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Introduction to the 2020 issue of Cross-Border Review

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Welcome to the 2020 Cross Border Review which again highlights insights from research and policy debate regarding borders, cross-border cooperation and territorial development. This time around the central theme invites us to reflect on the multilevel and everyday significance of borders by engaging in border thinking exercises. This kind of thinking suggests a kind of mindfulness as well as critical self-reflection on the ways in which we negotiate and make borders as part of our social interactions. This is not about some atomised or individualised gaze on borders, although our individual senses of being and cognitive faculties are very much in evidence; border thinking emerges as a project of co-creation and intersubjective communication. We realise that we create borders with others and in response to others and do so under the numerous restrictions and opportunities that condition our lives.

Maria Lugonés (1992: 3-4) has aptly defined border thinking as "a tolerance for contradiction and ambiguity, (a) transgression of rigid conceptual boundaries, and (…) the creative breaking of the new unitary aspects of new and old paradigms." However, we need not enter into decolonial negation of the past - we cannot totally escape it – in order to appreciate the universal message that border thinking conveys. This kind of thinking is both cosmopolitan and locally situated, it is also resistant to monological obsessions with identity, nation and territory. **James Scott** elaborates on the issue of border thinking in more depth as part of a brief polemic that starts off this issue.

From this conceptual discussion we move to the level of research in the field, **Marnix Mohrmann** lifts the 'veil' of the borderscape concept by going beyond its 'irresistible vagueness', defining borderscaping as a plurivocal process of border-making that is based on lived experience. As Mohrmann shows, this can be made concrete through analysing representations, perceptions and interpretations of borders from multiple perspectives. With this approach he suggests we can move beyond borderscapes as something inherently caught up in the political and state-bound construction of borders. His example is that of Northern Ireland, where in the case of Ulster streets have become literal barriers dividing several different socio-cultural and political perspectives on the borderscape. By combining these individual perspectives, Mohrmann reveals the various building blocks that constitute the Ulster borderscape as an everyday space and not just as political agency.

The following contribution by **Jussi P. Laine** complements the first two essays by inviting us to explore the complexity of borders from a perspective of perceived (in)security. Borders are of course traditionally instruments that defend and secure territorial control. Here, however, the focus is on *ontological security* which entails the stability of personal identity and a sense of order and continuity. Ontological security can be considered as a fundamental human need to feel whole and stable over time and particularly during disruptive events and crises that threaten wellbeing. This, however, can also entail the magnification and exaggeration of threat perceptions regarding perceived enemies, migrants for example. In this way, Laine focuses his discussion of migration as a phenomenon and its political and social framing as a challenge. The rather unwelcoming mindset towards immigration throughout Europe is not merely an indicator of anti-migrant attitudes, it is rather more as a symptom of a more general sense of insecurity gripping many European societies. Amidst multiple overlapping crises, migrants have become convenient scapegoats for all things wrong and bad. This fact reminds us that border thinking needs to be reflective and measured lest imaginaries of (in)security dominate political agendas.

In this issue of the Review we will also scrutinise empirical tools that put local communities at the centre of creating what we can consider border knowledge. What this entails is an enabling of communication across group identities and administrative boundaries in order to achieve common understandings about problems and their solutions. In their essay, **Hayley Trowbridge and Michael Willoughby** also focus on the concept of co-creation and its salience regarding engagement with local communities, particularly highly diverse communities that face multiple social and political challenges. Within this context, the Community Reporting (CR) method facilitates border-crossing in diverse neighbourhoods by developing avenues of communication between citizens and stakeholders. Citizen participation as it is more commonly known in some contexts, is becoming increasingly prevalent across Europe. It is the result of a movement that is partly bottom-up, with some of its history bound up in the participatory healthcare movement 'nothing about me without me', which began some 20 years ago, and the push from the European Union to get public administrations to engage with citizens in a real way, thereby democratising the process of service design and implementation. This essay explains the workings of CR as a method for involving citizens and allowing their voices to be heard with a unique usage of digital storytelling and data curation processes. It begins with a look at current trends in literature on storytelling and its role within the field of research. It then goes on to describe how storytelling has been used via Community Reporting methods as an important evaluation tool in the Horizon 2020 project CoSIE, which entails 9 pilot schemes in as many European countries, all of which employ co-creation practices as a basis for design and production.

Martin Barthel, Alicja Fajfer and Hannah Heyenn continue exploration of local contexts and a bottom-up perspective on 'peripheral places' in two European borderlands. In this case the keyword is social cohesion. As Laine has suggested in his essay, ontological security is very much dependent upon a sense of belonging and living in a stable environment. Here, the authors investigate how lifeworlds in peripheries reflect the impacts of crumbling social cohesion on the lives of six stylised personas: three from Finnish Lieksa – at the EU's external border between Finland and Russia, and three from Vorpommern-Greifswald at the German-Polish and thus internal EU border. The personas are based on narratives curated from fieldwork and interviews. The narratives reflect trajectories of citizens in these two border regions which has dealing with population loss, youth unemployment and a degradation of community cohesion. In doing this the authors explore the roles of social networks, social capital, place attachment and identity as stabilizing elements. The salience of this research, funded by the EU's Erasmus+ and H2020 programmes, is given by its relevance to contemporary debate on the future of European Cohesion Policy and whether borderland peripheries will have a future role to play in its development.

In the following essay **Joni Virkkunen** deals with regional and cross-border cooperation between Finland and Russia which despite the geopolitical vicissitudes of the post-Millennium remains significant as a platform for dialogue. The European Union's joint foreign and security policy and policy towards the Russia Federation are in a process of rapid evolution, they also expose several of the weaknesses of EU actorness. The EU and its member states are closely interdependent with Russia through economic and energy exchange, trade, business, tourism and cultural ties. Some politicians, member states and EU Officers are extremely critical towards Russia due to Russia's aggressive behaviour in international politics. Others, like Finland, emphasise the significance of dialogue and cooperation as Russia is an important neighbour with which a certain political, governance and citizens' everyday encounters are necessary. This essay focuses on Finland's attempts to be an 'active, pragmatic and solution-oriented member state' of the European Union in developing working relations with its neighbour. Besides the Finnish state, also Finland's Northern and Eastern border areas have a particular strategic interest in cooperation with Russia.

In the final essay of this Review we dedicate attention to migration management. In his contribution **Roberto Uebel** addresses migration as a fundamental form of border crossing, that is central to the continued vitality of national economies, in this case that of Brazil. As he demonstrates, economic, social and labour conditions in Brazil, and especially in the State of Rio Grande do Sul, have, over the past two decades, allowed an increase in international immigration of individuals with very varied academic and professional skills. Moreover, the decrease in population growth and the labour force of the State coupled with an increasing demand

for skilled workers in order to revamp the state economy, make this immigration a window of opportunity. In his essay Uebel compares Brazilian and Canadian public policies, indicating how Canadian experience might serve as a template for managing immigration in Rio Grande do Sul. He does this by identifying possible points of convergence and applicability and then proposing the introduction of a points system that targets the optimization of immigration flows. The central idea operating here is that migration needs to be recognized as a resource rather than as a problem. The growth and development of Brazil and Rio Grande do Sul state in particular will depend on an open and effective migration management system that takes into account different micro-regional characteristics and needs, as is the case with Canada and its provinces.

Teodor Gyelnik provides an insightful review of Frank Furedi's most recent book which is also discussed by James Scott in his essay on border thinking. The title of the book, 'Why Borders Matter', is at the same time a mission statement. As Furedi argues, in our contemporary world the deconstruction of borders and boundaries has generated profound crises of individual and group identities. Borders play a central structuring role in developing a sense of self and the absence of clear boundaries profoundly confuses Self and identity. Consequently, the multiplication of unstable free-floating identities results in considerable nervousness, anxiety and tension. This book stands out in that it aims to break with the academic mainstream which is more inclined towards the idea of cosmopolitanism and an implied ideology of openness and free borders. This book represents and articulates a rather rare conservative approach and it expresses academic support for borders, boundaries and national sovereignty. As such it will be an important and polemical contribution to ethical debate on borders and boundaries.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the production of this year's edition has been marked by the advent of a global pandemic which has had fundamental impacts on everyday life, mobility, work, education and ultimately borders. The 2020 Review therefore closes with a brief research note by **Anna Casaglia and James Scott** regarding the Covid-19 epidemic and its impacts on borders. This is partly based on a webinar organised by Ben Gurion University of the Negev on 16 June 2020 entitled 'Controlling and Managing Europe's Borders During COVID 19'. In this research note we present some of the major bordering dynamics that can be attributed to the pandemic.

Border Thinking Revisited

James W. Scott

Introduction

This brief and somewhat polemical contribution to the Review takes up the idea that borders are spaces of possibility, they can open up our minds and enrich our lives. As counterintuitive as this might sound, given the culture wars, nativist populism and fear of difference that permeate our world, I will argue that when we reflect on social, cultural and political borders, rather than just taking them for granted, we are forced to think in complex and creative ways. We are always at some kind of border in everyday life and this entails switching roles, adjusting behaviours, modifying speech, shifts in expectations, making surprising discoveries, and so forth. Beyond this however, the idea of border thinking is one that situates us as navigators and attenuators of difference, both real and imagined. In other words, we live with the simple realisation that diversity and heteroglossia condition our everyday existence and this understanding, if we are open to it, makes us better equipped to accept and adjust to change and thus respond to challenges to our own sense of identity.

Another implication is that border thinking can help us understand why borders are so prevalent, pervasive and constantly in the process of becoming. Perhaps it is also a question of an undogmatic interrogation of why borders are necessary, and in doing this suggesting that there are ways to look at borders that do not first and foremost dwell on political economy, governmentality, securitisation, etc., but that do not ignore them either. As Massey (1999: 10) explains in her Hettner lectures, the overarching critical concern is one of an anti-essentialist understanding and a relational view of borders that rejects "false notions of internally generated authenticity." Fantasies of authenticity fuel exclusion and violence but this critical position is certainly not mutually exclusive of ontological considerations of social border-making: boundedness does not inherently signify exclusionary closure. Creating a sense of boundedness in no way suggests exclusionary closure. As Jeff Malpas (2012: 238) writes: "The boundary is that which, inasmuch as it establishes the possibility of openness and emergence, also establishes a certain oriented locatedness."

In the following I will advance two arguments. First, I will argue the idea that border thinking can be interpreted in terms of an open-minded attitude towards borders and border crossing as an everyday condition that resists exclusionary impulses. Se-

condly, I will suggest that this kind of thinking has very much to do with a situated cosmopolitanism that links global contexts with the specificity of local conditions. Furthermore, I suggest that cities - as sites of cultural encounter and change - provide evidence for the salience of both concepts in everyday terms.

Reassessing Borders: Resisting Realism

In his recent book entitled *Why Borders Matter,* reviewed in this volume by Teodor Gyelnik, Frank Furedi (2021) openly and forcefully challenges proponents of a 'borderless world'. It is not only at the opponents of restrictive border regimes and border politics that Furedi targets his criticism; he also interprets contemporary trends towards 'debordering' societies, demonising community and individual boundaries and even the rejection of 'lazy binaries' as a fatal lack of judgement. Furedi argues that states, societies, communities and individuals need limits and borders in order to function within a complex world. Without limits, without a 'here' and a 'there', without a separation between the public and the private, without an ability to distinguish, we might lose, among other things, our orientation and our ability to create a sense of self. Furedi's thoughts are partly echoed in the comments of Guardian journalist Hadley Freeman who similarly notes that in our increasingly performative and social media dominated world the walls between the public and the private are dissolving. This performative borderlessness is not always salutary as it can result not in a widening of horizons but in self-absorption and a reduced repertoire of possible public identities. Freeman also adds that: "solipsism is the pinnacle of narcissism – assuming that my experiences (as a woman, man, gay or lesbian person, Black, Asian, Christian, Jew, etc.) apply to all persons who belong to 'my group'."[1] By diluting the distinction between the private and public we might just be opening up too much for our own good.

The appreciation of borders is partly motivated by a backlash against the widespread framing of borders/limits as something shameful or retrograde. On the other hand, while Furedi's book is largely dedicated to debunking borderlessness, others extol the virtues of a bordered world. I am reminded in this regard of Régis Debray's (2010) border 'eulogy', celebrating borders and the differences they create while decrying the false Western universalism of globalisation, which in its mission to open up the world has generated numerous border conflicts. In Debray's understanding, borders are a moral and intellectual necessity; borders create uniqueness and singularity in a world where interchangeability and randomness have become the new status quo. Debray's éloge also eloquently argues the necessity of borders due

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1   Hadley Freeman, (10 October 2020, Guardian) The wall between what's private and what's not is dissolving. Which side am I on? https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/oct/10/the-wall-between-whats-private-and-whats-not-is-dissolving-which-side-am-i-on

to their inspirational power: behind the walls of retreats and cloisters we find spaces of transcendence, meditation and contemplation.

Furedi and Debray, perhaps indirectly, target the sentiments of scholars such as John Agnew (2008: 2), who warn that territorialist border thinking is a trap which ultimately limits "the exercise of intellect, imagination, and political will." In similar fashion, border scholars such as Henk van Houtum (2011) have also warned that borders are producers of a seductive binary thinking, for example in terms of imagining national identity as something concrete and immutable - it is a comforting drug that exacts a high price. Parker and Vaughan-Williams (2009: 584) have also taken aim at what they see as lazy border thinking; as part of their suggestion for a critical border studies agenda, they similarly question the seductive binary epistemology of the border that satisfies "a craving for the distinctions of borders, for the sense of certainty, comfort and security."

Reading the powerful arguments of Debray and others who resist *sans-frontiérisme*, I often get the sense that border advocates and critics are sometimes talking past each other. In my own capacity as a borders researcher I often find myself caught between the moral purity of the left and the cultural authenticity of the right - two thought-stopping dogmas that allow for little productive dialogue in order to explore and understand the *why and not just how* of borders. As Charles Taylor (1991) argues, great political and social harm resides in the unreflective confusion of authenticity of manner (self-identity) and matter (e.g. defining social goals). Furedi does raise many important points and I have a degree of sympathy with many of his arguments, particularly the notion that we all need limits and borders of identity. Borders between what is private and public do need to be respected, not treated with suspicion.

Nevertheless, what Furedi and Debray do not take into account is the overbearing influence of 'border realism' – the idea that there is an objective and inescapable logic behind the creation and use of borders that is most directly security-driven. Furthermore, ethical questions related to the construction of borders and limits cannot be easily explained away. Borders provide ontological security and enable communities to thrive; they can also be violent tools of exclusion and discrimination. Here, our border advocates have rather little to say. There is another important point to be made here, that of 'overbordering' our understandings of the world. As Amartya Sen (2006) urges, political debate must resist singular and civilizational understandings of identity and their reductionist treatment of complex social realities. The political expedient of social classification reduces the wealth of entanglements, social situations, and identities that characterize real life to highly schematic and misleading forms of political and social bordering. Sen (2006: 45) warns that the doctrine of singular identities is a crude classification instrument that is also "grossly confrontational in form and implication." The idea that choiceless identity forges

an individual and/or national destiny lurks behind identitary bordering. And indeed, the consequences of monological understandings of borders are well-known. For example, in the classic case of 'knowing where your borders are' as propagated by promoters of unambiguous territorial and ethnic understandings of nation. We are reminded of von Treitschke's category of 'objective Germanness' and Haushofer's (1927) plea for a greater consciousness (Grenzinstinkt) about where Germany's true borders are to be found.

Finally, Furedi also appears to take aim at least two decades of critical border studies, relegating the processual notion of borders (and with it bordering) to a vague post-modern fantasy of border transgression or even borderlessness. However, to my mind this is an unfortunate misreading of the critical thrust of the bordering paradigm. A processual approach to borders implies that borders are co-constitutive of multifarious border-making and border-crossing practices such as uses of space, narrations of place and political instrumentalization and securitization practices, all of them with ethical consequences. We are again reminded that borders are both makers and carriers of meaning (Donnan and Wilson 1999). Bordering practices are not merely social practices through which state-building and territorial consolidation transpire (see, for example, Paasi 1999) but are something more central to everyday life and being-in-the-world. Borders are thus social, political, ethical, cultural and ontological.

This discussion makes evident that one of central problems in discussing how boundaries are drawn is not one of denying the centrality of borders to everyday life and society at large, but the paradigm of border realism. Ironically, realism informs many of the arguments advanced by both border defenders and those that challenge borders as biopolitical tools of violence. In both cases reference is made to the notion that borders and boundaries are rules and institutions that protect society from Hobbesian anarchy - internationally and within society. For example, realist IR (International Relations) perspectives explain away the significance of perception and value orientations - these are ultimately nonsense in this empiricist worldview – and thus obfuscates the psychological nature and the socio-spatial and symbolic power of borders. Instead, border realism pursues ideal notions of a positive, indeed Kantian, border and region, phenomena which can never be confirmed. As such, despite its obsession with empirical data and verification, realism ultimately retreats into the realm of metaphysics in its search for the 'positive' ἰδέα of border. On the more critical side, the Hobbesian view is the reference point for challenging bordering processes and border biopolitics. This perspective also rests on an a priori definition (and thus in my mind objectivization) of what borders are supposed to do and why they are constructed. Deconstruction only reinforces this, suggesting the existence of an underlying and almost metaphysical order (power) that requires to be uncovered. Both of these realisms neglect the role of borders in making sense of the world, a serious omission as it is the social and cognitive aspect of bordering

which partly explains the exploitability of borders as political control mechanisms, economic resources and ontological processes.

Thoughts on Border Thinking

Border crossing is about cultural encounter and cultural change. I suggest that thinking about and reflecting upon the fact that border crossing is a central aspect of our lives can be a powerful resource for awareness, learning, greater tolerance and understanding of complex social realities. It entails the prospect of expanding our own borders to encompass new ideas, experiences and possibilities. As such, border thinking is a universal idea that is not limited to a specific geographic context nor to a specific set of social relations. Nevertheless, it bears emphasising that border thinking, or *el pensamiento fronterizo*, emerged in scholarly debate as a response to fundamentalism and xenophobia; it is often associated with Gloria Anzaldúa's (1987) iconic exploration into Mexican-American/Chicana identity. In the work of Anzaldúa, pensamiento fronterizo emerges as an open challenge to foundationalist border narratives and the enduring colonialization of the spirit by the powerful and vindictive. Anzaldúa's vision is a decolonial alternative, informed by personal experience of racism, homophobia, macho culture and intolerance while growing up in South Texas. In Anzaldúa's very personal rendering of the borderlands imaginary, she speaks of an open wound of history and a sustained sense of cultural subjugation. The border itself is part of the matrix of power that carries within it unresolved legacies of colonialism and white supremacy. In this way, Anzaldúa's 'new mestiza consciousness' inspires us to think of border-making as a form of disobedient, perhaps radical, freedom and liberation. At the same time, the borderlands is a space that generates hybridity and indeterminacy. As Anzaldúa's own biography reveals, border identities emerge not as binary oppositions but rather as multiple subjectivities that interact in very dynamic spaces.

This vision also has a wider appeal as the idea of a pensamiento fronterizo suggests a deeply reflective approach to life that emerges from being at the border. Border thinking is a way of seeing the world and social reality from the vantage point of being at *and amidst* social, cultural and political borders, in which diversity, the co-existence of many different social worlds and the daily negotiation of border-crossing rituals, e.g. code-switching, is the norm. Being at the border can also mean of having very different places simultaneously as central reference points in everyday life. Alternatively, border thinking is about a reflective way of conceptualising social borders as being in the world and the fact that we are all creating and crossing borders in one way or another. This counters the fiction of immutable border realities, meanings, and identities that is a source of misunderstandings of borders but also populist appropriations of them as 'taking back control' (the Hyperreal of borders as Paul Richardson argues). Defined in these terms, border

thinking completely breaks with monological obsessions and suggests that we can undertake a move from a thought-stopping to a thought-propelling consideration of borders as spaces of possibility.

As I have proposed, border thinking is a universal concept not limited to borderlands of specific socio-cultural contexts. The universal nature and core message of border thinking is summed up in the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin (1965/1984: 287), who years before Étienne Balibar pronounced that "borders are everywhere", observed that society "(…) is wholly and always on the border (...) Culture does not possess inner territory: it is wholly located on borders, boundaries route everywhere." In Bakhtin's understanding we become who we are through discursive exchanges and within a dialogic tension between the centripetal pull of monologic, authoritative discourses and countervailing heteroglossia. In a critical understanding, the strength of border thinking lies in turning the objectivization of border knowledge on its head. Thinking about borders in a reflexive and critical manner requires us to ponder the consequences of living with borders; it also encourages us to reflect on the borders we cross everyday and to better understand the borders within us. Most importantly, we realise that borders are not only imposed on us, but emerge through our own different and situated border-making practices: uses of space, narrations of place, senses of border-crossing, political practices.

Border thinking is a way of thinking that is privileged because freed of assumptions of border normativity and singular identities as a natural state of being. As Lugonés (1992: 3-4) has argued, border thinking is expressed in subjectivities characterized by "a tolerance for contradiction and ambiguity, (…) transgression of rigid conceptual boundaries, and by the creative breaking of the new unitary aspects of new and old paradigms." It is therefore not a coincidence that iconic borderlands such as the one between the US and Mexico have become sources of cultural knowledge and vital forces of cultural change. Here we see a reversal of the traditional top-down narrative of borderlands as peripheral backwaters, lawless spaces and civilizational divides. Not only does a rich artistic, literary, culinary culture flourish in the US-Mexico borderlands but influential social and cultural critique has emerged there. We only need to browse through an extensive literature such as the compilations of Benito and Manzanas (2002), Dear and Leclerc (2003), Víctor Zúñiga (1999), Kun and Montezemolo (2012) and many others to grasp the wider impact of the borderlands imagination.

Cosmopolitanism and Border Thinking

There is another issue that deserves discussion as both an element and consequence of border thinking, the question of situated cosmopolitanism (Healy 2010). This implies not only accommodating difference but an ability to thrive amidst borders even in situations of adversity. It is an understanding of cosmopolitanism that in

my view follows from *el pensamiento fronterizo*; moreover, it is universal in the sense that it is independent of context, and dialogic as a situated process of mutually constructing social meaning. In this way it diverges from 'hard-core' post-colonial or decolonial thinking in important ways. Grosfoguel (2008), Mignolo (2013) and Saldívar (2006) make the point that that border thinking is necessary for imagining and perhaps achieving a world defined by decoloniality and the emergence of global political society (delinking from processes of re-westernization and de-westernization). They also equate border thinking with 'immigrant consciousness' and the geopolitical consequences that can be derived from it. In their reading cosmopolitanism is not an acceptable way of being, as it is limited to certain empowered and fortunate individuals, inherently colonial and ultimately neoliberal. However, in this reading border thinking is applied too restrictively and exclusively. The implication is that Global North and Global South are in a permanent and asymmetric state of antagonistic opposition and, as a result, have little to learn from each other.

Mignolo proposes a decolonial option that supposedly rejects European localism masquerading as cosmopolitanism. But this is based on somewhat misleading portrayals of the West and 'Western' ideology as something monolithic, an idea that ironically recreates and cements exclusionary bordering. Mignolo criticises reifications of cosmopolitanism that emerge from the European world and considers Kant's universalism as an imperial notion and as such untenable. Here, however, he exaggerates the influence of the Kantian ideal which to date has failed to serve as a feasible basis for political agency, or a real existing basis for citizenship. Indeed, much of European philosophical energy has been was expended in developing Kantian imperatives into nation-building options. Kantian absolutes, that of absolute freedom, for example, are empty to the extent that there is no polity that can set them in motion (Taylor 1979/1992). Consequently, I argue that 'West against the rest' portrayals of cosmopolitanism is based on reductionist arguments that betray obsessions with the power and historical legacy of the West as a negative source of identity. This reflect Sen's critical concerns with colonialised thinking and do not really advance an idea of what a situated, local (Global South if you will) pensamiento fronterizo might look like. Cosmopolitan localism is not a Eurocentric invention (Appiah 2006). All of us, regardless of our positionality, can learn much from recognising our own situations at the border. It is about a kind of epistemic disobedience that we can interpret as a rejection of realist thinking, especially in terms of borders and geopolitics that reify political xenophobia and cultural supremacy.

Mohanty (2003: 224), who rejects the notion of a borderless feminist solidarity as the product of Eurocentric globalist thinking, defines the very contours of a situated cosmopolitanism when she writes of her "(…) firm belief in the importance of the particular in relation to the universal - a belief in the local as specifying and illuminating the universal." Sen (2007) has convincingly demonstrated that a situated cosmopolitanism is not dependent on Schmittian enemies or negative obsessions

with colonising others. Moreover, Paul Healy (2011) has argued that 'situated cosmopolitanism' is a condition of possibility that rejects the need for conformity, symmetrical reciprocity and thus an abhorrence of difference.

Appiah (2019) links two basic notions of cosmopolitanism thinking, one centred on universal moral obligations and one centred on the significance and maintenance of local identities differences:

> *The cosmopolitan task, in fact, is to be able to focus on both far and near. Cosmopolitanism is an expansive act of the moral imagination. It sees human beings as shaping their lives within nesting memberships: a family, a neighbourhood, a plurality of overlapping identity groups, spiralling out to encompass all humanity. It asks us to be many things, because we are many things. And if its critics have seldom been more clamorous, the creed has never been so necessary.*

We could argue that, despite enduring coloniality at many borders, situated cosmopolitanism is a privileged standpoint because it based not a divisive inside/outside dichotomy but on an awareness of the fluidity of human experience and the impossibility of fixing identity in unambiguous, immutable ways. Within this context, the idea of cosmopolitanism also takes on a rather new meaning. Chris Rumford (2014) has claimed that borders are 'cosmopolitan workshops' where 'cultural encounters of a cosmopolitan kind' take place and where entrepreneurial cosmopolitans advance new forms of sociality in the face of 'global closure'. Rather than represent a (western) universalistic ideal, with border thinking cosmopolitanism becomes part of everyday life, echoing Rumford's (2006: 163) suggestion that

> *cosmopolitanism is best understood as an orientation to the world which entails the constant negotiation and crossing of borders (. . .). Borders connect the "inner mobility" of our lives with both the multiplicity of communities we may elect to become members of and the cross-cutting tendencies of polities to impose their border regimes on us in ways which compromise our mobilities, freedoms, rights, and even identities.*

Research Consequences: Cities as Laboratories of Border Thinking

What might be some consequences of border thinking in terms of research and uncovering examples in the field? Border thinking helps us link socio-cultural borders and border-making processes to the construction of everyday lived space. In this border thinking is not new to border studies as the resonance of Anzaldúa's vision of the New Mestiza indicates. Wright (2019) has explicitly used the concept in describing the emergence of a powerful coalition against President Trump's border wall project, resisting a nativist urge to further divide and securitize the US-Mexico borderlands. Furthermore, the borderscapes approach (Brambilla et.al. 2015)

implicitly involves a way of thinking about borders in terms of the social heterogeneity of border-making processes and connecting border experiences with border representations. Moreover, in the more recent development of border studies, we find considerable investment in creating alternative border knowledges that reflect experiences of border negotiation and border-crossing. For example, through the borderscapes approach, a social complexity is made visible that border fundamentalism obscures: an inclusive perspective on borderlands as products of individual and collective imaginations. Despite a wide diffusion of borders as spaces of control and highly ambiguous zones, we also find that borders are produced not only by the state, but though border-crossing agency and civil society. As an epistemological tool the borderscapes concept closely reflects border thinking through connecting wider political contexts, border experiences and border-making practices. Society is of course bordered by state territoriality, among other things, but borders *in* society are very much about embodied experience, intersubjective meaning-making and socially transmitted knowledge about the world (Marsico and Telo 2019).

Used solely in prescriptive and normative terms, concepts such as border thinking and situated cosmopolitanism might remain 'autopoietic narratives' in the sense of Cicchelli and Octobre (2018). These authors (ibid: 44) alternatively suggest that cosmopolitanism can be approached not as an ethic but as a way to understand how social and cultural change is actually happening, as "human individuals, communities and institutions relate to globality and its outcomes". One need look no further than urban life: cities do not have to be paragons of cosmopolis in order to reflect processes of cultural encounter and change. They provide ample evidence that border thinking and situated cosmopolitanism are ways of life and exist within what Anna Tsing (2005:4) describes as 'friction': the continuous co-production of cultures through interaction and "(…) the awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference (…)."

Cities are dialogical spaces that make evident the significance of place and the processes by which cities and their neighbourhoods are continuously appropriated and re-appropriated in social, cultural and political terms. Border-making can be revealed as an intersubjective creation of meaning in the guise of social imaginaries and in more concrete everyday terms as socially communicated narratives of place distinction – stories and knowledges of place that reflect embodied experience of place specificity and relationality with regard to wider urban contexts (Scott 2020). As borders tell stories, border-making itself involves narratives of change and continuity that can reveal much about how places function - or fail to function - as communities.

Stories of urban place symbolize, in their own individual ways, shifting socio-cultural geographies and the differentiation of inner-city spaces, expressing, for example, spaces of cultural possibility and lifestyle alternatives as well as political contestati-

on. Deljana Iossifova (2013) suggests that urban borders represent much more than fragmented, 'enclave' geographies and in fact provide means to establish common ground and dialogue between highly diverse communities and interests. Furthermore, Iossifova has also identified elements of 'borderlands urbanism' in Chinese cities (Shanghai) as spaces of accommodation and change between older neighbourhoods, new gentrified areas and often gated urban exclaves. In her readings urban borders are as much about place as about creating interfaces of interaction and exchange. More substantially, borderlands urbanism describes a process of creating a sense of belonging which also necessitates strategies of coexistence between neighbourhoods. As Iossifova (2019) notes, urban coexistence can involve recognition, tolerance or in some cases conflict. The most positive scenario is one of gradual recognition between neighbourhoods through everyday interaction, even giving rise to shared urban cultures despite economic and political forces that promote social fragmentation.

Further evidence can be gleaned by multicultural cities such as Berlin which have undergone significant socio-cultural and economic change in the last decades. Iconic neighbourhoods including Kreuzberg as well as other inner-city districts have become models of sorts for diversity, social innovation and cultural accommodation. Moreover, these neighbourhoods are no longer peripheral or 'liminal' spaces within the city but have achieved a significant degree of cultural and social centrality, despite the fact that many communities with foreign roots still struggle for recognition. Rather than represent a Sojaesque thirdspace, Berlin's Kreuzberg is 'its own deal'. It is more than a bridge between cultures, it is a dialogic space that crystallises and makes visible processes of socio-cultural transformation that are taking place more generally. The existence of populism, anti-migrant sentiment and nationalism (rather ubiquitous phenomena) does not change this.

The somewhat less publicised Berlin district of Wedding has a very specific and partly unique 'thereness' that defies interpretation as subaltern to monolithic national cultures (in this case German and Turkish) which themselves are also in the process of transformation. Place narratives of contemporary Wedding combines both an emphasis of diversity and a sense of authenticity. It has acquired a place identity as an exceptional area in that it represents both socio-economic and socio-ethnic continuity and change. It is above all, the mix and the diversity of Wedding that is at the root of narratives of place uniqueness within Berlin and that distinguishes it from other inner-city areas. Part of the Mitte District of Berlin, Wedding is a traditional working-class area and former industrial centre and is one of the most ethnically diverse localities of Berlin. The multicultural atmosphere is highly visible on the streets, in the types of shops and services flourishing in the area and bilingual

shop signs. Wedding's image as an up-and-coming working class area[2] references the area's historical development, and traditional left-wing activism. It is a place where local Berlin traditions have been maintained despite Berlin's overall rapid pace of change. At the same time, Wedding embodies gradual cultural shifts in terms of an increasingly diverse population. According to the bloggers Mick ter Reehorst and Natalia Smolentce:

> *"What was once a working-class neighbourhood called 'Red Wedding' is now a booming and culturally diverse area. Compared to other Berlin neighbourhoods, Wedding is relatively untouched by gentrification, making it one of the city's most authentic areas. The true spirit of Berlin is still alive here."[3]*

In the past, Wedding and other Berlin inner-city neighbourhoods have been subject to highly sensationalised debates regarding multiculturalism (which to some is an ugly word), ethnic diversity and their association with social dereliction. Officially, Wedding is home to the most deprived neighbourhoods and the highest concentration of socio-economic and public safety problems in Berlin. Wedding's negative reputation as a centre of social tensions, criminality, youth unemployment and dereliction is thus a constant in the narration of transformation. And yet perhaps the most unique feature of Wedding that receives attention is its apparent ability to thrive as a highly diverse place. In the Arte Info website blogger Nathalie Daiber describes the profile of a 'Multikulti-Wedding' in which:

> *"(..), Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Atheists, Lower Saxonians, Swabians, and other refugees live here quite peacefully together. Might this be a model for all Germany's future? Decision-makers at least should have a closer look at the people here."* [4]

Conclusion

As elaborated here, situated cosmopolitanism and border thinking describe both a state of possibility as well as an empirical reality. Neither of these concepts are applied normatively, and there it would be presumptuous to suggest that they might inevitably supersede traditional thinking. Cultural and political cognition and thus processes of socialisation are central to the development of perceptions and there is no doubt that everyday borders are often based on negative stereotypes rather than engaged and reflective interaction. Border thinking remains an option, but a highly productive one; it helps us understand the borders around us, the borders

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2   Wedding in Berlin Finally Has Its Moment, NY Times, 9 August 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/travel/wedding-berlin-beer-restaurants-bars.html

3   Meet my Hood: Wedding, Berlin, https://cafebabel.com/en/article/meet-my-hood-wedding-berlin-5ae00be2f723b35a145e8079/

4   https://info.arte.tv/de/wedding-portraet-des-multikulti-berlins

within us, the borders that we constantly make. It also breaks with monological obsessions and suggests that we can undertake a move from a thought-stopping to a thought-propelling consideration of borders as spaces of possibility. Identities emerge on and at borders not as binary oppositions but rather as multiple subjectivities that interact in very dynamic spaces. This is privileged thinking because despite the vulnerability and struggles that underpin being 'at the border', it is way of thinking that provides a space for both self-creation and, more broadly, the disruption of simplistic narratives of difference.

Returning to the initial debate regarding borderlessness and the intrinsic value of borders, we can agree perhaps with Debray and Furedi that borders are not the problem - borders can most certainly move with people's mobilities, practices, ideas and experiences and are hence adaptable. Problems only arise when our borders fail to take into consideration and adjust to wider social and cultural realities. The main critical message is thus the avoidance of border reductionism as something inherently about state security, biopolitics, geopolitical hegemony and conflict-inducing distinctions between 'us' and 'them', 'here' and 'there'. Given the propensity of some to simplify borders and their significance, this is in my opinion one of the more important messages emerging from border thinking. Perhaps one conclusion that can be drawn is that thinking about borders in a reflexive and critical manner requires us to ponder the consequences of living at borders as well as the consequences of our own border-making and border-interpreting practices. The point in other words is this: socio-cultural encounter and change are the norm rather than the exception.

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Lifting the veil of the borderscape

Marnix Mohrmann

Introduction

The European Union in the 21st century is subject to change. Not so much change from within, but forced upon by events in the world. Global flows of data, goods and people have an impact on every corner of Europe (Vaughan-Williams 2009). Technological advancements create new flows and also alter existing flows. These innovations have the possibility to 'bypass' traditional power structures like borders and subvert existing power relations. The refugee crisis is a prime example. A sudden influx of immigrants, either legal or illegal, has posed Europe with a challenge, a challenge that laid bare issues of sovereignty, equality and identity and challenged the state/territory dichotomy (Sidaway 2012; Scott et al. 2017). In the refugee question countries exerted national power, while a coordinated and joint 'European' stance and response was barely visible. These challenges all relate, to a certain extent, to borders and bordering. Who belongs here and who does not, continuing to fuel the much referred border debate on 'us' versus 'them' in national and international context.

At the same time academics have tried to grasp what a world without borders would look like, how cosmopolitan individuals experience a borderless world. Yet this academic approach is lost to non-academics. Why think about being a human of the world when there is work to do and a family to feed? But exactly those people, the non-cosmopolitan, grassroots, 99% of the population hold the power in democratic countries and the European Union. In something that could be called a *response*, by the people, on globalization is the resist towards more transnational entities, most notably the European Union. Through international cooperation the barrier that borders present are being overcome, but to overcome a border as barrier it is paramount to understand why and how the border is a barrier. There needs to be a focus on how the border is constructed and by whom.

The technocratic, top-down approach on borders is coming more and more under fire from practice and lived experience. As Makarychev (2015) puts it "the refugee crisis strongly resonates in the current discourses on the future of the European integration and regionalism", indicating a focus on the individual identity of European citizens and reinforcing the focus on the local level in a globalizing world. The

emphasis on the local in the global has been made overtly apparent during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in which national borders rapidly closed and cross-boundary openness evaporated (Radil et al. 2020). Quickly after closing the border national governments saw the need to re-open certain parts of their border, because their regions are so intertwined with neighbouring countries that their citizens were starved of health services and supermarkets among other vital services (European Committee of the Regions 2020). The border in those areas is more than just a dividing line, it is a lived and constantly reconstructed border.

The very essence of borders as solely political constructs is being challenged. This means that new ways of thinking about and approaching borders have to be explored. Borderscapes is the most prevalent emerging concept that moves border thinking beyond solely political and attributes actors other than the state with the ability to influence bordermaking. But the concept is not yet fully developed. In this paper I present my theoretical and methodological approach to contribute to the development of the concept.

The article starts by providing an overview of recent border thinking, reviewing trends in the last few decades that explain the need for and emergence of new ways of critically reflecting on border thinking and in doing so moving borders away from the state/territory dichotomy towards a plurivocal/pluritopical, socially constructed border. The new prevailing concept, borderscapes, is then argued to be of great value but still essentially flawed. Based on the work by Dina Krichker (2019) the critical potential of the concept is explored and why it is the most widely embraced concept at the moment. Despite its potential the concept is lacking theoretical and methodological demarcation, coined the irresistible vagueness of the concept. Finally a new methodological approach for the borderscape concept is explored in an attempt to overcome the identified challenges, by combining the three axes of reflection by Chiara Brambilla (2015) with Alfred Schutz' sociological phenomenology. This new approach is argued to 'lift the veil of the borderscape' and provides the concept with a much needed theoretical and methodological demarcation and clarification.

Border thinking genealogy

In the early days of post-war Europe the emphasis on cooperation grew. The international political arena focussed on rebuilding and reinvigorating the economy. To that end governments entered trade agreements that spanned borders, setting in motion the changing role of borders. Academics at the time had to renew their thinking on borders as being 'good' or 'bad' towards different narratives (Houtum 2005; Newman 2006). The prevailing, now deemed classic, narrative was that the state is at the centre and borders are solely its domain. Borders are there to demarcate territory and outline a state's sphere of influence defining inclusion and exclusion. This western territorialist view is informed by colonialism, imperialism and other zeitgeist

related oppressing policies. The binary approach to borders and its power relations problemizes the classical border and frontier thinking (Al-Hardan 2018; Sidaway 2019). The classical viewpoint, with its traditional assumptions of state territoriality and fixed images of the bordered world of nation-states and identities, is branded the 'territorial trap' (Agnew 1994; Paasi 1998; Brambilla 2015). Gradually over the course of decades, starting around the 1980's, discourses on border thinking began to challenge these state-centric and colonial narratives and provided new ones in their place (Paasi 1998; Houtum 2005; Newman 2006).

The counter reaction of these new narratives is called the 'cultural turn' and started to take place around the 1980's and 1990's. It attempts to move away from binary thinking and to avoid the territorial trap. No longer are borders regarded as solely the domain of the state and international politics, more actors are attributed to influencing and shaping borders (Hataley & Leuprecht 2018). In synergy with postcolonial thought, the focus shifted towards identity, culture and socio-spatial practices (Brambilla 2015). The focus shift is initiated by regarding borders not as geographical lines, but as sites of social interaction, contest and an outcome of socio-spatial practices creating a fluid rather than a static border (Perera 2007). Perera (2007: 207) describes borders(-capes), in an exploration of the Pacific borderscape, as shifting and conflictual spaces that are being reconstituted through ongoing spatial relations and practices that defy categorization of borders. Based on this new way of approaching borders there are many ways, angles and disciplines to answer the question of what a border is, often combined or borrowing some notions from one another. A few examples: philosophical (Houtum & Ekker 2015), cartographical (Houtum & Lacy 2015), sociological (Sidaway 2007), geographical (Vaughan-Williams 2009; Sidaway 2007) or political (Scott 2015).

Speaking and writing about a border as a site of interaction indicates that a border has a location, a way of visiting the border. Although when visiting that location the border itself is not visible, it is made visible through physical barriers and structures. Although in recent times, especially within the European Union, the physical structures have been replaced with digital and paper borders (Sullivan & Burger 2017). However, this border is still demarcated by a national government and fulfils a political goal, that of sovereignty and sphere of influence. If one were to cross this line different rules apply, a different sphere of influence. The concept of a border thus consists of the idea that borders are markers of spatial separation and creates two sides, even after the cultural turn or in digital form (Krichker 2019). The two resulting sides have always coincided with national and state borders, their respective territory. With the cultural turn this border concept and thinking is being stretched to its limits by including everyday life in border regions that influence the border. New research, from various disciplines, has argued the acknowledgement of actors, beyond the state, to contribute to (re)shaping, (re)defining and (re)structuring bor-

ders. It has become increasingly difficult to use the border concept, bound by geographical location and inherent political primacy, to include the latter observations.

Thus a problem arises: the inherent binary nature of the border concept is being challenged in the cultural turn, so is the border concept sufficient enough in order to keep moving the discussion forward? It has become increasingly more difficult to use the border concept to include social processes and actors beyond the state. Academics have started to develop new concepts to better suit the newly argued border. Especially in the past few decades the amount of border studies is growing rapidly, ever evolving an already complex concept. Borders as markers and dividers of territory are making way for borders as fluid social constructs, merely hinting at state and sovereignty. More and more actors are being attributed with the power to influence and reshape borders, going beyond borders as a solely political domain.

A new, mostly unrivaled, theoretical notion emerged based on the critique: borderscapes (Appadurai 1990; Rajaram & Grundy-Warr 2007; Brambilla 2015; Krichker 2019). The borderscape concept is more inclusive than the border concept, which clings to spatiality and is rigid. The emerging borderscape concept regards borders not as geographical dividing lines, but as sites of social interaction, contest and an outcome of socio-spatial practices creating a fluid rather than a static border, including actors beyond the state. In fact, the borderscape concept can include so many different actors and factors, in relation to borders, that the concept is insufficiently demarcated. This fuzziness is coined the 'irresistible vagueness of the concept' by Dina Krichker, a vagueness that at the moment serves the needs of the discerning disciplines to cater for a new concept, more inclusive than the border concept (Krichker 2019). There are two reasons why this concept is more appropriate than borders, (1) borderscapes move away from the idea that borders are spatial markers that serve a dividing purpose and (2) borderscapes focus on social interaction and personal identity in a border region (Krichker 2019).

Borderscape

When reading the literature on borders, in many disciplines, one may get confused through the interchangeable use of terms: Borderscape, border region, borderland, border aesthetics or in European context Euroscape and Euroborderscape (Dell'agnese & Amilhat Szary 2015). Each of these terms, in relation to one or another, are argued to be 'trendy', novel or a newer iteration. While the entire concepts on and of borders after the cultural turn are relatively new, they have been rapidly embraced and developed by academics. The main prevailing concept is that of borderscape. While it seems that the concept has matured quickly and is now set in stone, its exact definition is still being debated and developed. The concept is as fluid as borders itself.

Defining the borderscape concept is a challenge in its own right. A borderscape is not static, it composes of a *static* aspect as well as a socio-spatial *process*. There is a constant development within the concept. Johan Schimanski begins his account of the Norwegian-Russian borderscape with the following sentence:

> *'The borderscape concept is a way of thinking about the border and the bordering process not only on the border, but also beyond the line of the border, beyond the border as a place, beyond the landscape through which the border runs, and beyond borderlands with their territorial contiguities to the border' (Schimanski 2015: 35)*

As far as a definitive description of the term, this comes pretty close. It demarcates what a borderscape is not, leaving a very open space to define what is confined in a borderscape. Loosely said, a borderscape entails practices, not confined to any space, by a plethora of actors that influences the border (Schimanski 2015). A borderscape is more diffuse in character than a borderland and a borderscape is not solely the culmination of borders in a given spatial area. A borderscape can rather be seen *as* the border, diffused across space, defined by what it involves (Schimanski 2015). Though even what it involves is left completely open; in line with the cultural turn new emphasis is placed on culture and day-to-day socio-spatial practices, even on multiple spatial levels. It acknowledges and accredits a plethora of (f)actors, moving beyond a territorialist view on borders.

This process of the becoming of a border, influenced through socio-spatial practices, is enshrined within the word 'borderscape'. Van Houtum (2015) provides an etymologic and linguistic analysis of the term borderscape. He splits the term into two parts: 'border' and 'scape'. Border in this regard can be defined as a dividing line and marker of sphere of influence, akin to the traditional definition. 'Scape' has the emphasis here, he argues it to stem from the Dutch verb 'scheppen (to create)' and the Dutch term 'landschap' (landscape). Combining both freely translates to 'created land' (Houtum 2015: 2). The important note to make is that borderscape includes the verb 'to create', which is an active process that is never finished unless the term is used in the past tense which has not been done in literature (yet). A borderscape, thus, is as much of an object as it is a process. The process it refers to is the process of bordering and ordering (b/ordering), a term frequently used by Van Houtum. The object it refers to is the border, in the more traditional sense.

Borderscapes move beyond 'the line of the border' and beyond the border as a place. A borderscape involves anything and anyone that influences the shaping, or *becoming,* of a border. An exact spatial demarcation is thus quite difficult to formulate. Following logical reasoning that borders are no longer geographical dividing lines per se, as a result of the unravelling of the binary geopolitical mindset, and are socially constructed, one might suggest that borders are everywhere, in different sizes, shapes and/or meanings (Vaughan-Williams 2009; Rumford 2013; Cooper 2015).

This means that borders are not necessarily found at the edges of nation-states, but can be found in unconventional locations created by various actors and diffused across space. Asking the question of the *where* of borders opens up new ways of thinking and seeing borders away from their inherent political primacy.

Rumford, among others, poses this question, building on the notion of fluid, socially constructed borders. Letting go of borders as solely geographical dividing lines between nation-states and shifting focus to identity and practice, Rumford (2013) questions and identifies new types of borders within Europe. In contrast to Agnew and the relation between borders and sovereignty, Rumford identifies a border superimposed by a supranational organisation located far from traditional borders and not related to state sovereignty. He illustrates this by looking at the city of Melton Mowbray, home to Melton Mowbray pork pies, and the granted status of Protected Geographical Indication (PGI). The PGI status creates a border, stating that only pork pies from within the demarcated geographical zone may be called a Melton Mowbray pork pie. EU superimposed borders, lobbied for by local actors, are being used to gain recognition and derive authority from. In terms of Rumford this border empowers producers within the border while disempowering those outside (Rumford 2013: 70). Rumford therefore moves away from obvious homogenous political centred borders and goes beyond the geopolitical definition and identification.

In the 2015 special edition of the Journal of Contemporary European Studies, the contributors address the where of the European border, also moving beyond the purely, oversimplified, geopolitical definition and stating the importance of the inherent power relations that a border holds (Lacy & Houtum 2015). Cooper (2015) introduces the special edition of the Journal by posing and answering the why question. He does so by conveniently distilling the general gist of border studies, as conducted by multiple disciplines; 'There are some key, overlapping, observations that rest upon the idea of the borders as process' (Cooper 2015: 450). In addition to (and in line with) with Rumford, the special edition's observations and thinking continues by stating that borders are 'meaning-making' and 'meaning-carrying' entities, regardless of where they are (Donnan & Wilson 1999 in Cooper 2015: 451). This indicates the inherent power relations a border contains, regardless of where they are. These power relations in turn influence and are influenced through social interaction and lived experience. The need to ask the where question is thus important in understanding European borderscape dynamics on cultural, political and economic aspects. Locating Europe's borderings shifts attention to the socio-spatial practices of bordermaking and b/ordering by a wide variety of (f)actors, revealing an amorphous character.

Linking back to the quote, a borderscape moves beyond the line of the border and beyond the border as a place. A borderscape is a dynamic spatial process, which in-

cludes a plethora of (f)actors and is spatially diffuse. It is nonetheless important to think about the possible locations of borders, because in this new way of thinking borders are not necessarily political dividing lines. The point here is to illustrate that asking the question of the *where* of a border is important, but also to point out that the *where* of a border impacts *who* is being affected, spatially as well as socially; who is being b/*ordered* and *by whom*? Thinking in this way, a socially constructed border is not a line, but a spatial location that entails culture, politics and economy (Vaughan-Williams 2009), practically assuming the definition of a borderscape. In practice this means that one needs to be aware of different borders, with different meanings to different people (Strüver 2004).

Irresistible vagueness of the concept

Borderscapes encompass a large variety of actors, at different spatial scales and in different contexts. The concept can be used to understand local communities, grasp geographically bound historical, social and economic processes and much more. There is seemingly no end to the possibilities. If everything is possible, then everything is relevant. It is argued that the concept is in need of more direction, an agenda as some call it, to create consensus on its ontology and a general more unified workable methodology. Yet the 'everything goes' aspect of it also frees thinking from the 'lines in the sand' approach and offers the sought after inclusionary iteration in the border thinking paradigm.

The author Chiara Brambilla set out to explore the critical potential of the borderscape concept for the development of alternative approaches to borders along three main axes of reflection that, though interrelated, can be analytically distinguished as: epistemological, ontological and methodological (Brambilla 2015: 14). The epistemological axis is used to find alternative spatio-temporal typologies to the binary oppositions that modern Western thought has privileged, the ontological axis is used to propose alternative reflections that could adequately respond to the epistemological challenge described and the methodological axis is used to push the reflection forward based on experiences and representations that help to humanise the concept. Her exploration is a theoretical one, in the hopes of defining a new agenda for critical border studies. These particular axes are to be used to open up novel political experiments to overcome the modern territorialist (geo)political imaginary and moving towards a new politics of becoming based on a pluritopical and plurivocal interpretation of borders (Brambilla 2015: 29). This critical exploration showed that the borderscape concept has not yet fully developed, but has significant potential for the future.

There is a variety of problematics encompassed by borderscapes which leads to it being used widespread, but therefore also lacking in theoretical and methodological uniformity. Dina Krichker coined this lack of consensus the 'irresistible vagueness'

of the concept (Krichker 2019: 2). On the one hand this responds to the needs of the border studies discipline. It allows for including actors beyond the state and shifts the discipline's ideas towards everyday life, local developments and meanwhile also re-appreciates borders in regard to political geography. Making it return to pre-cosmopolitan border thinking while also including 'regular' citizens and socio-spatial practices (Brambilla 2015; Krichker 2019). On the other hand the inclusion of so many intricate and complex dynamics of geopolitics, social life and with it economics and globalisation poses a serious challenge to the conceptual development of borderscapes and border studies in general (Krichker 2019). To overcome this challenge Krichker states that 'analytical and methodological clarity is necessary to draw effective conclusions about the futures of space, territory, and sovereignty, and to account for the multiplicity of border zones and bordering dynamics' (2019: 2).

Dina Krichker (2019) operationalizes a new approach by studying the institutionalisation of violence in Melilla, a small Spanish enclave in North Africa. Acknowledging the lack of ontological and methodological consensus she revisits Henry Lefebvre's theory on the production of space to approach the production of borderscapes through social practices and discursive tools (Krichker 2019). By returning to the theoretical origins of the concept she raises the question of how borderscapes are produced in the first place. Based on Lefebvre's theory she researched the interaction and interrelation between space, experience and imagination. She argues that 'imagination and experience both produce and are produced by space, and have the capacity to infuse space with 'borderscaping' conditions' (Krichker 2019: 15). With borderscaping conditions she points at a set of circumstances that blur the international separation line and create a diffuse bordering process. In other words, she exposed the elements that create a borderscape, based on the theory production of space. Based on these results she intended to open up the discussion on a common framework for borderscapes.

Lifting the veil of the borderscape

The return to the theoretical origins of the concept is a great inspiration to me and raises many fundamental questions: How is a borderscape actually constructed? What are the exact socio-spatial actions 'on the ground' that builds up a borderscape? Deriving from that, how do local actors and factors create this new socially constructed and fluid border? Building on notions set forth in the academic debate on borders, bordering and borderscapes, most notably the work by Henk van Houtum, Chiara Brambilla and Dina Krichker, I attempt to contribute to the discussion on the common framework for borderscapes. By taking a closer look at the irresistible vagueness of the concept I try to 'lift the veil' of the borderscape, particularly contributing to the methodological and ontological uniformity.

Understanding the current academic debate on borderscapes only shows that there is a lack of consensus. Contributing to overcoming this lack of consensus requires more than just a definition of the concept, a well thought through methodology is required. In the conclusions and recommendations, Dina Krichker argued that her approach, based on Henry Lefebvre's work, is just one way and that different methodological approaches need to be explored as well. Building on notions of lived experience and representations, both scantly mentioned in the literature, I saw potential for developing an alternative methodological approach that might lead to a more solid ontology and methodology of the concept. Where Dina Krichker enquires into the interaction between space, imaginations and experiences, I enquire into the interaction between experiences, representations, perceptions and interpretations of a phenomenon. The phenomenon researched in this case is the Ulster borderscape, also known as the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland.

Lived experience

Before going into the methodological approach, another central aspect in my research has to be explored: lived experience. The premise of borderscapes is that they constitute of human actors and their actions. Going into the field primarily based on broad conceptual notions on borders will not give any means of researching human action and interaction and the processual b/ordering aspect. A second theoretical layer is required to focus the research further. Not so much a second layer in the sense of deepening the understanding on borders, borderscapes and other invisible, intangible concepts, more so to gain an understanding of what constitutes lived experience, the concept's true building blocks, and thus what lies at the foundation that creates and shapes the borderscape. The starting point for understanding lived experience is social theory and partly sociology, these help bring about an understanding of lived experience and social interaction. By combining social theory and geography I attempt to bring new insights into the discussion on the common framework of borderscapes.

Social theory is quite philosophical, but necessary to understand the way lived experience is constituted. In order to create a solid foundation for combining sociology and social geography Western society has to be understood in a broader context, the researched Ulster borderscape is located in the West after all. By setting the stage the characteristics of the Western capitalist society are being included and brackets any pre-given ways of thinking and reflecting. This precedes lived experience and influences the shaping of the individual from the day they are born. A great place to start setting the stage is by looking at a text by Georg Simmel (1903). In 'Die Grossstädte und das Geistesleben' (The Metropolis and Mental Life), he sets out answer the question of 'how the personality accommodates itself in adjustments to external forces', i.e. how is one's identity being created and shaped in light of exter-

nal factors? He sets out a multiplicity of external forces that shape one's identity, all embedded in Western capitalist society, such as time, state, history and money economy. Without going into too much philosophical and sociological detail, Simmel describes the stage in which one battles to exist and under influence of externalities attempts to (re)gain identity in the impersonal through their experiences and their construction of reality. This is very relevant for the Ulster borderscape, seeing as new generations keep being born into a long lasting conflict. From the youngest age individuals face(d) tremendous external social forces, historical heritage, external culture and techniques of life in their upbringing and perception of reality. Thus the way one experiences reality, lived experience, is influenced by a plethora of factors.

By stating that one's reality can be influenced and altered through external stimuli it means that reality is not ready-made, a pre-given that is unable to be altered through human actions. This directly opposes philosophical structural paradigms that assume an overarching structure and set of rules that govern social interaction. Applying such structural thinking makes one fall directly in the territorial trap because one will look for an overarching, 'higher', set of rules that govern the conception and evolution of borders and immediately caters for a top-down approach. Second, this directly conflicts with the borderscape concept in which nothing is pre-given and borders can be ephemeral and are constantly shifting because of human agency and a result of and dependent on human interaction. Instead a more constructivist paradigm is suited, in which human agents are inextricably bound up in the creation of the social and cultural contexts they inhabit as they actively (re)shape their everyday lives (Inglis & Thorpe 2012). A specifically useful line of thinking within constructivism is pragmatism, which is based on several assumptions like the dialectic way the world is being shaped and understood and that research always takes place in social, historical, political and other contexts (Creswell 2013). This provides the theoretical foundation for understanding how borderscapes are socially constructed.

Then, what is lived experience exactly? Alfred Schutz posed this question and his goal was to synthesize a framework of social interaction based on individual experiences (Schutz 1970). In understanding lived experience and social interaction Shutz's sociological phenomenology accounts for all the previously mentioned aspect. In 'Der Sinnhalte Aufbau Der Sozialen Welt' (The meaningful construction of social reality) he lays the basis for understanding social reality, basing his thoughts heavily on the phenomenology of Husserl and the ideas of Max Weber (Schutz 1970, in the edited introduction by Wagner). A term often used by phenomenologists like Simmel, Husserl and the Chicago School is that of 'life-world'. Simply put, life-world is the whole sphere of everyday experiences, orientations and actions through which individuals pursue their interests (Schutz 1970, edited by Wagner). Schutz focused on the life-world from different angles, one of which deals with the dominant factors which circumscribe the conduct of any particular individual. An individual not only finds himself in a specific situation, containing opportunity and limitation to

the individual, but one stands in the situation as having gone through a long chain of prior life (lived) experiences (Schutz 1970). All the experiences the individual has had up until that point are factored into his current experience. Therefore no two individuals can experience something in the same way. This is especially relevant for borderscapes seeing as, for example, geographical location influences the possible 'chain of lived experiences'. Seemingly small things like the primary school one went to or in which neighbourhood one grew up in dictates how one perceives experiences later down the line. All in all this is sociological jargon for explaining social encounters. Grounding it in a spatial location, or wording it differently, life-world, can also be argued to be a summation of culture, religion, heritage, language, politics and economics. These macro scale concepts can be attributed to a specific place, or region. Being able to identify these concepts based on lived experience might prove useful in identifying the, let's use this rhetorically, 'building blocks' of borderscapes and therefore demarcate the concept more clearly.

Spatially augmenting sociological phenomenology

The method of reduction phenomenology, used in Schutz' sociological phenomenology, is about retracing an experience back to its origin and in doing so the researcher must think of the epoché by bracketing factors that could limit access to the true meaning of said experience. It is a means to suspend the beliefs of taken-for-grantedness to pierce the veil of the experience and get to the actual construction of the borderscape. Though applying this method in border studies is challenging. Borders and bordering are a multifaceted concept, studied from various angles and fields, for which there is no real 'standardized' way of approaching and researching them. Brambilla (2015) proposes in her critical reflection on the current academic border thinking paradigm that a way to move forward is to study the border from three axes: ontological, epistemological and methodological. By combining sociological phenomenology with these three axes I attempt to contribute to the ontological and methodological uniformity of the borderscape concept.

Epistemological axis

Brambilla (2015) embraces the multi-sited approach of borderscapes in her epistemological axis and defines it as a kaleidoscopic and double ontological gaze. Moving this viewpoint forward and applying it to practice means that borders and border variations are not static but move around, like a kaleidoscope. When in the field this means that borders, of any kind, could be uncovered all around, with different meanings to different people. Being aware of this multiplicity and utilizing such a gaze makes it easier to grasp '… the configurations assumed by the border on a small and large scale, globally and locally, and taking into account not only the 'big stories' of the nation-state construction, but also the 'small stories' that come from expe-

riencing the border in day-to-day life' (Brambilla 2015: 25). What the kaleidoscopic lens means for phenomenology is that through lived experience multiple 'variations' of a border can be identified in space and time, across different social, economic, legal and historical settings which go between different actors and not only the state (Brambilla 2015). These categories, or dimensions, of borders conjoin nicely with the construction of the social life-world in the Chicago School and the externalities described. The variations Brambilla is speaking of, and the need to humanize the approach to borders by looking *with* the border, are thus the individual perceptions based on different experiences of the border. These are the highly individual border perceptions, coined the 'small stories'. They show the complexity of boundaries in their 'materialities, paradoxes, leakages, fractionalities and practical enactments (Mol and Law 2005, in Brambilla 2015). The true spear point for Brambilla in this approach is that it is now possible to not only become aware of geographical and territorial borders but also of social, ethnic and cultural boundaries. She argues this to be the true innovative epistemology of and from borders, in which the borderscape is a crucial means to an end (Brambilla 2015).

Ontological axis

The ontological axis concerns itself with the definition of borderscapes. Looking at the definition and characteristics of the concept, what are the implications and possibilities? First off, the concept of borderscapes includes a static and a processual aspect. Brambilla (2015) writes about a processual ontology in which reality is actively being (re)constructed and what it means depends on human praxis. Keeping this in mind, in regard to the Ulster borderscape, means that the current state of the border, the being, is closely linked to the future, the becoming because there is a reflexive dialogue between the border and those that constitute it. Further building on the ontological multidimensionality of borders is the reflexive dialogue of crossing a border. Borders allow for regulating or blocking flows of persons and goods and thus maintaining state control and its territoriality on the one hand. On the other hand the flows of persons and goods in an ever globalizing world undermine the state and territorial sovereignty and the borderscape is being reconfigured and spatially re-inscribed (Brambilla 2015). Placing further focus on the re-inscription of space in this regard allows for the uncovering of hidden and silenced borders made invisible by the state viewpoint. By understanding the many facets of a borderscape one can put in practice looking from the border while being aware of the bigger stories.

Methodological axis

The traditional methodological approach in multidisciplinary research since the cultural turn has been to use ethnographic methods and combine those with desk

research, archival research and other forms of data like maps, pictures, art and more recently digital sources (Brambilla 2015). But how does one gain insights into lived experience through desk research or by looking at pictures? This is where Brambilla (2015) proposes two new aspects in the borderscape concept to move the methodology on borders forward: experiences and representations.

The methodological axis helps point to the place where bordering is actually happening. This would be a place of claim and counter-claim, a sphere of contestation and change where the social and political order (in democracies) is being produced. This sphere is best mapped through looking at individual experience and subjectivity, by looking at the phenomena constituting the whole. Strüver (2005) refers to this as performative acts, through narration, visualization and imagination and conceives it as borderscaping. Approaching the Ulster borderscape in this manner would allow for bridging the gap between practices and representations. The real novel contribution Brambilla (2015) makes, in methodological regard, is that in phenomenological border research the focus has to be not *on* (f)actors but *with* them. This notion helps to highlight sites in borderscapes where the right to become is expressed. When looking with (f)actors one concerns itself with perspectives. Perspective is a very powerful word because it captures the past, present and future and explains one's perception, representation and interpretation of events happening at this moment in time. Actions of individuals in society can be seen as acts of resistance within the sphere of contestation of Northern Ireland. Individual experiences, perceptions and interpretations of society and politics thus form perspectives on the border. These perspectives lay bare the true intricacies of a border and illustrate the lack of scientific demarcation and vagueness. At the same time it shows that a borderscape is imagined, materially established, experienced, lived as well as reinforced and blocked but also crossed, traversed and inhabited.

Conclusion

This research embarked on the mission to contribute to the common framework of borderscapes by lifting the veil of the borderscape. Based on the relation between experiences, representations, perceptions and interpretation I argue for a new methodological approach to create a more unified ontology and methodology of the concept. Along the way an important notion emerged, that of *perspectives*. Perspective is a very powerful word because it captures the entire life-world, stock of experiences and chain of experiences of an individual.

Different perspectives of individuals are being influenced not only through experiences directly related to themselves but also by political events happening on an international level. Respondents have stated that their perspective on the border has been heavily influenced by the unfolding Brexit, the 'reopened' constitutional question and internationally polarizing politics in which populism plays a big role.

The approach of lived experience and individual perspective shows that the (re) construction of the Northern Irish borderscape is not restricted to society and national politics, it also unveils connections with international politics. The intricate connections between the individual, society and politics, that are part of the borderscape, can now be used to link the local borderscape narrative to the global. This is a point raised by Krichker to argue the strength of the borderscape concept in the global bordering project and based on lived experience proves to successfully be able to grasp the complex social and political nature.

The different perspectives, by individual border region inhabitants, are created by and based upon their lived experiences with the phenomena of a border. These perspectives constitute the theoretical plurivocal/pluritopical view on borders used to interpret the border. The interpretation of the plurivocal view can be seen as borderscaping, the act of creating a border based on lived experience, which is done through analysing 'representations, perceptions and interpretations'. The act of borderscaping then gives an insight into the being and becoming of a border from multiple perspectives, going beyond the 'modern territorialist (geo)political imaginary', in a kaleidoscopic fashion. Building on individual experiences the border is studied from a broader perspective and interprets social life not merely as 'in service of' (geo)politics. This moves the borderscape concept beyond solely political borders and the state in a manner that has previously not been possible.

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Fear and loathing in the European Union: Immigration and the hunt for a homogeneous home

Jussi P. Laine

Introduction

In Europe, as well as generally throughout the Global North, there has been a consistent drive for ever stricter border and migration policies. The persistent attempts to keep immigrants out is, however, at odds with the continent's increasing need to bring immigrants in (Carr 2012). Irregular migration has become a field where estimations often prevail over researched actualities, and hearsay and myths govern over concrete evidence. The situation has become increasingly paradoxical since what became branded as "refugee crisis" in that rather than mere numbers, the question has become increasingly about filtering between the welcomed and the unwanted (Laine 2020). The European borders have become increasingly unevenly transparent, bringing into question also the humanitarian pretensions (Harding 2012) as well as the ethical premise of the tightened policies. As Finne (2018) put it, "[i]mmigration is, literally, the poor man knocking on the rich man's door, and the enforcement of borders is slamming the door shut".

In contrast to the mere attempt to close state spaces, that is, support for the more deterrent policies stems from the common narratives that posit borders as hard lines and defences against all kinds of "ills" affecting the body of the *our* "national" societies. While much of the recent discussion has – quite justifiably – been caught up in the resultant reinforcement of the "us" versus "them" divisions, the definition of "them" in this equation would require more attention.

The interpretation of the recent events that this article seeks to advance with evidence is that the question of migration has indeed become an existential challenge for the European Union (EU), yet rather than merely the people on the move being the ones forming the perceived threat, the challenge the EU faces is equally, if not more, homegrown. Migration has become an issue sharply dividing the European and national political arenas, whereby the "them" can no longer be automatically assumed be only found on the other side of the border. Consequently, the sense of anxiety and insecurity many ordinary Europeans may feel over migration, cannot be solved by borders – both the cause and the solution lie elsewhere.

It is by acknowledging the highly ambivalent and paradoxical effects of the thick, historically rooted idea of "home" (Duyvendak 2011: 102), which are reflected in our self-image and used to block immigrant integration, this article underlines the need of introspection as only by looking first inward may we see clearly outward. As scholars of European security have noted the levels of fear, anxiety, and threat felt by many seem to drastically exceed the actual levels of physical risks to contemporary EU citizens (Kinnvall, Manners and Mitzen 2018: 149). This article relies on the notion of ontological (in)security to explain how the widespread anxiety over migration can be seen to stem from the strains in preserving a continuous positive version of the self amidst the perceived crisis. It is argued that in resorting to exceptional measures in coping with the exceptional situation the recent migratory pressures inflicted, the EU together with its member states and citizens deviated from the fundamental value basis which has traditionally hold them together. While migration plays a key part in this conundrum, the actual cause for insecurity stems from the European population getting increasingly torn and divided. By utilising recent Eurobarometer survey data, this article looks in to the EU citizens feelings and reactions on immigration and the future of the EU, and provides a theoretically and philosophically grounded analysis on the lack of stability regarding the European identity and the bordered conception of self.

This article shifts the discussion on migration as a phenomenon of its own right and dynamics to its broader societal implications. The wide-spread, less than welcoming, mindset towards immigration throughout Europe, I claim, cannot be taken explicitly as indication of an anti-migrant attitude, but rather as a symptom of a much broader insecurities many Europeans have felt. These insecurities have only exacerbated amidst the current COVID-19 pandemic, which has also further bulked up the perception of borders as barriers for *foreign* threats. It is these reasons we must better understand in seeking to reconstruct the future relations on more balanced footing. Amidst multiple overlapping crisis, migrants have become used as convenient scapegoats for all things wrong, if not a strategy to fight against anxieties and insecurities caused by other kinds of societal changes in search of stability and continuity (Laine 2020). With, *inter alia*, mounting democratic deficit, steeping debt, struggling labour market and the related social security concerns, unfavourable demographics stemming from ageing population, declining both rates and cumulative brain drain, the resilience of the European societies had already become considerably weakened. It is this circumstantial backdrop, to which I wish to begin with.

Challenges for the EU as postnational political project

In seeking to understand how and why the rational accounts on migration as Europe's saviour became so swiftly overshadowed by more emotional perspectives on migration as a threat, it is necessary to take the bigger picture into account. The

what the *Spear's* (2019) magazine, a niche British bimonthly for high-net-worth in-dividuals, termed as the "doom-loop" of Europe, will not be overturned by solving the migration "problem". While "the death of Europe" is hardly as evident as the *Spear's* analysis would let us to believe, it must be given the credit for going against the grain and not even mentioning migration in their extensive take on the Euro-pean vicious cycle of economic decline and potential break-up of the EU. Should their logic be taken further, the "migration crisis" may have been the last nail in the EU's coffin, yet hardly the reason to consider the need to put the EU in that coffin in the first place – contrary to Antonio Tajani's (2018), then the president of the European Parliament, straightforward speculation that "[t]he migration crisis could spell the end of the European project".

Mr. Tajani's thinking may have been influenced by the substantial, yet often times rather lopsided, coverage on migration that hijacked much of the European medias-cape following what many referred misleadingly to as a refugee or even more broad-ly as a migration crisis (see Laine 2019). Interestingly enough, two years prior Tajani gave his statement, that is very soon after the tipping point of asylum seeker arrivals to Europe had passed, the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker admitted in his State of the Union address before the European Parliament in 2016, the European Union itself was in "an existential crisis". Mentioning migration only in passing in his 6000-word speech, the core concern for Mr. Juncker (2016) was the lack of solidarity that has by default been taken as the glue that keeping the Union together. Never before, Mr. Juncker confessed, had he seen such little common ground between the Member States, heard so many leaders speak only of their domestic problems, and seen national governments so weakened by the forces of populism. Never before, he continued, had he seen representatives of the EU ins-titutions setting very different priorities, sometimes in direct opposition to national governments and national Parliaments.

Mr. Juncker was not alone with his worries, but the desperation towards what was to come echoed widely throughout the EU executive, not to even mention the growing number of statesmen and political commentators across the continent. Issuing a stern word of caution against falling into the trap of identity politics, Frans Tim-mermans (in Lefranc 2016), the First Vice-President of the European Commission, stated that for the first time in thirty years, he had really come to "believe that the European project can fail". That is, it is not the migration as such, but rather the lack of solidarity and unity as well as compliance with the own rule of law, that would be needed, in contrast to the observed regression into state-centric thinking, to manage the general situation the sudden increase of migrant arrivals had contributed to.

The EU has duly been criticized for securitizing migration through its bordering regime and exclusionary practices, which more than anything else has jeopardized its proclaimed ideals and hollowed out its core values (Cuttita and Last 2020; Lai-

ne 2020; van Houtum and Bueno Lacy 2020). The way many live, put Machiavelli (1966[1532]: 56) once famously forth, "is so far removed from the way they ought to live that anyone who abandons what is for what should be pursues his downfall rather than his preservation". Given his self-proclaimed intent "to write something useful to whoever understands it", Machiavelli (1998[1532]: 61) considered it "more fitting to go directly to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination of it"[1]. Talking about the modes of government a prince should assume towards his "subjects and friends", Machiavelli (1998[1532]: 61) claimed that many had "imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in truth. While it seems safe to suppose that his remarks may have concerned more of Plato's *Republic*, rather than provided a prediction of the future contractions between the European idea(l) and practice, the underlying logic of Machiavelli's argument seem to hold true still today as evidenced by the recent swell of political realism.

In order to keep its promise to act as the "force for good in the world", as the common early 2000s self-depiction went, and work proactively to create a world "offering justice and opportunity for everyone" (European Security Strategy 2003), it might be needed for the EU to stand for the values of its own values and act accordingly. The aim once depicted in the Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union (Bulletin of the European Union 2001), and repeated and finetuned many times ever after with the affirmation to work proactively to this end, for Europe to have a leading role to play in a new world order and power to able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples is certainly something worth striving for, but unmistakeably getting ever further from reality:

> *Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others' languages, cultures and traditions. The European Union's one boundary is democracy and human rights. The Union is open only to countries which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law. (Bulletin of the European Union 2001)*

Rather than simply striving for making the world a better place, already the logic of the 2003 strategy revealed a vested interest: to seek to solve problems before they reached EU; that's is, aim for a better world as that would be "more secure for the European Union and its citizens". By now, the logic has come ever more reminiscent of a classical chicken and egg situation. Which one ought to come first: a secure Europe or a better world? Rather than a win-win situation, as it was depicted close to two decades ago, the persistent conundrum now appears closer to a zero-

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1   Machiavelli talks about *verità effettuale*. I have chosen to use a more recent translation "effectual truth" here instead of the 1966 translation of "practical truth" for its clarity.

sum game, where the security of EU is sought after at the expense of the others. In order to have a stabilising role worldwide and claim to act convincingly as the force for good, for all, it must have its internal act together – that is, be ontologically secure and secure its identity in order to give meaning to the space and polity it has come together to govern (Mitzen 2018; Kinnvall, Manners and Mitzen 2018).

Homogenous home and the irruptions of enjoyment

The logic of the argumentation herein relies on the notion of ontological security – that is, the security of being, which already Laing (1960) and latter Giddens (e.g. 1991) considered as a fundamental need of humans to feel whole, continuous, and stable over times and particularly during crisis when their wellbeing is threatened. The concept was later introduced in the field of International Relations (IR) in order to better understand how and why states, much like individuals, are concerned with maintaining a consistent notion of self to enhance their ontological security in relations with other states (Kinnvall 2004; Steele 2008; Mitzen 2006). This notion has also been extended to the supranational level. Also the EU, facing many crises and risks to its security and existence, seeks ontological security in securing its identity and gives meaning to the space and polity it has come together to govern (Rumelili 2015; Kinnvall, Manners and Mitzen 2018).

Ontological security, this approached suggest, can be threatened by rapid political change and can be manipulated by threat scenarios which target specific organisations of groups. Thus, the threat potential of perceived negative difference between peoples, cultures and states needs to be emphasised (Rumelili 2015). For example, partly as a result of long-term migration pressures and the more immediate refugee crisis in Europe, threat scenarios have proliferated in which asylum-seekers and migrants become seen to challenge the political bases of the EU and the foundations of European civilisation itself. More recently, the notion has also been applied to the EU with an aim to better understand contemporary fears and anxieties amongst Europeans, and the consequences of this approach for European security (Della Sala 2017; Kinnvall, Manners and Mitzen 2018; Mitzen 2018).

Ontological security is largely a question of identity, values and points of common reference that create a sense of group belonging (Mitzen 2006). On the flipside of the search for stability and continuity is a cognitive-affective resistance to any disruption therein. The experience of ontological security is contingent upon routinized personal, social, and political orders that hold hard uncertainties at bay and a socio-spatial environment – home– that embodies a feeling of being (Mitzen 2018: 1374). Home, she continues, is psychologically central to subjectivity- regardless of how it is construed. From the phenomenological point of view, often stressed by the environmental psychologists, home is a safe and familiar space, where people feel "at ease" (Duyvendak 2011: 27).

Attachment to a home has been conceptualized as "a positive place-bound affection by which people maintain closeness to a place' (Hidalgo and Hernandez 2001: 274), yet it is also created by familiar daily routines and regular settings for activities and interactions (Fried 2000). This is to say the familiarity of a place does not derive from that particular place alone, but from the strong social, psychological and emotional attachments (Easthope 2004: 136). As Bourdieu (2000: 142) put it, whereas the unfamiliar is "out of place", home is the place "to be". As long as home is considered as bordered container, as the traditional Westphalian notion of territoriality has etched it in our minds, the psychological comfort that borders can be seen to produce remains strong – inflicting in so doing an impression of borders as protective, yet vulnerable, walls safeguarding the inside from the perceived threat from the outside (Laine 2018a). This is demonstrated perhaps the most palpably in the concept and practical applications of *homeland security* and the related reverberation of the narrative which conveys an effective image of our homelands on the verge of conquest and being overrun with foreign elements.

These ideas echo Douglas' (1991: 289) work on the material, located aspect of home: "home starts by bringing some space under control". Following Massey's (1994) space ought not however be viewed as an inert platform, as a territorial homeland within which stability and coherence would sprang out of a mythical sense of unity between a bounded land and "its" people, but rather constitutive of and inseparable from social relations with others and the outside. Surely, as Hollifield (2004) points out, international mobility creates tension between liberalism's universalist, free-movement aspirations, and the state project's particularism of bounded security communities. As the recent events have shown, this tension manifests itself expressly at the borders and gets reflected in migration governance built on the rhetoric of "longing for a homogenous national home" (Duyvenduk 2011: 1). The current widespread populist and nationalist appeals to homeland discourses of closure and fear, Mitzen (2018: 1383) argues, stem from this mythic sense of Westphalian home as comfortable refuge in a threatening world. Offers of a strong and familiar nation state as a solution for the perceived uncertainly and chaos have resonated well with the public discourse in many EU member states, yet at the same time effectively watered down the credibility of the EU's own ideas of security community.

Given that the European project is grounded in the ambition to create unity not only among its states, but also its people, it become of great important to assume a more interdisciplinary reading of ontological security. While most agree that ontological security is a security of identity, in much of the IR scholarship the strong association of identity and belonging with the state has overlooked the significance of society in identity formation. As Chernobrov (2016: 582) suggest, "ontological security is not about state per se but about society and its need for a stable and continuous self-concept when faced with a crisis". The same inner motivations, he continues, lead societies to (mis)recognize the unexpected as anticipated and familiar, to

self-populate the other, spilling into supportive or devaluing narratives about major international crises – and it is this (mis)recognition that enables agents to (re)act as the event becomes explainable, recognizable, and more controllable (Ibid.: 596).

Reading societal reactions to uncertainty reveals how one is anxious to preserve a stable identity and transform uncertainty and discontinuity into a recognized routine, even if the latter contradicts rationality or escalates the crisis (Chernobrov 2016: 596). That is, for the sake the ontological security, rationality may be pushed aside and overridden in the search for continuity, even if this might compromise the values and norms otherwise held dear (Laine 2018b: 233). The failure to measure up to our own ideals surfaces in our psychosocial behaviour in the form of anxiety and insecurity. Questioning one's self-worth leads easily to a defencing action, which tends to get manifest in hostility towards others, glorifications of nationalist narratives and radicalization, and misrepresentations – if not smears – of migrants. As Chernobrov (2016: 596) asserts, a "drawing self" is constantly present behind its portraits of others. The more negative the qualities attributed to the "them" group are, the more positive "we" seem in comparison (Laine 2020), and these representations seldom seek accuracy. On the contrary, (Figlio 2012: 11) self-love "lives in a world of fantasy, which contact with reality can only contaminate".

Fantasy, Žižek (1997) explains, maintains and masks divisions within society, often by attributing to reviled others the causes of one's own, or a group's one assumes to belong to, lack of satisfaction, *jouissance*. By extracting coherence from confusion and reducing multiplicity to singularity, fantasy "enables individuals and groups to give themselves histories" (Scott 2001: 289). Even so, fantasy is not the *object* of desire, but its *setting*, Laplanche and Pontalis (1986: 26) stipulate and continue, in fantasy the subject "forms no representation of the desired object, but is himself represented as participating in the scene." This is to say that in contrast to the common understanding, fantasy is not antagonistic to social reality, but as Rose (1996: 3) asserts, "it is its precondition or psychic glue."

Whether the determinants of the group based "we-feeling" and the conventional, often inflexible, social-spatial imaginaries and demarcations that maintain it, are factual of fictional becomes secondary to their ability to influence socio-spatial behaviours and attitudes; that is, how we perceive different people and places, and how we perceive and interpret our own place and actions. As the question is ultimately about the fundamentals of one's being and the security of the self, these determinants cannot easily be challenged even if proven deceitful or wrong. Fear, in particular, stands out in this conjunction a factor that cannot be overlooked. While it has become recently harnessed to advance political goals and purposefully politicised by feeding xenophobic readings of the migration situation, fear is a psychological, not a political, phenomenon (Laine 2020). This is to say that it cannot simply be made go away with a political decision.

To get to the bottom of it, we must dig deeper into our hearts and minds. The old proverb, according to which "home is where the heart is", continues to hold true in underlining the importance of the emotional bond to a place and the safety it brings. In privileging the "factual" knowledge, we tend to disregard that it is often our emotional response, rather than any scientifically proven fact, that helps us deal with reality. Tangibly, new brain imaging research shows that imagining a threat lights up similar regions as actual experiencing it does (Reddan, Wager, and Schiller 2018). Emotions, Aizenberg and Geffen (2013) explain, are closely linked to perception. As the recent psychological discoveries about the human mind also indicate that facts indeed seldom change our minds, but there are limitations of reason (Gorman and Gorman 2016; Mercier and Sperber 2017; Sloman and Fernbach 2017). While the manipulability of public sentiment has become heightened during the current era of alternative facts, fake news post-truths, and other deceptive or misleading information, it can be seen to reflect long standing human behaviour pattern from the hunter-gatherer era: there was little advantage in reasoning clearly, while much was to be gained from winning arguments (Mercier and Sperber 2017).

We know, however, already from the classical study by Ross, Lepper and Hubbard (1975: 880) both self and social perceptions may persevere even after the initial basis for such perceptions has been totally refuted: "once formed," they found out, "impressions are remarkably perseverant and unresponsive to new input". Such the tendency to embrace information that supports one's beliefs, unwillingness to make appropriate revisions in one's beliefs and reject information that contradicts them, has come to be known widely as "confirmation bias". Such bias, Cunningham (2019: 9) explains, is especially common when security is considered. Much of this has to with resistance to change, which Kanter (2012) explicates, manifests itself in many ways, and lists loss of control as being the most common one. Change, she posits, can make people feel that they have lost control over their territory. It may also have less to do with a particular space *per se* and more with the deeply rooted attachment to it and the customary b/ordered identity that this territory is seen to confine and nourish. The question is thus not only political, but also psychological – as is the second factor on her list: excess uncertainty (ibid), which Chernobrov (2016: 596) avers, the human mind understands as self-doubt – the key determinant of ontological insecurity.

In this respect, it is also important to differentiate between fear and anxiety, for in order to alleviate them, we must first understand what they actually are and how they are formed. While both are triggered in response to threat, fear, generally considered as a reaction to something immediate and known that threatens one's security or safety, tends to be easier to respond to than anxiety, a more general state of distress, nervousness or dread, the source of which may be more complicated to pinpoint (see. e.g. Lang, Davis, and Öhman 2000). The fear of the unknown, that is, is actually anxiety. While the strategies to alleviate these emotions are different, both of

them, Öhman (2008) clarify, can transform into defence mechanisms and irrational behaviours that may obscure the recognition of reality. The idea of defence mechanisms, unconscious strategies whereby people protect themselves from anxiety, is rooted in Freud's (1923) theory of personality, which – at risk of oversimplification – posits that the mind has three duelling forces (id, ego, and super-ego). To mitigate the tension, emerging in the form of anxiety, between the unconscious and primitive urges of the id and the partly conscious drive toward moral and social values of the superego, the ego deploys strategies of self-deception to avoid the discomfort (Ibid). This may lead to deleterious thoughts or emotions being projected onto someone else, even without provocation, for the sake of own comfort and security.

Money well spent? The value of border security

"The land should be large enough to support a certain number of people living moderately and no more", Plato proclaimed in his last dialogue, the *Laws* (Book V, §737), and insisted that in addition to determining the appropriate total number of citizens, it was necessarily to also agree about the distribution of them. While Plato's endeavour to seek balance between the competing aspirations for monarchy and democracy, far preceded the now almost natural Westphalian confines, the underlying issue at hand has remained largely the same: how many, and in particular, who to let *in*? In pursuing the debate with the anonymous Athenian Stranger (representing ideal version of himself, perhaps), Plato eventually points to the unity of the virtues, the noble and the good, as the b/ordering criteria to applied and the necessary condition for the long-term success of the sought-after political project. In assuming a position of the other, the stranger within, Plato thus takes distance from his earlier works on more clear-cut political theory (the *Statesman* and the *Republic*) by involving extensive deliberations on ethics psychology, theology, epistemology, and metaphysics.

The current era or multiple and constant crises, with the various elements of uncertainty that they bring about, has underlined – perhaps more lucidly than ever before – the role of borders in the constitution of difference or bringing order amidst the perceived dangers of chaos. Far from mere markers of sovereignty, the approach taken on borders herein accentuates their constitutive role as a fundamental social need, thought by this decision I do not indented to depreciate the continued, even increasing, prominence of borders as something concreate and fixed. Indeed, our world – Europe being an excellent case in point – has become more fenced and walled than ever before. In addition to various other measures aimed at controlling and restricting movement, almost 1000 km of physical walls, Benedicto and Brunet (2018) detail, have been constructed along the EU and the Schengen borders since the nineties to prevent displaced people migrating into Europe. What is more, thirty-five years since the Schengen agreement dismantled most internal border checks

in the EU, and over three decades since the Berlin wall was torn down – the key moments in materialising the very European *idea* of integration and unity – new walls have been constructed not only along the external borders of the European space, but also within it. Whether physical, virtual, or mental for that matter, these walls and the mindset they on the one hand create, but on the other are also a symptom of, cast effective a shadow over the perhaps the greatest achievement of the European project: the freedom of movement.

Much has been written about Europe turning itself into a fortress excluding those outside and fostering the division between us and them (e.g. Carr 2012; Jünemann, Scherer and Fromm 2017; van Houtum and Bueno Lacy 2020). The extent to which boosted border security, then, actually makes people feel safer remains debatable. An increasing number of scholars have suggested that these heavy investments have actually backfired. Despite the stated goals to increase security against a supposed threat, but in the amplified securitization has pushed the migrants into more treacherous waters (Squire 2017; Benedicto and Brunet 2018; Cuttita and Last 2020; Laine 2020) and endangered also the life and rights of people inside Union. Stricter border controls do little to stop irregular migration, the answers must be sought elsewhere, yet they certainly make it more dangerous and, quite frankly, fatal (Figure 1). This is evidenced, in particular, in the statistics exposing that despite the number of arrivals having decreased drastically from its peak in 2015, the mortality rate, in turn, increased. Though already the official figures are disquieting to read, the figures provided by various human rights groups make the situation seem even more disheartening. For example, according to the "List of Deaths" collected by UNITED[2] in the period 1993–2019 at least 36,570 refugee deaths can be attributed to the "fatal policies of Fortress Europe", including border militarisation, asylum laws, detention policies and deportations – in addition to which "most probably thousands more are never found" (UNITED 2019). In all, more than forty thousand people died trying to cross international borders in the last decade, no less than half of which at the at borders of the EU (Jones 2016).

What has also increased is the investments in border security. While straightforward development curves are somewhat difficult due to different calculation methods and reshuffling of instruments and initiatives, it seems nevertheless safe to say the money spend of border security has grown progressively. The budget of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) has soared from an initial €6.2 million in 2005 to €333 million in 2019[3], and estimated to increase by another 34.6 percent

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2   UNITED for Intercultural Action is the European network against nationalism, racism, fascism, and in support of migrants and refugees consisting of more than 550 organisations from a wide variety of backgrounds, from 48 European countries, work together on a voluntary basis, see: http://unitedagainstrefugeedeaths.eu

3   Compiled from Frontex's annual budgets (https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/key-documents/?category=budget).

to €420.6m for 2020 (EUobserver 2019). In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany border walls have received significant sums of EU funding, particularly through the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion during the budgetary period of 2007-2013) and as much as €2.76 billion (2014-2020) through the Internal Security Fund (Akkerman 2019). The budget for the next EU's seven-year period, geared towards addressing the key challenges of today and tomorrow, and matching aspirations to action, boosts spending on border protection significantly. The increase includes, for example, €8.02 billion to the Integrated Border Management Fund, €11.27 billion to Frontex (Ibid.).

Figure 1. Development of the number of migrant arrivals and deaths.
Data source: International Organization for Migration (IOM). Illustration by the author.

Having acknowledged back in 2018 that "migration and border management will remain a challenge in the future", the Commission proposed to almost triple funding for migration and border management to €34.9 billion during the 2021–2027 EU budgetary period (European Commission 2018) that would be finance two funding instruments, the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) and the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF), as well as the activities of relevant EU decentralised agencies, such as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the European Asylum Support Office. This was to be granted in addition to a separate allocation or more than 24 billion for security and defence. The Juncker-Commission's 2018 proposal for the overall budget for the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) was however cut down, largely due to Brexit. In the more recent proposal by the Incumbent President of the European Council, Charles Michel, the share allocated for the migration and border management by almost one-third, which in

practice would have meant a proportional cut far greater than for any other budget item to this "already modest" (Koerner 2020) expenditure representing a minor share of the EU budget (D'Alfonso 2020). However, having received fierce criticism for his proposal from the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), calling it "scandalous" proposal that would make the EU "irrelevant" – particularly in light of the challenges in arriving to a common EU response to the migration situation at the Greek-Turkish border and current COVID-19 emergency (European Parliament 2020), the Council President Michel (2020) acknowledged his failure. Hence, the border budget is likely to be hauled back up again.

Mere numbers aside, it is noteworthy that the border security investments continued to rise even though the number of irregular migrant arrivals went down (Fig. 1), suggesting that the walling of borders has created a momentum – and business – of its own; that is, separate from the actual "problem" it is supposed to be addressing. While the current (2020) COVID-19 pandemic may explain some the most recent demands for the increased border expenditure, yet most of the related decisions were made prior to its actual outbreak. Moreover, even in the current circumstances, it remains unclear to what extent further investments in border security would actually help to alleviate the impact of the coronavirus – apart from enhancing the psychological conform borders tend to bring and reinforcing the perception that the threat is, as usual, foreign.

United we stand, divided we fall

While there is no denying that in the course of the recent events, borders have become to foster social orders and categories of a binary nature between the internal "us" and the external, foreign "them", that has oftentimes translated in practice into European and non-European, migratory pressures have also made the inside group increasingly divided and torn. It is the mounting polarization and internal estrangement, I argue, that is challenging the resilience of the European societies and the very future of EU as a coherent actor and unified space. We have witnessed the rise of strongly polarised narratives across the continent that is fed by various actors with competing ideological interests and rivalling claims on the truth. Efforts to agree on a common European policy on migration has gotten nowhere, as charismatic leaders with strong populist anti-migration platforms have swept to victory in recent elections, most notably in Italy, Hungary and Austria, and effectively manufactured a crisis to support their own agendas and domestic political objectives to the detriment of the core values that the European project has relied on. As the Hungarian case despairingly illustrates, granted that similar tendencies have emerges elsewhere as well, the siege mentality has reached levels whereby solidarity with migrants and refugees has become constitutionally criminalised.

Polls after one another have indicated that for many Europeans migration has become a key concern. According to the Standard Eurobarometer data[4], immigration, has topped the rankings with thirty-plus percent support since the inception of what became branded as the "refugee crisis" (Fig. 2). From 2015 to 2018, terrorism was ranked the second most severe cause for concern after immigration – and as can be deducted from the rife media reports, these two concepts became often associated with one another in the minds of many. In all but two EU member states (climate change was ranked number one ahead immigration in Sweden and Ireland), immigration was ranked as the number one concern for the EU, the highest proportions being in Malta (66%) and Cyprus (60%) and the lowest Romania (24%), Portugal, and the UK (both 26%). While being the key concern, for approximately a third of Europeans, facing the EU is not to be understated, the obvious – yet seldom, if ever, heard – interpretation of the poll figures would carry that for close to seventy percent, a majority of the people, immigration is not the concern they worry the most about. Be it as it may, almost seven in ten (68%) are in favour of a reinforcement of EU external borders with more European border guards and coast guards, support being the strongest in Cyprus and Greece (both 91%) and Bulgaria (85%), and lowest in the United Kingdom (55%) and Sweden (57%).

At the national level the concerns hit closer to home and become more personal, yet in all, the situation seems more balanced as several issues receive now receive more equal weight in the assessment than ever before (Fig. 3). In the autumn 2019 figures, even before the current COVID-19 pandemic, health and social security is perceived as the most important national issue, with the highest proportions in Finland (48%), Slovakia (45%) and Portugal (44%). Immigration ranks fourth drawing in importance with rising prices and the cost of living. The environment, climate and energy issues has moved up to second position, while unemployment ranks third following a long and steady decline of 28 points since the high of spring 2014. Terrorism is in last position, with five percent on an EU average (France being the outlier with 14%). Immigration is cited as the most concerning national issue only in Malta (61%), Greece (54%) and Belgium (25%). Mere rankings aside, immigration is considered as the main concern facing the national level by only 18 percent of the Europeans in contrast to the 34 percent, who saw immigration as broader European challenge.

When the views on immigration are taken under closed examination, it becomes evident that that the European public opinion largely continue to view the immigration from other EU Member States much more positively than that from outside the Union. A comparison with the earlier surveys reveals that the distinction between

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4   The Standard Eurobarometer surveys, conducted at the request of the European Commission, consist of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country. All the data in this part of the article derives from Standard Eurobarometer surveys 91 (Spring 2019) and 92 (Autumn 2019), unless specified otherwise.

the two has only increased: the views on the intra-EU migration have become increasingly positive, while the views on immigration from elsewhere have become more negative. The most negative impressions of the immigration from outside the EU can be found in Czechia (82%) and Latvia and Estonia (both 74%). Non-EU migration is perceived positively only eight countries: Ireland (72%), Spain (64%), Luxembourg (63%), Sweden (61%), the UK (57%), Portugal (56%), Croatia (49%) and Romania (45%).

Figure 2. Immigration has become EU citizens' main concern facing the EU over the last years, %. Data source: Standard Eurobarometer 92 (Autumn 2019)


Figure 3: Concerns at the national level, %. Seven most mentioned items. Data source: Standard Eurobarometer 92 (Autumn 2019).

Positive impressions of immigration from other EU Member States predominate in all socio-demographic categories of the population, yet are most prevalent among the younger age groups and middle or higher social categories. Immigration from outside the EU creates, however, more pronounced divisions among Europeans (Fig. 4). That is, while there are differences between the member states, those exist also within the states. Non-EU immigration is seen in the most positive light by students and young people in general, but also by people in managerial positions, but generates the most negative response among the elderly, low educated, unemployed and those who considered themselves to represent working class. In shorth, negative views of the immigration from outside the EU increase in line with respondents' age and decrease in line with their level of education. This supports the notion that the fundamental premise of the widespread anti-migrant narrative stemming from the alleged struggle for the securing of Europe's welfare state. A majority (82%) of Europeans want more to be done to combat the irregular immigration from countries outside the EU. Most of them are of the opinion that these measures should be taken rather at EU level than at the national level. At the same time, there is very broad support throughout the EU for the principle of the free movement of EU citizens.

Figure 4. Negative view on immigration, %.
Data source: Standard Eurobarometer 91 – Wave EB91.5 – Kantar (Spring 2019)

At the same time, the positive image of the EU had lost some ground by the autumn of 2019, standing at 42% (down 3 percentage points from spring 2019), yet remains nevertheless still higher than ever in the last decade. While the figures have gone up, they also indicate that 58 %, close to 300 million Europeans, do not view EU overly positively. Similarly, the level trust in the EU, which was at its all-time low before the "refugee crisis" has actually improved since then (from 31% to 44%). The highest proportions of respondents trusting the EU are observed in Lithuania (72%) and

Denmark (68%), whereas the lowest in the autumn of 2019 were in the United Kingdom (29%), Greece (32%), France (33%). The level of trust is EU is higher than the trust in national governments, and its increase can be taken to indicate that the harsh actions taken by the EU in trying to manage the situation have gained support amongst the citizenry. More than six in ten Europeans are optimistic about the future of the EU. The most optimist perspective is hold by the Irish (85%), Danish (79%) and Lithuanians (76%), while the optimism were (in 2019) less pronounced, unsurprisingly, among the British (47%) followed by the French (50%).

Figure 5. Views on the EU, %.
Data source: Standard Eurobarometer 91 – Wave EB91.5 – Kantar (Spring 2019).

While the average trends are interesting in themselves, they also obscure more than they illuminate in not showing the spread of results and the unevenness of their distribution. A closer assessment of the socio-demographic categories, supported by a general observation made on the ongoing public and political debate, seems to suggest that Europe is more divided than what a cursory statistical overview would suggest. There are differences in perspectives between different EU member states, yet there are also major differences of opinion within the member states. A conclusion that a half of the population does not trust the EU and the other half does is far more accurate than claiming the average trust levels are getting closer to fifty percent.

Conclusion: A broken home, a broken heart

Migration has become an issue that is sharply dividing the European and national political arenas of today. This article has claimed that rather than the immigrants as such, it is these divisions over migration that has put the unity and, hence, the resilience of the EU and the European societies to the test. These division are real, but they are not only dividing Europe into various national agendas, as it is often depicted, but the "nations" – to the extent they actually even exist – have also be-

come increasingly torn. At either end of the spectrum, the reactions to immigration have become, first the foremost, emotional. While emotions should by no means be dismissed as unmeaningful, misinterpretation can occur if the wisdom of emotions become creates momentum of its own, contradicting, rather than complementing reason. As thinkers from Aristotle and Nietzsche to C.S. Lewis all argued, feelings must be intertwined with reason in order to achieve the good life.

The gruesome fact that the external border of the EU has become the most lethal border in the entire world is telling in terms a of variety of factors. It should, for one, urge us to rethink the value of the *border* security as such, as opposed to making *people* feel safer. Yet the mere silent toleration of the "troubling situation whereby death becomes a norm through which migration is governed" (Squire 2017: 514) suggest a deviation from the conventional collective values, ideas and ethical concerns that Europe has stood for and which has hold its various parts together. While it seems that indeed "one may smile, and smile, and be a villain"[5], but the attempts to manage migration by setting aside one's core values, to follow Machiavelli's writing, one is paving a road to one's own downfall with considerable social and political repercussions.

The accentuation of perceived difference between states, cultures, and people, becomes a major security risk, which increases within contexts of socio-economic stress and geopolitical instability. The feeling of being ontologically insecure has led to defencing actions that have manifested themselves in antagonism towards others, in so doing fuelling the misrepresentations of immigration. At the times of a crisis, in particular, the extent of association and the interests to be cared for tends to shrink. As the crises deepens, the definition of "us" tightens. The national, in some cases regional interest, tends to be put before the broader European ones, to the extent that they differ, and under increased pressure, most people seek to seize the interest of their own family – if not of themselves personally – first. As these closer-to-personal interests are improperly mingled with the interests of the state and do not necessary align with one another, the common interest – the voice of the people, which would serve as the basis of the unity of the state – tends to get increasingly polyphonic.

The anxieties stemming from the rupture of the invisible social glue and the resultant rebordering of self, it is argued, cause the feeling of ontological insecurity, which in turn triggers antagonistic perceptions of difference and anti-immigrant attitudes. Instead of accuracy, to follow Chernobrov (2016: 596), a self becomes motivated by anxiety avoidance. From this perspective, the securitisation of the immigration agenda can be seen to be facilitated by a profound fear felt of the loss of the own b/ordered identity and the meaning of home as a result of intermixing with others. Feeling at home is thus discriminating and differentiating phenomenon:

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5   As stated by Hamlet, in William Shakespeare's play "Hamlet", Act I, scene V, 105–109.

"it necessarily divides those with whom we feel at home from the rest. If home is everywhere and we feel at home with everyone, 'home' tends to lose its meaning" (Duyvendak 2011: 106). By combining these various perspectives together and reflecting them upon the empirical evidence, the situation becomes, however, to resemble more of feeling homesick even if you are already home. It's a lingering feeling of acute isolation and being sorely disconnected from a self or a time that no longer exist. It is a painful feeling of losing touch with reality, however utopian that may be, whereby our actions become guided by our imagination. Ideas of nations as "gated communities" or the EU as "fortress" are fantasies in which there is no place for inconvenient facts.

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Connecting Voices, Challenging Perspectives and Catalysing Change: Using storytelling as a tool for co-creation in public services across Europe

Hayley Trowbridge and Michael Willoughby

Introduction

Co-creation, or citizen participation as it is more commonly known in some contexts, is becoming increasingly prevalent across Europe. It is the result of a movement that is partly bottom-up, with some of its history bound up in the participatory healthcare movement "nothing about me without me", which began some 20 years ago, and the push from the European Union to get public administrations to engage with citizens in a real way, thereby democratising the process of service design and implementation. This article looks at a particular method for involving citizens and allowing their voices to be heard with a unique usage of digital storytelling and data curation processes. It begins with a look at current trends in literature on storytelling and its role within the field of research. It then goes on to describe how storytelling has been used via Community Reporting methods as an important evaluation tool in the Horizon 2020 project CoSIE, which entails 9 pilot schemes in as many European countries, all of which employ co-creation practices as a basis for design and production. The work ends with conclusions on the most important lessons learned on the use of digital storytelling as a highly useful tool for the needs and assessment and evaluation stages of co-created public services.

With its origins clearly in the field of marketing with the servitization phenomenon (Vandermede and Rada, 1988) and the arrival of Service-Dominant Logic (Vargo and Lusch, 2006), where the emphasis is laid not so much on the inherent value of resources but in the value-in-use created at the nexus of interaction with the user, co-creation has been adopted in different fields and particularly by public service organisations (PSOs). A new age has been heralded by authors such as Osborne (2018) or Alford (2016), where the citizen is an integral part of the creation of public services. This stream of literature has helped to form current popular trends in co-creation practices, such as those currently advocated by the EU. Much of this literature, though, is theory-based, so the question must be addressed of exactly how we enable citizens to participate in design, production and even evaluation processes.

Digital storytelling has been used in many and varied ways to enable participants to share their perspectives and experiences. Pera et al. (2016) look at digital storytelling (DS) within a marketing context and discuss its benefits in terms of creating a consumer relationship experience that shapes a whole community of consumers in their study of the Airbnb phenomenon. The notion that communities of consumers or, in the case of PSOs, service beneficiaries can shape and affect the services they receive is a knock-on effect of the digital age and the availability of technology to a large proportion of the population. Lambert and Hessler (2018) talk of DS enabling a "strong emotional coding" at the moment of telling a story. Such feeling or passion, whose transmission is based upon our relationships to one another as human beings, is hard to encapsulate in typical means of information gathering, such as structured questionnaires that use sets of pre-designed parameters that do not allow the bigger picture to be seen with regard to the effects of public service design on the lives of people who access those services.

Within the context of the research arena, the methods inherent to DS are still in their infancy with regard to recognition as a valid instrument for data gathering and analysis, possibly due to a lack of established structure in analysing data; a question that has been successfully addressed by the organisation studied in the sections below. Stories of lived experience can provide a window into people worlds. Johnson and Hendrick (2017) use DS to garner information from groups of adolescent refugees about their lived experience, where using DS enables them to gain insights from a group whose voice is rarely heard, often because of their reticence in giving information in formal settings. Greene et al. (2018) also look at the use of DS as a means of civic engagement to gather sentiments from racially and ethnically diverse groups of youths in terms of urban and rural development. Despite its relative lack of recognition, DS has been applied more frequently in the healthcare sector as a means of improving awareness of the issues surrounding access to proper healthcare among ethnic minorities (Briant et al., 2017) or other contexts, such as Lenette (2015) who declares the advantages of storytelling for patients in terms of shaping the actual content of research in ways that benefit them and enable a sense of agency. Other benefits cited by authors such as de Jager et al. (2017) include relationship building, reflective benefits and the impact on the wider community. These authors also cite the fact that its use is still scarce, while recent trends indicate that a growing acceptance of the benefits of stories of lived experience. This is where organisations such as People's Voice Media and their method of Community Reporting is proving a vital tool in capturing the results of citizens' efforts to become more involved in the processes of design, implementation and evaluation of the public services they are able to access.

Experiential knowledge in the co-creation of public services

As part of a Horizon 2020 funded project, CoSIE (Co-creation of Service Innovation in Europe) involved 9 municipalities across Europe[1] who have been using co-creation as a tool to design, implement and evaluate pilot services across sectors as diverse as probation, employment, disability, health and rural economies. The project employed applied research methods to establish whether public sector innovations can be achieved by creating collaborative partnerships between service providers and service beneficiaries. Within this project, a specific approach to digital storytelling – Community Reporting – has been applied as a tool to support the co-creation activities in the pilots. Community Reporting is a peer-to-peer digital storytelling methodology that focuses on lived experience. Central to Community Reporting is the belief that people telling authentic stories about how they experience the world offers a valuable understanding of their lives, and that this insight can help to drive forward social change.

This article focuses on how Community Reporting has been applied in the 9 CoSIE pilots and what we have learned from its application. To ascertain these findings, we adopted a mixed methodological approach focusing on qualitative reflection. This has involved:

One-to-one dialogue interviews with the lead public sector workers involved in each of the pilots[2].

- Group SWOT analyses in which the pilot teams determined the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in how they have applied Community Reporting within their pilot.

- Facilitator reflective practice and debriefs with pilot teams to collate observations of first-hand experience of working with lived experience and Community Reporting as part of co-creation activities.

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1   The 9 pilots took place in the following locations and sectors: Probation Services (Hull, UK), Disability Services (Jönköping, Sweden), Health Services (Reggio Emelia, Italy), Employment Services (Valencia, Spain), Rural Community Development (Vorumaa, Estonia), Rural Community Development (Various locations, Hungary), Youth Services (Turku, Finland), Co-Housing Development (Wroclaw, Poland) and Employment Services and Community Development (Utrecht, The Netherlands).

2   This interview approach takes the form of a conversation with no designated set of questions, just a broad topic to discuss (i.e. the use of Community Reporting in the pilot). This enables the 'interviewee' to be able to set the specific agenda of the conversation and explore the issues and sub-topics that they feel are relevant. The 'interviewer' is the facilitator of the conversations and adopts an active listening practice and asks questions based on what the 'interviewee' is saying rather than a pre-determined list.

Originating in 2007, Community Reporting has been developed across Europe as a mixed methodological approach for enhancing citizen participation in research, policy-making, service development, and decision-making processes. In line with work such as Glasby (2011) and Durose et al (2013), Community Reporting purports the validity of lived experience and knowledge-based practice in these fields. It uses digital, portable technologies to support people to tell their own stories, in their own ways, via peer-to-peer approaches. It then connects these stories with the people, groups and organisations who are in a position to use the insights within them to make positive social change. When used in this way, storytelling, as Durose et al (2013) argues, allows for the representation of "different voices and experiences in an accessible way".

For over a decade, the Community Reporter movement has been developing ways of using experiential knowledge in co-creation settings, such as co-producing research findings, service and organisational development, and community building. The methodology is particularly useful when addressing 'wicked' problems due to its ability to examine and work with different perspectives on the same issue. The Community Reporting approach has three distinct components – story gathering (capturing different lived experiences), story curation (analysing those experiences) and story mobilisation (i.e. catalysing change based on those experiences). This way of working is broadly based on the Cynefin decision-making framework for complex environments (Snowden and Boone, 2007), as depicted in Figure 1 This approach allows for learning to emerge during the process and provides a space in which ideas can evolve. This fluidity makes it an apt tool for co-creation, hence its application in the CoSIE project.

Figure 1: Community Reporting change-making cycle

Application of Community Reporting in the CoSIE project

The Community Reporting methodology has been applied in the CoSIE project as a tool for co-creation, supporting public services across Europe to work with lived experience and storytelling as part of the design, implementation and evaluation of their pilots. As a tool for co-creation, Community Reporting has been utilised in the following three ways in the project:

- A tool for insight: Community Reporting is an insight tool that broadly fits into the realms of participatory and empowerment research fields. It engages people accessing services and wider stakeholders to be a part of an insight-gathering and identifying process by sharing their stories and co-curating them into concrete findings.

- A tool for dialogue: Community Reporting aids dialogue by providing people with the tools to use storytelling to engage in conversations with their peers and other people beyond their peer groups in the co-creation process. Using the stories as part of Conversation of Change events to stimulate dialogue between different stakeholders about a topic, issue, service etc., and Community Reporter stories can be used as communication aids to talk to decision-makers.

- A tool for reflection: Community Reporting supports people to reflect on their experiences and the experiences of others. This pro-active, critical reflection provides people with the space and time to more deeply understand how they and others experience the world, and thus support people to identify how public (and other) services can better support their needs.

Figure 2: Community Reporting as a tool for co-creation

While these three types of applications are distinct, there are overlaps between them and they can be combined and applied jointly. Additionally, a number of 'sub-level' applications are situated within them. This fluid relationship is represented in the Venn diagram illustrated in Figure 2 above.

Application as a tool for insight

In the UK, a pilot service was launched that sought to enhance personalisation in probation services. As part of the pilot, staff and peer mentor volunteers were trained as Community Reporters and used these skills to gather lived experiences of people working in probation and others who had been on probation. These stories and the insights from them provided the pilot with a layered understanding of the current service from different perspectives. It was felt that a key strength of this approach was in its ability to support of a wider cultural change within the service by supporting a better understanding between the perspectives of staff and the people accessing the service. Essentially, the tool provided the pilot with a mechanism through which they could "*hear people's views directly*" and not second-hand through panels and other forums. However, despite this, there were some initial, quite strong, reservations about using Community Reporting within the service. The two main reasons cited were (a) people felt that existing tools for gathering input from people who were on or have experienced probation services such as feedback forms or forums were more than adequate, and (b) there were genuine concerns over the use of digital media, the Internet, and technology in the service. As one of the research team involved in the pilot reflects:

> "*Community Reporting was [initially] not well understood - it is very different than social media but people in the staff thought that it was a way of using service user voice for entertainment in a shallow way. We think that, that understanding was based on a very deep-rooted fear in social media in the service of its service user being shamed and stigmatised.*"

With probation services being fundamentally about risk management, it is unsurprising that these initial reservations were risk averse, or at least sceptical about change or innovation in the field. However, through listening to these concerns and working ways around them (i.e. only using audio on the stories so people are less identifiable, identifying the limitations of existing 'voice' and feedback methods and how Community Reporting can be utilised within these gaps), this initial 'push back' was overcome and resulted in an overall positive engagement of the tool within the pilot.

This fear of technology and risk of sharing, was also seen in the Estonian pilot. Culturally, it was felt that Estonian people do not like to share feelings on social media and they saw Community Reporting in the same light. Due to this, and other culturally sensitive issues such as data protection and general privacy it is important

to understand that not every citizen will want to participate in Community Reporting. Furthermore, Estonians can be quite reserved. As a Community Reporter and resident of Vorumaa states:

> *"At first, I came in not really knowing what I was getting involved in… it's really hard to break the ice - Estonians are masters as being introverted and closing themselves off as much as they can."*

Therefore, one of the main barriers to applying Community Reporting in Estonia on inclusive social hackathons was that the method is something that is culturally new and innovative. Despite such cultural contextual issues, the methodology was eventually received well. As one Community Reporter states, "*one thing I was amazed at is that we did such simple things that got people opening up*". Therefore, the key learning from this pilot is that it is important to know how to build trust when approaching people for their story and avoiding the use of jargon so people feel more comfortable with the method and can relate it to their worlds.

In Community Reporting's application in the Finnish, it was felt that its key strengths lay in its ability to directly connect with a marginalised demographic and gain understanding of their worlds. The key focus of the Finnish pilot was to produce service interventions for young people who are currently not accessing formalised support. To engage these young people in the pilot, they used Community Reporting as a tool in terms of a peer-to-peer methodology where students (i.e. young people) were trained as Community Reporters. They then utilised these skills to capture the stories of other young people who were in more marginalised situations – i.e. migrants, homeless young people, young people with addiction issues, young people not in employment, education or training, and young people who were socially excluded. This resulted in lived experience stories being gathered from young people who were largely outside the domain of and lacking connection with existing support services. They connected with the young people via their own networks (i.e. people they knew, or 'friends of friends') and by going out onto the streets and directly engaging with one-to-one conversations at sites where they knew (from their own experience) that young people congregated. As the pilot reflects themselves, this approach would not have been as successful if professionals had been the Community Reporters as there would have instantly been a barrier (or at least a hierarchy) between the young person telling their story and the Community Reporter collating it. The municipality felt that results of the stories gathered and the curation of them was that they gained a better understanding of the needs of young people whom they perceived as 'hard to reach'. IN the words of pilot participants, the stories essentially meant that "*the real voice of the young people [can be] on the table*" and this was used to inform future service development conversations and actions.

Application as a tool for dialogue

Using the stories as stimuli for dialogue was also applied in the Dutch pilot that was looking at reducing unemployment in the municipality of Houten. The pilot found the storytelling approach garnered insights into the underlying problems (i.e. root causes) that jobseekers and employers were encountering and this opened up a conversation about issues that they had not been exploring, or considering at first. In essence, the stories gathered dug beneath the surface and the pilot was able to hear the whole story from a person's own perspective, not just their perceptions on preset topics. As the lead staff member of the Houten site stated:

> *It's not rocket science. It's a basic thing that as a civil servant we tend to have an agenda - a well-meaning agenda but an agenda nonetheless. [Community Reporting] took us away from our agenda and allowed people to make their own.*

This created a dialogue between the citizens and service providers, and had a huge impact on the pilot as it took them away from their presupposed agenda and lead them to "*something much more profound [...] you need to make sure that basic needs are addressed*" as well as sorting out more basic issues such as job application processes. Furthermore, the stories were used at a 'Conversation of Change' event in which different stakeholders (i.e. citizens, employers, services etc.) discussed the stories and their key insights and used them to determine the interventions concerning unemployment that the pilot would deliver.

Community Reporting can sometimes challenge the status quo. For example, at the Houten site, whilst the municipality and other stakeholders are curious about the approach and are willing to learn and test out more and share this knowledge with others, it was still felt that Community Reporting is quite challenging to bureaucratic thinking. This issue is hard to combat and people can see the approach as a threat, as it challenges existing power relations, and supports the creation of more equitable environments within an institutionalised system that is largely top-down in nature. Furthermore, municipalities have questions about whether the method is representative and, if not, where its value lies, as well other issues surrounding justification of the cost-benefit ratio. Questions such as these are common, as long-held values, such as representative sampling and traditional economic thinking, are brought into question by the method. The Houten site found that producing an infographic to explain the approach and why they were using it in the scheme of the pilot was an effective way of overcoming some of these apprehensions. The systematic analysis of the stories gathered was also a feature of the method that can reassure its critics.

Application as a tool for reflection

In Community Reporting's application in the Spanish pilot, it was felt that its key strengths lay in it being able to provide richer and more intricate data than other tools. This pilot was working with people at a distance from the labour market to support them to develop businesses and become self-employed/entrepreneurs. In terms of evaluation, it was felt that the dialogue interview methodology adopted by Community Reporters enabled the pilot to gain insights that were not visible in their more quantitative methods that were capturing baseline data on numbers of people accessing the service, firms created etc. As a member of the pilot team explains, Community Reporting provided an opportunity for the entrepreneurs to reflect on their experiences in a concrete way. This helped the pilot to garner otherwise unattainable qualitative information and gauge the intangible effects of the pilot on the beneficiaries, such as the pilot's positive impact on their wellbeing. For example, when telling his story an entrepreneur became emotional and that was because "*he was looking at the inside of himself… introspectively… so suddenly he realised that his life had changed through the past few months*". This level of self-awareness was achieved via only a few minutes of storytelling. Such findings have provided integral material for the pilot's policy roundtable and summative knowledge exchange events, and have created a knowledge bank for future related schemes.

Strengths and weaknesses in the application of Community Reporting as a tool for co-creation

Through the application of Community Reporting in these three ways within the pilots, a set of key learnings have emerged. Table 1 synthesises these key learnings using a SWOT structure and provides some key summative conclusions. (see next page)

Conclusions and Future directions: Using storytelling as a change-making tool

Through the use of Community Reporting's in these pilots, a number impacts have been identified on different levels. These include individual effects (ideologies and behaviours) e.g. a person could change their perception of a topic; a professional could change their practice. Organisational effects (delivery and spaces): e.g. an organisation may change the ways it does things; a service or space could be re-designed, re-purposed or co-created from scratch and systemic effects (society and culture): e.g. a policies could change or be introduced; practice could change across a whole sector and social norms may change.

Table 1: Key learnings from the different applications of Community Reporting in the pilots

Application	Key Strengths and/or Opportunities	Key Weaknesses and/or Threats
A tool for insight	• Community Reporting provides an alternative tool for gathering insights that provides more depth than basic quantitative measurement tools and some other qualitative approaches. This can result in **richer qualitative findings** emerging that support the understanding of 'wicked' and 'complex' problems. It also **functions as a way of conducting needs analysis** using an alternative methodology. • Applying Community Reporting as a tool for insight can **increase reach, engagement and inclusion of marginalised demographics** in a way that other research processes do not. This is particularly apparent when applied in a **peer-to-peer** manner, or in environments where existing relationships of trust exist. • As an insight tool, it has the potential to **address power imbalances between citizens and public services.** It provides citizens with the opportunity to use their voice to set the agenda rather than participate in a pre-existing agenda. • Community Reporting's methodological approach to story curation **provides a way of working with the knowledge of lived experience that enables individual insights to be used to produce key findings** in a robust and systematic manner.	• Applying Community Reporting as a tool for insight takes **more time and resourcing** than other, simpler consultation tools (i.e. surveys). • **Hierarchical differences** between Community Reporters and storytellers can limit the quality of the stories gathered and reduce accessibility. • As a tool, it is relatively innovative and unconventional in its approach. Therefore, **it is not usually immediately recognised as a rigorous form of gathering and analysing data.** Experiential knowledge, in some spheres (such as decision-making arenas) is not given as much weighting as other more traditional knowledge bases (i.e. cost-benefit analysis). • In some instances, the **technology aspect of the method can be a barrier** to engagement – i.e. people's fear of digital/social media/the Internet, lack of digital skills etc.

Application	Key Strengths and/or Opportunities	Key Weaknesses and/or Threats
A tool for dialogue	• Through using varied experiential knowledge as a starting point for ideas generation, it **supports people to think 'outside the box' or from different perspectives** when tackling issues and making suggestions about how they can be overcome. • In bringing different stakeholders with different types of experiences together to actively listen to one another, the methodology provides an **effective way to exchange knowledge between people, groups, and organisations** who would not usually occupy the same space. • The method's focus on equity and empathy through engagement with lived experience stories **provides opportunities for people with opposing or differing perspectives and experiences to engage in a non-hierarchical dialogue.** This helps unheard (or overlooked) voices to enter into the discussion in meaningful ways.	• The varied and complex perspectives that surface when applying Community Reporting as a dialogue tool **can make it difficult to gain a collective consensus and/or could generate too many ideas** for a co-creation project. • It can be **hard to apply the tool in this way for participants with severe cognitive disabilities** as they face additional and complex barriers to engaging in an equitable dialogue.
A tool for reflection	• The methodology **supports introspection in a quick, accessible, and effective manner.** This can aid co-evaluation activities and also self-development of individuals through recognising their own journeys and distance travelled in projects. • The approach can be used to gather reflections at different stages in a co-creation process life cycle. This can **help learning and development on an on-going basis** not just in a summative fashion. • The approach **supports active and deep listening** – both for professionals working in services and the people who access them.	• Citizens who are trained as **Community Reporters do so voluntarily** and therefore they are not 'contractually' obliged to gather stories on an on-going basis throughout a co-creation project lifespan. To do this, they generally need support and encouragement from the public service or associated organisation.

The area where Community Reporting has had the most impact is in the behaviours and ideologies held by individuals and in the delivery and spaces of services delivered by organisations. Whilst there have been some indicators of wider impact (e.g. the learning community being built in the Hungarian pilot and the training of members of the Local Activity Centre network in Community Reporting techniques in Poland), it is unsurprising that systemic impact is an area where little change has occurred. This is because this type of change and impact often takes longer to come to fruition and is usually influenced by interconnected, networked and incremental changes at individual and organisational levels. Furthermore, in the CoSIE project, Community Reporting has not necessarily been aimed at influencing the policy arena – which is a contributor to systemic change – and instead has been applied as a co-creation tool, which lends itself to the individual and organisation impact fields.

The project's focus on using Community Reporting for insight into the experiences of citizens accessing public services, also means that, whilst the involvement of stakeholders other than direct beneficiaries has occurred, it has been more marginal. Where other stakeholders have been involved, they have mostly been frontline professionals and middle management, rather than strategic management and higher echelon policy-makers. When thinking about the methodology's application in a macro, meso and micro framework, Community Reporting focused on individuals operating in the micro field (i.e. people accessing services and frontline workers). Involving other groups (i.e. senior management, strategic leaders, policy makers) who tend to operate in the meso and macro arenas earlier and more prominently in Community Reporting activities could help achieve more systemic impact.

Due to the innovative nature of Community Reporting and the fact that it often challenges the status quo (as identified by the municipalities involved in CoSIE), it is sometimes at odds with top-layer decision-makers and the processes they use. Community Reporting's 'bottom-up' methodology is in stark opposition to 'top-down' operations of conventional decision-making environments and policy-making procedures. It also provides different types of data (e.g. experiential knowledge) and understanding (e.g. empathy and non-silo thinking) than institutions are used to working with. It takes time for innovations like this to become less marginalised and more accepted in the mainstream. Essentially, Community Reporting seeks to re-humanise such processes and the services that they govern. This in itself is a paradigmatic shift in terms of how societal and governmental institutions operate, and cannot happen overnight. In short, the move to more relationally-driven rather than process-driven public services, beyond specific pilots and into national and pan-European standards, is part of a longer journey than the CoSIE project.

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Social Cohesion in EU Peripheries: Negotiating Opportunities in German & Finnish Peripheries

Alicja Fajfer, Hannah Heyenn and Martin Barthel

Introduction

European countries differ in their economic, cultural and social composition. Not only do the distinct strengths and weaknesses of each country contribute to the motley crew that is the European Union, but each country carries within itself a variety of strong centers, 'pioneer regions' as well as structurally weak peripheries. All in all, structural change favours metropolitan economies and spaces that are more or less directly linked to them. Differences between pioneer regions and those lagging behind have in fact accelerated, increasing by 56% between 1995 and 2014 (Bachtler et al. 2019). Moreover, there are demographic issues involved - demographic shifts reinforce the metropolisation of Europe's economy and accentuate ageing of smaller and rural centres. The challenges posed by these national - on top of the cross-national disparities - threaten Social Cohesion in the European Union.

In this paper we discuss, how life worlds in peripheries can inform Cohesion Policy. To that end we trace the effects of crumbling social cohesion in the lives of six ideal type personas- three from Finnish Lieksa - the EU's external border, and three from Vorpommern-Greifswald by the internal EU border. The personas are based on narratives extracted from interviews and focus groups conducted in the summer and autumn of 2020. We first explicate the supporting pillars of social cohesion and their expression in peripheries before exploring the narratives and trajectories of citizens in the affected region for impacts made by reduced capacity of these supporting pillars. To go into depth rather than only touch upon the five realms of social cohesion this analysis is focussed on *social networks and social capital* as well as *place attachment and identity.*

Theoretical Framework

Social Cohesion and European Peripheries

Social Cohesion is conceptualised as a multidimensional construct consisting of phenomena on the micro (e.g. individual attitudes and orientations), meso (features

of communities and groups), and macro (features of societal institutions) levels (Schiefer & van der Noll 2017**)**. On the meso level, a set of shared values and a shared sense of purpose (including a sense of belonging and solidarity for people from diverse backgrounds) are often seen as the major components that hold a society together, creating social cohesion. Here we can see a large overlap with solidarity, especially when it is summed up as the "unity (as of a group or class) that produces or is based on community of interests, objectives, and standards" (Merriam-Webster 2020) in non-academic dictionaries. Behind these generalisations the types of solidarity developed in sociology over the last centuries are hidden: The distinction between "mechanical solidarity" that creates cohesion between similar groups and "organic solidarity" encompassing differences (Durkheim 1893) is vital to our argument. As Tönnies (1887) pointed out the modern form of solidarity is association (*Gesellschaft*), which is largely equivalent to organic solidarity and creates cohesion via institutionalised differentiation of democratic societies. Renewals of the concept of solidarity have grown to include negotiation processes of solidarity in the face of "conflicting values and perceptions of reality" as well as "recognition and a fair distribution of chances for recognition" (Juul 2010).

Social cohesion, though related to solidarity, goes beyond it by encompassing "Common values and a civic culture, Social order and social control, Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities, Social networks and social capital as well as Place attachment and identity" (Forrest & Kearns 2001). Schiefer and van der Noll (2017) argue that only three elements are prerequisites of social cohesion, namely "social relations, identification with the geographical unit, and orientation towards the common good", while "shared values, inequality, quality of life" are rather products of functioning or lacking social cohesion. Considering quality of life as a result of functioning social cohesion, it is thus not surprising that indicators of social cohesion have also been linked to (self-perceived) happiness (Delhey & Dragolov 2016).

For the area of social relations, Putnam (1995) has pioneered the vital role of social network capital for social cohesion. Especially in populations subjected to population loss and migrant influx the resources required to maintain or create networks and communities are scarce. While some, including Putnam (2007) have suggested ethnic diversity to cause the crumbling of social cohesion others have found that actually social deprivation - as witnessed in peripheries as well – to be the culprit dissolving the glue that holds society together (Letki 2008; Laurence and Heath 2008; Laurence 2009). In urban contexts it has been argued that open debate and contestation of the status quo can [re]-create social cohesion despite social and cultural identity disparities (Forrest & Kearns 2001; Amin 2002). Such interactive exchanges are intrinsic to participation, which has been defined as "a process through which separate parties demonstrate to each other their ongoing understanding of the events they are engaged in by building actions that contribute to the further progression of these very same events" (Goodwin 2007: 24-25). Lahusen (2013) has,

however, stated that political participation is most prominent in centers and among middle- and upper-class citizens as these maintain more "chances to socialize and mobilize for common causes".

Especially for rural peripheries "structural disadvantages are seen as intertwined with their geographical location, an imbalanced economic structure, low population density and consumer demand, out-migration and ageing, but also with political and, not least, financial dependency on decisions in the urban centres of power." (Steinführer, Reichert-Schick, Mose & Grabski-Kieron 2016).

Structural and social changes in rural peripheries (id.) as well as deprivation in urban peripheries (Cassiers & Kesteloot 2012) can, thus weaken prerequisites of social cohesion (Social networks and social capital, identification with the region, and common aims). In this context, low quality of social service provision in welfare states as well as economic difficulties of households have been linked to the level of social cohesion within a country (Rhys & Jilke 2016). An effect we propose to be transferable to regional deprivation of public services and weakened state of economy in peripheries.

These findings build the foundation for policies aiming at the reawakening of participation by focussing on social and socio-cultural issues rather than structural inequalities. The debate regarding Cohesion Policy takes place against the backdrop of polarizing conflicts within many European societies. As far as cohesion in the European level is concerned, the debate reflects a profound crisis of European identity and challenges to democratic values in general, not to mention the economic integrity of the Union. As part of the aftermath of the financial crisis, the refugee crisis, etc., the EU's legitimacy crisis has been clearly linked to popular perceptions of inequality and a failure to promote solidarity (European Commission 2016–Eurobarometer).

The meaning of the periphery

As shown above, social cohesion and collective identity are intertwined, and this link is also manifested in the attachment to the place of residence. Holtung (2016) observes that social cohesion derives from social identity if the social identity of a given group promotes trust among its members. Holtung (id.) adds that, alone, the fact of sharing the identity is not sufficient to produce trust – the specific components that make up identities are also important. Since sharing an identity is not a key factor, it must also be noted that diversity does not preclude cohesion if values that make up identities are not in conflict.

Identity is a sensitive topic. Despite its unifying properties, it may also be used to spark heated debates or divide. In simple terms, cultural identity may be theorized in the following ways. A modern identity is traditionally framed as a primordial set

of fixed features establishing and exploiting a link between historic and present-day communities. This framework underlies the idea of the nation state, where history and categorization are building blocks of nations and their identity. In postmodernism, the focus is on flexibility and power dynamics. Hall (1996: 3) proposes a framework where "this [postmodern] concept of identity does not signal that stable core of the self, unfolding [...] without change [...]", whereas the cultural 'belongingness' does not exist on its own but has to be created". This idea is reflected in the concept of banal nationalism, where national identity must be continuously re-established through imperceptible quotidian symbols that are unchallenged and 'always there' (Billig 1995). However, in peripheral communities, where the need to re-size and economize shape local policies, some of these everyday symbols are at risk of disappearing.

Although the concept of unchanging identity is contested in postmodern frameworks, the idea that there is nothing fixed in identities is also problematic. The concept of ontological security reflects this conceptual duality. High ontological security is a result of subjectivity securitization, which is "an intensified search for one stable identity (regardless of its actual existence)" (Kinnvall 2004: 749). Promoting social cohesion may therefore be interpreted as an effort to securitize certain collective identities. An argument may be made that the rationale for promoting Cohesion Policy resonates with Žižek's understanding of ideology. First, ideology is about a Truth "that anyone sensible would believe" (Sharpe, no date, no page number). Secondly, ideologies are notorious for invoking objects whose identity is extremely elusive, like 'the people'.

Arguably, the rationale behind cohesion policy is a multidisciplinary matter. This paper combines sociological, geographic, and cultural perspectives. This interdisciplinary approach allows us to combine the material reality of the periphery with its ideological dimension. Indeed, these two elements are intertwined. We argue that Cohesion Policy exploits the ideological role of the periphery and is motivated by a need for a unifying identity. An argument for not drawing a line between the real and the imagined is based on the existence of certain cultural stereotypes concerning the core and the periphery. In one version, the core symbolises the positive, whereas the periphery (especially the borderland) embodies corruption (Dodds 2013). However, there also exists an opposite narrative where the periphery, or rather its settled population, is an ideal community, despite its apparent small-mindedness and double standards that dominate social relations (Fajfer 2016).

Indeed, Poll (2012) observes that the small town (understood as an ideology) shapes the American national identity because a small community's life is what the nation emulates on a larger scale. Thus, the periphery becomes the ideological core. This paper argues that the important ideological role of a small town extends beyond the American context. This said, we understand that this role may be contested

across cases, and the 'core' periphery may take a different form. In Germany, "a provincially rooted society" (Applegate 1990, 19) celebrates 'peripheral' material culture of the former GDR (Blum 2000). The Finnish national identity, in turn, is shaped by country life and the 'wilderness' (see e.g. Aslama & Pantti 2007, Periäinen 2004). These images are the result of distinct negotiation of what constitutes a nation state (or a federal region) in the framework of individual and collective identities. Similar to this discursive construction of nation states (Habermas 2004: 227), where solidarity extends from the local to the national realm, the underlying narratives of cross-border and interregional cooperation are building the foundation for transnational solidarity in the European Union. On the other hand, it is also in these peripheries that right-wing populist parties such as AFD and the Finns Party have been gaining importance. To further xenophobic sentiments the nationalist narratives blend mechanical solidarity within families with "legally constituted civic solidarity" (Habermas 2015: 37), which is rather based on democratic institutions in contemporary societies. Intra-European border regions can therefore be argued as a central discursive arena to negotiate solidarity and social cohesion for peripheries, nation states as well as the European Union.

We argue that these ongoing negotiations between national and regional identity on the one hand, and different forms of regional, national and transnational solidarity on the other, play an active, though elusive, role in shaping the Cohesion Policy

Cohesion Policy in European Peripheries

The debate about challenging discrepancies on the EU-level provides valuable insights concerning social cohesion in general. Fabrizio Barca (2017), a major architect and policy advocate of place-based thinking, has characterised the EU's cohesion problem as one of threefold inequality - income inequality, social inequality, and recognition inequality[1]. This third aspect that is the most intractable. Therefore, if the cohesion project is to succeed, a better understanding of recognition inequalities is a pressing need.

As Barca (ibid.) states: recognition inequalities involve "recognizing the role of people"; in rural and crisis areas people "feel like they don't belong in history, like they're far away from modernity, as if it was only cities that were inevitably made creative and pioneering thanks to globalization's technological processes". Andres Rodriguez-Pose (2018) has captured the essence of this dilemma regarding Cohesion Policy and questions of European cohesion in more general terms. His main argument is that a one-sided focus on centres of innovation has relegated many

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1   From a 2017 interview, "Here is the threefold inequality that Europe must fight. Notes by Fabrizio Barca on a new cohesion policy", https://open.luiss.it/en/2017/12/01/ecco-la-triplice-disuguaglianza-che-leuropa-deve-combattere-appunti-di-fabrizio-barca-per-una-nuova-politica-di-coesione/

areas of the EU to the status of places "that don't count". Nevertheless, they aim to "take back control" of local affairs and that this could in fact destabilise the EU.

More carefully developed and place-sensitive policy instruments are needed to deal with this issue; it cannot be resolved with the traditional efficiency/equity trade-off. This is reflected in the very broadly defined objective of getting the EU "closer to citizens". However, the task of establishing communication between central institutions and citizens can prove tricky because the feeling of abandonment is an inherent element of the periphery identity. Using Finnish Kainuu as a case study, Berglund (2008: 414) notes that

> *At the periphery [...] the current sense of there being no alternatives clashes starkly with the emphasis on openness that characterizes rhetoric at national level [in Finland].*

Though well-meaning, EU Cohesion policy may create an impression that a lot of pressure is being put on the periphery, exacerbating the problem of recognition. So far, EU citizens in regions suffering from detrimental structural changes have used the freedom of movement as a tool to escape hardships such as joblessness and lack of social and cultural participation opportunities (Schiek et al. 2015). It has been proposed that the problem of young people's outmigration can be addressed by incorporating the idea that 'knowledge' itself is a resource and can be reinfused into deprived regions. For Barca (ibid.) this means "a lively exchange between local knowledge and global knowledge". Cross-border and local co-operation [as practiced by companies and public institutions] can foster local learning and contribute positively to business performance and social cohesion (Roper 2006).

Migration creates challenges but it also helps exchange knowledge. Social contacts and visits to other EU countries have been put forward as other aspects that contribute to social cohesion in the European Union. Deutschmann et al. (2018) argue that contact may result in "transnational attachment" that invokes "a sense of community in Europe". While transnational attachment is associated with middle and upper classes (id.), border-crossings are part of everyday life at internal EU border peripheries. With borders being central to local identity, all classes are likely to develop transnational attachment (O'Dowd 2002: 27). Communities in the EU's internal borderlands have been shown to actively work together in creating a common "Euroregion" (Barthel & Barthel 2018). These co-creation processes are negotiated via discourses oriented towards trans-border cohesion rather than national cohesion (id.).In light of the above argument, the situation of peripheries is complex. Policies that have an immediate adverse effect, may produce opportunities in the long run. One lesson that may be derived from the ambivalent consequences of migration from the peripheries is the need to consider all realms of social cohesion carefully.

In summary, for policy makers the lack of participation has become a central obstacle to increasing social cohesion. The personas analysed in the empirical section of the paper are the target of such a Cohesion Policy. This critical overview of the two European peripheries helps us contextualise such individuals' experiences, narratives and biographical trajectories. Before we proceed to discuss empirical findings, we highlight the methods. To increase our understanding of recognition challenges, our methodology must include tools that allow studying elusive phenomena: identity and ideology. While addressing the problem of unequal opportunities between regions, the ideological dimension of Cohesion Policy must also be taken into account. Indeed, the ambitious goal to bridge the gap between 'places that count' and those that, apparently, 'do not' deserves attention. One may argue that, by seeking to elevate the status of peripheral communities, Cohesion Policy echoes elements of the traditional nation building discourse, though on a different scale and in different scope.

Data and Methods

Empirical Data

The summary of challenges in Lieksa and Vorpommern is based on desk research, focus group interviews and individual interviews with peripheral citizens and experts. The fieldwork took place during the Covid-19 crisis, which had an impact on how many participants could be reached and how the data could be collected. The participants were approached directly and through existing networks and provided an informed consent, either verbally or in writing.

In Lieksa, data collection took place face-to-face and online. The number of participants may be found in Table 1. Gender bias is relatively common in interview research. Since educated young women are likely to leave the peripheries, the gender bias works to our advantage. Because of a Covid-19 outbreak in Lieksa, focus group data came from two discussions from a semi-public Facebook group (80 comments) and a public Reddit forum (34 comments). The discussions were triggered by a news report about the research project Prospects in the Peripheries. Since the discussions were 'open' and partly anonymous, the details about participants are imprecise. In Vorpommern 13 citizens acted as informants: a group interview with 7 local stakeholders (3 female, 4 male, 29 – 77 years old) and 3 expert interviews and 2 interviews with citizens were conducted.

Table 1. Informants questioned in the two border regions

Number of Informants	Lieksa		Vorpommern		Total
Gender	male	female	male	female	
Interviews with Citizens	3	11	1	1	3
Expert Interviews	2	8	2	1	13
Group Interviews	n/a	n/a	4	3	?
Age Range (citizens)	16 - 30		29 - 77		16 - 77
Total Gender			7	5	
Total	**14**		**13**		**27**

Methods

As narratives incorporate biographical trajectories as well as identities and their development over time (Bamberg, De Fina & Schiffrin 2011), narratives were chosen to inform on complex identities (Deppermann 2013) as well as the effect of social cohesion factors on the life worlds of citizens living in peripheral regions. We analysed the content of the interviews and from this data we condensed the main narratives and biographical trajectories into three ideal type personas from each region. These ideal types were "formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena" (Weber 1904/ Weber 1949). To be able to discuss the effect of diversity and insider - outsider phenomena we included one 'migrant' persona from both regions. Moreover, the personas represent different genders and age groups to include narratives and trajectories that reflect intersectional factors.

Following Warren (2001), we acknowledge that the narratives collected through interviews reflect the participants' interpretations of events that take place in their lives and regions. Understood in this way, the narrative is a space where the physical location interlinks with its ideological representation. The stories that lay at the foundation of our personas illuminate and contest challenges that populations in the peripheries live with. Though based on actual individuals' experiences, each persona is a product of ideologies that concern peripheries. The narratives of these ideal type personas unite discursive elements found in our interviews and focus groups. The personas presented in this paper illustrate the cohesion challenges present in the case study regions. Based on theoretical framework and cohesion policy we trace three topics in our personas' trajectories, narratives, and discourses (see Figure 1).

Social Engagement & Participation as a category of analysis covers social relations as one of the three major elements of social cohesion, while giving room to reflect upon participation as the core aim of contemporary cohesion policies.

Cooperation & Forms of Solidarity offers a space to discuss the role of orientation toward a common good as a major component of Social Cohesion. Working towards shared goals through intergroup cooperation and their basis in distinct forms of regional, national, or transnational solidarity is tracked for this purpose. Further we use the category to show mechanical, non-democratic forms of solidarity that form the basis of xenophobic and nationalist tendencies in our personas' narratives.

Place attachment and identification is about "insight into rural living" (Pedersen & Gram 2018). Here we explore the meanings our personas ascribe to territories, bearing in mind that individuals develop and negotiate attachment to multiple places, real and imagined.

Figure 1: Concepts from Theoretical Framework and Cohesion Policy and their Operationalisation as Categories for Narratives from the Region.

Theory	Social Cohesion	Solidarity	Identity
Cohesion Policy	Participation	Intergroup Cooperation	Recognition
Narratives	Social Engagement & Participation	Cooperation & Forms of Solidarity	Place attachment and identification

To frame the discourses against the background of specific issues of their regions we start our analysis by introducing the specific challenges of the municipalities of Lieksa (Finland) and Vorpommern-Greifswald (Germany).

Social Cohesion and Challenges in Case Study Regions

The typical issues associated with peripheries are affected by or have an impact on these social cohesion factors. In the following section we introduce two municipalities in the European periphery and give you an overview of their challenges and their link to social cohesion.

Introducing the Regions

Two peripheral border municipalities were selected for analysis. Vorpommern-Greifswald is in North-eastern Germany, by the border with Poland, an EU member state. Lieksa is in Eastern Finland, by the border with Russia. Even though both municipalities take up a significantly large surface area, they are sparsely populated, which contributes to their peripherality. Both peripheries experience the same processes of demographic change, migration as well as territorial reforms that reorganize institutions in smaller municipalities. Both Vorpommern and Lieksa are mostly rural. Besides agriculture and timber industry, tourism and recreation are major economic sectors in both regions.

Vorpommern-Greifswald is the most structurally challenged area within the already peripheral Federal State Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Because of mass-migration and aging, in the years 1990-2020 the municipality of Vorpommern-Greifswald has lost a staggering 78% of its inhabitants, landing at 235 623 (Statistisches Amt Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2013: 325; 2020: 26). Today, aging remains a problem, as the region has developed a migration surplus. Vorpommern-Greifswald's main urban centre is Greifswald. The other towns include Pasewalk, Anklam, Wolgast. At 9-10%, the unemployment rate in the municipality is twice as high as in the Federal state, and the school dropout rate exceeds the national average.

Lieksa is the largest municipality in the province of North Karelia. Roughly the same size as the Ruhr region in Germany, Lieksa has only 10,799 inhabitants, which translates into 0.2% of Ruhr's population. Having reached its demographic peak in the 1960s, Lieksa's population has decreased by more than a half since then. Most of the municipality's population lives in the town of Lieksa. Pankakoski with 700 inhabitants is the second largest urban centre. The capital of North Karelia, Joensuu, is just over one-hour drive from Lieksa. The demographic situation of Lieksa reflects the problems faced by North Karelia and other peripheral Finnish regions - low birth rates, aging, and economic migration. Regional reforms have exacerbated issues concerning infrastructural decline and long distances. The role of regional authorities has been reduced, challenging social and political engagement. Participation as a major element of social cohesion is hindered by the reduction of institutionalised pathways for political co-creation, as well as the closing down of physical meeting places that administrational institutions, such as town halls, provide.

The national borders with Russia and Poland have very different roles in each municipality. Despite the proximity of the border, Lieksa has no border crossing, and the nearest (3.5-hour drive away) urban centre on the Russian side, Sortavala, is a relatively small town. Greifswald is a two-hour drive away from the metropolitan area of Szczecin in Poland. Other urban centers are even closer to the border. Arguably, Vorpommeranians from Germany and West-Pomeranians from Poland depend on cross-border mobility more. However, Lieksa is involved in cross-border

cooperation, as school authorities recruit Finnish-speaking students from Russia. Since Lieksa had a reception centre for asylum seekers, students with diverse backgrounds attend local schools. Similarly, some bilingual schools in Vorpommern co-educate Polish and German pupils. In both regions there are linguistic asymmetries. Students from Russia and Poland are more likely to speak the neighbour's official language, whereas Finns and Germans rarely speak Russian or Polish, respectively.

As shown in our theoretical framework, the five realms of social cohesion are among the elements that are severely compromised in peripheries (see Table 2). In a non-deprived ideal typical community high levels of social cohesion correspond to high levels of participation over several of these realms. The presence of common aims and moral principles in a community has been associated with the shared support for political institutions and participation in politics. In addition to values, a higher degree of social interaction (as reflected in civic engagement and associational activity) creates social cohesion and relates to solving communal problems more easily. Moreover, the willingness to engage in community activities depends on the attachment to the region and the corresponding nexus of personal and place identity.

The juxtaposition of the ideal type social cohesive society and the situation in our two border regions exemplifies the undermining of cohesive elements in the European periphery. Based on these findings, the theoretical framework and current cohesion policy, we trace *Social Engagement & Participation*, *Cooperation & Forms of Solidarity* as well as *Place attachment and identification* in our personas' trajectories, narratives and discourses in the next section.

Table 2: Realms of social cohesion (Forrest and Kearns 2001) and their expression in peripheries covered in this paper.

Realm of social cohesion	Expression in non-deprived community	Expression in Vorpommern (Germany)	Expression in Lieksa (Finland)
Common values and a civic culture	Common aims and objectives; common moral principles and codes of behaviour; support for political institutions and participation in politics	Reduced number of public facilities and places of social and political engagement (i.e. town halls and regional parliaments)	By strengthening the autonomy of regions, Finland plans to withdraw responsibilities from municipalities

Realm of social cohesion	Expression in non-deprived community	Expression in Vorpommern (Germany)	Expression in Lieksa (Finland)
Social order and social control	Absence of general conflict and threats to the existing order; absence of incivility; effective informal social control; tolerance; respect for difference; intergroup cooperation	Discrimination or disrespect of newcomers: politically motivated crimes in the form of right-wing violence have increased. Active support for right-wing parties that base their propaganda on Xenophobia and overemphasis of solidarity within a homogenic domestic community. Cooperation with the neighbouring Polish municipality and community.	Intergroup cooperation is supported. Anti-racism activities alleviated ethnic conflicts. 'Outsiders' complain about hierarchical access to social support.
Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities	Harmonious economic and social development and common wealth disparities standards; redistribution of public finances and of opportunities; equal access to services and welfare benefits; ready acknowledgement of social obligations and willingness to assist others	Absence of public services and reduction of institutionalised political participation institutions through regional reforms accelerate social division.

Thriving of right-wing parties that base their propaganda on Xenophobia and overemphasis of solidarity within a homogenic domestic community. | The municipal administration has drastically overhauled its traditional redistributive approach in order to privilege entrepreneurial initiative. Covid-19 outbreak and the transition to online activities impacted vulnerable groups who rely on face-to-face support. |
| **Social networks and social capital** | High degree of social interaction within communities and families; civic engagement and associational activity; easy resolution of collective action problems | Civic engagement of the few with a low level of active and sustainable associations. Collective issues remain largely unresolved. | Volunteering (talkoot) is an important part of community life. Numerous local associations. Collective issues persist. |
| **Place attachment and identity.** | Strong attachment to place; intertwining of personal and place identity | Strong attachment by those remaining in the region by choice meets weak, opportunistic attachment by newcomers. Conflicting attachments between citizens of rural and urban backgrounds. | A strong sense of place attachment is observable even among individuals who had left the region. This is sometimes manifested through return migration. Young people interested in academic education have a strong desire to migrate. Identities that thrive in 'wilderness'. |

Narratives and Trajectories from European Peripheries

Vorpommern

Three Personas from Vorpommern

Persona 1 'Marcin' m, 48 y, married, "newcomer" to the region.

Born in the Polish City of Szczecin 20 years before reunification. Marcin studied Administration and German in Poland. In his late 30s he moved to a village in Vorpommern, because he could only afford to buy a house on the German side of the border. Marcin works for a German city administration. Polish-German Cooperation in the region is the theme connecting his work and his private life. He engages in participation projects with Polish and German citizens, who live in Vorpommern. The combination of intercultural competence and language proficiency allows Marcin to move through different communities in the region with ease. All the while he is aware that many long-term citizens still view him as an outsider.

Persona 2 'Rüdiger' m, 67 years old, single, born in the region.

At reunification Rüdiger was in his late 30s. His company was dissolved and partially relocated to Western Germany in 1990. First moving with the company, Rüdiger was discriminated against by his colleagues for being from the GDR. He could not adapt to the different way of living and returned to his family's homestead in the region of Vorpommern after a year.

Rüdiger had worked for 20 years before reunification and became unemployed shortly afterwards. After a short stint in West Germany, he returned and remained unemployed, self-sustaining from his family's farm and retreated into private life for nearly a decade, while falling into depression. His mental state prevented attempts by the employment office to have him retrained. Recovering he has engaged in the recording of local history. He sees great social inequality in the way the region and people like him have been and are still treated by outsiders from the west including national policy makers.

Persona 3 'Lena' f, 28 years old, single, born in the region a few years after reunification.

Lena left the region to study Social Sciences at a German University. She recently graduated with a master's degree. So Lena received her tertiary education outside the region. While in the bigger city she has gotten used to cultural services. She especially enjoyed going to the theatre and putting on plays with some fellow students themselves. Originally planning to travel after graduation, she returned to her family's home in Vorpommern in the spring of 2020, because Corona sanctions blocked

international travel. Lena now works for an NGO that runs social projects in the region. She is hopeful for her future and eager to make a difference for the people in the region.

Transitions and Trajectories

Rüdiger has gone through most transitions in life. He was a respected family, factory and community member before 1990. After reunification he failed to transition into the new economic and social system successfully. Now after battling depression he has reengaged in his local community and is regaining confidence. He will most certainly co-design his community throughout his retirement years. Marcin transitioned successfully from school, to university to work life and lately into a new neighbourhood and society. He feels at home in both neighbouring countries but is actively co-designing his local community as well as the community of Poles living on the German side of the border. Lena is still at an early life stage. Just starting off her first job after university. Because of Corona she moved back home temporarily but could secure a good income and her own apartment in a neighbouring town within a few months. Although stranded in Vorpommern by Corona circumstances, she now sees it as a lucky fate and plans to remain in the region. Lena is not settled into her new community yet but will most probably engage and co-design her environments in the future.

Narratives of Social Cohesion in Vorpommern

Social Engagement & Participation

As daily life in Vorpommern-Greifswald involves daily border crossings and intercultural exchanges language skills are a vital element of social interactions here. Rüdiger can communicate colloquially when shopping in Poland. Marcin is fluent in German after studying it at school and university and living in Germany for 10 years. Lena studied Polish in school and university but is still hesitant to speak. Marcin engages in participation projects with Polish and German citizens and as a public administration employee also works in Polish-German Cooperation programmes.

Rüdiger's hobby of recording local history brings him in touch with Germans and more than Polish citizens. Lena comes in touch with how to participate in the region professionally but has not started to engage in her own community since returning to the region. She wishes for the region to become more open for diversity and will probably work towards this development in the future. Marcin feels at home in both neighbouring countries but is actively co-designing his local community as well as the community of Poles living on the German side of the border.

Place Attachment and Identification

Marcin identifies with the Metropolitan region of the Polish city Szczecin, which extends into Vorpommern in Germany in his perception of the local. This cross-border region is at the core of his regional identity. Rüdiger is proud of nature in Vorpommern. He spends most of his time outside, farming, walking, or hunting. For him there is no greater place than this region, which he defends against all insinuations of being inferior.

Lena is still managing her involuntary return to the region and the experiences and personal developments she made, while studying in the big city. Connecting her past and her future in the region, she realizes that efforts to make the region presentable for tourists should rather go into making it liveable for citizens. In this way her re-negotiation of local identity is themed by change and opportunity. Marcin and Lena miss the multitude of sport and cultural offers in the city. Marcin values the benefits of rurality for outdoor sports such as running, trekking, and swimming, but reflects that it was much easier to stay in shape, when you could just go to the gym after work. Both travel longer distances by car or train to meet friends or enjoy cultural events regularly. The lack of commercial services is tackled by our all three personas through regular smaller trips to regional centres and sporadic larger shopping trips to Berlin or Szczecin.

Cooperation & Forms of Solidarity

The three personas perceive the nature of the common good in the region very differently. For Marcin the region exists beyond the European border. He works towards the common good by dissolving the restricting effect of the border through his private and professional engagement as well as participation in voluntary cooperation projects. In Marcin's experience, Polish citizens moving from the metropolitan area of Szczecin to a village or town in Vorpommern are viewed as double outsiders and also experience double adaptation difficulties from Polish city to German village. He feels that many of the inhabitants of the regions do not have an open mind but are intolerant towards change in the form of new neighbours as well as new ideas.

Lena, returning from studying in a bigger city, perceives the neighbours in her home region as less open minded and scared of differences, while she appreciates diversity. Lena sees the region as growing towards the east by cooperation and exchange with the Polish citizens that live and/or work on both sides of the border. Rüdiger feels kinship with the original German population, meaning those that were citizens of the GDR here with him. He wants to protect himself from outsiders and associates crime rather with Poles than with Germans. He negates that there is and was a prevalence of right-wing aggression against refugees and migrants in the region. Politically he leans to the right and may engage in a right-wing party in the future.

Lieksa

Three Personas from Lieksa

Persona 1: 'Sveta', f, young adult, educated student, from Petrozavodsk (Russia)

Sveta, 28, had a job in Petrozavodsk in Russia but decided to move to Finland. Sveta's friend found a job caring for her Finnish husband's elderly relative. Sveta, however, chose education as her migration channel. She brushed up her Finnish skills and applied for a vocational school from a small town that was looking for students from Russia and offered a lot of support in finding a job. Aware of the fact that even highly educated Russians have a hard time finding a good job in Finland, Sveta had bittersweet feelings about quitting her job in Petrozavodsk. So, Sveta keeps applying for internships and waits. Meanwhile, she attends workshops for migrants, volunteers at a local association and is ready to accept any job. Sveta likes the peace and quiet of Lieksa, even though it is far from her hometown. She is prepared, however, that she may have better chances finding a job in a larger city. All she needs is a job offer.

Persona 2: 'Juha', m, 50s, entrepreneur, divorced, born in L.

Juha is a private contractor and works all over North Karelia. He is a divorcee in his 50s and has three grown-up children. Juha had established a successful business and never seriously pondered migration. He had lost contact with many friends, but some of them had moved back to the region. Juha made friends with elderly customers who regularly eat lunch at his favorite cafeteria. The men pause when a group of Somali boys passes them, laughing loudly. These boys have become regulars, too. Juha often wonders what Lieksa will be like when he retires. Will the local health centre stay open? Will his children visit him? Maybe Juha will remarry one day. His hunting buddy has recently married a Russian woman whom he met during his cross-border visits.

Persona 3: 'Anu', f, teenager, descendant of Karelian evacuees, born in L.

Anu is a student facing a big decision – where to continue her compulsory education. Anu has no doubts that the local vocational school is 'good enough' but, at the youth club, her friends often talk about academic education in a larger city. This scenario is tempting, too. Anu feels a bit bored and tired in the periphery. But what about family and friends? And what about hobbies? In the periphery hobbies are less expensive. Although Anu's life seems carefree, it is full of challenges. She meets many supportive adults, but she wants to do things her own way. If only there were more things to do… But Anu is not interested in a school party. She is going to watch YouTube videos and maybe go for a walk in the forest by herself.

Transitions and trajectories

The lives of all the characters have been marked by transitions, though not all these transitions affected them directly. Juha was born when the municipality's economy was at its peak. He lived through the economic recession of the 1990s. Although today he is an established entrepreneur, the memory of that event gave him a more understanding perspective on poverty and unemployment, but, at the same time, it made him resilient and pragmatic. Anu is facing a major transition now – into adulthood. This transition is marked by mobility: she is changing schools and soon she will have a right to drive certain vehicles. On one hand, Anu is experiencing a lot of push factors. Her life is strongly marked by a narrative that her future looks grim. On the other hand, if her network presents her a valuable offer of employment, she is likely to take it. As any young person, she is idealistic, but pragmatism informs her choices, too.

Although Sveta does not remember life in the Soviet Union, its collapse shaped her future. Sveta grew up admiring the West, even though this admiration may have been naïve and materialistic. For Sveta, the small peripheral town of Lieksa is the ideological EU and the West. Her transition into a new community is not free from friction. Sveta is bittersweet that her 'Russian' degree seems to be of no use, but she believes she can 'fit in' if she perseveres.

Narratives of Social Cohesion in Lieksa

Social Engagement & Participation

Juha's main social engagement concerns participation in the Church and a professional association. He takes part in public discussions about major developments in the municipality, sometimes actively. Since he works as a private contractor, he meets a lot of people from different walks of life. He is confident that he understands the local situation well. Sometimes the lack of access to services available in larger towns upsets him, and he raises such topics with the community. Sveta actively participates in any event she can find. She tries to rebuild her social network to negotiate her positioning as an outsider in a small community. Sometimes this proves challenging. She understands the power of networking and believes that volunteering for the community will make her visible. She blogs and posts on social media, which she uses as a reflexive tool. Understanding that change requires a lot of effort and involvement, Anu is torn between staying and leaving. Her personal sympathies influence the events in which she participates. She picks events carefully.

Place Attachment and Identification with the Region

Juha spends all his time off close to nature, fishing and hunting. He developed a strong attachment to the region and rewarding social networks. As an underage per-

son, Anu is tied to the region. She grew up in a 'shrinking' Lieksa, which made her idealize the life in the city. She believes that it might be an answer to the insecurities that bother her. Sveta enjoyed the urban lifestyle, but she sees advantages in Lieksa, too. As a graduating student, Sveta lives in-between her current place of studies and her future place of work, which for her may be different localities. Education helps establish attachment to place and develop social networks. Juha and Sveta studied locally, and for Anu it is an attractive option, too. Although, in general, few residents have higher education, education opportunities are an important local asset.

Cooperation & Forms of Solidarity

Expressions of solidarity take the form of combating loneliness. The personas illustrate different variants of local efforts to address the problem of loneliness. Anu, the teenager, represents the need for close personal relations and mental health. Sveta, the student, stands for employability and networking. Juha, the entrepreneur, illustrates the balancing between relying on community support and autonomy.

At the same time, the personas illuminate certain boundaries that challenge the perception of solidarity. Sveta's character addresses the gap between one's commitment to a community and the difficulty to be recognized as its member. Juha brings to the fore ethnic tensions and racism. Although their nature has changed, the lack of trust persists. Another 'trust' issue concerns the future of the municipality - shrinking becomes a problem when it directly impacts one's life. Juha and Anu also embody the challenge eroding the community of 'us' - gossiping. Gossiping reveals the presence of rules that members impose on others. Solidarity is thus challenged by the negotiation of trust and norm compliance. Since individuals in this periphery rely on others to escape loneliness, social solidarity may be associated with a strong need for establishing trust.

Discussion and Conclusions

Earlier in this paper we presented an argument that, by putting pressure on peripheral regions to 'catch-up' with the rest, the Cohesion Policy may fail to address the recognition crisis successfully. The recognition issue looks differently, depending on a given persona's point of view.

On one hand, the youth who consider migration reject the periphery, by treating it as a place with no future that must be abandoned. This youth does not feel 'forgotten', but instead is determined to forget. Both our young personas are ready to leave the periphery behind to discover the world beyond, while shaping their identity and developing new place attachments. It is only due to the travel limitations brought about by the Corona pandemic that Lena decides to return to her peripheral home region more permanently. Forced into this choice, however, she becomes eager to

co-create her region, revealing the availability of better options in the cores as a pull factor rather than the issues of the periphery as pushing youth out of the region. Anu is also eager to explore opportunities elsewhere, but unexpected favourable circumstances may inspire her to reconsider her plans. Although the youth may think of the periphery as a 'second choice', Cohesion Policy should help present this choice as 'good enough'.

For the middle-aged personas, a sense of distance may be seen as healthy. Having experienced difficult transitions, Rüdiger and Juha value the quality of being 'good enough' While they feel like they fit-in, further weakening of the region may challenge their sense of ontological security, contributing to them feeling as a 'last generation'. As far as the migrant personas are concerned, Sveta initially imagines the peripheral border municipality as cohesive with the rest of Finland, the EU, and the West. However, she realizes that her stay in the periphery is likely to be a stop within a larger journey, unless her efforts to fit in are recognized. For Marcin, the border is part of his identity, as he switches between Polish and German contexts every day in his professional as well as in his private life. Sveta and Marcin illustrate different opportunities that migration makes available in peripheral regions: an influx of social capital in form of new residents and their social, cultural and economic resources as well as their intrinsic capability to maintain and establish connections beyond the region.

Since the personas illustrate complex migration flows in peripheral regions, we presented the freedom of movement as a policy tool that both exacerbates and alleviates demographic problems in structurally weak regions. The influx of new residents slows down the population decrease in border regions of the EU. Whether it is a personal experience or not, mobility helps negotiate one's place attachment, and interest in co-creating the community. Accumulating the motivations to stay in or move out of peripheral regions in quantitative studies may give further insights for Cohesion Policies addressing the specific needs of the inhabitants in European peripheries. Also, return migration and immigration show that peripheral regions may be attractive places for some, but it may be challenging to use this potential in a way that promotes solidarity across groups.

Happiness as measured by subjective well-being correlates positively with cohesive societies (Delhey & Dragolov 2016). When in good condition in a community, the core elements of social cohesion, namely *social relations*, *identification with the geographical unit*, and *orientation towards the common good*, contribute to social cohesion as well as to happiness. Delhey and Dragolov (2016) suggest that it is the capacity to create togetherness and solidarity among the members of a society that creates the perception of well-being. This finding is highly relevant for policy makers, when tasks with increasing contentment are faced with the issue that, contrary to income, it "it is not possible to transfer happiness across individuals" (Becchetti, Massari &

Naticchioni 2014). By linking happiness to indicators of social cohesion, however, cohesion policies are effective in raising the happiness index as well. Concentrating on economic factors suggesting "measures aiming at increasing education and economic performance, i.e., higher incomes and lower unemployment rate, generate additional spillovers in terms of reduction of happiness inequality and, in turn, of enhanced social cohesion" (id.). However, the narratives recorded by us suggest that increased investment in the infrastructure for participation might also be effective in supporting social cohesion in peripheries. This may be achieved by creating arenas for mutual recognition as well as co-creation from within the region itself.

In summary we have seen that Cohesion Policy and related discourses that present peripheries as problematic contribute to the alienation of inhabitants from their region while deepening recognition inequality. To avoid this effect policy makers must utilize narratives of opportunities and chances rather than highlighting the issues. One way to achieve this without ignoring pressing challenges is to present peripheries with their unique manifold characteristics rather than as a one-dimensional 'negative other' of centres of innovation.

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Finnish-Russian Cooperation:
Between Geopolitics and Pragmatism

Joni Virkkunen

An interview given by Finland's Minister of Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto to the Financial Times at the beginning of September 2019 (Flemming, Peel and Foy 2019) once again raised the domestic and international debate on Finnish-Russian relations, on the forming Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and on the Union's Russia policy in the situation when Russia is clearly violating its international commitments. (see e.g. Massa 2019). The Minister's statement, which emphasized the importance of good relations and Russia's key role in resolving international conflicts, has been particularly criticized. In the early summer, several European countries marvelled at the Council of Europe's decision to open its doors to Russia's return to become a full member of the Council, even though Russia had not given up on any of the issues due to which its voting rights there were originally suspended.

The above critique and discussion of Finland's 'friendly' position to Russia illustrates well that neither Finland's nor the European Union's relation with their neighbouring Russian Federation is straightforward. As Russia maintains involvement in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, with no intention to give up Crimea that it has now made one of its Federal subjects, both Russia and co-operation with Russia are highly criticised. In Finland, the situation is not so simple. Finland adheres to the five principles guiding the EU's policy towards Russia and the sanctions policy tied to compliance with the Minsk Agreement. As President Sauli Niinistö and the Foreign Ministry authorities have repeatedly emphasized, relations with Russia are not *"Business as usual"* (Henriksson 2018), and there can be no greater rapprochement with Russia until Russia is willing to resolve the threshold issues related to Ukraine. The conquest of the Crimean Peninsula and Russia's involvement in the conflict in Ukraine are violations of international law that cannot be ignored with a shrug.

At the same time, Finland supports the European Union's joint policy to Russia, including the sanction regime, with an opportunity for dialogue and selective interaction with Russia. There are many practical issues of governance related to the environment, the 1300-kilometer joint border, people-to-people relations and, of course, security that can only be resolved through dialogue. Trade relations, smooth cross-border flow of goods, shopping and business tourists, and other local-level cross-border encounters are in Finland's interests. Trade and tourism bring work and

cross-border cooperation bring much needed resources to the border regions' economy. Many of the borderland provinces and municipalities have incorporated Russia's near-by location and cooperation across Finland's 'eastern' border in their regional strategies.

The European Union is developing its joint foreign and security policy and its evolving policy to the Russia Federation. The EU and its member states are closely interdependent with Russia through economic and energy exchange, trade, business, tourism and cultural ties. Some politicians, member states and EU Officers are extremely critical to Russia due to Russia's behaviour in international politics. Others, like Finland, emphasise the significance of dialogue and cooperation as Russia is an important neighbour with which a certain political, governance and citizens' everyday encounters are necessary. In the following, I will in more detail look at that in-built paradox of EU's Russia policy in the context of Finland. After a short overview of the EU's evolving Russia policy, an attention is paid to how Finland as *"active, pragmatic and solution-oriented member state"* (Prime Minister's Office 2016: 6) of the European Union develops its pragmatic relations to its neighbour. Besides the Finnish state, also Finland's Northern and Eastern border areas have a particular strategic interest for cooperation with Russia, just across the border.

The study is based on a qualitative content analysis of policy documents such as the regions' regional development, cross-border cooperation and Russia strategies, and of the thirty theme interviews on Russia, regional and cross-border cooperation and the Northern Dimension conducted with experts at different levels of Finnish governance[1]. I have also collected participant observation data of the different regional and cross-border cooperation seminars and consultations in North Karelia and beyond[2].

Geopolitics of the EU-Russian Relations

The relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation are not easy. In the 1990's, soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's situation caused serious concerns in Finland but expectations for cooperation were high.

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1   Interviews were conducted with Finnish public servants at the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Education and Culture, Economic Affairs and Employment, Social Affairs and Health, Transport and Communications, and the Environment as well as with individuals currently or previously involved with the Northern Dimension, regional and cross-border cooperation at the Northern Dimension Institute, the Finnish Parliament, the EU's European External Action Service, the International Barents Secretariat, the University of Lapland, the City of Rovaniemi and the Regional Councils of North Karelia, Kainuu and Lapland. The events took place and the interviews were conducted in 2017-2019.

2   Addresses at public presentations and recordings are referred to using the regular referring standards but quotations of the transcribed interviews are anonymized and referred to by the date, the gender of the informant and the order number of the interview.

Russia faced tremendous economic, social, environmental, and other challenges and it was eager to cooperate with 'the West'. Russia ratified the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU in 1997 and the EU's first Common Strategy on Russia was approved in 1999. (European Council 1999: 7). The EU welcomed Russia's *"return to its rightful place in the European family in a spirit of friendship, cooperation, fair accommodation of interests and on the foundations of shared values enshrined in the common heritage of European civilisation."* (*ibid.*). It envisioned Russia as *the "A stable, democratic and prosperous Russia, firmly anchored in the united Europe free of new dividing lines.."* The EU saw clear benefits of Russia's integration into a wider area of cooperation and strategic partnership. As we quickly realised, the policy failed and led to the first disruptions in EU-Russia relations.

Despite a clear need for cooperation, analysts observing EU-Russian relations have provided several causes for the shifting paradigm emphasising conflict over cooperation, integration and interdependency: Cultural difference, identity politics, power asymmetry, and the EU's normative marginalisation of Russia. (see e.g. Makarychev 2014: 8; Engelbrekt & Nygren 2010; Prozorov 2006: 18). The first signs of the changing relations were visible already during the late 1990's and early 2000's, well before the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine, when Russia expressed its dissatisfaction with the EU's agenda. The liberal approaches to EU-Russian relations emphasising cultural belonging, economic interdependence, Russia's transformation into and integration with the West (see e.g. Motyl, Ruble, Shevatsova 2015; Pavliuk 2015) were replaced by more antagonistic cultural or civilizational explanations that emphasise Russia's otherness.

Sergey Prozorov (2006) explores the emergence of EU-Russia conflict through the concepts of transitionalism and traditionalism. While liberal approaches to conflict emphasised Russia's historico-cultural Europeanness and the benevolent nature of Russia's integration with the West, institutionalist and cultural approaches focused on institutional agency and cognitive factors, rather than political ones. Inspired by the ideas of Francis Fukuyama (1992) and Samuel Huntington (1993), looking either to the future (liberal-teleological transitionalism) or to the past (cultural-civilisational traditionalism), Russia's integration was rationalised with post-Soviet transition and continuous development on one hand, and Russia's a priori posited cultural difference and deeper 'meta-conflict' of insurmountable mutual otherness on the other hand.

According to Prozorov (2006: 18-22), neither the cultural nor the civilisation model is able to grasp the exceptional nature of Russia's post-Soviet transformation and offer an appropriate model of conflict emergence. He provides a practice-based interpretive model and a bottom-up logic for EU-Russian relations with actual conflict discourses. The conflict is an outcome of policy discourses and incompatibility of the subject-positions between the two. Andrey Makarychev (2014: 28) notes that

both the EU and the Russian Federation, in a way, defined their foreign policies in the prevalence of managerial, administrative, and legal, and thus post-political, aspects of governance. The result of the 'technocratic' politics was the increasing politicization of the bilateral relations and the common neighbourhood area. The EU-Russia relations are, Makarychev argues, at the same time conflictual and inter-dependent (intersubjective) where the current Russian discourse contains at least two layers – realist (interest-based) and ideological (identitarian). In contemporary Europe, this can certainly be said about the EU's Russia policy as well.

During the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU-Russian relations were formally built upon language of 'cooperation' and 'dialogue'. In Russia, the EU's dominance and normative power in 'expanding' its neoliberal agenda in its neighbourhood caused clear discomfort. For Russia, the EU's 'civilizing' role in Europe represented inequality and expansion of a 'post-modern' security community where the EU's disregarded Russia's history, identity, actorness and sovereignty. In the context of increasing distrust and open disputes related to the Chechen and Kosovo wars in the late 1990's, Yukos case in early 2000's, the disruptions of Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine and several member states of the EU member states (2006 and 2009) and the Georgian war in 2008 it was clear that the 'romantic' phase of the EU-Russian relations was officially over. That had a direct impact on the formulations and implementations of the EU's Russia policy as well as on the way the different regional integration initiatives in the 'shared neighbourhood' evolved.

The above conflicts trashed the mutual trust and changed the rhetoric of cooperation. Thus, Russia conditioned cooperation with symmetric and non-hierarchical platforms and practices of cooperation. In the new model it was neither an 'object' of EU's hegemonic policy nor a target of the EU's norms and value export but, rather, an equal partner. (Prozorov 2010: 84). This opened opportunities for progress and new kind of cooperation that was pragmatic and non-political. That has become a practice in regional and cross-border cooperation such as the 'renewed' Northern Dimension, Barents and Arctic cooperation.

The EU's Russia Policy

The EU's evolving policy on Russia is deeply rooted in its foreign and security political documents such as the 2016 Global Strategy (EC 2016), five principles on Russia (EC 2019) set the legal and ideological basis for Finland's cooperation with Russia. The EU's double-track approach emphasising Russia's strategic challenge to the European security, sanctions and an aspiration to constrain Russia's 'assertive and un-cooperative behaviour' while, at the same time, cooperation with Russia on various foreign policy matters (EEAS 2019: 19) set the context to the EU-Russian relations.

The EU's renewed Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe" that was approved by the European Council on 28 June 2016 (EC 2009) reflects the EU's attempts to tackle the changing global security and the chaotic state of the EU. While the EU's 1999 Common Strategy on Russia and 2003 Security Strategy (EC 1999, 2009) established main principles and objectives for the EU's relation and security interests on Russia at the time, based on its core values and interests, the aim of the new Global Strategy aim was broader. In general, it was expected to find common principles, interests and priorities in the increasingly fragmented European Union and to 'fight back' in the issues when the EU's entire existence was increasingly questioned by populist and Eurosceptic forces, e.g. in the United Kingdom, and to 'correspond to high expectations of its citizens' in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in Paris and London. (Davis Cross 2016). Additionally, the strategy was an effort to discover its identity as an international actor in the new global security environment and to clearly state the nature of its relations with the rest of the world. (Howorth 2016).

In terms of external relations, Davis Cross (2016) observe an attempt for strengthening the EU's status as a diplomatic actor with professional diplomats, EU's own delegations, or 'embassies', representing the joint European External Action Service (EEAS) on daily operations of foreign policy around the world. That corresponds to the rapidly changing global security by clarifying the EU's foreign and security policy priorities. Those priorities include strengthening global governance, supporting for regional architectures, building state and societal resilience, and adapting the EU's response to conflict and crises. Even though it covers the entire world, Russia plays a central role in the Global Strategy.

In relation to Russia, the EU's new Global Strategy totally ignores the vocabulary of strategic partnership and shared spaces of the 2003 Security Strategy (Mälksoo 2016) and, explicitly, describes Russia as the 'key strategic challenge' to European security order. It also calls Russia for full respect for international law and the principles underpinning the European security order. Mälksoo (2016: 381) extends this to the clash between EU's 'postmodern' and Russia's 'modern' security identity and the protection of European security that Russia's resent actions in Ukraine have significantly disturbed. On a broader scale, Howorth (2016, 395) observes that the EU has been unable to understand Russia's zero-sum approach to international politics and to make best use of its potential in situations when member states, as the author expresses it, allow themselves to be seduced by Russia into multiple bilateralisms. The below quotation from the Strategy illustrates well the paradigm shift and new meta-narrative in its relation to Russia (Fisher & Timofeev 2018: 33).

> *Russia's violation of international law and the destabilisation of Ukraine, on the top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea Region, have challenged the European security order at its core. The EU will stand united in upholding interna-*

tional law, democracy, human rights, cooperation and each country's right to choose its future freely.

As neither the EU's member stats nor their institutions fully agreed on a joint approach, the Foreign Affairs European Council outlined five guiding principles underlying the EU's future relations with Russia: (1) Full implementation of the Minsk agreement; (2) Better relations to the EU's Eastern neighbours; (3) Strengthening resilience, energy security, (4) Strategic communication and fighting hybrid threats in the EU; and (5) Possibility for selective engagement in issues that it considers important; and supporting people-to-people contacts and Russian civil society. These guiding principles express the EU's concern for Russia's behaviour in its neighbourhood and encourage EU member states for stronger resilience and preparedness, e.g. in hybrid warfare, and offer stronger relations with its Eastern partners. Importantly, they also set full implementation of the Minsk agreement as the precondition for lifting the EU's restrictive measures on Russia.

Schmidt-Feltzman (2014) argues that member states' national foreign policies to Russia have acted both as a divisive force and as a catalyst in the EU-Russian relationship. She claims that it is not member states' relations with Russia *per se* that help understand the EU's failure to anticipate and respond effectively to Russia's aggression. It is rather the failure of governments and EU officials to take experts' and countries' concerns of Russia's actual military and foreign policy seriously. The EU has not developed to a federal state and is, thus, divided in the scope of the EU's restrictive measures on Russia and in how much cooperation with Russia as desired, or even possible. According to Raik, Helwik and Iso-Markku (2015) the EU's Global Strategy represents a gradual shift from idealism to realistic (as distinct from realist) policy that is, they argue, at the same time interest-oriented but with clear value-based agenda. The 2016 Strategy (EC 2016) and its 2019 update (EEAS 2019) recognize the 'double-track approach to Russia' voice Russia's violation of international law through sanctions and selective engagement in the issues that are of interest for the EU. Those two principles function the basis of Finland's pragmatic approach to Russia as well.

Finnish's Cooperation with Russia

Much of the EU-Russian relations is currently affected by mutual sanctions, or so-called restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine and Russia's counter measures. These include diplomatic measures regulating political dialogue with Russia, individual restrictive measures freezing assets and restricting travel because their actions undermined Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and restrictions on economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol. In addition, the EU has targeted sanctions against specific economic sectors, e.g. curtail

Russian access to certain sensitive technologies and services, export ban for dual-use goods for military use or military end users, export and import ban on trade in arms, and limited access to EU primary and secondary capital markets. (EC 2019).

The EU's sanctions on Russia are focused and tied to the implementation of the Minsk agreements. The progress evaluation is done, and sanctions extended, every six months. Significantly, one of the five guiding principles of the EU's relation with Russia, namely selective engagement, enables cooperation in issues that the EU or its member states considers important. Besides economic and business cooperation, outside the sanctioned fields, a particular reference is made to people-to-people contacts for example, in the fields of scientific research, higher education and cross-border cooperation.

The selective engagement principle recognizes the diversity of interests in the EU-Russia relations, including business and trade interests, aspirations for regional and cross-border cooperation and, significantly, everyday cross-border encounters at different levels. Russia is still one of the biggest trading partners of the EU, particularly in the field of energy, and EU remains Russia's biggest. While in the 1990's and 2000's, the primary of the goal of cooperation with Russia was to support modernisation and democratisation in Russia and, thus, contribute to security and regional stability, currently the aim is simply to manage the status quo and preventing the current conditions of deteriorating (Fisher and Timofeev 2018: 2, 9). Selective engagement, or selective cooperation as Likhachev (2019) calls it, enables continuation of the different forms of connectivity during crisis.

The example of Finland that shares a long border with the Russian Federation illustrates well the importance of the EU's tandem policy. Finland has good long-term business ties across the border with Russia, regional and cross-border cooperation in different fields and, significantly, selective dialogue at different levels of administration and policy making. The 2016 the Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy (Prime Minister's Office 2016: 6) views Finland as an *"active, pragmatic and solution-oriented member state"* that bolsters the European Union as a strong security community but also promotes rule-based international system, active bilateral and multilateral (security) cooperation in its vicinity.

The initiator and the key figure of the EU's Northern Dimension policy, Finland's former Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen (2019) elaborates Finland's interest in developing cooperation with Russia in the early and mid-1990's: *"Then we wanted to integrate Russia toward Western democracy, jointly, with a goal of stability and strengthening democracy in Russia and, specifically, recovery of its economy. Finland had a particular interest in recovery of Russia's economy, just as Germany did."* Cooperation with Russia would, thus, significantly improve Finland's security and stability, and bring economic benefits in the context when much of the trade with the Russian neighbour had collapsed. As an informant expressed Russia's importance: *"It is clear that we cannot do anything for our*

location and that we need connections to Russia. [..] It is also in the EU's interest that the border holds and goods pass, also the environmental problems do not wait for better times. So we just have to tackle those."

In the early 2000's when the enthusiasm for integration and positive interdependence between the EU and Russia decreased, the Northern Dimension remained as an important corner stone of Finland's policy to Russia. Finland's foreign service, thus, take a central role in transform the policy from the EU's joint policy on Russia, where Russia considered itself as an object, to a joint policy between four ideally equal participants – the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland. The Director General of the Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Maimo Henriksson (2018) explains Finland's Russia policy as *"predictable, solid, pragmatic – and profoundly anchored in the EU family"*. Besides voicing Finland's commitment to the 'EU family' and to the EU's foreign and security policy, she also emphasises Finland's agency and pragmatic, not politicized, approach to Russia. Accordingly, *"it is inevitable that must keep up the dialogue with Russia and engage. Issues that are of interest to Finland are usually also of interest to the EU"* (*ibid.*). This materialises Finland's interest for continued political dialogue and cooperation with Russia also in the context of today's EU-Russian conflict.

Regions' Strategic Interest for Cooperation

In Finland's border areas, the notion of Russia and cross-border cooperation is to some extent detached from the above-described EU-Russia relations and Finland's tandem approach. In Northern and Eastern Finland, next to Russia, the value of cooperation develops in the local readings of history and pragmatic strategies of development that, to an extent, depoliticize cooperation even in the times of conflict. These subnational actors' interest run in parallel to the 'real' foreign policy and diplomacy of the state and the EU, thus, materializes the EU's multi-level governance. In the regions, collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's and Finland's 1995 EU membership opened new possibilities for the regions' strategic planning and economic development.

Overall, the regions' aspirations for cross-border cooperation have become less chaotic and incorporated into the regions' long-term development strategies (Joenniemi and Sergunin 2015: 22). To bring further Santos's (1990) and Duchacek's (1988, 1990) well-known discussions of paradiplomacy, i.e. subnational and non-state actors international activities taking takes place outside, or in *parallel* to, the 'real' diplomacy of the state Klatt and Wassenberg (2017: 207) elaborate an idea of 'secondary foreign policy'. Actors such as regions, units of federations, cities, companies, NGO's and so on try to find solutions for challenges in their day-to-day problems and use internationalisation as well as borders and cross-border cooperation as resources for problem solving. These are to improve the local economy

by developing the local business environment while, in the meantime, increasing cross-border trade, investments, tourism, cultural and environmental cooperation and partnerships in international marketing.

In this context, the Finnish actors involved with regional and cross-border cooperation present both Russia and the EU, as well as the impacts of the conflict, in a very different manner than the major media. The geopolitical situation evidently effects the cooperation with Russia – e.g. through Russia's 'foreign agent law'[3] and extremely slow decision making both on Russia and, particularly, in the EU. Instead of rejecting or setting political demands for cooperation, the many of the actors argue, Russia shows even more interest and commitment for cooperation than the European Union. While *"Russia and the question of Russia divides the EU and its member states so dramatically that it is reflected in everything"* (Vilen 2019), *"Russia is very interested [in cooperation]. Yes. I think they are very interested."* (120618F21). Based on the principles of equality and concrete cooperation, as well as conscious exclusion of both day-to-day politics and politically sensitive issues such as human rights, the Russian regions such as the Republic of Karelia and Murmansk and Leningrad regions bordering Finland, are now formally 'allowed' to cooperate. As an informant (140219M28) put it:

> The permission has been given. But there are certain sensitive topics that we do not touch, take a stand on. [..] I would say that they have been given a permission to do concrete cooperation, to solve concrete problems, as long as it does not violate Russia's national identity. I think these do not violate but, on the contrary, give opportunities and increase resources to develop its peripheral areas. [..] It departs from the interests of its population but also of Russia's central government. They do recognise that it brings more positives than threats.

Despite aiming to contribute to the European level strategic and thematic objectives defined for cross-border cooperation under the European Neighbourhood Policy (see e.g. ENI CBC Karelia 2015), the intention to complement the regional development programmes with its specific cross-border nature and to enhance practical cooperation ought to benefit the regular citizens in the EU and in Russian Federation alike. For the Finnish state and Russian Federal governance, this form of cooperation is a way to continue dialogue during conflict. Yet, the serious delay in the drafting and the ratification of the financial framework of the three Fin-

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3   Initially, the so-called 'foreign agent law' was presented and approved in 2012 and requires to register groups as 'foreign agents' under the Ministry of Justice if they receive funding from any foreign sources, governmental or private, and engage in 'political activity.' The definition of 'political activity' is yet vague and, besides political activities, it also includes different advocacy and human rights work, social activism and scientific research. The organisations registered as 'foreign agents' need to identify themselves as 'foreign agents' in all public materials and allow regular checks by authorities. The phrase that carries Soviet-era connotations of spies or traitors and make it difficult for the organisations to operate. The law has been revised and stretched to also include organisations such as 'undesirable' organisations and media. (Malkova 2020; Human Rights Watch 2018).

nish-Russian CBC programmes for 2014-2010 and, particularly, for 2021-2027, was rationalised rather through the EU's disinterest and ignorance, rather than through Russia's isolation. Several informants in the Northern and Eastern border areas (e.g. 120618F21 and 070318F13 respectively) expressed their disappointment and frustration over the EU:

> *I got a feeling that now, when it is possible [for the EU] to delay these programs, it does it (…)*

> *But we have gone so much back from that time. That Georgian war impacted directly on the CBC programme of previous programming period, and now this Ukrainian war impacts this. [..] In practice, the CBC Programming apparatus functions as if we had the money in our hands. But as the EU and Russia have not been able to ratify that financial agreement, we do not have a penny. [..] We have projects agreed but nothing progresses. It is unbearable. [..] During the Georgian war it was the same, the projects were three years delayed. But now it is already the fourth. So, it's worse now.*

The interest among the EU's 27 member states and Directorate Generals (DGs), among the Officials at the Finnish and Russian Ministries of the Interior, Finance and External Affairs, and among the regional-level Governors, the Region Mayors and the Regional Development Directors varies. It is, thus, *"very much up to the attitude of the key players. If we have an interest, it works fine."* (070318F13). In other words, the course and success of cooperation depends not only on politics and institutional positions but also on key individuals. A single Policy Officer, Regional Mayor, Governor, or teacher at a local school, can make huge difference for the success, or failure, of cooperation. As the example of a joint cross-border strategy building and regionalisation of the Euregio Karelia (see e.g. Scott 2013; Liikanen 2008; Cronberg 2003) – a cooperation area and border spanning cooperation forum in the Finnish-Russian border region established twenty years ago – well indicates, the regional and local actors still, during the time of conflict, are still able and willing to cooperate. The above informants (120618F21 and 070318F13) continue:

> *In principle, all the institutions are working, and we do things together with the administration of the Republic of Karelia, this advocacy, to get that CBC program operational. It is not only ours, or theirs. This regional level is, in a way, together in this."*

> *..at the regional level, I think, we quite agree on what should be developed, and how. But when it goes to the level of states and the EU, it is already a different thing. [..] The regions want to work with each other and to develop that cooperation. And people want to work with each other, and to act."*

Conclusions

This article has looked at the EU-Russia relations and the last years' geopolitical conflict in Europe through Finland's two-fold approach to Russia. The fact that Finland strongly supports the EU's joint Russia policy and restrictive measures on Russia but, at the same time, continues to the tradition of dialogue and cooperation helps us to see of the multi-layered character of the EU's Russia policy. It also gives us a possibility to overcome the relatively simplistic views of the EU's approach to Russia and of the EU-Russia conflict.

Russia's violation of international law and the EU's evolving foreign and security policy have led to a mutual distrust and sanction regimes that seem to dominate the EU-Russian relations. Russia is a key player for Finland. Therefore, Minister Haavisto's much-debated request in Financial Times to maintain good relations to a country that has violated its international commitments and creates a 'key strategic challenge' to European security order is understandable. When the 1990's and early 2000's 'romantic' phase of the EU-Russian relations was over and the discourses of strategic partnership and interdependence turned to mutual distrust, the Government of Finland and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued its 'active, pragmatic and solution-oriented' approach to Russia and actively lobbied both the Northern Dimension and selective engagement window to the platform of the EU's Russia policy.

Apart from being 'the best security politics' (Informant 170118F4) for Finland as a state, many local entrepreneurs, municipalities, regional councils, non-governmental organizations and, of course, citizens view Russia's nearby location, open and well-functioning border and cross-border interaction as resources. For them, the acidic EU-Russia relations based on mutual blaming seems distant and, to an extent, irrelevant. For them, the Russian border and 'the East' represent a new direction, ways to internationalize and get extra boost for development. Yet, the success of that requires a pragmatic approach where the focus is on issues of mutual interest – e.g. business, environment, health and well-being of citizens – and where day-to-day politics and politically sensitive issues such as human rights are excluded. As the Northern Dimension and its four partnerships, Euregio Karelia and joint CBC programmes well indicate, creation of common visions and joint strategies is possible even during the times of conflict. Also, the issues that are in the interest of Finland are usually also in the interest of the European Union.

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Adapting the Canadian immigration policies to Brazil: the case study of Rio Grande do Sul[1]

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Introduction

The role of immigration as a builder of the social, economic and cultural bases of Brazil is always manifest, and is studied from the first flows, which occurred in the sixteenth century, passing through the first generation of great migrations between the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries; by the second generation, shortly after the World War II; and now with the two immigration booms of the twenty-first century (Uebel 2015).

Brazil had two periods in its history which were marked by the great migrations. The first was still in Imperial times, with the subsidized immigration of Germans, Italians, Spaniards and Japanese between 1824 and 1908. The second period was between the end of World War I and the beginning of the Cold War, when the country received large flows of European, Arab, Jewish, Japanese and Chinese refugees. Since the military dictatorship, which lasted from 1964 to 1985, immigration flows have reduced, a pattern that only changed with the new flows of the 2000s and the warming of the Brazilian economy.

In Brazil this builder role was commonly analysed from the perspective of the Social Sciences and Humanities, such as demography, anthropology, sociology and history (Rocha-Trindade 1995). Recently, the Administrative Science discipline and the scholars of management, as well as their agents, started to pay more attention to immigration phenomena, led by the Canadian and European schools, serving as a model for later studies in the United States, Australia and New Zealand, and more recently, in the third millennium, in Latin America, particularly Argentina and Ecuador (Esteban & López Sala 2010), countries that have recently received many immigrants.

Although Brazil has always produced considerable reference literature analysing immigration flows, the studies conducted by the Administrative Science discipline and its researchers in this field have always been focused into interdisciplinary

research, but more with the contributions from other areas than from the Administrative Science, and to very specific cases, as in the works of Cavalcanti (1946) and Diégues Junior (1964) and those in Administrative Law, such as the work of Gomes & Leão (2010).

Despite the fact that in Brazil and in Rio Grande do Sul administrative and managerial scientific production has followed a path of not approaching immigration during the last decades, the flows toward these two territories grew exponentially after the year 2000, with an immigrant population that represents about one percent of the total Brazilian population in 2015 and considerable participation in the Rio Grande do Sul's demographics. This mass immigration flow has mainly been composed of Latin-Americans and Africans, and are predominantly economic immigrants (Uebel 2015). Therefore, considering that the debate on immigration legislation occurs in both countries at the federal level - although in Canada with relevant provincial autonomy - the research problem is first encapsulated in the comparison between the national policies of the two countries. Moreover, I choose to use the Canadian case because its immigration dynamics are similar to those of Brazil and specifically to the case of Rio Grande do Sul.

*Figure 1: Map of the State of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil.*

Source: "Rio Grande do Sul: location map". Map. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Web. 27 Mar. 2017. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Rio-Grande-do-Sul?oasmId=129043>

At a second stage, I choose to consider only the State of Rio Grande do Sul (Figure 1), due to the considerable increase of immigration flows in the last two decades towards that state and because it is, after São Paulo and Acre, the state that proportionally received (at least temporarily between 2010 and 2014) the most immigrants.

Graph 1 shows the evolution of the number of immigrants in the State of Rio Grande do Sul for the year 2000 (2001 to 2006 were excluded due to the lack of data) and from 2007 to 2015 (with statistical projections for 2016 and 2017), in order to prove this significant growth:

*Graph 1: Historical series of the number of arriving immigrants
in Rio Grande do Sul - 2000, 2007-2017.*

Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, Federal Police, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Foundation of Economics and Statistics Siegfried Emanuel Heuser This later one extinguished by the state governor José Ivo Sartori in December of 2016, despite strong popular opposition. The data for 2015, 2016 and 2017 were therefore estimated.)

It is observed that the behaviour of the immigration flows into the state presents in the years of change - inflexions - a growth above the tendency line - gray points -, whereas an immigration rate of five to fifteen thousand immigrants had been forecast in a period of fifteen years. I note that the annual immigration numbers for the years 2000, 2010 and 2014 showed a very significant quantitative jump, indicating a growth of 198.8% between 2000 and 2010 and of 125% between 2010 and 2014, that is, in Rio Grande do Sul the rate of immigration grew in four years to an extent that took almost a decade elsewhere.

Accordingly, this data, in combination with the nationalities of those immigrants (Table 1), lead public policy researchers and the Public Manager, i.e. the State's secretariat and governorship (as well as the policymakers) to inquire about the consequences of the sharp and unexpected growth of the migration of individuals who,

despite different origins, had common goals: employment, economic and social stability and housing.

*Table 1: Ranking of immigration groups in Rio Grande do Sul by country of origin -
Total stock 2007 - 2015.*

Country of Origin	Total by nationality	Ranking	Country of Origin	Total by nationality	Ranking
Uruguay	36.299	1º	Jordan	1.096	16º
Argentina	11.792	2º	Bolivia	1.021	17º
Portugal	5.614	3º	United Kingdom	943	18º
Italy	5.002	4º	France	906	19º
Germany	4.564	5º	Russian Federation	836	20º
USA	3.607	6º	Netherlands	539	21º
Chile	2.793	7º	Senegal	536	22º
Spain	2.681	8º	Cuba	466	23º
Japan	2.578	9º	Canada	423	24º
Haiti	2.517	10º	Mexico	421	25º
China	2.441	11º	Lebanon	420	26º
Paraguay	1.805	12º	South Korea	400	27º
Poland	1.682	13º	Greece	373	28º
Colombia	1.445	14º	Austria	371	29º
Peru	1.407	15º	Angola	366	30º

*Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, Federal Police,
Ministry of Labour and Employment.*

In this sense, this article presents public policies regarding immigration implemented in Canada and its provinces over recent decades: these are relevant because that country has observed a proportionally similar growth in its immigration flows to that of Rio Grande do Sul. Using a specific methodology combined with the adoption of multicultural immigration public policies, Canada optimized the inclusion of immigrants and their direction of immigrants to the jobs, regions and sectors of the economy that most needed them, which is a desirable for Southern Brazil. I strongly believe, based on the empirical literature I have studied, that Canada presents indicators and dynamics very similar to the scenario verified in Brazil and Rio Grande do Sul, so I chose this country for comparative analysis.

The choice of Canada as a reference country for this feasibility study of the application of public immigration policies derives from its historical experience as an

aggregator of immigrant communities, especially of Asians, Africans and Latin Americans, similarly to the current case of Rio Grande do Sul (Moura & Uebel, 2016). In addition, since the year 1870 there has been a systematic implementation and renewal of such policies in Canada (Green & Green 1996), imbuing there the adoption of new approaches from Management Science.

A comparative study of the action of the two States on the issue of immigration is justified for a number of reasons, namely:

a) The lack of analysis of Rio Grande do Sul and Brazil's participation on migration issues in present days.

b) The fact that Canada has a government structure specifically designed for immigrants, which includes regulations and public bodies that have been structured and adapted since the 1960s, which can be considered as being consolidated from a State recognition of the need for immigration in the country as an important contributor to Canadian development (Green & Green 2005).

c) Brazil's tendency to accept many immigrants due to a group of factors, among them the economic development of recent years; the recognition of the country as a regional power; and the limitations of the models of reception to immigrants used by governments worldwide.

The Brazilian social scientist, Aline Maria Thomé Arruda, complements the justification of this study by inferring that:

> *The choice of countries to be compared is justified by reasons different from the empirical and academic point of view. Canada has, as seen earlier in this paper, a tradition in the adoption of multicultural policies since its establishment as a nation-state. These cover the ethnic diversity recognized as the origin of the Canadian nation, with an Anglophone, Francophone and "native" presence. In the last forty years, however, there is also the inclusion in this multicultural perspective of the recognition of the rights and specificities of other "minorities", such as religious groups, genders and immigrants. These measures and state actions, therefore, have been elaborated and improved for some time. So, it is understood that there is an expertise of this State in dealing with the diversity present in its territory. (Arruda 2015: 19, our translation from Portuguese).*

Despite some differences in immigration management between Quebec, the French-speaking province, and the English-speaking provinces, especially Ontario and British Columbia, Canada is now recognized for following a multiculturalist approach to dealing with its immigrants. Brazil is beginning to go in the same direction. Thus, in Canada it seems that there is a priority in the recognition of the diversity of the multiple immigration groups, giving them the right to express these

cultural specificities, the authorities having recognized them as part of a welcoming multicultural society (Abu-Laban & Gabriel 2002).

Another relevant aspect is the complexity of the combined actions and measures that aim not only to recognize the demand for a foreign labour force in the country, but also to respond to other needs of the immigrants, preferentially assuming that they will settle in Canadian territory for a long period and will thus contribute to the development and to the economic growth of the country and its provinces. In this regard, a lot of attention is paid to decentralized management in provinces and, at the same time, organization by the Federal Government in Ottawa (Arruda 2015).

Given this configuration, this article has as its main objective to contribute to the optimizing of immigration in Rio Grande do Sul, taking into account the immigrant labour supply, based on one of the most open policies on immigration, on the socialisation of immigrants and refugees, and contributing to the debate about the role of Public Management facing the migration in a federative environment, such as that of both Canada and contemporary Brazil. The specific objectives of the article are:

1) Discuss the concepts of immigration in Public Management and the conceptualization of public policy and immigration policy in Canada and Brazil.

2) Describe the Canadian points system and show how it can be adapted to the needs and limitations of Rio Grande do Sul.

3) Describe Canada's public immigration policies, as well as its federative management.

4) Argue the possibility of applying the Canadian policies in the specific case of Rio Grande do Sul, as an autonomous federative unit.

5) Contribute to the optimization of the state's migratory situation and to the debate about the role of the Public Management of migration in the management of social and employment policies in a federative environment.

The work method used in this article follows the precepts of Viana (1996) and analyses the migration policies in force in Canada and Brazil, based on the legislation and scientific production of both on the subject, and later indicating propositions and opportunities of use and employment in the context of the Rio Grande do Sul. As a methodological standard used in this work method, the Canadian system of immigrant selection by points was adopted, starting from a categorization of foreigners - potential immigrants - to be discussed in section 2. In doing so, it follows a federative, normative, systematic and managerial characterization, enabling an integration of the Canadian pre-established system to the proposed model for Rio Grande do Sul. In addition, such selection criteria - both in the Canadian system and in the proposed model - follow a methodological basis with premises in: family ties, humanitarian reasons and professional skills.

The article is divided into three sections. Section 1 introduces its theoretical basis, discussing the topics and concepts of immigration in Public Management and, consequently, in Administrative Theory, as well as its conceptualization of public policy and immigration policy, and of points systems. Section 2 describes the public policies of immigration in Canada, as well as their federative management, that is, how the main provinces manage the reception, hiring and integration of immigrants. The section also covers the methodological approach. Section 3, i.e., the analysis of the results, argues the possibility of applying these Canadian policies and Canada's management of social and employment policies to the specific case of Rio Grande do Sul as an autonomous federal unit. It also briefly considers the immigration scene of the state and the possibilities of applying a *System of Management and Selection of Immigrants* at the state level, in order to direct newly arrived immigrants, especially those in the continuous flows to job vacancies and shelters throughout the entire territory.

Conceptual and comparative framework

In this section, I will present a brief discussion of the concepts of immigration, public policy and migration policy, as well as analysing the approaches of the Canadian and Brazilian scholars - and the similarities given by the legal system of each country - of a comparative and supportive nature. These concepts, therefore, will support the discussions of the last two sections and the analysis of the results, and will always provide a basis for comparison between the Brazilian State and the Canadian State.

Immigration: concepts

The concept of immigration, although it seems universal and linked to the first academic discussions from the sixteenth century, has different nuances and interpretations if analysed in different scenarios. The differences in context relevant here are those between a traditional immigrant-receiving country, such as Canada, or a traditional sending country that is undergoing a process of transformation into a receiving nation, such as Brazil.[2] Inserted in a scenario of multiculturalism, which Castro (2012) defines:

> *Such as the existence of various ethnic and racial segments in the population of a society or States... and policies and programs designed to address and manage ethnic diversity. (Castro 2012: 33, our translation from Portuguese).*

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2   Brazil is a historically recognized country as the sender of migrants. The largest Brazilian communities are in the Mercosur countries, the United States, Portugal and Japan. In recent years there has been a growth of Brazilian immigration to Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia.

Canada was one of the first nations in the world to adopt a multiculturalism policy and did so as early as 1971. This policy was formulated to offer recognition and support to multicultural groups, encouraging society to think of cultural diversity as a positive influence on the inclusion and participation of all citizens. According to Helly (2002), the cultural diversity of Canadian society was chosen as its major symbolic figure. Canada sought through the policy of multiculturalism to promote equal rights, respect for fundamental freedoms and political participation by diverse cultures. It was in a model that, unlike the traditional European integrationist model, it favoured the integration of immigrant communities in a common sense of citizenship. It is inside this multicultural environment that the concept of immigration thus arises in Canada and provides an administrative normative basis for other federal and provincial bodies - suggested by the Canadian Council for Refugees. According to the official terminology:

Immigrant: a person who has settled permanently in another country.

Permanent resident: a person granted the right to live permanently in Canada. The person may have come to Canada as an immigrant or as a refugee. Permanent residents who become Canadian citizens are no longer permanent residents.

Temporary resident: a person who has permission to remain in Canada only for a limited period of time. Visitors and students are temporary residents, and so are temporary foreign workers such as agricultural workers and live-in caregivers.

Migrant: a person who is outside their country of origin. Sometimes this term is used to talk about everyone outside their country of birth, including people who have been Canadian citizens for decades. More often, it is used for people currently on the move or people with temporary status or no status at all in the country where they live.

Economic migrant: a person who moves countries for a job or a better economic future. The term is correctly used for people whose motivations are entirely economic. Migrants' motivations are often complex and may not be immediately clear, so it is dangerous to apply the "economic" label too quickly to an individual or group of migrants. (Canada 2010a).

While Canadian migration policy is broad and still includes terms related to refugees and political asylum, Statistics Canada defines the immigrant as "persons residing in Canada who were born outside of Canada, excluding temporary foreign workers, Canadian citizens born outside Canada and those with student or working visas" (Canada 2010b). Finally, the Canadian legal system, like British Common Law – which strongly influenced Canadian Law – expresses through its Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, in force since 2002, the definitions of immigrant, the conditions for its legal authorization and permanence in Canadian territory and is also

the basis for the public and migration policies of the country, which will be discussed in the following sections.

Analysis of this legislation, which differs from its Brazilian counterpart in form and process indicates that in Canada the immigrant receives this status only after entering the territory: before that, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act points to two denominations: 1) foreign national, meaning a person who is not a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident, including stateless persons; and 2) permanent resident, meaning a person who has acquired permanent resident status and has not subsequently lost that status under section 46 (Canada 2001). The definition of immigrant in Canada is tied to the economic and social *momentum* of the country - always combined with multiculturalism - and has a margin for broad legal interpretation, which allows the redesign of immigration policies in each government.

A good example is the most recent case of Justin Trudeau's election, who also managed these policies, especially in relation to Syrian refugees and those citizens affected by the Travel Ban of Donald Trump in the United States (Mulligan 2017). On the other hand, in Brazil, the most widely used concept of immigration comes from the French école and is linked to a legal system dating back to the dictatorial period and pre-1988 Constitution.

The most used concept of immigration that has been propagated by Brazilian scholars, especially those in in Demography and Geography, is that given by the French geographers Brunet, Ferras & Théry (2012):

> *Movement of individuals (immigrants) accounted when entering a lieu, in a country. In fact, the term applies to foreigners who stay for a long time in a country that is not their own - eventually to the demand of the receiving country itself. In their country of origin, they are considered as emigrants. (Brunet, Ferras & Théry 2012: 271, our translation from French).*

Law No. 6,815 of 1980, also known as the Foreigners' Statute, defines the legal status of foreigners in Brazil and creates the National Council of Immigration. In the first articles of this Law, the principles that guide it, namely, national security and the defence of the national worker are highlighted:

> *Article 2. The application of this Law shall take into account national security, institutional organization, political, socioeconomic and cultural interests of Brazil as well as the defence of the national worker. (Brazil 1980, our translation from Portuguese).*

As Dizner (2015) argues, current legislation on migration reveals the ongoing tension between sovereignty and human rights. The recognition of migration as a human right collides with the constraints imposed by the state authority, in strong contradiction to the idea of the universality of human rights. Furthermore, unlike the

Canadian Act, the Brazilian statute does not have a clear definition of foreigner, or of immigrant. Throughout the Foreigners Statute, there is only one mention to the word "immigrant", in Article 17:

> In order to obtain a permanent visa, the foreigner must satisfy, in addition to the requirements referred to in article 5, the special requirements established in the rules for the selection of immigrants established by the National Council of Immigration. (Ibid., our translation from Portuguese).

In order to adapt Brazilian immigration legislation to the present, Faria (2015) writes that the successive amnesties implemented by the Federal Government since the re-democratization of the 1990s have sought, to some extent, to update the country's migratory reality to address contemporary challenges, which could not be answered in the current legal framework. Also, due to the inadequacy of the Foreigners' Statute, issues related to the treatment of migrants in Brazil such as the granting of visas, regularization of undocumented immigrants and access to the labour market have been regulated by successive resolutions of the National Council of Immigration (CNIg). The resolutions of the CNIg became the only possible solution to meet the demand imposed by the presence of foreign individuals in Brazil, in aspects not covered by the statute. This also served as a contribution to the formulation of public policies to immigrants, as will be seen in the following sections.

In the 1990s the need to adapt Brazil to contemporary migratory reality triggered a debate about the revision of the Foreigners Statute, and the Federal Government presented to the Parliament a bill on the subject, which did not advance and was withdrawn by the House Majority Leader in accordance with the Minority Leader (Uebel 2017). In 2009, the leftist government of Lula da Silva (PL 5,655/2009) presented a new bill, which remained for some years in the Committee on Tourism and Sport. The project managed to progress in 2012 and is in the process, with its last discussion in September 2015 with the Special Committee to deliver an opinion to Bill No. 2516, of 2015, of the Senate, which "establishes the Migration Law". The new Bill is authored by current Brazilian chancellor Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, a former communist and now a social democrat and a supporter of the government of Michel Temer.

In its preliminary articles, the new Migration Law highlights the defence of the human rights of migrants, as well as guaranteeing national interests, including the protection of national workers. The law also states in article 5 the fundamental rights and guarantees of foreigners that are enshrined in the Constitution. And it creates a new form of visa, the "tourist and business visa", replacing the current several forms of tourist and business visa. The law also creates several new types of temporary visas that reflect the Brazilian reality and the needs of immigrants coming to the country, including for the exercise of labour activities (Brazil 2017). The future

law - based on the Canadian legislation mentioned above - will allow Brazil to favour migratory flows that contribute to the economic, social, cultural and academic development of Brazil, regarding its twenty-first century's multiculturalism.

While it is not promulgated in the new Migration Law, the most widely used definition of immigrant/foreigner is the one given by the glossaries of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) to the previous censuses, which date back to 1940, namely:

> *The most general classification of nationality adopted by the censuses is: Native Brazilians (people born in Brazil or in a foreign country and registered as Brazilian, according to the laws of Brazil); Naturalized Brazilians (foreigners who obtained Brazilian nationality by means of naturalization certificate or using the provision of Brazilian legislation); Foreigners (people born in a foreign country or born in Brazil and registered in foreign representations, who did not become Brazilian citizens). (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 1940: 39, our translation from Portuguese).*

Thus, Chart 1 summarizes the differences and concepts concerning immigration in the context of Canada and Brazil:

Chart 1: Summary of concepts of immigration in Canada and Brazil

Immigration	
Canada	Normative and official terminology: immigrant, permanent resident, temporary resident, economic immigrant, refugee, asylum seeker.
	Terminology for statistical purposes.
	Legal terminology: foreigner and permanent resident.
	Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2002.
Brazil	Terminology influenced by French école.
	Terminology from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics: foreigners.
	Foreigners Statute, Law No. 6,815, 1980.

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Once the terms related to immigration, such as 'immigrant' and 'foreigner' have been defined in the light of Canadian and Brazilian normative interpretation, the next subsection, in order to build the theoretical and proposal framework of the last two sections, will address the interpretation of public policies and immigration policies in both countries.

Public policy and immigration policy: comparisons

Among the similarities between Brazil and Canada, besides the territorial extension and governmental democracy (as a structure), there is the presence of federalism in both national systems that constitute the Administrative Law of the two countries, though with different nuances. While the Canadian federation is divided into autonomous provinces and territories governed under Ottawa's nomination and supervision, each having its prime-minister and a Lieutenant Governor representing Queen Elizabeth II – the Head of State - Brazil is divided in equal federal states as indicated in the Constitution. On this account, the formulation of public policies in these two federations is distinct and has a delineating character, as in the Canadian case, and a central normative propositional role, as in the Brazilian case. Likewise, the power exercised by the federal branch in Ottawa and Brasília in matters of public policies, has consequences for the provinces (and territories) and for the states.

Atkinson et al. (2013) state that in the Canadian federation, it is the executive branch that holds the largest share in formulating and combining public policies with the immigration policies within the provinces, while, according to the authors, the legislative power is fragile and limited in this area. The authors also mention that the essential character of Canadian public policies is centred on intergovernmentalism, a concept not well known in Brazilian Administrative and Constitutional Law, and sometimes confused with the co-participation of the Union, states and municipalities in the formulation of public policies (Atkinson et al. 2013). According to these authors the formulation of intergovernmental public policies in Canada, is made on the basis of soft consensus rather than decisions voted after long debates, as in the Brazilian case. Such intergovernmental relations consist of two distinct groups: 1) vertical relations between the constituent units (the provinces and federal territories) and the central government; and 2) horizontal relations between the constituent units. Thus, contrary to Brazilian federalism, the construction of public policies is often not guided by Ottawa, but are developed between the provinces, especially among the Anglophones, without the direct involvement of the central government.

Erk & Koning (2010) argue that in multicultural federations such as Canada, there is a natural tendency towards decentralization in the formulation of public policies, precisely because of the central role given to language and cultural identity and the potential for coalition by national linguistic minorities, which form majorities inside the constituent units. In other words, immigrants and foreigners have a voice in the formulation of policies because of their differences and identities, which is not the case in Brazil, where the only officially recognized minorities are the first nations (indigenous) and *quilombolas* (descendants of African slaves).

The French-speaking province of Quebec, which on past occasions has attempted to achieve political independence from Canada and which still has a separatist sentiment in the most conservative sectors of society (Weber 2015), is the one that stands

out in its own formulation of public policies without the direct interference of the central government. However, Cameron & Simeon (2002) show that other provinces, such as Ontario and British Columbia, have followed the Quebec example and have their own definitions and practices regarding the concept of public policy. So, it is observed that in the Canadian context three areas of public policy have a greater provincial than a national role: 1) health policies, particularly the universal Medicare; 2) immigration policies, especially the Provincial Nominee Program; and 3) labour policies and internal trade (Cameron & Simeon 2002). Ley & Hiebert (2001) contend that these three areas are directly related to three interests:

> *We now turn to consider some of the implications for public policy and Canada's social geography, given the present tendency for immigration to drive population growth. We organize our thoughts around three main issues: the highly-concentrated geography of immigrant settlement in Canada and related impacts on urban environments and housing markets; the participation of immigrants in the Canadian labour force and concerns over the economic difficulties experienced by many who arrived during the recession of the early 1990s; and the evolving nature of Canadian identity and citizenship in an age of rapidly growing population diversity. (Ley & Hiebert 2001: 121).*

According to the Canadian Constitution, immigration and public policies concerning it have a shared jurisdiction between Ottawa and the provinces (with federal supremacy), but today this area of public policy has been predominantly taken by the federal government. In the 1960s, Quebec was the first among the provincial governments to demand exclusive control in the formulation of immigration policies and public policies for immigrants. In recent decades, other provinces have also begun to create specific policies. Although the Canadian federal government still establishes the criteria for selecting immigrants in the categories of families and refugees, the category of economic immigration now has two flows with two types of criteria: the federal programs and the provincial nominee programs (Baglay 2012).

The Provincial Nominee Program has allowed provincial governments to play a greater role in the selection of economic migrants and in the formulation of public policies for them, in order to meet the demographic and labour demands of each province, which recruit skilled and semi-skilled workers, and send refugees to shelters and reintegration into society without interference or greater participation by the central government, as in the Brazilian case. Such programs will be discussed in section 3 of this paper. So, the Canadian system of public policy formulation, which is divided into the central federal sphere and the provincial spheres, also conceptualizes them in a different way than in Brazil, while retaining a statist approach - (state-centred policy-making); in Brazil scholars see public policy as synonymous of multicentric policy (Ru 2009).

Following the Anglo-Saxon model that differentiates politics from policy, Rua (2009) gives us the most basic definition of public policies in a commentary on the Brazilian context and conjuncture: "the public policies are the result of political activity, and that consists in the peaceful resolution of conflicts, an essential process for the preservation of life in society". (Rua 2009: 21-22, our translation from Portuguese). For that reason, from the Brazilian theoretical-conceptual perspective, public policy in general and social policy in particular are highly multidisciplinary-origin fields, and their focus is on explanations about the nature of public policy and their processes. That being so, a general theory of public policy implies, in Brazil, the search to synthesize theories built in the fields of sociology, political science and economics.

In this way, researchers in so many disciplines - economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, geography, planning, management and applied social sciences - share a common interest in the field. Within this scope, one can perceive the growing contribution to theoretical and empirical advances in a strong and intense way in Brazil, much more than in Canada, where it is observed a specific circumscription to political scientists and geographers.

Souza (2006) summarizes public policy as the field of knowledge that seeks at the same time to "put the government into action" and/or to analyse this action (independent variable) and, when necessary, propose changes in the course of these actions (dependent variable). The formulation of public policies is the stage at which democratic governments translate their purposes and electoral platforms into programs and actions that will produce results or changes in the real world. Finally, another factor that differentiates the concept of public policy in Brazil from that in Canada, and which will be important when I show the proposals of this article, is the process of disclosing topics, as Rua (2009) wrote:

> *In other words, in government organizations, universities, political parties or in the organizations of society, there are often proposals that make it possible to solve certain problems. (Rua 2009: 69, our translation from Portuguese).*

Consequently, it is imperative that the proposal of public policies, as a means of solving the problems and adversities of a certain society, has in Brazil a more participatory character than in Canada, although in that country each constitutional unit has a broader autonomy than in the Brazilian case. Accordingly, in the following sections it will be possible to propose, based on the Canadian immigration policies, possible implementations for the Brazilian case and, especially, for the Rio Grande do Sul's case.

The similarity that exists between the concepts and definitions of the theme in both Brazil and Canada lies in the conjunctural circumstance, that is, the problem situation shows correspondence vis-à-vis an *a posteriori* need for a regularization, norma-

lization or proposal of appropriate policy for the proper needs. The social fact is the same: the immigration process.

The legal system of both countries also indicates similarities, whereas from the centrality of the federation, that is, the federal government, however, the differences happen, as already mentioned, in the vertical relations between the Federation and its constituent units (provinces, territories and states) and in the horizontal relations between them. In addition to the statist and multicentric approaches that also appear in the same stage of the process: when arguing, designing and implementing the public policy.

Regarding the conceptualization of public policies and immigration policy in both countries, Chart 2 summarizes them:

Chart 2: Summary of the concepts of public policies and immigration policy in Canada and Brazil

Public Policy and Immigration Policy	
Canada	1) vertical relations between the constituent units (provinces and federal territories) and the central government.
	2) horizontal relations between the constituent units.
	Provincial action: Quebec, British Columbia and Ontario.
	Statist approach (state-centred policy-making).
Brazil	Public polices as a result of political activity.
	"Put the government into action" and/or analyse this action (independent variable) and, when necessary, propose changes in the course of these actions (dependent variable).
	Multicentric approach.

Source: Elaborated by the author.

That said, the main point of confluence that allows the feasibility of the proposal of this research is the consideration of immigration policy also being a public policy, given the reasons explained above, in the cases of both Canada and Brazil. While Ottawa and other provincial cabinets have the immigration policy as public matter, but of governmental origin, in Brazil such a policy, like the 1st National Conference on Migration and Refuge, arises from extra-state agents as contributions, propositions and suggestions, which then become a government policy (Ministério da Justiça 2014).

Canadian Immigration Policy

In Canada, as in other liberal democracies, it is understood that the State has the constitutional legitimacy for the formulation and implementation of public policies, as discussed in the previous section. Moreover, it is inferred that in a federation like Brazil, the State has unrestricted power and resources to reach the goals of public policies; but it is not possible to conclude which country is more or less "federal". In this context, Simmons & Kehoane (1992) show that in the case of the formulation of Canadian immigration policies, the State places itself not only as an all-powerful hegemonic leader, but also presents itself as a group of concerned actors who analyse contingencies and strategic solutions to the country's immigration issues. In other words, the State appears as powerful and vulnerable at the same time, which delineates the entire formulation of the country's immigration policy since a century ago.

According to Esteban & López Sala (2010) the beginning of the regulation of the entry of immigrants into Canadian territory dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century, accompanying the debates about the creation of the Confederation in 1865. At the time, the regulation was a central element of the political agenda because of its consideration as one of the primary benefits of the union of the British colonies in North America and one of the foundation stones of the future development of the young Canadian nation. In this first stage of Canadian immigration policy, which occurred from 1869 to 1896, the primary objective of the legislation was the recruitment of settlers and workers as an instrument of social and economic improvement. Despite this, this declaration of intent did not translate into an active immigration policy in the later decades, and the policy suffered biases and changes in the following century.

It is not the purpose of this paper to analyse historically the development and evolution (or involution, depending on the case) of the Canadian immigration policy. However, in order to safeguard the contemporary background, the periodization made by Green & Green (2004) was used to synthesize the main historical points, before consideration of the issue of contemporary policies that will serve as basis for the case study of Rio Grande do Sul. The authors assert in their periodization that the main feature that defines the Canadian immigration policy is its continuing flexibility. Beginning with the 1910 Act, parliament gave almost unlimited power to the Council of Ministers to decide who and how many people could migrate to Canada. The 1952 Act, which replaced the former, transferred this decision away from Parliament, now under the care of the immigration Minister and immigration officials. The 1992 law provided the minister and the department even more powers, giving them the ability to set limits on the number of people who fell into subcategories: the department could now exclude a candidate, even if he or she met all the official requirements (Green & Green 1996).

The clearest implementation of flexibility is observed in the fact that all the main characteristics of immigrant adjustment system, instead of being debated in the Parliament, were established by authoritative orders, up to the most recent 2001 law, confirming the statist character of public policies discussed in the previous section. Such flexibility was also useful to Canada in cases where quick reactions were demanded, such as the Hungarian refugee crisis in 1956 and, more recently, the Syrian refugee crisis (Carlier 2016).

Another key feature of Canada's policy until very recently has been its emphasis on absorptive capacity. This was first introduced and put into action in the recession that followed the First World War as a response to labour demands. From that time until 1990, every new rise in unemployment was accompanied by substantial cuts in immigration. Equally important is the general underlying concept that attempts to solve the growing demand of the country by immigrants with specific skills, such as physicians, engineers, accountants and economists (Green & Green 1995). Another major feature of Canadian immigration policy that exists to this day is a broad regulatory system set in the 1960s. In this system, candidates are divided into classes, with different admission standards and processing priorities for each. Family or refugee applications are accepted only if they have family ties or refugee status, whereas independent candidates must undergo sorting under the points system. The creation of a separate class of refugees was part of a gradual recognition of international human rights in Canada towards the refugees, who are now part of the country's immigration policy, serving as an example for other nations, including Brazil. The specifications of each class are given by Green & Green (1995) in Figure 2:

Figure 2: Classes of immigrants and their definitions.

Entry class definitions

Independent Principal Applicant (IPA)	Individuals entering based on assessment under the point system without reference to family ties in Canada.
Independent Accompanying Family (IAF)	Direct family members accompanying an IPA at time of arrival. Individuals in this class are not assessed, though they are often included as part of the Independent class in tabulations.
Entrepreneur Principal Applicant	Similar to IPA's but assessed based on investor related criteria.
Entrepreneur Accompanying Family	Similar to IAF but accompanying an entrepreneur.
Sponsored	Close relatives and fiancés entering based on personal ties to Canadian residents. No assessment under the points system. Called Family class after 1978.
Nominated	Somewhat more distant relatives who are assessed under the point system but are given a bonus based on kinship ties with a sponsor. Called Assisted Relative class after 1978.
Refugee	

Source: Green & Green (1995).

Thus, Green & Green (1996) show that Canada's immigration history can be summarized as periods of large flows facing a specific problem, alternating with periods in which immigration was halted or slowed dramatically in the face of the precarious conditions in the domestic labour market. During the last decade, Canadian immigration policy has undergone changes of detail but not changes of principle. Some new trends, their functioning and their effects should be evaluated in coming years. Among these new trends, the most significant has been the transformation of the selection criteria, especially since the 2000s. We can observe a process that provides new variables for the admission of immigrants, in which family ties, humanitarian reasons and professional skills determine the possibilities of staying in the country (López Sala 2005). This mechanism of regulation was achieved with the approval, in 1967, of the so-called points system, a policy that has since been improved and included in the 2001 legislation and in Trudeau's proposals in 2015.

The Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS) Criteria, i.e. the points system, inspired by the Australian legislation, becomes a combined selection mechanism using different variables such as qualifications, training and professional experience, age and investment capacity or language skills - for example, according to the points system methodology candidates who know both Canada's official languages, French and English, have greater chances of being accepted in the immigration process. This system, which characterizes the main Canadian immigration policy and will serve as the basis for this work in the *analyse propositionnelle* of results for Rio Grande do Sul, has turned over time into a planned and proactive public policy that has promoted permanent immigration and in which the provinces have acquired progressively more responsibility, which would apply perfectly in the Brazilian federative case.

In the 1990s, as a result of Canada's growing emphasis on a knowledge-based economy, the points system was re-adjusted in terms of its selection mechanisms, promoting the recruitment of highly skilled workers (Augustine 2015). Immigration is perceived as a tool to promote consumption, create investments and improve productivity levels and technological innovation in the country.

This logic has brought a growth of independent immigrants, those who are not refugees or family members, into 60% of the 250,000 permanent workers admitted each year, compared to 28% in the family classes and 12% who have refugee status (Augustine 2015).

As Esteban & López Sala (2010) wrote, such a system has also contributed to the diversification of immigrants' nationalities, just as the process in which Rio Grande do Sul is facing nowadays:

> *This type of policy has sharply increased the diversity of the composition of migratory flows. For example, in the last two decades, the main continent of origin has been Asia, with the predominance of workers from China, India, the Philippines and Pakistan. (Esteban & López Sala 2010: 663, our translation from Spanish).*

Having been incorporated definitively into the public policy agenda and into Canada's legislation since the 1960s, such selection criteria have led Canada to consolidate an active immigration policy under the assumption that even during periods of crisis or economic turmoil immigrants will also possess strategic resources for the economy. This policy has included, as a priority, selection mechanisms based on each candidate's qualifications. This immigration management has thus promoted the establishment and privileged acquisition of Canadian citizenship *a posteriori* (Reitz 2007; Kelley & Trebilcock 2010; Papademetriou 2007; Knowles 2007) and the transfer of some responsibilities (selection, integration, family reunification) to the provinces, so that immigrants have become major players in the development of the country.

On January 1, 2015, the Government of Canada implemented the Express Entry immigration system, including the Federal Skilled Worker Program. Through Express Entry, skilled workers in several eligible professions that meet the minimum entry criteria can submit a request for interest in the process. The profiles of the candidates suitable for the selection are classified according to an official points system. The highest-ranking candidates are invited to apply for permanent residence as the normative of the programme. The Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSW) includes immigrants with adequate training, professional experience, age and language skills in one of the official languages of Canada and are selected under the Express Entry immigration system to apply for permanent residence.

To qualify for admission to the Express Entry process as a Federal Skilled Worker, applicants must meet the following criteria:

1. Possess one-year of continuous full-time paid work experience or the equivalent in part-time continuous employment within the previous 10 years in one of 347 eligible occupations listed under the applicable National Occupational Classification system; AND

2. The work experience must be classified within Skill Type 0 (Managerial Occupations), Skill Level A (Professional Occupations), or Skill Level B (Technical Occupations and Skilled Trades) within the meaning of the National Occupational Classification system; AND

3. Score sufficient points under the skilled worker point grid comprising of six selection factors. The current pass mark is 67 points;

4. Undergo language testing from a recognized third party and demonstrate intermediate level language skills in English or French corresponding to the Canadian Language Benchmark of 7)

5. Possess suitable settlement funding;

6. Undergo a successful security background and medical examination.

(Canadian Citizenship & Immigration Resource Center 2017).

Under the new rules, qualified applicants are assessed against six factors to determine admissibility for immigration to Canada. Applicants must obtain a total of 67 points within a limit of 100 in order to qualify. The selection factors are: Education; Language; Employment experience; Age; Arranged employment; Adaptability, divided into the following scoring table (see Table 2):

Table 2: Selection and scoring table of immigrants in the Canadian system.
Skilled Worker Selection Grid.

Factor		Score	Final
EDUCATION			**Max. 25**
(Canadian equivalence established by a designated third party)			
Doctorate			25
Master's or professional degree			23
Two or more post-secondary degrees, of which one is three years or longer			22
A three year or longer post-secondary degree			21
A two-year post-secondary diploma, trade certificate or apprenticeship			19
A one-year post-secondary diploma, trade certificate or apprenticeship			15
Secondary School Educational Credential			5
LANGUAGE (Abilities: Speak, Read, Write, Listen)			**Max. 28**
1st Lang	Very high proficiency (per ability) (CLB 9)		6
	High proficiency (per ability) (CLB 8)		5
	Intermediate proficiency (per ability) (CLB 7)* **Minimum threshold required to apply*		**4**
	Basic or no proficiency		0
	Possible maximum (all four abilities)		24
2ndLang	Basic proficiency or higher (per ability)		1
	No proficiency		0
	Possible maximum (all four abilities)		4
EXPERIENCE (NOC Skill Level O,A,B)			**Max. 15**
One year* **Minimum threshold required to apply*			**9**
Two to three years			11
Four to five years			13
Six years or more			15
AGE			**Max. 12**
18 to 35 years			12
36 years			11
Less one point per year until 47 years			

Factor	Score	Final
ARRANGED EMPLOYMENT IN CANADA		**Max. 10**
HRSDC-confirmed permanent offer of employment		10
Applicants from within Canada holding a temporary work permit that is:		
Validated by HRSDC, including sectoral confirmations		10
Exempt from HRSDC validation under international agreements (e.g., NAFTA)		10
ADAPTABILITY		**Max. 10**
Applicant has a minimum of 1 year skilled Work experience in Canada		10
Applicant has previously studied in Canada		5
Spouse has previously studied in Canada		5
Spouse has previously worked in Canada		5
Family relation over the age of 18 in Canada		5
Arranged employment		5
Spouse is proficient in an official language		5
Total		**100**

Source: Canadian Citizenship & Immigration Resource Center, 2017.

There are three major drivers of recent Canadian policy concerns about economic immigration, which, as our study discovered, resemble the situation experienced by Brazil and especially in Rio Grande do Sul. The first relates to the possibility of an impending general labour shortage associated with an aging population, an increase in retirement levels, and an increased demand for employee replacement. Second is the desire of many Canadian provinces to receive a larger number of immigrants in the belief that these will reduce the impacts of the current shortage of skilled workers and promote economic and demographic growth. The third driver is the need to improve the economic results of immigration in the face of deterioration over the last three decades, especially in the purchasing power and consumption of immigrants as the engine of the Canadian economy.

This paradoxical situation - low job vacancies for many immigrants, and at the same time calls for immigration to address "deficiency" situations - has resulted in an incentive to change immigration policies and practices in order to improve results. In response to these labour market issues the immigration system in Canada has therefore undergone considerable changes in the last decade. They include a greater role for the provinces in the selection and integration of immigrants, expansion of Temporary Foreign Worker (TFW), increased hiring of students completing their studies in Canada, changes in the FSW point system, and the development of a new program, the Federal Skilled Trades. These changes have increased the role of employers and educational institutions in the selection of immigrants, and reduced

the emphasis on the federal point system, turning to a multicentric policy like the one practiced in Brazil.

This section ends by presenting similarities between the scenarios and the conjunctures of Canada and Brazil, which will allow the adoption of some policies in the Brazilian states, in order to solve the same problems mentioned in the labour market and economic growth issues by the Canadian provinces. It will be observed in the following section, that it is not only the scenarios that resemble each other, but the trends and statistics as well. Lastly, it is clear from this section that Canada, by adopting a renewal in its policies in the 21st century, now resembles Brazil in its public management of such policies: from a statist system to a multicentric one with the participation of other stakeholders in the formulation and implementation, in particular, the business community and educational institutions.

Analysis of results:
application in the State of Rio Grande do Sul

The model proposed by Freeman (2006), shown in Figure 3, allows the combination of the Canadian immigration system to the one proposed for the specific case of Rio Grande do Sul:

Figure 3: Types of policy and politics.

Policy type	Migration type/policy	Mode of politics
Concentrated distributive (concentrated benefits/diffuse costs)	Permanent residence visas	Client
Diffuse distributive (diffuse benefits/diffuse costs)	Non-immigrant visas for purposes other than work	Majoritarian
Redistributive (concentrated benefits/concentrated costs)	Non-immigrant visas for work, welfare for immigrants, non-immigrants, and asylees	Interest group
Regulatory (diffuse benefits/concentrated costs)	Asylum claims	Entrepreneurial

Source: Freeman (2006).

From Figure 3, it is clear that both Canada and Brazil have a concentrated-redistributive system, differing in the way it is applied in their legislations and in the whole immigration process. While Canada already has a consolidated system, the proposal of this section is to adapt it to the needs of Rio Grande do Sul is; that is, it is the main objective of this study to perform this comparative and *propositionnelle* adaptation. In order to demonstrate the similarities of demographic immigration proportions between Canada and the Rio Grande do Sul, I present the compiled data of Sweetman & Warman (2013) in Figure 4:

Figure 4: Types of immigration flows to Canada in 2000, 2001 and 2010.

Immigration Flows by Class from the LSIC and 2000, 2001, and 2010 Administrative Data

	Administrative Data for Comparable Years to the Survey				LSIC Sample	Admin. Data
	2000	2001	% of Class	% of Total	% of Total	2010
Spouses and partners	35,296	37,761	57.3	15.3	15.1	40,764
Fiancé(e)s	1,521	1,637	2.5	0.7	+	'
Sons and daughters	3,950	3,934	6.2	1.6	+	2,955
Parents and grandparents	17,768	21,334	30.7	8.2	6.1	15,324
Others	2,078	2,119	3.3	0.9	2.9	1,177
Family class	**60,613**	**66,785**	**100.0**	**26.6**	**24.1**	**60,220**
Skilled workers – PA	52,125	58,906	38.0	23.2	38.7	48,821
Skilled workers – S&D	66,469	78,313	49.6	30.3	24.9	70,536
Canadian experience class – PA	NA	NA			NA	2,532
Canadian experience class – S&D	NA	NA			NA	1,385
Entrepreneurs – PA	1,657	1,610	1.1	0.7	2.15	291
Entrepreneurs – S&D	4,526	4,482	3.1	1.9	3.11	796
Self-employed – PA	795	707	0.5	0.3	++	174
Self-employed – S&D	1,735	1,451	1.1	0.7	++	326
Investors – PA	1,390	1,767	1.1	0.7	++	3,223
Investors – S&D	3,561	4,572	2.8	1.7	++	8,492
Provincial/territorial nominees – PA	1,252	1,275	0.9	0.5	0.4	13,856
Provincial/territorial nominees – S&D	··	··			0.3	22,572
Live-in caregivers – PA	1,760	1,875	1.2	0.8	——	7,664
Live-in caregivers – S&D	1,023	751	0.6	0.4	——	6,245
Economic immigrants	**136,293**	**155,709**	**100.0**	**61.1**	**69.6**	**186,913**
Government-assisted refugees	10,671	8,697	33.4	4.1	3.4	7,264
Privately sponsored refugees	2,932	3,576	11.2	1.4	1.5	4,833
Refugees landed in Canada	12,993	11,897	42.9	5.2	NA	9,041
Refugee dependants	3,496	3,746	12.5	1.5	1.0	3,558
Refugees	**30,092**	**27,916**	**100.0**	**12.1**	**5.9**	**24,696**
Other immigrants	460	205		0.1	0.6	8,845
Category not stated	1	1		0.0		7
Total	**227,459**	**250,616**		**100.0**	**100.2**	**280,681**

Source: Sweetman & Warman (2013).

For the same period, according to the official statistics compiled by Uebel (2015), the State of Rio Grande do Sul received in the year 2000, 17,525 economic immigrants in 2010, 34,864 economic immigrants. During the period, the growth recorded in Canada was 120.03%, while in Rio Grande do Sul was 98.93%, that is, close numbers. As in the Canadian case, each micro-region of Rio Grande do Sul has different economic and demographic needs, (Moraes & Alvim, 2012), and labour deficits in certain sectors of the economy, which eventually absorb immigrants.

A system of points criteria such as that adopted in Canada, added to the provincial criteria, according to the economic, labour and demographic needs of the state, would be feasible in the Rio Grande do Sul's context. In contrast, the propagandization of the state is precisely formed by two axes: 1) contact networks of immigrants and their families and colleagues in the country of origin; 2) trade promotion tied to Brazil, through its diplomatic posts and specific actions such as scholarships for foreigners, research grants, recruitment of Brazilian companies, etc.

According to data from the Atlas of Human Development in Brazil, the economically active population of Rio Grande do Sul grew by only 15.69% between 2000 and 2010, the aging rate increased by 31.34%, and the total population grew by 506 thousand inhabitants. These are attention-demanding figures and if the increase of recent immigration, particularly of Haitian and Senegalese, does not meet the job vacancies open each year, it may generate an increasing labour shortage linked with the reduction of economic growth and the proper capital turning in the state economy (Uebel 2015).

Because of this and considering the main migratory flows towards Rio Grande do Sul described in Table 1 at the beginning of the paper, it will be inferred that these immigrants come from countries with high levels of training and academic and professional skills, which can be incorporated into the state's needs, if a points system criterion are used. Even immigrants from countries that do not have academic skills standards- but still have a professional semi-qualification - could be absorbed in sectors of industry and services, as in the provinces of Western Canada and the specific case of Haitian immigrants in Rio Grande do Sul.

A system of points adapted for the state is presented in Table 3 below, considering the regional economic and labour situation.

Table 3: Proposal of a selection and scoring simple table of immigrants in the Rio Grande do Sul's system.

Factor	Score	Final
EDUCATION		Max. 30
Doctorate		30
Master's degree		23
Two or more post-secondary degrees, of which one is three years or longer		22
Bachelor's degree, MBA or a 2-year major		19
A one-year post-secondary diploma, trade certificate or apprenticeship		15
Secondary School Educational Credential		5
LANGUAGE (Abilities: Speak, Read, Write, Listen)		Max. 20
1st language Portuguese		20
2nd language Spanish		10
3rd language English, Italian or German		10

Factor	Score	Final
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE		Max. 30
One year* *Minimum threshold required to apply*		5
Two to three years		10
Four to five years		20
Six years or more		30
AGE		Max. 20
18 to 35 years		20
36 years		9
Less one point per year until 47 years		
ARRANGED EMPLOYMENT IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL		Max. 20
ADAPTABILITY		Max. 10
Applicant has a minimum of 1 year skilled Work experience in Brazil		10
Applicant has previously studied in Brazil		5
Spouse has previously studied in Brazil		5
Spouse has previously worked in Brazil		5
Family relation over the age of 18 in Rio Grande do Sul		5
Arranged employment		5
Spouse is proficient in Portuguese		5
Total	130	

Source: Elaborated by the author.

The adopted criteria for the construction of this propositional model for the State of Rio Grande do Sul are based exclusively on the Canadian system already pre-established and freely adapted by the author. They take into account the educational and professional needs and standards of Rio Grande do Sul, in compliance with indicators such as the Human Development Index, Gini Coefficient, GDP per capita, and other indexes of education (ENEM, CPC, ENADE, etc.), society, economy and development.

The score was changed to a limit of 130 points in order to maintain the same weights for the points of education and to give greater relevance to the qualification in foreign languages and professional experience. As it is a model, it opens the opportunity for discussion in future researches about its validity, possibilities of change, modifiability and malleability in observing the transformations, demands, limitations and conjunctures of each microregion of the state.

This system could be applied through embassies and diplomatic missions of Brazil, especially in those countries with the greatest potential for immigration to Rio Grande do Sul, following the historic series, and by the internet, as in the Canadian case, with the formalization of the process later in one of the diplomatic offices.

Such a public policy would optimize the migratory entry, meeting the demands of the state, and reduce the costs incurred by the federal government through the issuance of work permits, deportations, inspections and documentation, as in Canada. It is an instrument that would be formalized through the State Government and its Secretariat for Social Development, Labour, Justice and Human Rights and the Foreign Relations Office, and would not require costs for the implementation of specific agencies as in the Canadian provinces. With universal access by potential immigrants to information and to the Internet, combined with the divulgation and promotion of the immigration system of Rio Grande do Sul, it would also be possible to relocate refugees from other Brazilian states, and unemployed immigrants already arrived through an online system of shelters and job offers, as in the Quebec model (Vengrof 2013).

Noticeably, the implementation of such a public policy depends on other factors inherent in the public policy cycle (Figure 5). However, Rio Grande do Sul, as already discussed, would be in a decision-making process, whereas the initial phase, from the formation of the agenda - the current real immigration situation - to the formation of alternatives - the proposal of this work - would already be completed or widely debated (Zamberlam et al. 2013). This is because:

A) The formation of the agenda had occurred when the increase of the immigration flows towards the state was observed.

B) The definition of the problem, immediately prior to the formation of the agenda, had arisen when it was necessary to direct immigrants, especially Haitians and the from the West African coast, to housing, shelters and the labour market, finding points of convergence and oversupply in some cases.

C) The analysis of the problem took place through the discussions in the scope of the 1st COMIGRAR, the monthly debates of the Human Mobility Forum and other committees and state agencies seeking to offer assistance to immigrants and workers.

D) The decision-making and the concomitant adoption of the policy come with the proposal presented in this article.

In this manner, the proposal that is presented with the points system would already be included in the National Migration Strategy, drafted by the Ministry of Justice during the government of Dilma Rousseff, who was irregularly impeached in 2016. However, reading the Proposals Book of 1ˢᵗ COMIGRAR, we can identify some common points (Ministério da Justiça 2014).

Figure 5: Public Policy Cycle

Source: Rua (2009), adapted from the original and translated from Portuguese.

The main points of this strategy converge towards the adoption of the Canadian-Rio Grande do Sul policy proposed in our paper, namely: Portuguese classes, professional training and counselling directed at productive inclusion (*Ibid.*, p. 16); the inclusion of the immigrant population in public and private agencies of labour intermediation that offer professional orientation services, job placement, Portuguese courses and professional qualification, among others (*Ibid.*, p. 31); the creation of access mechanisms, and expansion of the criteria for the inclusion of migrants and refugees in national and local policies (*Ibid.*, p. 38); the creation of specific reservation quotas for these groups, including a unified system of selection for migrants and refugees (*Ibid.*, p. 40); and the equipping of public bodies, such as the National System of Human Rights (*Ibid.*, p. 17).

Finally, what is more related to the proposal in this article is to develop a National Register of International Migrants that considers all the migrants in Brazil, Brazilians living abroad and Brazilian returnees, and is coordinated, managed and updated by a specific body of the federal public administration, consolidating data from the services provided to the migrant population by public agencies at the federal level, particularly the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Labour and Employment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Police. In addition, the proposal would also have application/utility in the state and municipal spheres, as well as those obtained through official surveys conducted by the Brazilian government, such as the IBGE's censuses, and/or by international organizations, universities and research centres and civil society organizations that are known for providing care and assistance to migrants in the country (*Ibid.*, p. 22).

Final Considerations

The intention of this article was to contribute to the incipient debate on the immigration issue in Brazilian Public Management, as well as to the deliberations already under way concerning Administrative Law and Public Policies. Furthermore, considering the situation of Rio Grande do Sul, as a state with a certain autonomy over the implementation of public policies in the fields of labour and social assistance, I have also tried to propose a system that optimizes the entry and involvement of immigrants in the labour market and regional economy.

This discussion certainly does not close the debate on the comparison and applicability of exogenous policies - immigration, labour, social, population policies - to the context and case of Brazil and Rio Grande do Sul. It rather presents a possible solution to the imminent needs arising from the economic and social situation in which Brazil and, more especially, Rio Grande do Sul, has been experiencing over the past two decades. Instead of proposing walls, it is recommended to build bridges based on Public Management and through policy cooperation between Brazil and Canada.

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
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Book review

Frank Furedi (2021): Why Borders Matter: Why Humanity Must Relearn the Art of Drawing Boundaries. London and New York, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, p. 193.

In his new book, Frank Furedi attempts to grasp and to analyze one of the most actual and at the same time one of the most controversial and provocative topic of our lives, namely the issue of borders, their meanings, roles, functions and their possible future. The question of border plays an immense role for every human being, either for those who wish to preserve the borders because of their positive and building characters or for those who wish to eliminate and erase the borders, hence imagining a utopian cosmopolitan and transnational borderless world.

The book attempts to underline that borders have significant meaning for our lives. Specifically, drawing of borders, boundaries and demarcation through symbolic markers have been integral elements of humanity, human societies and their development. Within the divided territorial demarcations there is a space in which shared feelings, community elements and identity can be created between the individuals, thus establishing powerful bounding and protecting dimensions. In other words, (symbolic) borders are essentially important for the construction of the 'Self' and the 'Other' structure which helps to uncover and to understand the pivotal question of 'who I am' and 'who I am not', hence establishing clear identity, norms, moral value frames; consequently, making a distinction between right and wrong, between good and evil, between sacred and profane, etc.

The idea of propagated openness has been transformed into contemporary core value that has been adopted and propagated by big (high-tech) companies, private and public sector organi-

zations, educational institutions, culture industry and websites. The vision of the idea of openness is to introduce a cosmopolitan world which is freed from the classical border structures. Although, humanity must relearn the art of drawing boundaries since borders and boundaries play significant role, they are the key elements of our Self-identity and their symbolic meanings give structures and frames to human life. This means that elimination of borders, boundaries and entering into a borderless world would eliminate our identity, our Self, it would unbound cultural and moral norms and it would bring immensely deep identity-crisis with unpredictable consequences. Furedi notes (p. 12.) in his book, "*Western society's estrangement from borders is not an enlightened step forward – rather is expresses a self-destructive sensibility of estrangement from the conventional sign posts that guide everyday life. Consequently, it finds it difficult to hold the line that separates the positive from the negative dimensions of human experience.*"

In our everyday life, we are the eyewitness of a huge battle of these two paths, a battle that is fought between the globalists and the territorialists. This clash could be also identified as 'culture wars'. In this war, a mobile and globalist class of professionals and managers unleashed a strong criticism on every aspect of borders and boundaries, hence idealising, as part of our civilizing process, the idea of openness, transparency and a borderless world. This means that majority of academics, managers and celebrities call for open borders and they reject, often explicitly, traditional understanding of borders. What is more, culture industry, like films, movies, television programmes and musical hits celebrate the idea of removed borders, free floating identities, elements of cosmopolitanism, but at the same time they rarely express some support for national sovereignty and/or secure borders.

The idea of openness and a world without borders underline that borders constitute a hindrance and real physical and mental obstacles for human societies, for their development and civilizing process. The traditional boundary structures, including the notion of national citizenship and even the national sovereignty, are far too exclusivist. This exclusionist frame has to be remade and it has to be recalibrated in order to be inclusive one. Subsequently, the proponents of a borderless world attempt to deterritorialize the key elements of our traditional world, like sovereignty, citizenship and democracy. Even more, they attempt to challenge the borders between generations, genders, public and private and between binary categories.

However, the process of deconstruction and devaluation of borders has triggered some serious and unpredictable anxieties. To be more specific, deconstruction of borders disrupts the 'Self and Other' nexus, it powerfully disintegrates the traditional built identity, hence directly leading to the status of identity crisis. As a consequence of this fluid and free floating identity, we experience the explosion of identity, thus demanding and drawing of new (cultural) boundaries. Nevertheless, the new artificial borders and boundaries are much more separating and much more nonnegotiable than

the former classical meaning of borders. Furedi writes about this phenomenon as '*paradox of borders*'.

This means that alienation and hostile climate towards the classic border frames are not without consequences. These consequences are severe and deep-going, like atomization, loss of solidarity, feeling of loneliness and/or widespread mistrust. Materialization of these feelings, fears and insecurity of the Self generate an irreversible push in the soul of the atomized people for new border frames which is a direct paradox of the ideology of openness and world without borders, thus "*the culture of boundaryless-ness suddenly mutates into its opposite (…) One striking feature of the paradox of borders is that scepticism about the practice of border security runs alongside an increasingly aggressive demand to respect personal boundaries*" (p. 163., 171.). Subsequently, robust personal and cultural boundaries are imagined and built up between identity groups and cultures (between man and woman, between heterosexual and homosexual, between black and white), but these new boundaries are immensely politicized and they are enormously conflict driven. This means the prism of culture becomes a powerful battle line between identity groups. Furedi (p. 161.) writes about this in the following way, "*the principal achievement of the crusade against appropriation is to turn every form of cultural interaction into a potential site for conflict.*" The real problem of these newly manufactured politicized cultural borders is that they miss the moral and organic connection with the people and with society.

The ideologists of openness and world without borders have opened numerous domains and spaces where they attempt to delegitimize, deconstruct and demoralize the borders. One of these domains is the issue of binary thinking, like 'Self' and 'Other', us and them, man and woman, normal and abnormal, etc. According to the author, there is a palpable aggressive tone towards this space of boundaries, especially to issues which are related to identity, gender and sex. However, binary categories are not simply tools of culture which can be easily 'updated' and substituted, but these categories represent a fundamental feature of human conceptualisation. Hence, the binary logic is also inbuilt in major religions, like Christianity, Taoism, Zoroastrianism and/or the strict binary logic of the Jewish's idea of chosen people. Moreover, this logic plays profound part in philosophy, from Plato until Descartes. Simply, binary categories embody one of the most important elements of human identity and conceptualisation of the world around us, which means that their 'exorcism' could unleash sever unpredictable risks.

The domain of public and private sphere and the boundary between them have become object of the openness ideology. The sphere of private, privacy and intimacy have become suspicious and there is an urgent push for opening up every element of the private sphere, from feelings, tears or even sexual life. We can experience that there a strange phenomenon, namely the 'pornography of suffering', i.e. endless talk about domestic violence and dangerous character

of the private sphere and this continuous and nonstop talk legitimizes the intrusions into the private sphere and the urgent call for public scrutiny towards the private. Furedi (p. 79-80.) writes about it, "*private sphere … once regarded as a safe refuge from the demands of everyday life, it is now often depicted as a toxic environment in which its intimates vent their destructive emotions at those who are closest to them.*" In other words, we are the eyewitness of an impatient attempt to transform the historically perceived private forms of behaviour into public acts, hence opening up new areas for politicization and culture wars. However, the consequences are serious, "*once the space for secrecy is lost, the individual's capacity to question, doubt, and act in accordance with their inclinations is undermined.*" (p. 88.).

Moreover, deconstruction of the barriers between private and public has profound destructive and disintegrating effects on the political realm, too. This step of the open border ideology has two immediate consequences. On the one side, the personal side is pulled into the politics, thus private lives, public confessions, private sentiments, habits, golf games and even sexual life become principal object of political attention. However, it devaluates the role of politicians and politics itself because they have become more preoccupied with management of personal affairs rather than governing the issues of public policy. On the other side, the person/personal is politicized in a way that identity (frequently transgender activists) is used as a political weapon. The politicization of the person and the identity is a very dangerous

and insecure road because differences are not simply 'personal slights', but they are interpreted as attack on identity, thus normal problems of daily life are transformed into 'psychological language of harm', into an irreconcilable fight between culture and identity that further atomizes the society, increases personal insecurity and generates a form of behaviour of the borderless mass which is characterized by so-called micro-aggressions. In other words, we enter into an unpredictable realm through blurring the boundaries between private/public and between politics/personal, as Furedi (p. 109.) underlines it, "*once politics becomes deprived of its inner content, democracy loses its relationship to any fixed points and becomes a caricature of itself.*"

Deconstruction of borders and boundaries generates a phenomenon that is described as 'identity crisis'. Borders play structural role in developing the self-identity of a human being and the absence of clear boundary profoundly confuses the Self and the identity. Consequently, multiplication of identities and unstable free-floating identities emerge which cause that the modern man is in a permanent state of identity crisis with considerable nervousness, anxiety and tension. One of the most damaging outcome of disintegrating the symbolic boundaries is the infantilisation of adulthood which goes hand in hand with the challenge of the adult moral authority and idealization of the children, pretending to be responsible adults. Perplexity of adulthood, moral authority and the young directly leads to serious confrontation, namely to genera-

tion wars. The young generations blame the older ones for their irresponsibility towards environment, political issues, Brexit and/or open borders, while the moral authority of the older generation is narrated as authoritarian and the inevitable moral boundaries are blurred, distorted and perplexed.

Furthermore, Furedi underlines that we are the eyewitness how the traditional cosmopolitanism, the cosmopolitan utopia with universal and moral outlook, the universal ideals of humanism and the idea of utilizing the potentials of the human spirit are transformed into structurally some else. The contemporary cosmopolitanism is profoundly different than the traditional one. It is characterized by anti-community dogmatic character with aggressive rejection of nation, national borders, the relating institutions and political categories, like sovereignty, citizenship and even democracy itself. Simply, it has turned itself into a negative and destructive ideology. Instead of controllable national democratic frames and sovereignty, the ideology calls for global sovereignty with global demos. Nevertheless, as the influential political thinker, Hannah Arendt, notes and warns us, the establishment of an unbounded world government is not a path towards the climax of world politics, but rather the literal end of world politics itself.

The principal message of Furedi is that the age-old existing boundaries, like the boundary between different nations and states, boundary between adults and children, boundary between men and women are questioned and narrated as illegitimate obstacles to human development. Subsequently, the ideology of openness and borderless world aims to eliminate them in order to fully explore, accomplish personal identity and the civilizing process. However, the boundaries guarantee security and clear structures for human societies, as Furedi (p. 171.) puts it, "*boundaries, such as those between nations, between children and adults, or between the private and the public, are not seen as arbitrary or morally irrelevant, but as points of reference essential for navigating our existence.*" In the absence of boundaries, defensiveness prevails and identity falls into parts and these psychological risks of openness lead to an unpredictable and dangerous constellation that is driven by 'culture of fear'.

Moreover, there is a coexistence of the aggressive tone of border deconstruction and the psychological demand for new borders at the same time, thus substituting the disappearing borders. With disappearance of traditional borders, moral and cultural relativity is introduced that deprives society from its ability and capacity to perform judgment, to be more specific, "*Morality is mediated through the symbolic boundaries and rituals that help individuals endow their experience with meaning, and refreshed and made relevant through acts of judgement and the drawing of lines.*" (p. 173.) Consequently, there is an urgent need, especially for the Western society, to relearn to draw the boundaries, hence assuring guidance and moral norms for the community, nation and the state, hence overcoming the dangerous self-destructing effects of identity-crisis.

The book aims to break out from the academic mainstream which is more inclined towards the idea of cosmopolitanism, ideology of openness and free borders. This book represents and articulates rather rare conservative approach and it expresses academic support for borders, boundaries and national sovereignty.

The book is primarily recommended for the academic community, for students of political sciences, international relations, sociology and for those readers who are interested in topics like, like borders, (national) sovereignty, democracy, identity-crisis, culture, Self-Other nexus and/or public-private relationship.

Teodor Gyelnik

Research Note on Covid and Bordering

Anna Casaglia and James W. Scott

Since the advent of SARS-CoV-2 in 2019 and its worldwide spread in 2020, the question of Covid-19 and its impacts has become a major concern (not only) for borders scholars. This will be increasingly visible as ongoing research becomes publicly available in the coming months. Definitive analyses of Covid's effects around the globe are still pending, however issues related to social and psychological well-being (Saladino, Algeri and Auriemma 2020), the unequal global distribution of social, economic and health-related burdens (Rohwerder 2020) and various forms of everyday 'bordering' that Covid-19 has either generated or exacerbated (Wille and Kenesu 2020) are among the many perspectives that have been elaborated.

Based on research reports and webinars targeting better understanding of Covid's societal implications, a number of observations can be made. One thing that is abundantly clear is that the Covid pandemic has reinforced how borders and border-making operate as manifestations of state power as well as processes embedded within and dispersed throughout society. In our estimation, the following issues stand out in the debate:

1. The pandemic is a border-making phenomenon that operates politically, socially, socio-economically and culturally at different levels

Obviously, the most visible manifestation of border impacts is their temporary closure and/or the introduction of sweeping restrictions on mobility as a means to control the spread of the virus. Unfortunately, border closures have usually come too late, after infections through specific spreading events have taken place. Once the virus is established locally, border closures have more limited epidemiological but considerable economic and social impacts. However, this is only one aspect. The Covid-19 epidemic also highlights how broader challenges to social cohesion, openness and solidarity need to be understood through the multilevel and multifaceted prism of borders. The pandemic has laid bare the vulnerabilities of nations and societies in social, economic, welfare terms. This is reflected in border-making patterns that have emerged with differential impacts within society: age, health, nature of employment, levels of employment flexibility, housing conditions, etc. divide the population in terms of exposure and vulnerability to the virus.

Furthermore, the challenges societies are facing will reverberate in the near future and raise questions regarding the achievement of transnational solidarity: as regards the European Union management of security measures to fight the pandemic, it has been noted how "[t]he pandemic can teach us many lessons on solidarity: it is a legal and moral value, it is crucial for integration, and it must be operationalized, providing for different forms of solidarity, such as financial solidarity, as *ultima ratio*" (Marin 2020: 15-16).

2. Vulnerable categories and global injustice

The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has put to the fore the differential impact of threats and disasters on diverse population groups, rising fundamental concerns on forms of spatial and social injustice. In different areas of the world, the most affected by the virus are categories of people who already present some kinds of vulnerability and experience inequalities. Among those who appear to be more at risk with regard to the pandemic, migrants and refugees indeed present patterns of vulnerability that lie at the intersection of class, race and status (Guadagno 2020, Marin 2020), left aside gender and age (Eaves and Al-Hindi 2020). Various factors affect migrants in the different stages of their migratory path, starting from the dramatic health conditions in overcrowded camps, the lack of entitlement to health care, the exclusion from welfare programs, and the illegalized condition that often determines migrants' invisibility. Border restriction affect irregular mobility, further complicating the already precarious travel conditions of people trying to reach countries where to ask for asylum or look for better life chances. In a situation of health emergency, it is easy to imagine the negative impact of sanitary conditions that are already fragile in a normal scenario.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi stated that "If health risks are identified, screening arrangements can be put in place, together with testing, quarantine, and other measures. These will enable authorities to manage the arrival of asylum seekers and refugees in a safe manner, while respecting international refugee protection standards designed to save lives."[1] However, many countries already suspended asylum procedures, other declared themselves unsafe for welcoming refugees due to high numbers of contagion (Tondo 2020), and resettlement departures were temporarily suspended. Indeed, Covid-19 brings to the forefront the relationship of globalization, inequalities, security and global migration.

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1   https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/3/5e7395f84/statement-filippo-grandi-un-high-commissioner-refugees-covid-19-crisis.html

3. Covid-19 has a border-making impact in terms of ontological (in)security

Feelings of wellbeing and security are threatened by disruptive events and drastic changes to everyday routines. As Jussi Laine has argued in his essay in this volume, ontological security expresses a need to locate and orient oneself in the world but can also entail gross exaggerations of threat perception regarding perceived threats. Here, misinformation plays an insidious role. In many countries, misinformation has emerged as a major challenge in managing the pandemic; it is also a border-related issue. Resistance to lockdowns, wearing of masks and observing other guidelines and restrictions has to some extent divided public opinion and complicates the political framing of response measures. Covid-19 related events thus indicate that one important aspect of information is rather an old one: its use as ideological ammunition in geopolitical and domestic political contexts. Accusations of "fake news", often heard in the media, are used to disqualify opponents and limit the possibility of open and measured debate over socially and health-relevant issues. In order to respond to security challenges of (mis)information, measures need to be taken that reduce everyday perceptions of threat. Transparent and inclusive communication is key. Moreover, communication should avoid creating new socio-political boundaries between individuals and groups. Ultimately, the impact of misleading and tendentious media appeals will often depend on how society works towards reducing potential for mutual mistrust.

Misinformation was also an essential component of racialized reactions to the spread of the pandemic, still defined as the "Chinese disease" in countries like the US, which led to the victimization of ethnic minorities and the socio-economic discrimination of marginalized groups (Teixeira da Silva 2020). In addition, stigmatization and the creation of stereotypes in connection to the spread of the virus have also created a harmful climate for migrants. In many contexts this phenomenon has been politically instrumentalized to spread anti-migrant narratives and promote increased immigration control, the interruption of SAR operations, and the reduction of migrants' rights (Banulescu-Bogdan et al. 2020).

4. Biopolitics of public health have emerged as a political and ethical battleground:

Following from the above, the public health struggle has, perhaps inevitably, become highly politicised. Giorgio Agamben, for one, has channelled outrage at lockdowns and disease control measures by decrying a biopolitical 'state of exception' and its threats to European societies. This message has resonated particularly in West Europe, for example in France, Germany, Italy and the UK. It has also been appropriated by extremist groups who aim to gain visibility by supporting anti-lock-

down measures (e.g. Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, white supremacists in the US). his perspective has been countered by many scholars, for example by Jean-Luc Nancy who argues that theoretical commitments, such as those of Agamben, and a lack of connection with real life have led to delusional conclusions about the significance of states of exception. Roberto Esposito has also weighed in by defending the relevance of biopolitics, but also suggesting that in Italy (and elsewhere) we have seen rather "a breakdown of public authority and health systems than that of a dramatic totalitarian grip."[2]

This raises the question whether a democratic biopolitics is indeed possible. Sergei Prozorov (2019) defines this option as the coexistence of diverse forms of life on the basis of reciprocal recognition as free, equal, in common and derived from lived experience. Similarly, Panagiotis Sotiris has stated that: "Biopolitical measures as the result of democratically discussed collective decisions based on the knowledge available and as part of a collective effort to care for others and ourselves. (…) instead of a permanent individualized fear, which can break down any sense of social cohesion, we move towards the idea of collective effort, coordination and solidarity within a common struggle, elements that in such health emergencies can be equally important to medical interventions. This offers the possibility of a democratic biopolitics. This can also be based on the democratization of knowledge." [3]

However, concerns remain regarding the long-term effect of control policies and limitations to individual and collective freedom introduced or enhanced in the fight against the pandemic. Actions were put forward to safeguard society's health through mobility restrictions, police surveillance and sanctions, the development of mobile apps for tracking individuals, quarantine measures, the radical interruption of social life and gatherings. All these measures could be also used to enhance surveillance and tighten control, actually limiting civil rights, and they might "serve as a dramatic precedent for limitations on human mobility, targeting the most vulnerable, and setting up future draconian restrictions" (Slack and Heyman 2020: 5)

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2   https://crisisandcommunitas.com/crisis/the-philosophical-debate-about-biopolitics-in-times-of-covid-19/

3   https://lastingfuture.blogspot.com/2020/03/against-agamben-is-democratic.html

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