of the border. Military checkpoints were installed and people were stopped at the border because of security reasons. Even into the new millennium, security controls were in place and people were under surveillance in the border region. EU membership had a great influence on relations between the United Kingdom and Ireland and succeeded in removing customs controls between the two. Yet all this facilitation was
happening when the security border was very much in place. The recent history of the Irish border shows that it is quite possible to have a customs border with no restrictions on the movement of people, or to have a security border with few restrictions on trade.

The peace process and the border

There was a long process of negotiation that led to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, namely, Sunningdale (1973), Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), Downing Street Declaration (1993) and Framework Documents (1995). The main point of this negotiation process was that it was built on inter-governmental cooperation: it aimed to build trust between communities and governments and to establish frameworks for cooperation at various levels in order to manage the different interests and identities within Northern Ireland. The 1998 Agreement had several key points which had important effects on the situation. After the process of negotiation between the main parties, it agreed (or rather reaffirmed) that the status of Northern Ireland is a choice for the majority of people of Northern Ireland. The Agreement essentially says that there are two choices for Northern Ireland. One is that Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom or it can be part of the United Island. The Agreement holds that the political aspirations of the unionists and the nationalists are equally legitimate even though that they are directly opposing.

Related to these differing but equal identities is the point that people in Northern Ireland can chose to be either British or Irish or both, regardless what happens in the future. At the moment, most of the equivalence of rights shared by British and Irish citizens arise from common European Union membership. The question of what comes after Brexit and the potential changes and inequalities in this domain is a cause for concern in Northern Ireland in particular as it speaks to a core principle in the Agreement. What will it mean for Irish citizens in Northern Ireland to hold EU citizenship whilst living in a non-EU member-state (the UK)?
Another point of the Good Friday Agreement is that it allows the self-determination of those on the island of Ireland, north and south. For any change to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland there will need to be consent of a majority in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The Agreement says that if majority of people in Northern Ireland vote for being part of Ireland or the United Kingdom, both governments have to respect that decision. To be specific, “(iv) affirm that if, in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise their right of self-determination … to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both Governments to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish.”

The very possibility of such a change reflects the preference of nationalists in Northern Ireland who want to see Irish unification. At its root, framing the constitutional choice for Northern Ireland in binary terms inevitably perpetuates majority/minority tensions and a quest to be (or remain) the majority view which dominates any quests for more moderate, complex outcomes. Thus, the 1998 Agreement is quite unsettling in its own way. It definitely creates an environment for a much more peaceful healthy democracy, but at the same time it satisfies neither unionists nor nationalists because it contains an ongoing sense of ambiguity and uncertainty about the future status of Northern Ireland.

As Gilligan (2008) writes, “The Agreement had to achieve the seemingly impossible task of guaranteeing the right to Irish national self-determination and securing Northern Ireland’s place within the UK … This formulation provides satisfaction to both Nationalists and Unionists, or to neither, depending on how it is interpreted.” Put simply, the Agreement contains a limbo, namely the status of Northern Ireland may be changed by majority wish at any time. Essentially, unionism and nationalism tried to reinforce their constituency basis all the time and they do not get any benefit from reaching out to forge common ground for cooperation. They have to sustain their constituency base by keeping the border as a live political concern.
Another important element of the 1998 Agreement is that it had an effect on constitutions of both Ireland and the United Kingdom, in that both constitutions were changed. In the case of Ireland, it was very obvious and it installed a new Article 3 of Bunreacht na hÉireann, “It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island.” That means it expresses a retraction from the irredentist claims on the territory. It no longer anticipates reintegration of Northern Ireland into the territory of Ireland, but rather it situates Northern Ireland within a much friendlier narrative.

The flip side of this was a corresponding change in the constitution of the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland has now a devolved status that was part of wider changes within the United Kingdom itself. The government of Tony Blair shifted toward regionalisation of the United Kingdom as a possible way to manage Scottish nationalism. It devolved powers from Westminster to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This shift was vital for the success of the 1998 Agreement. Unionists could be confident in this new devolved status for Northern Ireland because it was not being treated differently from Scotland and Wales. This was a vital framework for the Agreement and for stability in Northern Ireland.

Related to this, the evolution of the United Kingdom has been extraordinary successful for the 1998 Agreement. For years after the Agreement, the majority of Catholics in Northern Ireland would have said that their constitutional preference was to have a united Ireland, i.e. to remove the Irish border. On the other hand very few Protestant would have said that they preferred a united Ireland, rather they supported the status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.

Public opinion has changed, however, as a result of the appropriate implementation of the Good Friday Agreement and the follow up agreements. According to the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey in 2016, there was a majority among the Catholics in Northern
Ireland who say that they support the status of Northern Ireland with devolved status within the United Kingdom. The number of those who prefer a devolved status for Northern Ireland overtakes the number of those who prefer a united Ireland. This change demonstrates the relative stability of Northern Ireland. However, by 2017 (after the beginning of the Brexit process) this pattern had reversed again, and there was a majority of Catholics again saying that their preference is for a united Ireland. This is some indication of the polarising effects of Brexit within Northern Ireland.

If the United Kingdom strongly moves towards a singular nation-state system this exacerbates the difficulties in nationalists feeling comfortable in Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. For Brexit has brought to the fore a conceptualization of the United Kingdom as a singular nation-state, with clearly defined territory and borders. If you have the idea of a singular United Kingdom with no differentiation in its various parts then it is going to be extremely difficult to find arrangements for Northern Ireland post-Brexit that meet the commitments made in the 1998 Agreement vis-à-vis cross-border cooperation.

The relevance of the EU context to border change

Beyond the United Kingdom’s internal dynamics, Brexit raises the following question: ‘Is Europeanization reversible?’ More specifically, is it possible to undo the good achieved through the transformation of the Irish border, much of which was largely accomplished as a result of EU membership? The European Union was very important for the 1998 Agreement. There are three areas in which this is particularly evident. The first is the ‘EU model and the environment’ created by the integration and by the acquis. The second is the ‘EU process’ within the domain of cross-border cooperation. The third is the ‘EU stimulus’ towards all-island economy.

Together, these effects of the EU have helped to normalise and depoliticize cross-border cooperation. It is difficult to quantify, but this was absolutely vital for the peace process in Northern Ireland. Such a process built upon the evidence of EU membership, such
as the removal of custom posts and tariffs, reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade, harmonised regulatory system, harmonisation of indirect taxation, major cross-border infrastructural projects including telecommunication and transport, the wider project of a closer union and cooperation that facilitates cross-border cooperation on the ground and local levels. There is an impact of the EU on citizens across the border, on the right to cross-border work, employment legislation or protection of frontier workers. And, in a process of ongoing integration, there are other areas where the European Union has changed the Irish border, like education, health care, research cooperation, etc. These are all domains which may be jeopardized by Brexit.

All these areas have gone hand in hand with new forms of governance. These were formalised in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which had three strands. The first strand is within Northern Ireland, the second strand is within cross-border North/South dimension and the third one is the British/Irish. Within the first strand, Northern Ireland, a power-sharing Assembly was established, which is suspended at the moment. The second strand, North/South relations, involves institutions (North/South Ministerial Council and Joint Secretariat) and six implementation bodies.

The aim of the North/South Ministerial Council is ‘to bring together those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland - including through implementation on an all-island and cross-border basis - on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the Administrations, North and South.’

How much can we say that things will be secured on matters of mutual interest in the context of Brexit? One of the main problems is that definition of mutual interest is not as neutral as we might often hope that it should be. Areas of cooperation are very significant, like agriculture, environment, transport, education, health care or tourism. It is not the case that every one of the bodies work on all-island basis, but they cooperate in order to manage cooperation in those areas. Common policies and approaches are agreed in the North/South Ministerial Council in each of six areas of cooperation, but they are implemented separately in each jurisdiction.
A recent mapping exercise conducted by British and Irish officials for the withdrawal negotiations identified over 142 areas of formal north/south cooperation connected to the public sector.

The third strand is the British/Irish relationship. This strand includes the British-Irish Council which includes Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and other members like Guernsey or Isle of Man. On top of that we have the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference with very high level contacts between the British and Irish governments.

It is quite clear that these very strands define multi-level governance and these institutions are interlocking and interdependent. That means if one strand falls then all the others will fall, or they cannot function properly. The idea of interdependence showed to the unionists that North/South cooperation is not possible without British/Irish cooperation. Moreover, all the cross-border bodies have a clear operational remit. They operate under the overall policy direction of the North South Ministerial Council with clear accountability that links back to the North South Ministerial Council and to the Oireachtas [Irish Parliament] and the devolved Northern Ireland Assembly.

The nationalist response to North-South cooperation is pragmatic in its approach, it is understood as a way to compensate for losing the territorial claim. Nationalists see the North-South dimension as a way to accept other aspects of the Agreement and it reflects a willingness to disassociate cooperation from Irish unification. Cooperation is always understood as conditional and mutually beneficial for both sides. Indeed, cooperation between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland is sometimes much more easy to do than between unionists and nationalists within Northern Ireland. Political responses to cross-border cooperation are important and they will be highly important in relation to Brexit.
Protecting cross-border cooperation through new modes of governance

There are historic challenges for cross-border cooperation that will take on new relevance after Brexit. One issue is sustainability given erratic funding patterns. Secondly, competences are often mismatched, and there is a duplication of effort despite communication between civil servants and local authorities. Inter-agency conflicts over resource allocation also appear among the challenges for cooperation. Finally, soft factors – trust, familiarity, goodwill – are often overlooked. These challenges will only grow in the context of Brexit.

In light of this, there is an interesting question to ask with regard to Brexit: ‘Can exogenous shocks bring ‘exnovation’ as well as innovation?’ Exnovation is the idea that you can drop practices that do not work or function properly. Simply put, any crisis around the process of Brexit is an opportunity to drop those practices which are not appropriate and which do not work properly. At the moment, there are few opportunities for exnovation given the current state of affairs in British-Irish relationship. The process of Brexit could concentrate entirely on trying to preserve the bare minimum in cross-border relationships, rather than to develop opportunities for better governance.

Before considering where these opportunities for enhanced governance might lie, it is worth outlining the state of play with regard to the Brexit process. The preferred scenario (as per the Joint Report between the UK and EU of December 2017) is for the UK and for the EU to make an agreement that will not require any controls and border checks at the Irish border. It is almost impossible to guarantee that outcome unless the UK remains in the single market and custom union, or unless it is fully aligned with the rules of single market and custom union. The second scenario is to agree on specific solutions regarding Northern Ireland. The third option for the UK and the EU is full alignment. So, if the anticipated post-Brexit UK-EU relationship failed to provide sufficient regulatory alignment to avoid a hard border and protect North-South Cooperation on the island of Ireland, the UK government
in the EU-UK Joint Report of December 2017 committed itself to maintaining ‘full alignment with those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement’ (European Commission, 2017: para 49). Hence, we see that there are number of possible solutions and alternatives.

As noted above, Northern Ireland already occupies a unique position in the governance structures of the United Kingdom (UK) that is reflected in the structures for devolved government and the very specific constitutional status established by the 1998 Belfast ‘Good Friday’ Agreement. In addition, Northern Ireland has its own legal system. Consequently, and in the context of the UK’s current membership of the European Union (EU), Northern Ireland is subject to laws and policies adopted at the regional/devolved (Northern Ireland Assembly), national (Westminster) and supranational (EU) levels of government. Broadly-speaking there is extensive regulatory alignment within the UK and EU contexts. However, such alignment is not total either because of the UK opt-outs from certain areas of EU competence or, more extensively, due to the adoption or emergence of Northern Ireland-specific regulations, particularly following devolution. Notable areas of regulatory divergence between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK include the policy spheres of education, health and agriculture. Notwithstanding such divergence, the context of EU membership has helped sustain regulatory alignment within the UK.

The UK’s withdrawal from the EU has the potential to impact significantly on this position where ‘repatriated’ competences are passed by the UK government to the regional/devolved level. In the case of Northern Ireland, the potential for regulatory divergence will be greater still if there is a differentiated treatment of Northern Ireland in the post-Brexit relationship that the UK establishes with the EU. This potential is most obviously reflected currently in the so-called ‘backstop’ arrangement for Northern Ireland contained in the draft Withdrawal Agreement. In the draft Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the Withdrawal Agreement (March 2018) the EU put forward a proposal to meet the commitments of the Joint Report vis-à-vis avoiding a hard Irish border. This contains
the provision for Northern Ireland to remain part of the customs territory of the EU and within a ‘common regulatory area’ with the EU which ‘shall constitute an area without internal borders in which the free movement of goods is ensured and North-South cooperation protected’ (European Commission, 2018: 111). The effect of this would be to create the potential for increased regulatory divergence between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK; this would happen as the EU’s acquis evolves and the UK government pursues its commitment to regulatory divergence from the existing acquis and concludes new trade agreements with third countries.

Formally, the UK government is committed to ensuring ‘no new regulatory barriers develop between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, unless, consistent with the 1998 Agreement, the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly agree that distinct arrangements are appropriate for Northern Ireland’ (European Commission, 2017: para 50). In the same document, the Joint Report, the UK government has further committed ‘[i]n all circumstances … [to] continue to ensure the same unfettered access for Northern Ireland’s businesses to the whole of the United Kingdom internal market’. However, the UK government’s ‘red lines’ of moving out of the EU’s customs union, of leaving the internal market and of not being inside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) are incompatible with the regulatory alignment regarded by the EU as necessary to fulfil the commitments it has made in the Joint Report. As a consequence, unless the obvious tensions between the UK’s various commitments are resolved, there is a distinct prospect of Brexit creating new tensions in Northern Ireland’s regulatory alignment with the rest of the UK.

The UK government needs to meet its commitments regarding avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland, protecting North-South Cooperation and supporting the all-island economy and the operation of the 1998 Agreement. In order to do so, even if the proposed ‘backstop’ arrangement is not used, there remains the prospect that in order some differentiated arrangements for Northern Ireland will be agreed as part of the post-Brexit UK-EU relationship (as per under ‘scenario 2’ of the Joint Report,
i.e. ‘specific solutions’ for Northern Ireland). These could include existing regulatory regimes (e.g. such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules) as well as new ones which sustain and build on existing alignment underpinning North-South cooperation. The UK government already envisages ‘consistent with the 1998 Agreement… distinct arrangements for Northern Ireland’, where agreed by the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly’ (European Commission, 2017: para 50). Furthermore, the expectation exists that efforts to minimize the disruption of Brexit to the free movement of UK and Irish citizens on the island – including as regards to provision of services (which is not currently envisaged as part of the and EU-NI common regulatory area) – will include an expansion of bilateral arrangements between the UK and Ireland, notably in the context of the Common Travel Area.

The prospect of increased regulatory differentiation and divergence between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK as a consequence of Brexit as well as new arrangements for all-island and UK-Ireland cooperation raises a range of governance challenges for the UK, for Northern Ireland and for the EU. These include: minimizing the economic impact and political consequences of differentiated regimes; ensuring appropriate implementation and monitoring processes; and determining effective means for the representation of Northern Ireland’s preferences in relevant decision-making bodies and procedures. Some of these challenges can be addressed, at least in part, using established structures and mechanisms (e.g. devolved institutions, the Joint Ministerial Committee between the devolved governments and the Westminster government). In other instances, new structures and procedures will be necessary, particularly where the UK-EU relationship is concerned. The draft Withdrawal Agreement recognizes this and already includes provision for a Specialized Committee on issues related to the implementation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland and for the representation of Northern Ireland’s interests within EU processes where these concern implementation of the ‘backstop’ Protocol (European Commission, 2018: 104 and 114).
Challenges ahead

For the UK government, a key challenge will be how to manage and keep to a minimum any regulatory divergence between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. Moreover, how will the UK government manage its commitments to the EU vis-à-vis Northern Ireland, especially if these involve a common regulatory area between NI and the EU? What role will there be for the devolved institutions? Indeed, does Northern Ireland possess the requisite competences or do new competences need to be devolved? What bodies and processes will be used in the absence of a functioning Executive and Assembly? And what role(s), if any, could or should be assigned to the North-South and East-West bodies established under the 1998 Agreement? Should indeed new bodies and structures be established?

For Northern Ireland, a key issue concerns how the Executive, Assembly and civil service will ensure implementation of obligations under the terms of the post-Brexit UK-EU relationship. Furthermore, how will Northern Ireland ensure, using formal and informal channels, effective monitoring of and engagement in shaping EU policy developments in so far as they relate to commitments for sustained regulatory alignment? Assuming such opportunities exist, how will Northern Ireland formulate its position for representation in the Specialized Committee and in EU decision-shaping processes?

For the EU, important questions concern how it will monitor and ensure effective implementation of the UK’s commitments vis-à-vis Northern Ireland, e.g. as regards a common regulatory area? How will access to judicial review be arranged? Also, how will decision-shaping arrangements operate? How will the EU ensure, as appropriate, that these are not exploited by the UK government to pursue UK interests generally as opposed to specifically the interests of Northern Ireland?

The potential scale of the challenges will also depend on the extent and scope of the regulatory alignment required between Northern Ireland and the EU and the extent and scope of the regulatory alignment with the acquis that the UK government ultimately
commits to maintain in its post-Brexit relationship with the EU. Based on what has been proposed by the European Commission in the draft Withdrawal Agreement the scope of the common regulatory area is to include inter alia: the free movement of goods and Northern Ireland remaining within the customs territory of the EU; sanitary, phytosanitary and other rules governing trade in agriculture and fisheries; aspects of the acquis relating to services, notable regarding the all-island single electricity market; environmental laws relating to trade in and the transportation of goods; state aid; and 14 stated areas of North-South Cooperation (i.e. of environment, health, agriculture, transport, education and tourism, as well as energy, telecommunications, broadcasting, inland fisheries, justice and security, higher education and sport) (European Commission, 2018: 111-112). In addition, the draft Withdrawal Agreement provides for the maintenance of the Common Travel Area and an EU role in overseeing and ensuring a UK commitment ‘[to] ensure that no diminution of rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity as set out in that part of the 1998 Agreement entitled Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity results from its withdrawal from the [EU]’ (European Commission, 2018: 110).
Conclusion

Establishing the post-Brexit arrangements for the island of Ireland will be a process of negotiation. Both the UK and the EU need to be flexible, particularly when it comes to conceiving of the management of customs borders. The best way to do this is to consider the nature and needs – not of the border per se but of the region in question. The unique status of Northern Ireland is already acknowledged in international law, in constitutional and institutional frameworks, in citizenship regimes, in practice and operation (all via the Good Friday Agreement), and in the resolutions of the European Council. This should be our starting point.

If Northern Ireland wants to avoid hardening of borders, it will have different border regimes in operation at the same time. It is possible that Northern Ireland will be aligned with the EU in some areas whilst being aligned with the UK in other areas. There are numerous areas that have to be managed very carefully looking ahead. These areas have huge implication for governments and for the EU. Above all, the choreography of the British-Irish intergovernmental relationship remains critically important to managing ideological dimensions of the border conflict, as well as the practical matters.

These are all fascinating and interesting challenges for future cross-border cooperation and governance. It is vital to think about these cross-border issues, not just within the context of Brexit and the position of the UK, but within the context of profound challenge and change for the European Union itself.

Thank you very much for your attention.
References


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It is a distinct honour to close this distinguished lecture series, following the eminent speakers you have invited so far here in Budapest.

Let’s start things off with the moment of that quiet revolution in border studies which I and many others had the privilege to take part in, in Nijmegen together with my colleagues Henk van Houtum and Wolfgang Zierhofer.

Around the mid-part of the first decade of this century, we edited a volume within the field of border studies, *B/ordering space* (van Houtum et al, 2005). This volume crystallized and pushed forward a debate within the domain of border studies around the so-called ‘bordering turn’, a turn that occurred not only in the field of border studies but within the social sciences more broadly. Within border studies this development had been taking place for some time, beginning in the late 80s and entering the 1990s through the seminal works of scholars such as David Newman and Anssi Paasi, who have addressed you earlier, and in the pioneering work of sociologists and anthropologists at Queen’s University, Belfast, such as Liam O’Dowd, James Anderson, Thomas Wilson and Hastings Donnan.

What was this turn about? It is really hard to summarize within a scope of one lecture. Nevertheless, when we think back on it, a prime motive behind the turn was to overcome what we then perceived as a hegemonic naturalism in the study of borders, one which viewed the spatiality of borders as comprised largely of material, objective and transparent infrastructure, as material backdrop shaping social relations in/around the border. Theoretically and methodologically, we attempted to ‘denaturalize’ the border in border studies by applying a social constructivist and postmodern theoretical lens in a multi-scalar context. As reflected in an edited volume that I co-edited with Barbara Hooper around the same time as *B/ordering space*, a further significant theoretical inspiration for this move came from the broadly influential late 20th century ‘spatial turn’ in the social sciences, one which took the social production of space as a foundational point of departure in the study of any kind of spatial relation, from the body to the globe (Kramsch and Hooper, 2004; Soja, 1989).
Throughout this work of the mid-2000s, we joined a growing chorus of voices that wanted to make it quite explicit that there is nothing natural to the production of borders. There is no such thing as a border that is not human made and which is not a social construction. This is the space social constructivism and postmodernity opened up for us, taking us some distance from what we saw as a lingering material-structuralist determinism in the field of border studies.

In 2005 Wolfgang, Henk and I began to reconceptualise borders in terms of beliefs and imaginations that create and shape the world around us. Simply put, borders are a social reality; paraphrasing Henri Lefebvre (1991), border space is socially produced space. This reorientation in thinking about the nature of borders transformed borders from a noun into a verb, from ‘border’ to ‘bordering’. This shift allowed us to identify some key processes involved in the production of borders, namely the fact that borders are also used as ordering devices, ordering and claiming space. As a result, b/ordering also involves a purification of space and the creation of distinctions between inside and outside, between an ‘Us’ and a ‘Them’.

Nearly a decade and a half on from our ‘bordering’ moment, one that now feels like a lifetime ago, I’d like to use this ‘Budapest lecture’ to talk back to the field and in so doing return with a critical eye to myself as a relatively young man, now in middle-age. Beyond the scope of our original intentions, B/ordering space became deeply influential in the field of border studies; ‘bordering’ has arguably become an institutionally hegemonic concept. But as with all ideas and institutions, I feel the time is overripe to assess whether, -- paraphrasing the felicitous phrase of Jean Peyrony in this lecture series – the bordering concept “follow[s] the reality of life” in the Europe we are now confronted to live in (Peyrony, 2019: page 17). For the space and time of contemporary Europe represent a much darker and more pessimistic moment than in the relatively euphoric period of the mid-2000s. On the one hand, we could sit back as some of us do, and feel complacently vindicated: if we look around us today, we see bordering all around us. Bordering, ordering, othering, the purification of space through the creation of walls and fences along the so-called migrant ‘Balkan route’ is the banal order of the day in Europe. To repeat what has been trumpeted ad nauseam since
the beginning of the millennium, we do indeed now live in a ‘world of borders’ rather than a ‘borderless world, as so often ascribed to the so-called prophets of globalization. But then, to be provocative, perhaps the ‘bordering turn’ has proved too successful? Perhaps, rather than provide the conceptual-theoretical tools to work over and around the proliferation of walls and fences, it has only served to legitimate them? I believe, as public intellectuals, we have a duty not just to reflect and describe reality but to come up with concepts that work through reality, transforming reality in sight of emancipatory futures. Call me naïve. I am a romantic Postmodernist.

As we have seen, bordering at the local and micro-scales of walls and fences against migrants are also bound up with wider geopolitical dynamics. If we think back to 2004 for instance, we can reflect on the re-bordering of Europe via Eastward Enlargement, which in turn led to the accession of Hungary and other Central Eastern countries to the EU. As described by József Böröcz and Melinda Kovács in their book (2001) Empire’s new clothes: unveiling EU-enlargement, in the run-up to accession countries such as Hungary were subjected to Copenhagen conditionality criteria and the notorious acquis communautaire, which were covertly used as instruments to incorporate and ‘civilize’ Eastern ‘Others’ that were perceived to be ‘not quite European’ or ‘not yet European’. Subsequently, accession candidate countries had to modify their institutions --, including economic, judicial and education sectors -- so as to conform to so-called European values (ie, liberal democracy, good governance, rule of law, human rights). In the words of the Estonian geographer Merje Kuus, a renewed form of Orientalism thus asserted itself by way of a graduated ‘Otherness’ in Central and Eastern Europe. The legacy of this ‘nested Orientalism’ is now visible in the right-wing thrust of populist governance in the region, notably in the aggressive neo-nationalist policy vis-à-vis migrants of Viktor Orban and his disciples in Poland and Czech Republic (Ash, 2018). B/ordering triumphant? At what cost?

Bordering on a wider, extra-European scale would also be on view in the foreign policy initiative of the European Union subsequent to enlargement. As Romano Prodi, then President of the European Commission, expressed it in a widely read speech to diplomats in
2003, Europe cannot continue expanding its borders, but it does face the need to create a ‘Ring of Friends’ incorporating those countries contiguous to its Eastern and Southern flanks. Prodi’s vision became codified in the program ‘Wider Europe – European Neighbourhood Program’ (ENP). Through ENP, ‘stability, prosperity and security’ are promised to countries which are in the so-called neighbourhood of the European Union. Following a similar dynamic as Eastern Accession, a relationship can be achieved with the EU on condition of accepting and implementing ‘shared values’ such as democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance and market economy.

In this manner, ENP dangles the vague notion of ‘partnership’ to countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, the Levant, post-socialist Moldova, Transnistria, Belarus and Ukraine. Partnership, but not membership (‘all but the institutions’) is promised them. Their progress is measured year by year through action plans and progress reports, each measuring the degree to which countries with quite different political trajectories and cultures are on the road to becoming more like us, ‘European’. What Bohdana Dimitrovova and I have recently called the ‘template vision’ of ENP thus serves to reinscribe the EU/non-EU border, paternalistically generating a graduated hierarchy of ‘good and bad ENP pupils’ (Dimitrovova and Kramsch, 2017). As can be expected from the outcome of such a b/ordering dynamic, countries having taken a lead role in mid-20th century decolonization--, such as Bouteflika’s Algeria or Gaddafi’s Libya --, choose not to play Europe’s neighbourhood game, seeing through its neo-colonial intentions. Similarly, Russia feels threatened by the European Neighbourhood Program, as witnessed by the series of events that took place in implementing the Eastern Partnership Agreement in Ukraine, culminating in the deaths on Maidan Square, the flight of Yukanovich and the fait accompli of Russia imposing its own borders on Europe through the annexation of Crimea. Are there limits to b/ordering and othering?

From the micro-scale of walls and fences to the macro-regional scale of ENP, the socially constructed dynamic of European borders and bordering have been on vivid display. Given the massive and systematic nature of b/ordering at multiple scales and the
equally massive forms of exclusion, violence and marginality they produce, I think it urgent for border scholars to sit back and take some responsibility for our scholarship, for our thinking and for our writing. I believe we must ask an important question thus far unremarked in the field of border studies: *what kind of borders are we producing through our thinking and writing? And with what effects?* Beware, Montaigne warns us: *Fortis imaginatio generat casum!* (2007/1595: 98). If the field of border studies can only describe the bordering and re-bordering of the world then we have not met the challenge of being responsible social scientists. In so doing, we simply reproduce the misery of the world. I think border scholars are aware of this, but many are perplexed, feeling the impasse but not knowing how to move forward because borders, after all, are the ‘bread and butter’ of what we do. It is at this juncture that I partly sympathize with but also part ways with James Scott in this lecture series. I agree we need to pay more attention to ‘border narratives’ – the way people interpret, give meaning to and ‘create borders as part of everyday life’ (Scott, 2019: page 46; see also Rumford’s important and related notion of ‘borderwork’, 2008). But if the end result is simply to describe how people continue to b/order and reb/order one another, at multiple scales, then I find the normative value-added of this perspective quite thin and potentially deeply conservative, indeed becoming indistinguishable from that of any Afd voter in Germany or Fidesz voter in Hungary. We know that borders are inherent markers of spatial differences, that they produce and reproduce relations of difference, of Us/Them. We also know in our gut that left at that --, both conceptually and politically -- this is not enough.

This is where we are right now: we are at impasse in our thinking and practice in border studies, caught as we are between descriptive empiricism and a social-theoretical malaise with that very empiricism. An important dynamic fuelling this blockage is the impact of what I and others are calling ‘academic fast capitalism’ and the production of the ‘spectacular border scholar’ (tales from the underside of the business). Neoliberalism is not a new term, but we all suffer under it for many years. Those of us who work at university feel it in our bones every day. We feel it in our interactions with our colleagues.
We feel it in the pressure to publish in so-called ‘top journals’. Those journals, not coincidentally, are all English language journals, thus putting those who are not native speakers at a distinct disadvantage. Moreover, today there is a huge pressure on Ph.D. students from day one because they are pushed to go out and publish, to participate at conferences and to be visible. Maybe I am the last of the generation of academics who went through their Ph.D. without feeling such pressures. At UCLA in the 1990s, when I approached my mentor and asked him whether I could publish in a top journal or conference he looked at me and said “no, wait, you will do it when you are finished with your PhD”. This gave me the space to develop my thoughts without having that pressure on my shoulders, and it allowed me to be who I am today. However, Ph.D. students now are under huge pressure, they are pushed to be visible and to publish from the first day. This is academia eating its own seed.

But more to our present purposes, the phenomenon I want to reflect on today is the way we border scholars are trapped in this fast capitalist neo-liberal academic context. I give you an example. A few years ago we had a notable young Catalan border scholar in residence in Nijmegen. He is a well-known scholar of the Ceuta and Melilla borderlands. I was having lunch with him one day and he said to me that he was confronting a professional crisis at the moment since he submitted an article to one of the top English language journals addressing the issue of the border fence in Ceuta and Melilla. After submitting his draft article he had been recommended by one of the senior editors of the journal to add a photograph of the border fence being stormed by migrants so as to add dramatic impact to the text. He knew that if he added that photo his article would be published. Publication in that journal was important for him because his career was at stake. But he knew that in so doing he was just reproducing the spectacular border, the border spectacle which would help the journal to achieve a higher number of clicks and citations. Through this example I am simply trying to pinpoint how because of this fast capitalist practice relating to publication norms in a highly commercialized journal environment, there is a tendency to emphasize the ‘shock and awe’ of borders, while downplaying other aspects, perhaps the everyday experience...
of borders. Despite their trumpeting ‘critical’ credentials, I see all around me border scholars who play this spectacular game while building their ‘brilliant’ careers. The hypocrisy of it sickens me. It is largely as a result of this that I no longer consider myself a ‘critical border scholar’, nor have any desire to participate further in so-called ‘critical’ border or geography gatherings.

So what are we left with? We are left with a Europe of borders and bordering, marginalization, violence, exclusion, purification and death as we now see at the borders of Gaza. We are left with a Europe that is increasingly inward-looking, more and more cut off from the rest of the world, a Europe trapped in a labyrinth of fear and solitude. As border scholars, an important question we have to ask ourselves today is how do we think our way through this fear and solitude? How can we think ‘beyond b/ordering’?

Now, as previously mentioned, around the time B/ordering space emerged, Barbara Hooper and I edited a volume with title Cross-border governance in the European Union (2004). In framing the issue of cross-border governance in Europe, Barbara and I drew on the theoretical legacy of the late 20th century ‘spatial turn’, a practical as well as theoretical movement that has its roots in the works of Michel Foucault on ‘power/knowledge’ and Henri Lefebvre on the ‘production of space’, in the writings of Doreen Massey on gendered space/place and David Harvey’s rigorous understandings of the spatiality of capitalism. Barbara and I proposed that we might think of borders through the lenses of this spatial turn, a move that we felt might complement the bordering turn by giving it spatial depth and heft. We argued, similarly as Lefebvre and Foucault, that space is not a neutral and transparent stage on which social relations play out, but is dialectically entangled with specific social relations and interactions. In this respect space is fundamentally a social product, rather than merely epiphenomenal to underlying social or temporal structures. This was essentially the great tactical rebalancing act that Lefebvre attempted in the 1970s, to be carried forward by scholars such as Edward Soja and David Harvey in the 1980s and 1990s. It is noteworthy that in the late 1960s Ed Soja (as did Aristotle!) contributed to Kaspenson and Minghi’s The Structure of Political Geography. Something was in the air that bound this generation
We felt this spatial perspective might allow us to pose novel ‘cross-border regional questions’ that needed urgent posing within the field of border studies. One such question --, which I might add remains neglected to this day -- is how to adequately relate to the ‘other side’ of b/ordering practices. How to address ‘the Other’ produced by b/ordering? We know b/ordering takes place through acts of demarcation and through creation of us/them relations. I would propose that today we might recuperate the momentum of the ‘spatial turn’ to help us develop spatial and ethical relations with the other produced through b/ordering tactics. This might be one way to work through the devastating consequences of the bordering dynamics we see all around us today. In hindsight, what we proposed was nothing new, not even for the field of border studies. A generation ago, a hugely influential border scholar of the stature of Julian Minghi advocated just such a balancing between the social and the spatial – giving neither ontological priority – in the study of borders and borderlands (Kasperson and Minghi, 1969). In maintaining that balance, I argue, Minghi kept open a vital space in the study of borders and borderlanders that has disappeared in the subsequent ‘b/ordering turn’ literature of the early 2000s: *a sense that a shift in geopolitical alignments across borders can allow people to become other than what national ideologies say they are.* This space was nowhere more brilliantly on display than in Minghi’s own work on border re-alignments in South Tyrol as well as in the Franco-Italian Alps (Minghi, 1963, 1981; Kramsch, in press). As a field, I believe border studies has lost the trans-disciplinary spatial openness of Minghi’s generation, a generation that was still alive to the depredations of war caused by toxic nationalisms (Briner, 1971; von Malchus, 1972; Mozer, 1973). I feel that today we urgently need to regain that space, albeit with different words and in a vastly different context.

In thus restating our agenda -- at once recuperative and future-oriented --, I take further inspiration from Andrew Davidson and Himadeep Muppidi’s edited volume *Europe and its Boundaries: Words and Worlds, Within and Beyond*. Here, they argue:

*‘The theoretical burden … must take a self- and other-conscious, hermeneutic interest in eroding colonizing and ex-
clusionary identities through their encounter with Others and otherness, too. It must consciously seek and open ... restrictive borders as well as the conditions that support them. It must not only subject its own categories to questioning. Nor must it be content to show the self as a cultural construction defined in opposition to others. ... It must both disarm and work around the shield that prevents a rich engagement with otherness and, through this process, articulate new self-understandings that interpret, more compellingly, the content of globality.”

(Davidson and Muppidi, 2009: 84)

Here we have it that at the end of the first decade of the 2000s, Davidson and Muppidi – significantly, themselves not part of the self-appointed border studies nomenklatura --, signposted the field of border studies in a highly productive direction. Their basic message: bordering-ordering-othering takes us some way analytically, but it doesn’t get us to the real stakes of what makes borders so viscerally interesting and important in the European context, in that their governing logics often play out on a global geo-historical canvas of imperial expansion, one which continues to resonate both for Europe and for societies once ‘othered’ by the European colonial enterprise.

Here, I also want to invite Ladis Kristof and his work on frontiers into the conversation. As a Polish-Romanian exile working at Washington State University, Kristof was already thinking at the dawn of the Cold War about borders and frontiers in relation to otherness/the other. In an article that now stands as a classic in the border studies literature, he wrote:

“Given the existing conditions, it is wiser to recognize that between the two great ideological ecumene certain ‘grey areas’ of frontier lands, equivocal loyalties, and undefined allegiances, are unavoidable; perhaps not only unavoidable but even desirable: they permit mutual influencing and interpenetration in a broad border zone... The ‘grey areas’ of the ideological frontiers of today are capable of a more sophisticated intellectual-political role. In contact with and willing to internalize currents from
both poles, they are not merely transitive but also transformative: like an electrical transformer they adjust the tensions of the two political voltages to permit at least some flow of current without danger that flying sparks will fire the whole house.”

(Kristof, 1959: 279-80)

Interestingly, Kristof here uses the highly poetic metaphor of a “house on fire” to describe what we now may call the logical outcome of b/ordering relations: two sides with nothing to say to each other, and standing in a relation of (in)difference. For Kristof, frontiers provide an alternative to this state of bordered alienation, providing a zone of inter-civilizational dialogue, contact and inter-penetration. I would like us to think collectively about the possibility of borders and bordering along the lines that Kristof suggested a half century ago for frontiers, at the height of global decolonization.

The maps with which we are confronted today, particularly maps of migration, run absolutely counter to the relations of spatial thinking across borders and the potential of working with otherness that I would like to propose today. For example, I refer here to maps that have become utterly banal now in the media revealing migration paths from Africa and the Middle East into the ‘soft belly’ of Europe, maps that show how Europe is currently being threatened from all sides by migratory movements and illegal flows. These maps do the work of bracketing off Europe from the rest of the world. We know that maps lie. Some maps lie more than others. We need to remember that maps are instruments of power, knowledge is power and maps are a specific kind of discourse. Maps of Europe, in particular, tend to re-position Europe as the centre of the world and in so doing they shape our understanding and perception not only of Europe but the rest of the world. When we arrive at the topic of migration and refugee flows, we encounter discourses that reinscribe Europe at the center of world-historical developments. We know from ILO statistics that the movement of refugees to Europe is only a fraction of global refugee flows. Nevertheless, many maps now circulating in journalistic accounts or on the Internet imply that the whole world is trying to get into European
Union, which is a statistical falsehood compared to South-South migration, for example.

What kind of counter-images, what kind of counter-maps, what kind of counter-words might provide an alternative today to the partitioning and purification of the world between Us and Them, between Europe and rest? Against the backdrop of these questions, I have become interested lately in exploring the theoretical as well as political potential inherent in the word ‘horizon’. In Greek, the word ‘horizon’ – ὠρίζειν / horízein – means ‘to bound’. I ask myself, what kind of border and what kind of bounding is signalled by this term?

According to Didier Maleuvre, a horizon is that place where sky and earth come together. But:

“[L]ike the end of existence or the outer edge of knowledge, the horizon at the far end of the earth and sky does not come up and unveil itself there, earth and sky do not come lip to lip. Drawing not the empirical boundary of the world but the soft edge where perception fades off, the ‘offing’ is really a trick of vision. Where it glimmers, sight beholds its own vanishing. This vanishing – the trace of human vision seeing itself out – is what we mean by horizon”.

(Maleuvre, 2011: 2)

What does this passage mean? As a geographer, it tells me horizons are eminently spatial --, where earth and sky meet --, but not in an abstract, universal way since they inherently embodied; I perceive a horizon first and foremost bodily through my senses, particularly through the eye. And, most curiously, a horizon is meaningful to me at that very moment when my eyesight begins to vacillate, when I am not able to clearly perceive my surroundings (and believe you me, this is happening to me more and more as I approach my late 50s!). But for me this disorientation of eyesight in the beholding of horizons is highly productive. There exists further political potential in horizons in that each one contains one or more ‘vanishing points’. Vanishing points, in my view, harbour the potential to rework the ‘Self/Other’ nexus.
We can find excellent examples of such socio-spatial altering horizons in world literature, for example in the writings of Leo Tolstoy. Midway through *War and Peace*, for instance, we encounter Pierre Bezúkhov at the Battle of Borodino (1812), standing on a hill overlooking the moving fronts between Napoleon’s army and that of the Czar. Looking down from that promontory:

“[E]verything Pierre saw on either hand looked so indistinct that, glancing left or right over the landscape, he could find nothing that quite lived up to his expectations. Nowhere was there a field of battle as such, the kind of thing he had expected; there was nothing but ordinary fields, clearings, troops, woods, smoking camp-fires, villages, mounds of little streams. Here was a living landscape, and try as he might he could not make out any military positioning. He could not even tell our troops from theirs.”

(Tolstoy, 2016/1868: 845)

Approaching his horizon in the heat of a decisive battle that will shape the future contours of Europe’s outer borders for centuries to come, Pierre not only cannot adequately ‘see’ the Russian ‘Us’ from the French Napoleonic ‘Them’; as he descends the hill he ‘sees’ his fellow Russian peasant countrymen as if for the first time, in all their vivid agony. Not only national-cultural but class borders are rendered opaque in the sluice of a horizon’s vanishing point.

Beyond the realm of literature, where else might we gain philosophical or scientific inspiration for our understanding of the dynamics of horizons? We might, I suggest, turn to the work of the late Hans-Georg Gadamer and his classic book *Truth and method* (1985). In this book Gadamer links our understanding of horizons to the practice of reading and comprehending text. For the German philosopher, all understanding, be it textual or otherwise, is related to otherness. There is an ‘otherness within’ that is connected to traditions internal to texts, and there is an ‘otherness outside’ that is outside the horizon of the interpreter. For Gadamer, hermeneutic work, analogous to a Kristofian frontier, belabours the ‘in-between’ grey-zone between the ‘familiarity’ and ‘strangeness’
of a text. For each reading of an unfamiliar text there is a space--,
the so called ‘perplexing encounter’ -- which makes the reader
experience ‘questions’ rather than receiving ‘answers’. Gadamer calls
this moment being ‘pulled up short’ by a text, allowing ‘full play’
between interpreter and interpreted. Under certain conditions, it can
lead to a Horizonerweiterung, an expansion of horizons, whereby the
possibility of real dialogue with otherness comes into being. Here,
a common language is possible rooted in the mutual awareness of
ones’ relativity in interpretative outlooks. A creative tension arises
between ‘provinciality’--, the situatedness of the reader -- and the
‘globality’ of the text. Finally, there is a possibility of resituating
one’s ‘place in the world’ from the perspective of an enlargement
of the Self/Other relation, of being ‘at home’ with others. Being
at home with others is informed by a distinctive spatial sense of
coevalness in space and time, whereas mastery over others in a
colonial or neo-colonial context always places the other in a relation
of temporal backwardness. Since the time of the Enlightenment,
Eastern Europe has been perceived by ‘enlightened’ Western
European elites as having to catch up to the West, as laggard in
comparison with a vanguard Western core. As mentioned in my
discussion of the re-b/ordering of Europe that occurred via EU
accession, the East continues to be seen as not quite European and
sufficiently civilized because of a perceived temporal gap in relation
to the Western part of the Continent. However, working through
a European horizon, being at home with otherness and being at
home with difference means no longer working with the temporal
logic that the West is always in the vanguard, with the rest following
behind. In Gadamer’s formulation of ‘horizon expansion’ there is
an invitation to ‘lose’ oneself in order to find oneself again. I find
that a deeply Christian message. It goes without saying that it also
is deeply inimical to the stale claptrap in border studies that ‘good
fences make good neighbours’, or that borders are necessary for
the protection of some putative core identity without which we
would all be helplessly adrift. Perhaps precisely for that reason I
find Gadamer’s message so seductive, now more than ever. We shall
return to this point later in this lecture.
A third potential source of inspiration within the domain of a reworked ‘Self/Other’ bordering relation might be found in the somewhat cryptic-sounding formulation penned by the late postmodern geographer, Ed Soja. In *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places*, Soja opened a space for thinking about ‘the Other’ in terms of a process of ‘critical thirding’:

“Thirding-as-Othering is much more than a dialectical synthesis a la Hegel or Marx … Thirding introduces a critical ‘other-than’ choice that speaks and critiques through its otherness. That is to say, it does not derive simply from an additive combination of its binary antecedents but rather from a dis-ordering, deconstruction, and tentative reconstitution of their presumed totalization producing an open alternative that is both similar and strikingly different. Thirding recomposes the dialectic through an intrusive disruption that explicitly spatializes dialectical reasoning.”

(Soja, 1996: 61)

Nearing the end of the 20th century, Soja wanted to emphasize with these words that the very old idea of the dialectic can no longer be tied to a temporal teleology (as in the time of Marx), because it is now fully spatialized. He reminds us that there exist forms of the dialectic in which the core elements are in co-constituted and co-temporal, rather than hierarchical, relation, one which ‘speaks and critiques through its otherness’. This underappreciated idea, I believe, could still be productive for border scholars in re-theorizing the Us/Them relation at the border in a field of power. It is an eminent ‘border idea’, and one of the very highest art.

I do not believe that borders should disappear. But I do believe that we still need to develop a relational understanding of borders. What do they bring together? What do they connect and what do they separate? Are European borders merely an internal, ‘European’ affair? In the context of the so-called migration crisis, I think that we often perceive borders such as Evros or Lampedusa as cut off from their interrelations with non-European space. In my view, many (albeit non-academic) analyses send a strong message: “We on this
side of the border have nothing to do with you on the other side of
the border”. Once again, there is nothing natural about this vision,
which is politically constructed: “We have nothing to do there, we
are in Europe, we have nothing to do in Syria, we have nothing to
do with those refugees who arrive here, what are they doing here?”
This is pure ideology, of course. However, if we understand borders
as relationally binding features that connect history and territories
extending to the colonial period, then we can see how borders
connect geopolitical space, connect Europe--, France, Germany,
Belgium, the UK -- with all those places which are under the fire of
conflict and from where migrants now desperately come.

I’ll now give an example of how such border-relational thinking
dawned on me as an early-career researcher. When I first moved
from Los Angeles to Nijmegen back in 2000, one of the first
places I conducted fieldwork was the euregion connecting the
tri-borderland area of the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany
(Euregio Maas-Rhein/Meuse Rhin). The Maas-Rhein Euregion has
its roots in the 1970s as a result of the collapse of the coal mining
sector and the need for the entire tri-border region to develop a
new economic development pathway out of the resulting crisis. This
crisis helped to consolidate a shared feeling of cross-border destiny,
a cross-border sense of crisis and opportunity. As I was conducting
fieldwork in the euregio, I came across a school textbook Nederland
en de unielanden from the 1950s in a second hand Nijmegen bookshop.
A map of The Netherlands featured on the front cover. What struck
me in viewing that map was that the border area of Maastricht, The
Netherlands, is shown, but the surrounding areas of Germany and
Belgium are nowhere to be found. What we see instead is a blue
sea with wispy white arrows connecting territories that look quite
different from European member states.

What kind of map is this? These unusual looking territories are the
Dutch colonies of Surinam, Indonesia and Irian Jaya, shown on the
map in scale as existing just a short drive from downtown Maastricht!
Interestingly, after my research on Maas-Rhein began to circulate, I
was invited down to Maastricht to consult at a conference/festival
on strategies for the Dutch city to compete for 2018 European
Capital of Culture (ECOC). On the panel where I sat, we discussed how Maastricht might develop a vision how to profile its cross-border dimension as a strategic selling point in the upcoming ECOC competition. The auditorium was full of French- and Flemish-speaking Belgians, Dutch from Limburg and Germans from the area across the border around Aachen. All were sitting there and debating the cross-border nature of the region as an aspect of ECOC city-marketing, the Germans, Dutch and Flemish Belgians getting on swimmingly while the French-speaking Belgians, to be expected, pouted for feeling linguistically marginalized. I’ll never forget that moment during audience Q&A when a young Afro-Belgian woman, who had been sitting quietly at the very back of the audience, suddenly raised her hand in frustration and said: “All of you talk about this Euregion as if it only contains White ethnic Germans, White ethnic Belgians and White ethnic Dutch. What about my father, who came from Congo worked in the mines of Liège for 40 years? I do not see him reflected in your conversation on the future of this cross-border region.” At that moment the map of Nederland en de unielanden came back to me and I realised that this is precisely the map with which we need to work as a cross-border region for ECOC 2018. For that ‘outdated’ map reveals all the intertwined histories and overlapping territories that bind this specific European border region to the rest of the world.

I steal the idea of ‘intertwined histories and overlapping territories’ of course from Edward Said’s Culture and Imperialism (1993). And I made this argument back at the start of the 2000s when my first essay was published on the need to rethink European cross-border regions in a much more global context, one which reconnects them to the rest of the world in light of the longue-durée of colonialism and empire (Kramsch, 2002). Starting from that moment of inspiration in a Nijmegen cardboard box so long ago, I would like to continue extending the logic of thinking European cross-border regions through horizons and their associated vanishing points. In closing today, I would like to speak of three of them. All three horizons and their vanishing points emerge in the cross-border region where I live, namely the Euregion Rhein-Waal, with Nijmegen, the
Netherlands on one side of the border, and Kleve, the next largest German urban agglomeration, on the other side of the border.

Since the so-called migration crisis of 2015, the borderland connecting Nijmegen and Kleve was not immune to the challenge of hosting migrants. Euregio Rhein-Waal is naturally preoccupied by the challenge of receiving migrants from all over the world and integrating them into the fabric of the cross-border region. Euregional managers see the new migration issue as central to their remit and a crucial element of any future cross-border governance strategy. What makes our borderland so interesting in this respect is the way in which migrants have been differentially governed, depending on whether they are on the Dutch or German side of the border. Simply put, space matters.

The city of Nijmegen is traditionally a very Left-oriented, progressive city, probably the most progressive in the Netherlands. At the height of the migration crisis, the mayor of Nijmegen wanted to make a statement to the rest of the Netherlands and to the rest of Europe. To show how progressive and welcoming Nijmegen is in responding to the migration crisis, the city built a tent camp in the middle a forest located South of the city, in an area normally used to house visiting military from Scandinavia or Canada during a four day marathon march that takes place every year in July (Vierdaagse). The march commemorates the origins of Nijmegen as a Roman garrison, but also celebrates the role of the Allied armies that liberated Nijmegen from the Nazis in 1945.

Camp Heumensoord was built to house 3,000 refugees hailing from as far afield as Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and Syria. The camp was run by a government sponsored NGO. It was set up like a United Nations refugee camp, and governed according to strict principles filtering movement in and out of the camp. Refugees were allowed to leave the camp, but they were controlled with colour coded bracelets, depending upon nationality. Sectors of the camp were also colour-coded, separating families from single men, as well as nationalities. Strict provisions were made for safety and security. As applied to Camp Heumensoord, the overarching principle governing infrastructure planning for refugees in The Netherlands
can be summarized in one word: *sober*. True to the spirit of Calvin, not wishing to be seen as ‘soft’, just providing the bare essentials, with a strong focus on self-reliance and ‘responsibility’. Sober.

As a result of this initiative, the Nijmegen city council could say “look how progressive we are”. But on the other hand, by ensuring that the camp, situated in a forest, remained out of sight and out of mind, they made sure not to upset the local Nijmegen population. As a result, very few Nijmegen citizens had a chance to have contact with refugees (Aparna et al, 2016). It may be superfluous to mention in passing that forests in Europe have a disturbing relationship to camps of all sorts.

Where might we find horizons and vanishing points in such a setting? Remember: a vanishing point is a moment of encounter between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, whereby the ‘Self’ is disoriented in a productive way. One such vanishing point emerged at our Radboud university campus as a result of a pro-refugee student movement I helped co-found under the name Asylum University. The fact is that as a consequence of camp Heumensoord we witnessed the rise of a student movement at our university the likes of which had not been seen for a generation (Aparna and Kramsch, 2018). Although located in a forest, the camp was situated only 10 minutes’ walk from our campus. At first students responded in an improvised way; they just went to the camp on bicycle, brought with them coffee canisters and mugs stolen from local departmental offices, carried improvised tables made of old unused doors, and began talking to the refugees who, with curiosity, came out of the camp (mostly males).

As the student movement gathered apace, I began thinking: if the university is only 10 minutes away from the camp, why shouldn’t we open our classrooms to refugees? They sit in the camp, they do nothing and just wait for their asylum procedure, which can often take months. We found ourselves in a situation with two different, seemingly incommensurable spaces: on the one side, the university, where students run around like chickens with their heads cut off, the faculty staff ‘superbusy’, overwhelmed and suffering from burnout. On the other aide, the camp, packed with refugees sitting around like pieces of meat. We thought that this was unsustainable.
We thought: “Let’s break down the border between the two spaces and see what happens”. So we kicked things off by opening my classroom to the refugees from Heumensoord. We sent a message through our student movement that there is a course on geography, spatial theory and borders, and “refugees welcome”. The next week, standing outside my classroom door were 15 Heumensoord refugees from Congo, Eritrea, Somalia and Yemen. They joined a class of 60-70 Dutch students and were immediately embedded into working groups. The experiment worked beautifully; not only could refugees once again feel the dignity of using their minds, the Dutch students, many coming from small villages in the South of The Netherlands, could meet a refugee and hear her story for the first time in their young lives.

During one Asylum University classroom meeting, a Dutch male student began to speak about the danger he felt when he walked around the Heumensoord camp at night and about his feelings of unsafety generally after the refugees arrived in Nijmegen. After he finished speaking, one of the Syrian students, sitting in the front row, turned around and asked him: “Why did you put us in the forest? Why did you hide us so that you do not have contact with us and are afraid of us?” At that very moment, a productive vanishing point emerged as the two students were able to see each other for the very first time. The Dutch student could see that refugees are human beings and not just a threatening Other. Many such interactions have taken place since. The movement that we founded in Nijmegen under the name Asylum University has now spread throughout the Netherlands, and there are similar examples opening up across Europe, certainly in Germany, and possibly even here in Viktor Orban’s Hungary.

A second vanishing point occurred when a Dutch female law student comrade of ours of Somali heritage found herself walking in a Niqab past the refugee camp. As you all know, a Niqab is a full body garment covering the entire body except the face. As she walked past the camp on her way to law class, an elderly White Dutch couple coming in the opposite direction assumed she was a refugee who had lost her way and could not find her way back to the camp. The couple asked her in Dutch, “Are you lost?” Our
friend is a very soft spoken person. She is actually quite shy and rarely confronts anyone. But at that moment something snapped inside her and she felt she had to say something in return to this well-meaning couple. As she was asked “Are you lost?” she returned the gaze and responded in perfect Dutch, “No, I am not lost, speak for yourself”. At that moment, a vanishing point appeared to the degree that the Dutch couple immediately had to reorient their understanding of who they were dealing with, as it dawned on them they were not speaking to a refugee but with a Dutch citizen on her way to law class. At that precise moment, we argue, Europe ‘gets lost’, and does so in the most productive of ways (Aparna et al, 2018). The complacently paternalistic Dutch governmental principle of ‘sobriety’ in relation to refugees is hereby turned on its head; it is the sober-minded, Niquab-wearing Dutch-Somali who shows the White Dutch couple the way.

On the other side of the border, Germany’s strategy to house migrants is different from The Netherlands. For very obvious historical reasons, the refugee governance strategy on this side of the border was premised on the total avoidance of anything that smacked of ‘camp’. What the Germans have done instead is to renovate and reuse existing housing stock, such as post offices, schools and abandoned factory buildings, which have been converted into asylum centres. In this way, Germans not only address the shadow of their own past, but they find ways to integrate refugees in a much more sustainable manner than in The Netherlands. In this context it is important to underline that the Heumensoord camp no longer exists; refugees once housed there have been redistributed to detention centers located all over the country, often in places even more remote and isolated than the Nijmegen woods they once inhabited. But in Germany, the governance strategy of embedding migrants into the urban built environment, -- albeit accompanied by severe mobility and residence restrictions – allows them a more long-term and successful means of integrating refugees in German society. Where the principle governing refugee planning in the Netherlands may be summed up by the word ‘sobriety’, in Germany it may be captured by the term “well-meaning paternalism”.

After the ‘B/ordering Turn’
As with Asylum University in Nijmegen, I am also involved in refugee activism on the German side of the border, in the medium-sized city where I live, Kleve. Here a civil society movement was founded some years ago to create a House of Dialogue (*Beth Hamifgash*) between different religions and cultures on the site of the former synagogue which was burnt to the ground during Kristallnacht, 9-10 November, 1938. Since 2015, Kleve has been very supportive of the refugee community. A local café (appropriately named *Kontaktcafé*) provides a space where refugees can convene with Germans and Dutch to play music in improvised fashion. This is the space of my third vanishing point. In the café we play music. I say ‘we’ because I often join with my djembe drum. Together with my Balkan comrades from Albania and Kosovo, we often drum with abandon. So much so, in fact, that we are often told by the German and Dutch violinists to tone it down, as we are “drowning out the string instruments”. A Syrian refugee takes out a string instrument that looks to me like an *Oud* and starts to play a plaintive melody, accompanied by the German and Dutch violinists. At one moment the Dutch violinist stops the Syrian from playing because she wants to know if the performed song is from his ancestor homeland. Our Syrian friend looks back uncomprehendingly and replies, “No, I just made it up, I was improvising”. The Dutch violinist looks disappointed, since she thought it was an ancient song from his Syrian homeland, an ancestral cultural artefact, when in fact he was just doing the equivalent of a free jazz riff. Vanishing point: through an active *détournement*, a European fantasy of exotic ancestral origins is productively reoriented to another kind of space that is neither ‘Syrian’ nor ‘refugee’ nor ‘German’ nor ‘Dutch’. Our Syrian friend demands to be something else. The constant negotiation of such benign paternalism has become the everyday lived space of refugees caught in the German refugee support regime (Aparna et al, 2018).

Taking stock of the three vanishing points I have so-far described in our German/Dutch borderland, I argue that they each productively destabilize the border between a putative ‘Us/Them’ and between ‘Self/Other’. They also productively disturb the very concept of the Euregion as an unproblematized space inhabited only by ‘Germans’ and ‘Dutch’, and as solely an ‘internal’ European project. The
socio-spatial horizons they now effectively produce expand our understanding of what our border region could be by reminding us that it is now (was it ever not?) inhabited by people from all over the world, who in turn maintain connections all over the world. Against this vaster geopolitical backdrop, our ongoing conversation regarding cross-border governance (or cross-border cooperation, which is essentially the same thing), can no longer afford to be a navel-gazing matter of worrying incessantly why communities sitting astride our borders continue to orient themselves culturally, emotionally and politically towards their national hinterlands, as some of us in this lecture series appear to do. Through Asylum University and Beth Hamifgash, we are currently working to bring the refugee communities of Nijmegen and Kleve in contact with one another, despite the legal prohibition of the border. In supporting this task, a more globally-oriented horizon might inform our view of European borders at the moment. What kind of map would do honour to this vision?

I will end my lecture with a very old map, an 864 year old map, to be precise. I believe this map could be a map of Europe’s future. It was made by Al-Idrissi, a geographer from Ceuta, in 1154.

![Image of a map](https://analepsis.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/tabularogeriana.jpg)

Al-Idrissi was invited to the court of Sicily under King Roger II to create a planisphere of the known world, out of silver, for which the map was constructed, section by section. This map reorients Europe
beyond any eurocentric imagination. The Maghreb and the Mashreq are featured on top, in the Northern quarter of the map; Asia Minor is near the centre. And Europe is just a small promontory at the far Southeastern edges of the map. I call this a map of the future because I think it represents Europe in its true, cross-border and fully global dimension. It invites us to rethink Europe’s place in the world, no longer as the centre of world history, no longer as a center b/ordering putatively peripheral ‘Others’, but as one actor among many, moving towards an unknown horizon in a relation of difference, inter-dependence and co-evalness.

Thank you.

References


