Cross-Border Review

Yearbook 2017

Editor-in-Chief

Dr. hab. James Scott

Professor of Regional and Border Studies

University of Eastern Finland, Karelian Institute

Editorial board

Martin Barthel

University of Eastern Finland, Karelian Institute

Prof. Henk van Houtum

Department of Geography, Radboud University,

Nijmegen, Netherlands

Dr. hab. Jarosław Jańczak

Lehrstuhl Europa-Studien, Europa-Universität Viadrina, Germany

Dr. Jussi Laine

University of Eastern Finland, Karelian Institute

Prof. Iwona Sagan

Department of Economic Geography, University of Gdańsk, Poland

Dr. Christophe Sohn

Luxembourg Institute for Socio-Economic Research, Luxembourg

CONTENTS

JAMES W. SCOTT: Introductory Note from the Editor 3

Articles 5

JAMES W. SCOTT: Globalisation and the Study of Borders 5

JUSSI P. LAINE: The Ethics of Bordering: A Critical Reading of the Refugee ‘Crisis’ 31

TEODOR GYELNIK: Double-Speed Europe: A New Round of Border Frames within European Integration 51

POLONA SITAR: Cross-Border Shopping Tourism in Socialist Yugoslavia: Gender, Socialist Economy and Reconfiguration of Borders 79

MARTIN BARTHEL: Connectivity vs. Disconnectivity – the Influence of EU Border policies on Regions. A Case Study of Poland’s Western and Eastern Borders 97

FULGÊNCIO LUCAS SEDA: Migration Perspectives within Southern Africa: Challenges for State Policies on Migration Management in Post-war Mozambique and Post-apartheid South Africa 111

VIRPI KAISTO: From European Union to everyday neighborhood in border studies? A conceptual analysis 139

HIROSHI TANAKA: EU Architectures of Cross-Border Regions: EU Macro Regional Strategy and European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation 153

Commentary 169

JAMES W. SCOTT: Interdependence – an Obsolete Concept? 169

Reviews 173

Hynek Böhm and Emil Drápela – Cross-border cooperation as a reconciliation tool: Example from the East Czech-Polish borders. Regional & Federal Studies, Vol. 27. Issue 3, pp. 305-319. (Teodor Gyelnik) 173

Jarosław Jańczak (2017): Town Twinning in Europe. Understanding Manifestations and Strategies. Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 32. Issue 4, pp. 477-495. (Teodor Gyelnik) 177

Introductory Note from the Editor

2017 was another eventful year for Europe and the world in general. Despite positive economic indicators and widespread growth, a sense of destabilisation, insecurity and fear continues to dominate political debates. Environmentally speaking, it was a record year for extremes, calamities and weather-inflicted damage. Reviewing 2017, it can only be confirmed that the networked nature of human security challenges requires greater cross-border cooperation and dialogue – as well as stronger commitments towards global governance mechanisms.

Recent events in Europe and elsewhere therefore reveal a need to rethink the research and policy-oriented goals of border studies. There is also a need to link current scholarly work with new perspectives on borders in order to promote a greater sense of interdisciplinarity and cross-cultural collaboration. To respond to this challenge, this Yearbook showcases the role of borders and cross-border interaction in the context of global challenges and transformation processes.

Crossing disciplinary borders demands new conceptualizations, theories, and methodologies that may help researchers to think about old problems (such as exclusion, inequality and power asymmetry) from novel perspectives. By engaging with borders as sites of encounter, reconciliation, and change, as well as sites of cultural dialogue and social development, we invite interdisciplinary thinking into realms of possibility. While the dividing nature of borders is a frequent fact of life in everyday situations, border research can also unveil connections, interactions, and overlapping social spaces across borders.

This edition of CESCI’s Yearbook therefore provides a number of cross-cutting perspectives on processes of border-making and on border politics from diverse angles. It is basically divided into three sections that deal with the following: 1) theorizing borders and border-making, 2) cross-cultural perspectives on cross-border interaction, and 3) conceptualizations of European Union policies as they relate to different forms of territorial relations. The collection is perhaps more theoretical and philosophical that past Yearbooks but we are confident that the different issues covered here will be of general interest to followers of border studies.

While the various essays and other contributions included in the 2017 Yearbook provide a variety of perspectives from different parts of Europe, as well as an excellent article on border politics and migration in Southern Africa, one common thread throughout is the relationship between border-making and globalization. Globalization has in fact had an immense impact on border studies. One the most important of these impacts has been a shift from a dominant concern with formal state frontiers and ethno-cultural areas to the investigation of border-making in diverse socio-spatial contexts and geographical scales. This has also encouraged a shift to multifacted processes of border-making and their social consequences.

Globalization has also contributed to the breaking down of separations between discrete disciplinary approaches within border research. As a research field, border studies now encompass a wide range of disciplines besides social geography: political science, sociology, anthropology, history, international law as well as the humanities - notably art, media studies and philosophy. Going beyond exclusively state-centred and territorial paradigms, the present state of debate emphasizes that borders are not given, they emerge through socio-political and cultural border-making or bordering that takes place within society. Engagement with globalization has induced border studies research to take seriously the interrelatedness of all previous thinking about the investigation and interpreting of borders. In the contemporary practice of border studies, literature and art tell us as much about borders, borderlands and border crossings as do ethnographic or historical investigations. It is precisely the disruptive force of globalization – whether real or imagined – that drives home the main argument of border studies: that borders are in a constant process of confirmation, contestation, transformation and re-confirmation.

James W. Scott

Globalisation and the Study of Borders

James W. Scott

University of Eastern Finland, Karelian Institute

james.scott@uef.fi

Introduction

The phenomenon of globalization is characterized by a multitude of definitions that emphasize the increasingly international nature of human societies, whereby much attention has been directed to flows, networked global infrastructures and cultural hybridization. In terms of the study of borders, however, it is perhaps understandings of globalization as interpenetration and transformation that are most salient. Interpenetration relates to transformations of everyday life and of social and economic practices by processes that operate across national boundaries (see Cochrane and Pain 2000). The transformational nature of globalization is, furthermore, evidenced by iterative processes of wide-scale diffusion and a simultaneous domestication of forces, social, economic and cultual practices and ideas circulating at cross-border and global scales (see Held 2000).

Importantly for this discussion, globalization has made the notion of a world without borders possible in the sense that socio-economic, financial, resource-based and, ultimately, environmental interdependencies increasingly lay bare the limits of state territoriality and sovereignty (Ceglowski 2000). Taken to its most extreme expression, in fact, globalization sometime even implies an end to borders in any politically and economically significant way − a scenario echoed by post-Cold War prophesies of a much less bordered future driven by global technologies, cyberspace, capital flows, political convergence and interstate integration (Ohmae 1995, Scholte 1997). Coupled with an equally extreme model of neoliberalism in which the state would no longer have an appreciable regulatory role, these processes might end the need for border studies altogether, except as footnotes in conceptual history. What we instead find is that the study of borders has enjoyed something of a renaissance since the new Millennium, reanimating debates about their social, political, economic and environmental significance (Newman 2011). In fact, the renaissance of border studies can also be attributed to the emergence of counter-narratives to globalization discourses of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, indicating that the 1990s fad of ‘borderlessness’ was too shallow to be sustained. As will be elaborated in more detail below, globalization has increased border sensitivities and the propensity to engage in border politics for a number of reasons, security and the maintenance of control figuring among the most critical. Given the real and imagined impacts of globalization, and the frequent spectre of threat to ontological and physical security, borders have attained increased significance as a defensive mechanism and guarantor of local stability.

Moreover, as Claude Raffestin (1992) has claimed, political boundaries are bio-ethno-social constants that make societies possible; borders are institutions without which it would be impossible to neogatiate an ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of any socially constituted space. Border scholars remind us that there are no inherent contradictions between political, social, cultural borders and globalization for the simple reason that borders fulfill a very basic social need, namely to create and manage recognizable spaces in which everyday life can be conducted. Moreover, globalization has proved a boon for border studies by multiplying the potential socio-spatial contexts within which political, economic, social and cultural processes unfold. According to Chris Rumford (2006: 163):

“A globalizing world is a world of networks, flows and mobility; it is also a world of borders. It can be argued that cosmopolitanism is best understood as an orientation to the world which entails the constant negotiation and crossing of borders (…) Borders connect the ‘inner mobility’ of our lives with both the multiplicity of communities we may elect to become members of and the cross-cutting tendencies of polities to impose their border regimes on us in ways which compromise our mobilities, freedoms, rights, and even identities.”

How then, do border studies interact with globalization, both as a concept as well as a process? Spurred on by globalization, border studies reflect continuity and change in scientific thought and thus innumerable contributions to the conceptualization of social space and its workings (Scott 2012). Thanks to processes of globalization, the study of borders has moved from a dominant concern with formal state frontiers and ethno-cultural areas to the investigation of border-making in diverse socio-spatial contexts and geographical scales. This has elicited a shift to multifacted processes of border-making and their social consequences. Globalization has also contributed to the breaking down of separations between discrete disciplinary approaches within border research. As a research field, border studies now encompass, a wide range of disciplines besides social geography: political science, sociology, anthropology, history, international law as well as the humanities - notably art, media studies and philosophy. One only need to browse through recent collections and compendia of border studies research in order to appreciate its post-disciplinary thrust (Donnan and Wilson 2012, Andersen et. al. 2012, Brambilla et. al. 2015).

Another important consideration is the fact that globalization has opened up possibilities for investigating in greater depth the rationales behind everyday border-making by understanding borders as institutions, processes and symbols that not only reflect but condition societal change (see Popescu 2012). Going beyond exclusively state-centred and territorial paradigms, the present state of debate emphasizes that borders are not given, they emerge through socio-political and cultural border-making or bordering that takes place within society (Newman 2006). Material borders, for example, do not emerge exclusively as a product of wars, agreement or high politics but are also made and maintained by cultural, economic, political and social activities. Bordering encompasses formal as well as everyday forms of border construction and is accomplished with the help of ideology, discursive and performative practices, and different forms of agency. Furthermore, everyday ‘bordering and ordering’ practices create and recreate social-cultural boundaries that are spatial in nature at the same time that they can also open up new spaces that reflect intersections, encounters and new affinities which emerge as a part of social life.

What this in fact indicates, is the globalization has challenged traditional disciplinary assumptions and certainties regarding borders. Talking about globalization has induced us to take seriously the interrelatedness of all previous thinking about studying and interpreting borders. In the contemporary practice of border studies, literature and art tell us as much about borders, borderlands and border crossings as do ethnographic or historical investigations. It is precisely the disruptive force of globalization – whether real or imagined – that drives home the main argument of border studies: that borders are in a constant process of confirmation, contestation, transformation and re-confirmation.

Consequences of Globalization: Border Studies and the Bordering Paradigm

To begin with, globalization must be understood to be a non-teleological but transformative process that involves continuity and change. Moreover, in order to properly elaborate the interaction between globalization and the study of borders, a focus on borders as mediators, regulators and representations of processes associated with globalization is needed. In other words, in the context of globalization, border studies, in very broad terms, investigate processes of socio-spatial accommodation and adaptation to change that reflect non-finalizable makings and re-makings of borders. Consequently, one major border studies paradigm with regard to globalization is that of bordering, or the more fundamental process of creating socio-spatial distinctions at various scales by multiple actors (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002, Scott 2012). Bordering is the everyday construction of borders, among others through ideology, cultural mediation, discourses, political institutions, attitudes and agency. The bordering paradigm thus brings diverse forms of social, cultural and economic globalization into a single frame of analysis. Moreover, the concept of bordering suggests that borders are not only semi-permanent, formal institutions but are also non-finalizable processes.

In terms of approaches and methodologies, globalization and its consequences are a major reason why border studies have largely abandoned descriptive, functional and positivistic approaches and instead developed highly critical perspectives, questioning, for example, the logics of border-making statecraft and focusing attention to the negative impacts of borders on individuals. Globalization has also challenged border scholars to more directly engage with bordering dilemmas and the ethical consequences of borders (Hing 2010). Many of these dilemmas pertain to the contradictions between state territoriality and sovereignty and the heightened significance of mobility, the global reach of financial flows, information and ideas as well as environmental challenges and threats. At the same time, limited ability and willingness to come to terms with global interdependencies has also elicited a process of vigorous re-bordering, fencing and securitization of national spaces. (see Rosière and Jones 2012).

The bordering paradigm does not ignore the structuring power of state borders and formal border regimes. Although interdependence and processes of globalization have complicated the picture, the continuous (re)construction of borders based on forms of social-political organization and processes of nation-building remains a central problem in border studies. One criticism of contemporary border studies is its propensity to privilege agency at the expense of the wider social contexts and the structuring effect of state borders. Liam O’Dowd (2010) has been particularly blunt in his claims that recent post-national theorizing indicates a lack of historical reflexivity and careless ‘epochal thinking’. On the contrary, states, state borders and their impacts are very much in evidence. As Paasi argues (2012, p. 2307) understanding borders remains inherently an issue of understanding how states function and thus: “(…) how borders can be exploited to both mobilize and fix territory, security, identities, emotions and memories, and various forms of national socialization”. Furthermore, according to Paasi, “this conceptualization of borders suggests that, while it is continually vital to examine how borders and bordering practices come about, it is also critical to reflect on the political rationalities and state-based ideologies embedded in these practices.” Looking at borders also forces us to take national and local experiences – and historical processes in general – seriously. State borders have a ‘time print’ - they symbolically reflect historical memories and can, in the sense of Megoran (2012) ‘rematerialize’ within changing national political trajectories. Similarly, the Finnish geographer Jussi Laine (2016, 467) writes that:

“The global primacy of state borders endures, but they are now commonly understood as multifaceted social institutions rather than as solely formal political markers of sovereignty. Borders are products of a social and political negotiation of space: they frame social and political action; help condition how societies and individuals shape their strategies and identities; and are re- and deconstructed through various institutional and discursive practices at different levels and by different actors. However, border-making also proceeds through cognitive processes of creating space though which individual self-identifications with certain territories, cultures and political systems”.

Taking these observations into consideration, we can argue that bordering serves to satisfy at least two basic needs, that of protection from external and internal threat and that of defining the territoriality, integrity and identity of groups and individuals. In a more traditional sense borders help determine both internal and external identities of territories, especially the states recognized by the international community: their right to maintain different relations, to create unions and associations, and to be represented in different unions, i.e. to be ‘legal’ political actors. At a more subtle level, bordering is about a politics of difference, played out in different contexts and by different actors. The inculcation of political and social borders as a part of everyday life takes place through processes of socialization, for example in the family, at school and through the media. Border narratives, for example, have always, consciously and sub-consciously, thrown up the notion of difference which exists on both sides of a given (or supposed) socio-cultural border (Andrén et. al. 2017).

If we accept the above, the bordering paradigm is in many ways a counterpart to the real and imagined impacts of globalization. Bordering indicates how globalization is ‘domesticated’ and incorporated, bordered, so to speak, within existing, practices, conventions, cognitive spaces and lived places, not always in harmonious ways. Henk van Houtum (2005) uses the term ‘b/ordering’ to refer to the interplay between the ordering (of chaos) and border-making. Physical borders are not there only by tradition, wars, agreements and high politics but also made and maintained by other cultural, economic political and social activities which accommodate the impacts of globalization. At the same time, everyday bordering and ordering practices connive to create and recreate new social-cultural boundaries and divisions which are also spatial in nature. Everyday lived experiences are also impacted by globalization, this results in intersections, differentiations and, under the most favourable circumstances, new convivialities in which gender, age and ethnicity meet and mutually constitute each other.

Table 1 captures some of the complexity of the bordering paradigm and indicates how globalization has affected border studies conceptually. The impacts have been profound. However, rather than challenge or question the centrality of borders as organizing elements of social life and human territoriality, globalization has confirmed their salience, while, at the same time, revolutionizing the ways in which we understand and interpret borders.

1. Globalization’s Conceptual Influence on Border Studies as Reflected in the Bordering Paradigm

1.

from state-centred to socially embedded perspectives

2.

from bounded territoriality to multilocal and relational spaces

3.

from normative assumptions to the questioning of border-making rationales

4.

from ‘objective’ political rationality to the articulation of ethical concerns (violence and discrimination at borders)

Conceptual Elaborations of Bordering

In its basic understanding, the bordering paradigm is quite general and can be rather abstract in terms of guiding empirical research. It is therefore undergoing constant development and refinement in order to accommodate different socio-spatial contexts as well as respond to the consequences of globalizing forces. In this section, some elaborations of the bordering paradigm that have linked bordering to other socio-spatial ideas will be provided. Power, ontological issues, the representational and symbolic nature of borders and the social ramifications of political borderings practices are some of the areas that will be briefly dealt with here.

Globalization and ‘Post-National’ Borders

Globalization is often conceptualized in terms of the transformation of state borders within the international economy and in response to global flows, environmental issues (e.g. global climate change and health issues), human rights and international terrorism, etc. These issues have opened up space for scholarly work on the ‘production’ of borders, more specifically processes of bordering, de-bordering and re-bordering. Furthermore, border studies interrogates the control of mobility within the world system. Globalization has thus provided impetus for thinking of bordering in terms of a ‘post-national’ perspective. This could signify a new form of territorial sovereignty based on shared political responsibilities between states and/or the emergence of new territorial and cultural identities (Laine 2016). With respect to Europe, post-national bordering approaches investigate the different ways in which national and European elements co-exist in the construction of borders within and between different political cultures and how these elements continue to shape opinions and attitudes on borders in different European countries (Scott 2015).

Another important strand of post-national theorization is that of the emergence of new political and economic units that partly incorporate but also beyond the context of the nation-state. The development of multinational (and geographically contiguous) zones of economic and political co-operation, such as the case of cross-border cooperation and transnational regionalism (see below), are one expression of the global forces that are restructuring the world system of individual states (Church and Reid 1996, Goodwin, Jones and Jones 2012). The concept of post-national borders can to an extent also be applied to new forms of territorial sovereignty that reproduce ‘stateness’ without traditional forms of external recognition. Examples of this are politically contested areas of the former Soviet Union such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria (Bahceli, Bartmann and Srbrenik 2004).

Conceptualizations of post-national borders in no way suggest a disappearance of states or the decline of state territoriality per se. They instead suggest the potential emergence of new borders, new border functions and/or new methods of territorial control that go beyond traditional notions of state territoriality. Post-national borders might thus follow either sub- or supranational logics of political interaction. Such borders are post-national because they create new political functions of integration and interaction across state borders. Understood in these terms, post-national borders might define polities that transcend the jurisdictional and conceptual limits of state-centred orientations, for example as a community of states, as networks of cities or cross-border regions.

Borders and Place

Border studies represents an area of investigation that tempers emphasis of space-time convergence as a globally operating structuring force. It confronts ‘spaces of flows’ and ‘power geometries’ with ontological questions and the significance of place. The work, for example, of major urban theorists such as Castells (1997), Harvey (1996) and Massey (1993) has emphasized the socially constructed nature of place which increasingly reflects globally networked economic and social relations. On this view, places are interpenetrated by relational flows but, at the same time, locality is the space of bounded cultural formations and potential resistance to mobile capital. As Michael P. Smith (2001) has argued, emphasizing the global can result in a misreading of the significance of locale and place: rather than merely representing containers where global flows and networks become evident, cities are sites of localization, community and drivers of social and political innovation. Cresswell (2004) has also warned against theoretical rigidity in conceptualizing place as something either defined from within or determined by external (global) forces – places are characterised by adaptation to change and continuity. Bordering thus establishes a conceptual nexus between everyday practices of differentiating social space, the instrumentality of place-making, for example, as economic projects, and the ontological need for a sense of rootedness in place (Keresztély, Scott and Virág 2017).

Along similar lines, Malpas (2012) has criticized what he sees as human geography’s neglect of the ideational connections between space and place. Malpas (2012: 228) is particularly critical of sweeping aside ontological questions in favour of political commitments that include the ‘theorization of spatial rhetoric and of spatial imagining as this forms the core of spatial politics’. In his development of the concept of place, Cresswell (2004) has voiced similar concerns, drawing attention to unproductive antagonisms between Place as something essential to existence (‘Being in the World’) and Place as a product of negotiating spatial relationships (‘Social Construct’) when in fact both mutually contribute to place construction. In terms of its social operation, this interpretation of bordering draws attention to relationships between globalization therefore, territoriality and cognition. All three processes interact in creating a sense of socio-spatial difference and reinforcing a sense of groups and individual identity in space. This perspective addresses the shortcomings of dichotomous rather than complementary understandings of relational and territorial borders have been enumerated by a number of scholars, including Martin and Secor (2014), MacLeod and Jones (2007), and Paasi (2012). These authors suggest that the process of bounding space maintains its more general everyday significance despite the networked (and globalized) nature of life.

Border Walls and Bordering through Teichopolitics

Border studies increasingly deal with questions of border security and more general securitization polices that have proliferated during the new Millennium (Hall 2012, Rosas 2012, Weber and Pickering 2011). Bordering is therefore also conceptualized in very concrete, physical terms as part of more general logics of control, security and border management. Globalization has, for example, engendered a politics of border closure that has been conceptualized as ‘teichopolitics’ (Ballif and Rosière 2009) - the politics of building walls and barriers for security and economic reasons. Rosière and Jones (2012) in fact argue that ‘teichopolitics’ is best understood as the antithesis of the borderless world of globalisation. As they suggest, new barriers are being built at asymmetric borders in the world where different spaces of economic, cultural, or political privilege converge. While the study of border walls and their evolution is an important agenda of practical borders research - this will elaborated in more detail below – there are other important conceptual aspects involved as well. Despite its highly technical and legalistic nature border management is also a socio-political and cultural process: the basis for securitized differentiation is in fact generally a question of identity as well (see Van Houtum 2011). Fabrizio Eva (2012) considers this form of physical bordering part of a process of ‘self-caging’ that is driven by interactions between iconographies of pyramidal (state) power and individual subjectivities regarding security and identity. Furthermore, Eva’s notion of ‘self-caging’ reflects how discourses of threat and insecurity are internalized at the level of everyday life, creating more demand for physical, political bordering.

The Concept of the ‘Border Multiple’

Others have developed the bordering paradigm by emphasising the inherently multifarious nature of borders (Andersen, Klatt and Sandberg 2012). As ‘multiple’ processes, borders are not autonomous phenomena with their own unique ontology above and beyond their legal and institutional identities. Borders come to exist socially in the practices of different actors and the contested meanings attributed to them. Security borders, for example, are constructed by the performance of internal regulatory practices which challenge and constrain mobility across borders. The same borders, however, can have a very different significance, practically and symbolically, to other actors, for example as economic strategies or places of worship. The heteronomy of border practices, symbolisms, border-related identities and imaginations means that borders are both abstract and at the same time very concrete. The ‘border multiple’ is composed of Janus-faced, contested and contradictory narratives at different levels of practice, be it in the realm of memory and as imagined borders, in the realm of the political discourse and geopolitics or in practices enacting borders in the functional realm of administration.

In specific border zones, the geographic state border itself becomes embedded in everyday life and in the meanings attached to the local, as well as national, cultural environment, traditions, social habits and emotions. While it can be easy for individuals to cross the actual border, the border largely defines the spatial understanding of the local context. People make sense of their border-related social world in highly contextual and specific ways. The construction of meanings of borders can range from a desired barrier against a demonized ‘other’ and, as a means of exclusion, to its conception as an institution in potential need of reform but yet essential to economic survival. Border narratives should be read through their historicity and relationality. Understood in ‘multiple’ terms, bordering practices and social divisions affect one another, are constantly changing and can include as well as exclude. The ‘border’ and the divisions stemming from it are fluid, contextual and spatially manifested in the community and its relations with the state.

The Concept of Mobile Borders

Balibar’s (1998) famous ‘borders are everywhere’ (BAE) proclamation has been criticized as a glib generality inspired by globalization and ‘post-national’ thinking (O’Dowd 2010). However, with the bordering paradigm, BAE takes on a very concrete significance. As Paasi and Prokkola (2008) argue, borders are not ‘located’ merely in border areas, but are everywhere in societies, for example in various forms of ‘banal flagging’ of the national in everyday life. Emotional bordering is loaded in national flag days and other national iconographies and practices – and this is also the ‘location’ of borders. Active ‘borderwork’ (Rumford 2008) may deconstruct established and existing forms and codes of national socialization in some locations.

Moreover, the idea that borders exist everywhere where bordering takes places has given rise the concept of mobile borders. It is more or less accepted that traditional dividing lines between the domestic and the international and between what it is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of specific socio-spatial realms have been blurred as is strikingly depicted in the Moebius strip analogy of Bigo and Walker (2007). This has given way to understandings of borders embedded in new spatialities that challenge dichotomies typical to the territorial world of nation-states. Mobile borders are thus part of a security complex that goes beyond the level of physical walls and fences (Popescu 2015). It includes a highly flexible system of delocalized and generalized border control mechanisms that differentiation between people their specific mobilities. Contemporary mobile borders can be created, shifted, and deconstructed by a range of actors (Amilhat Szary and Giraud 2015). Luiza Bialasiewicz (2012) has documented that the mobility of political bordering mechanism also comprises ‘off-shoring and out-sourcing’, particularly in the case of the European Union, where extraterritorial security perimeters have been set up in neighbouring regions far from the EU’s physical external borders (Casas Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickels 2016).

Borderscapes

According to Jessop (2012: 74):

“an imaginary is a semiotic ensemble (without tightly defined boundaries) that frames individual subjects’ lived experience of an inordinately complex world and/or guides collective calculation about that world. There are many such imaginaries and they are involved in complex and tangled relations at different sites and scales of action.”

Following the logic that geographical imaginations matter (see Gregory, 1994; Howie and Lewis, 2014), the bordering paradigm has appropriated the heuristic of imaginaries as a means of approaching complex socio-spatial processes (Brambilla, 2014; Bürkner, 2017; Vaughan Williams, 2012). Moreover, border scholars such as Brambilla (2015a), Dell’ Agnese and Amilaht Szary (2015), Grundy-Warr and Rajaram (2007) and Laine and Tervonen (2015), have suggested that the concept of bordering can be expanded to encompass ‘borderscapes’ - social/political panoramas that emerge around border contexts and that connect the realm of high politics with that of communities and individuals who are affected by and negotiate borders. As borderscapes, borders in fact cannot be reduced to instruments of terms of inclusion/exclusion as conveyed by biopolitical interpretations or metaphors such as ‘Fortress Europe’. Instead, borders must be expanded to include what is happening in terms of everyday life at borders as reflected, for example in the agency of migrants. As borderscapes borders emerge as fields in which processes of traversing and crossing meet those of reinforcement and blocking and in which borders are produced by social institutions and migration as a social force.

According to Brambilla (2015b, p. 111) borderscapes express “the (geo)political and epistemic multidimensionality of the border, enabling a productive understanding of the processual, de-territorialized and dispersed nature of borders and their ensuing regimes in the era of globalization and transnational flows”. Much in accord with the ‘border multiple’ concept described above, the use of borderscapes as an epistemological tool involves connecting border experiences and border-making practices. Moreover, borderscapes involve an inclusive perspective on the political in which everyday practices, representations and border imaginaries as well as formal political processes are closely linked. The borderscapes concept also breaks down sharp divisions between territorial and relational understandings of borders. Moreover, the term borderscape expresses the representation of borders as well as individual and collective practices of border-making highlighting the ways in which the borderscapes concept affords certain sets of reproductive practices and shapes political subjectivities in a particular manner. These bordering perspectives come together, among other ways, in the present geopolitical climate where, in stark contrast to the 1990s when discourses of ‘de-bordering’ Europe enjoyed substantial currency, Europe’s (also worldwide) borders appear to have become formidable barriers symbolizing civilizational difference between East and West.

Selected Research Perspectives

The impact of globalization on research agendas in border studies is also evidenced by the increase in international comparative research and networks that have created a vibrant border studies community. The border studies community, which is now clearly global in scope, is represented by the Journal of Border Studies, the Association of Borderlands Studies (ABS) and informal groups such as the Border Regions in Transition network (BRIT), which by 2018 has held 16 international conferences, the last of these located in Nigeria and Benin. In addition, large projects have received funding in order to pursue investigation on the global roles of borders such as the aptly named Borders in Globlization (BIG) project, financed by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. This project, inaugurated in 2014 seeks to ‘...build excellence in the knowledge and understanding of borders, (...) create new policy and foster knowledge transfer in order to address such globalization forces as security, trade and migration flows, and also to understand the forces of technology, self-determination and regionalization that are affecting borders and borderlands in regions around the world’.1

In addition, the EU-funded EUBORDERSCAPES project (full title: Bordering, Political Landscapes and Social Arenas: Potentials and Challenges of Evolving Border Concepts in a post-Cold War World), scrutinized conceptual change in understandings of borders in relation to transformations associated with globalization. Recognizing the close interrelationships between social change and paradigm shifts, the EUBORDERSCAPES project analyzed evolving concepts of borders in terms of their wider societal significance, critically interrogating ‘objective’ categories of state territoriality. This approach involves comparing and contrasting the ways in which different and often contested conceptualizations of state borders (in terms of their political, social, cultural and symbolic significance) resonate in concrete contexts at the level of everyday life.[2]

In this section, globalization will be related to border studies via discussion that indicates considerable thematic, theoretical and empirical diversity. We will specifically focus on: 1) borders, transnational spaces and cross-border cooperation, 2) the issue of borders as social and political resources and 3) key thematic areas that involve migration, mobility, securitization, state territoriality and 3).

Transnational Spaces: Cross-Border Cooperation

Globalization has led to the increasing importance of cross-border regions (Scott 2017, Zimmerbauer 2012). Cross-border co-operation between states has been the subject of interdisciplinary and comparative study for almost three decades. This research has been driven by at least one general core concern: i.e. transformations of nation-states and their consequences for economic, political, social and cultural life. Originally, research focused on urban and regional forms of ‘subsovereign paradiplomacy’ Duchacek (1986), and by the early 1990s the study of rapid cross-border urbanization on the US-Mexican border had also raised the question of local transnational planning and development responses (Herzog 1990). This work has been subsequently developed in international comparisons of cross-border and transnational strategic alliances between cities, regions and other subnational (Amen et.al. 2011, Goodwin, Jones and Jones 2012, Setzer 2015).

Partly spurred on by globalization – and in the guise of European Union - the focus of research shifted during the 1990s from empirical research on transnational urban networks and their co-operation mechanisms to the study of local and regional forms of policy relevant cross-border interaction. Within this context, theories of state space rescaling and neoliberal governance have considerable influence (Brenner 2004, Gualini 2003). With specific regard to borders, a particular European characteristic of this research focus has been a more contextually sensitive understanding of the socio-political nature of cross-border cooperation. More directly, cross-border cooperation is defined by political projects carried out by private, state and, to an extent, third sector actors with the express goal of extracting benefit from joint initiatives in various economic, social, environmental and political fields (Perkmann 2007, Svensson 2014). Through new forms of political and economic interaction - both institutional and informal - it has been suggested that greater cost-effectiveness in public investment can be achieved, economic complementarities exploited, the scope for strategic planning widened and environmental problems more directly and effectively addressed. For these reasons, Cross-border cooperation (CBC) is seen to promote the wider goals of European Cohesion.

Building upon the conceptual foundations of subnational paradiplomacy, border studies, particularly in the European case, developed during the 1990s and early 2000s a specific focus on cross-border policy integration as a form of “multilevel governance” (Perkmann 1999, Lepik 2009). This focus remains an important on in terms of CBC policy within the EU. However, if the former approach positioned CBC within a context of globalisation and transnational networks, the European perspective has been largely influenced by formal, structural understandings of transnational governance (see Blatter 1997, 2004). For example, in order to overcome traditional forms of intergovernmentalism, institutionalisation at the local and regional levels was seen as a necessary element for successful CBC (Scott 2000). Prospects for transboundary regionalisation have been thus defined by the outcomes of a gradual and complex process of institutional innovation and capacity-building at national, state and local levels. At the same time, the emergence of new planning forms across borders were prophesised in terms of regional dialogue. Dialogue, together with adequate strategies with which to reconcile and co-ordinate diverse interests, were seen to offer considerable promise for developing transboundary alliances between cities and their regions (Van Geenhuizen et. al. 1996, Leibenath et.al. 2008).

Borders as Resources

Although state borders are often discussed as ‘necessary evils’ or formidable institutions of state control and sovereignty, border studies has for quite some time pursued the idea that, given the impacts and consequences of globalization, state borders also represent considerable resources, not just in economic terms but politically and culturally. The discussions briefly presented above regarding cross-border cooperation provides clear evidence of the importance of resource-oriented arguments in border studies. The economic potential of the border, expressed in wage and price differentials or economic complementarities is not a new story. Observers of cross-border trade on the US-Mexican border, for example, have developed a large body of work analyzing border effects in terms of economic integration and growth (Barajas et. al. 2014, Hanson 1996, 2001). However, globalization has also provided incentives for exploiting state borders as resources for economic, political and cultural co-operation. As discussed above, cross-border co-operation is premised on the idea that borders can represent ‘bridges’ between communities and regions in the pursuit of solutions to common challenges. Christophe Sohn (2014) has demonstrated that cross-border metropolitan regions have been able to use borders to achieve political recognition, exploit cost differentials, take advantage of cost-effective divisions of labour and promote themselves as international, global and multicultural places (at the same time, Sohn also mentions that the exploitation of border potentials can also exacerbate social inequalities, as in the case in US-Mexican metropolitan areas such as El Paso-Juárez). Eker and Van Houtum (2013) develop the ideas of borders as resources in a more cultural sense, as a place of common history, landscape formation, discovery and cooperation. In Europe’s ‘underused’ border spaces, such as the Dutch-German borderland, the lack of controls and physical barriers is an invitation to jointly map, conceptualize and design common landscapes that invite exploration.

Mobility, Borders and Security

Mobility is about the ability to transcend borders whereas forced or self-imposed immobility strengthens the dividing power of borders. Mobility is thus a freedom, but it is not a freedom shared by all; in the neoliberal economy the hypermobility of the economically privileged can be contrasted with the marginalization of those with limited access to mobility networks. At another level, mobility is understood as conditioned by larger economic forces and the geopolitics that support their functioning. Vogt (2013, 764-765), for example, positions human mobility “at the intersection between local and global economies” and “embedded within logics of global capitalism and state militarism.” On this view, mobility is inherently subject to manipulation, control and punitive regulation. It is within this context that the positive characteristics of mobility has been questioned and subject to a highly politicized interpretation. On the other hand, as Doreen Massey (1993) has argued, mobility, such as that originally promoted by the EU, is a central element of a progressive sense of being that is at once robust due to its openness to the outside world and ability to connect with other cultures and other areas of the world.

Borders are at the core of discussions on security and the control of mobility at the national, European and global level: in terms of received understandings of security, borders represent an interface between domestic concerns and wider interstate and intercultural contexts. At the most basic level, borders serve to protect national societies from external threats while maintaining conditions for their economic sustainability. Beyond this, however, the functions and social significance of borders not only reflect the means in which security risks and challenges can be articulated and acted upon but also ethical questions of considerable importance. In tandem with the securitizing discourses that stigmatize mobility and migration, political pressure has increased for more formidable and militarized borders in order to defend national cultures, even at the risk of reducing cross-border mobility for everyday citizens and curtailing democratic rights (Reece Jones 2016). Border studies research has taken up ethical debate by questioning the Realpolitik of selective and restrictive mobility and interrogating the dilemma of bordering liberal societies (Jones and Johnson 2016, Elden 2009). Despite the European Union’s visions of open borders, Europe’s external boundaries are in many ways markers of inequality, exclusion and, as such, symbols of unfairness.

The European Union engages, for example, in humanitarian aid and conflict resolution in order to promote conditions for more equitable development on a global scale. But it at the same time it has markedly restricted the possibility of asylum while invoking police powers and state violence in order to prevent, at a very high human cost, irregular entry into its territory. Through visa regimes and border politics the EU defines the ground rules of access for different groups depending on origin, citizenship, material situation and socio-professional background (Mau et. al. 2012). In highly critical readings of the increasingly selective nature of EU external borders, the EU’s practices have been compared with legalized apartheid: with the “law of birth” determining an individual’s degree of mobility across, and even occasionally within, state borders (Van Houtum 2010). Furthermore, the violence of liberal states is not limited to their own territorial borders but is often extended to areas far beyond, such as in the case of the EU’s security perimeter in the Southern Mediterranean (Casas-Cortes et. al. 2016).

In de- and re-bordering processes, borders are mobile and territorially displaced. Border controls are, in principle, being carried out by anyone anywhere – by loyal inhabitants who inform police if they suspect the presence of ‘illegals’. They also involve all-encompassing surveillance technologies and the compliance of private businesses, public agencies and social services (Popescu 2015). Hence, borders as institutions are also ideal candidates for analyses of biopolitics and biopower, understood in their minimalist form: the control of population (Demetriou 2013, Topak 2014). The control of mobility takes place in rather mundane and unspectacular ways, such as through the use of biometrics and body scans at borders and airports. At the same time, borders can be seen as sophisticated techniques for the exercise of biopower and biopolitics and for the creation – discursively and physically – of spaces that are set outside everyday social contexts. These Agambenean (2003) exceptional spaces, such as the Guantánamo detention camp and refugee retention centres not only control mobility; they serve to externalize perceived societal threats and neutralize political resistance to security policies. In similar terms, limboscapes (detention centres), as portrayed by Gallardo and Abet-Más (2016), characterize the Moroccan-Spanish borderland at the exclave city of Ceuta, an iconic result of the EU’s bordering practices.

Conclusions and a Future Research Agenda

Through the investigation of borders, we realize that there can be no hegemonic dominance of any specific social theory, whether critical or not, in the understanding of space and its social significance. And whereas space is abstract and absolute, we now understand that it is borders that make space intelligible, for example as everyday social places. Borders not only have different meanings for different actors but are also manifestations of power relations in society at different scales. By the same token, the present state of border studies indicates that processes associated with globalization have deeply changed the power of borders, modifying the dialectical relation between their fixed institutional nature and constantly changing, fluid processes of bordering within and between societies.

The progress made by border studies in terms of interdisciplinary and complex understandings of borders and their significance is unquestionable. Here, globalization has played a major role. The question is: where to now? What might be possible future research agendas that maintain the innovative and integrating momentum as well as social relevance of border studies? One good place to develop research is in the ongoing ethical debate regarding the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of borders. An important target of these deliberations could be ‘bordering dilemmas’ within the context of globalization – a situation in which exclusion is often seen as result of creating or maintaining inclusive and open societies (Elden 2009, Jones and Johnson 2016). For example, despite the European Union’s visions of open borders, Europe’s boundaries are in many ways markers of inequality, exclusion and, as such, symbols of unfairness. Through visa regimes and border politics the EU thus defines the ground rules of access for different groups depending on origin, citizenship, material situation and socio-professional background (Mau et. al. 2012). Nevertheless, at least in the ‘Western’ case, there exist few feasible alternatives to liberal notions of an ‘inclusive’ but self-defined and thus bounded community as a necessary precondition of democracy (Batt 2002). It can be therefore argued that without a sense of closure and boundedness, the development and nurture of community and place identities is virtually impossible.

How then, can borders be ‘de-securitized’? Bauder (2014) proposes that instead of regulating mobility with borders and arbitrary politics of inclusion and exclusion, a constructive alternative would be to link mobility (and migration) to the possibility of acquiring certain rights, including domicile-based citizenship, thus avoiding a future of uncertainty, statelessness and increasing social tensions. While such scenarios seem distant from political reality, at least at this point in time, desecuritization would be an important first stop in opening up notions of community, belonging and citizenship to include ever larger cross-section of humanity. It is also here where the concept of borderscapes can provide constructive impetus. Thinking in terms of borderscapes has direct ethical implications, adding to a rich social sciences and humanities engagement with borders that takes inspiration from the realm of philosophy. A potential way forward is offered, for example, by the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt, the reappraisal of which is indicative of the ethical issues involved in the securitization of mobility. Arendt (1968) has warned of world alienation and ‘losing a sense of being in the world’ and with it, identity. Identity is disclosed in the public sphere, the exclusion from which results in a loss of identification with the political system. Alienation also gives rise to the deterioration of the public sphere itself (d’Entreves 1994). Making persons visible or invisible in the public realm is about bordering, about creating distinction. This idea resonates with Arendt’s (1968) notion of the politics of appearance or the making evident of positions, interests and actors that represent them. Borren (2008) has suggested that Arendt’s political philosophy can be adapted to criticize European policies that disenfranchize non-citizens through exposing them (as threats) and/or obscuring their claims, problems and motivations. Conversely, thinking of borders as borderscapes that reveal human conditions might stimulate positive agency and a politics of visibility could signify an expression of social acceptance and integration.

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The Ethics of Bordering: A Critical Reading of the Refugee ‘Crisis’

Jussi P. Laine

University of Eastern Finland, Karelian Institute

Jussi.laine@uef.fi

Introduction: What Crisis?

This essay does not intend to revisit the whole history of anthropological ethics across borders, nor does it seek to engage fully with the thick body migration literature that the recent and still ongoing European crisis has fuelled. Rather, this is an attempt to approach the situation by using borders as a prism that may allow us to focus our gaze on unseen nuances of the phenomena unwinding before our eye. Border are not one but many, and seem often contradictory in terms of their openness. While globalisation has made most border more open for cross-border flows of goods, capital and well-off citizens, there are heavy restrictions on such movements for those who might need it the most.

Being unevenly transparent for different groups depending on their origin, citizenship, material condition and socio-professional belonging, borders are inevitably related with discrimination and social injustice (Kolossov and Scott 2013) Where people happen to be born is a morally arbitrary fact, a matter of chance, and as such it should not affect their access to opportunities or enjoyment of basic freedoms (Fine 2013, 257), yet “the law of birth” determines the people’s mobility across the world, making world system of political borders largely a manifestation of inequality between the global North and the South, rich and poor (Kolossov and Scott 2013; cf. Shachar 2009)

Ethics across borders has been extensively theorized particularly within the field of anthropology (see e.g. Herskovitz 1973; Robbins 2010; Mair & Evans 2015), yet there is hardly any clear consensus about the actual outcome. The main reason behind this is that borders are not absolute, but perceived very differently by different people. In plain terms, if people should have freedom to move as they please then it should be equally ethical to allow those who so wish also to draw borders. Borders carry considerable moral weight in determining ethical responsibilities toward displaced persons, but there is a high moral value that has been assigned also to national borders and state sovereignty. The question thus is how to balance these and how much relative weight should be assigned to each of these duties; that is, to what extent can one prioritise one’s own benefits and the responsibilities to co-citizens of one’s own country before those of displaced persons.

For a long time now, political theorists have debated the obligations that states have concerning international migration and refugees. The debate is now perhaps more topical than ever as due to various crises the number of forcibly displaced people has reached worldwide over 65 million, the highest level since World War II (UNHCR 2016), whereby it seems fair to argue that the existing refugee regime is at crossroads (see e.g. Betts 2015; Hollenbach 2016) The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2016) even called the situation a “monumental crisis” that will require a response based on “monumental solidarity” (Ki-moon 2016) Instead of called for solidarity, a number of governments, in Europe but also more worldwide, have turned however to the end-of-pipe solution of closing their borders in an attempt to restrict the incoming or transiting movement of people. In Europe, for instance Macedonia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary and Austria have closed their borders to refugees, at least temporarily, and border controls have been re-introduced in many other locations, such as in the Nordic countries – most notably between Denmark and Sweden – but also in Norway, Finland, Belgium, France and Slovakia. These developments are indicative of how the states and their borders continue to function in the postmodern era of then characterised post-national polices and non-territorial flows. In all, they suggest a regression into state-centric thinking and the weakening of EU’s integrationist momentum and solidarity. The apparent lack of faith in the European social model challenges the idea of open borders, and, as Betts (2015) imply, that states’ commitment to asylum has become increasingly conditional.

In this essay I contend that much of the debate, both at the theoretical level as well within public debate, has focused on the impacts and consequences of the refugee influx, on solidarity and the states’ responses to refugees, as well as on the very underlying ethos of the current refugee regime. While important as such, the debate has become so widespread and, often, emotional, that it has largely overshadowed much of the analysis of the actual root causes of the current ‘crisis’ and the possibilities for changing the regime that has caused it.

The borders of Europe have been presented to us in the media but also in the political debate as the setting for a perpetual and only increasing emergency. The refugee ‘crisis’ has become spectacularised with pictures of crammed boats and desperate refugees trying to sneak in to the European Union thought various fences or wandering on a highway only to be eventually stopped by the authorities and sent to another direction. A completely new risk associated vocabulary has been assumed to depict migration as something akin to a natural force by referring to it commonly with such power words as a flood, tsunami, tide, wave, avalanche, surge, swelling and so on that foster the perception that there is indeed something that we need to seek to contain, control and combat. Consequently, the migrant influx has become primarily addressed through the security nexus, which apparently fails to capture in the phenomena in its full complexity.

The aim of this chapter is to broader the picture, and bring also the ethical issue of migration and borders into the discussion. The moral challenge we are facing is not limited only to finding more adequate ways of protecting the humanity of the displaced, but is deeply embedded also in the political, military, economic, environmental, and other conditions that drive people from home (Hollenbach 2016, 149) Examining the ethical issues, requires paying close attention to the various practices of border making, the politics of difference and the everyday construction of borders and the related social orders. In order to better understand what motives the actions by both the states and individuals, we must look deeper into the underlying criteria based on which bordering is made; i.e. on which basis someone is considered as welcome while others are not.

It is hard to disagree with the general humanitarian principle by which we have moral obligations and ethical commitments to help those in need (see e.g. Rawls 1974; Walzer 1983; Carens 2013) – at least right up until their quality of life is no worse than our own (Singer 2002) or to an extent that we do not get “overwhelmed” by ourselves, as has been reportedly the case in many countries of Europe faced with the increased refugee flow. As Benhabib (2004) suggests, the moral obligation toward others do not, however, stem only from the mere humanitarian principle, but is based on the realities of todays’ interconnected world. While acknowledging that protecting human dignity involves also respect for the self-determination of accountable states, she points out that we are no longer simply a part of isolated national communities, but by virtue of our transnational interactions in today’s networked world, developments even in distant areas may come with multiple and multi-layered bearings. The very existence of a global society, she continues, means that when other people suffer in the world, we are complicit in that suffering (Ibid.). Also the opposite holds true, various conflicts, such as those for instance in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have been affected in various ways by the foreign policy decisions of the United States and many European powers (Betts 2015). It is thus these interconnections that must be accounted for when we think about claims to global justice.

One of the key issues on the debate on global justice concerning migration has been whether states should have the right to control their borders and if they do on basis of which criteria the cross-border flows can be filtered. This essay is based on the understanding that the heralded refugee ‘crisis’ is not a border problem, nor it will be solved by borders – the solution must be looked for elsewhere. Nevertheless, borders play an important role here for they provide a prism to better understand the complex situation that now manifest itself at the state borders. Rather than a refugee crisis, the EU is having a crisis management crisis as it struggles to cope with the increased uncertainly and anxiety caused by the turbulent and unpredictable environment of the contemporary era where constant crises have become the new normal. More than simply protecting from any physical threats, borders have become to represent an important symbolic element of security, which in itself is an important social and psychological need of an individual. Feelings of personal level insecurity has become reflected on the rhetoric to close the state borders in an attempt to make borders feel ontologically safe (Laine 2018, forthcoming). These may have less to do about actual control or to protect from the perceived threat from the other side, and more about the psychological comfort borders bring about and the role they play for identity construction.

Solidarité, Dignité, Humanité – Sécurité?

The land should be large enough to support a certain number of people living moderately and no more

The Laws of Plato, Book V, §737

The states’ right to control their borders; i.e. entry and settlement of non-citizens in their sovereign territories, is often taken as granted and widely considered as legitimate aspect of the sovereign states’ self-determination as dictated by the modern international law. As Fine (2013, 254) notes, this right is however neither obvious nor uncontroversial, but comes with a number of moral and ethical concerns. The state’s authority over immigration is habitually coercively enforced, through the familiar apparatus of border control (Miller 2016), by which the states seek to keep out the various would-be entrants, acting – more than anything else – based on its own preferences. While there certainly is not anything like universally recognised human right to immigrate, it is nevertheless necessary to reconsider the moral justifications behind the states’ claimed authority over the admission migrants. Indeed, as Fine (2013; see also Fine and Ypi 2016) explicates, exploring the grounds for the state’s alleged right to exclude is a vital task, because if we cannot find adequate justifications for this right then we need to re-evaluate the very backbone of current approaches to immigration policy.

Freedom of movement is famously a fundamental principle of the Treaty enshrined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the freedom of movement within one’s state, the freedom to leave any state, and the freedom to return to one’s own state are considered fundamental human rights. However, as Cole (2000) argues, without a right to international freedom of movement, including a right to enter another state, the right to exit is virtually meaningless and worthless. Carens (1987) and Oberman (2009) contend that as the basic interests and claims which support the case for considering freedom of movement within state borders to be a human right are the very same that support also the case for considering freedom of movement across state borders to be a human right, there should be no morally relevant distinction between the two cases. Furthermore, they argue that the state’s alleged right to exclude is essentially at odds with the fundamental liberal commitment to the moral equality of all people. Moreover, if applying profoundly different standards to citizens and non-citizens in migration matters stands at odds with the liberal commitment to moral equality, then self-proclaimed liberal democratic states that pursue this practice are evidently failing to live up to their own regulative commitments (Fine 2014, 257).

The universalist cosmopolitan ethic guiding the advocates of the freedom of movement can be seen to derive largely from the principle of humanity. The term ‘humanity’ refers to the whole of humankind and all its members (Pictet 1979) To act in accord with humanity is to act with benevolence and to respond impartially to all members of the human family on the basis of their need, not because of some characteristic that differentiates them from others, such as their citizenship, nationality, race, religion, class, or political opinion (Hollenbach 2016, 150).

There are of course also many who support the opposing view. Walzer (1983), and more recently Miller (2005; 2007), as well as Wellman and Cole (2011) have made solid statements in defending state’s rights to control borders. In a broad sense, their arguments are based on the idea that a state’s right to close its borders is merely one component of its more general right to political self-determination. A legitimate state’s right to freedom of association, Wellman (2008) explains, entitles it to choose whether or not to admit any given immigrants; i.e. the freedom of association entitles one also to refuse to associate with others. This line of argument, has of course received increasingly popular justification since the events of 9/11 as a quick-fix for the perceived need to secure the safety of the citizens.

It is however debatable whether restricting immigration actually provide the desired security. Limiting immigration may well decrease legal immigration, but it may also increase illegal one. Wall, whether on paper or on the ground, may seem effective but they seldom are. Once a wall is erected, there will soon be people trying to cross it. This creates a fencing self-referential – a vicious cycle – that feeds itself (van Houtum and Bueno Lacy 2017). The more the movement is restricted, the more crossing will become illegal. The as the border control technology become more sophisticated, so does the smuggling industry. As the stakes get higher, so does potential profits, which in turn makes the illegal activities ever more lucrative. In the end, the more fences and wall are built, the more people die – as has become very apparent in the Mediterranean in during the last years. Even if a state could somehow eliminate all immigration it considers as threatening, this would hardly be of help because foreigners routinely enter countries, not as immigrants, but for shorter periods as tourists, guest workers, visiting students, or for short business trips (Kukathas 2014). Furthermore, the role of the border as barrier protecting the inside from a threat from the outside is eroded by the very fact that the greatest security threats most countries now face are actually home-grown.

While in addition to the objective of establishing security the arguments for closed borders are commonly based on accounts for preserving culture, sustaining the economy, distributing state benefits, political functioning and self-determination and various interpretations of realism, the arguments for open borders tend to rely on libertarianism, utilitarianism and cosmopolitan egalitarianism (Wellman and Cole 2011; Wellman 2015) Carens (1987) and later on Marfleet (2006) have urged us to rethink the states’ ethical responsibilities toward displaced persons and consider making borders fully open to all who are fleeing from persecution, conflict, or disaster.

Democracy, however, has been used to support both of the stands. Democratic governance provides a potential link between self-determination and controls on immigration, but the is no consensus about the manner this link is actually applied. Democracy, Whelan (1988, 28) argues, “requires that people be divided into peoples (each people hopefully enjoying its own democratic institutions), with each unit distinguishing between its own citizens – understood in a political sense as those eligible to exercise democratic political rights here – and others, who are regarded as aliens here, although (hopefully) citizens somewhere else.” This is to say that in order for democracies to function, there must be rule by the same people upon whom the rule is imposed; i.e. the people making the rules need to be bound by the outcome (Wellman 2015). Should people have the right to move freely, whereby their belonging to a particular state would fluctuate, the self-determination would not occur as the ‘self’ that made the rule in the first place would seize to match with the ‘self’ which is bound by its application.

What is unclear from Whelan’s argument is that even if we were to accept that democracy cannot function properly unless people are sorted into territorially defined groups, why is the only territorial unit considered that of nation state? Why cannot democratic rights be confined to local and regional democratic units, or to macro-regions for that matter? Or as Wellman (2015) asks, what is wrong with a democratic world state? In a similar spirit, with her ethical call for open borders Nussbaum (2002, 5) maintain that a cosmopolitan community of all human beings should have primacy over narrower communities defined in terms of nationality, ethnicity, or religion, and that nationality is nothing but a “morally irrelevant” characteristic of personhood.

Another important aspect to keep in mind is the core argument behind democracy. If indeed we believe that that coercive political institutions cannot permissibly be imposed unless those coerced are given an equal say in how the political arrangements are ordered (Wellman and Cole 2011, 84), should that not mean that the suffrage should be extended also beyond the territorial borders of a given state? After all, “there are two groups subjected to the laws of the state: its own members, and those non-members who are applying for inclusion.” (Cole 2000, 186) Thus, immigration laws which may be democratic inside the territorial limits, are often imposed coercively upon foreigners seeking to enter to that territory, while the democratic principles would suggest that these outsiders should also have a say in shaping the laws and policies applied to them. This line of thought has been extended by Abizadeh (2008, 38), who posits that democratic principles are actually incompatible with a state’s right to unilaterally exclude outsiders: “anyone who accepts a genuinely democratic theory of political legitimation domestically is thereby committed to rejecting the unilateral domestic right to control and close the state’s boundaries…”.

Given what has been discussed above, it might not be a too much of an overstatement to argue that when it comes to the ongoing refugee ‘crisis’ in Europe, a deficiency of historical self-understanding has catalysed a hollowing out of the very value upon which the very idea of Europe has been commonly built. Indeed, we have deviated quite far away from the commonly cited examples of the European values: democracy, human rights, and solidarity, or for that matter from liberty, equality and fraternity that Europeans had developed over the course of centuries. No matter whether we are talking about the Kantian, Enlightenment or the presumably Christian identity of Europe many hold dear, it is unclear how any of that would be challenged by showing a little compassion and fulfilling one’s moral duties. It is these ethical and moral questions of bordering that I shall turn to next.

Beyond Bordering – Rethinking the Arguments for Ordering

Moving beyond the debate whether borders should be open or closed, this chapter call for a more holistic approach to the current situation. It must take into account that the commonly used definition of a refugee continues to be based on the wording of the only global legal instrument there is to cover explicitly the refugee affairs, the UNHCR 1951 Refugee Convention that is product of its time and designed for a particular geographical context; i.e. largely limited to protecting refugees in the post–Second World War Europe. Granted that its 1967 Protocol expanded scope of the Convention more worldwide, the word has continued to change since then and there are now new causes for displacement. The realities of conflict, violence and persecution continue to cause displacement, but not all refugees are fleeing because for “a well-founded fear of persecution,” as the 1951 Refugee Convention stated.

The new driver of cross-border displacement including natural disasters and environmental change, state fragility, serious, socioeconomic rights deprivations, as well as food and water insecurity. As many of these fall outside the framework of the Refugee Convention, a set of normative and ethical questions arises. Sticking with the existing conception of ‘refugee’ can be seen to create an ethically arbitrary barrier, excluding others with equally valid moral claims to protection (Betts 2015). Hathaway (2007) goes as far to argue that a refugee status can be deemed as elitists as refugees represent a distinct case among forced migrants being considered as the most deserving of the deserving. To counterbalance the situation, Betts (2013), building on Shue (1980), has proposed a particularly workable solution for a way forward by proposing attention to be paid not just to refugees but what he calls survival migrants; “people who are outside their country of origin as a result of their country’s inability to ensure their most fundamental human rights.” What Betts’ proposal does in practice is that is extends the conventional definition, that ensures protection for people fleeing deprivations of basic liberty or basic security, to cover also people fleeing the absence of basic subsistence. Despite the fact that the European Convention on Human Rights1 provides (Article 5) that everyone has the right to liberty and security, and says nothing about the right to subsistence, it is the latter that has been become an increasingly relevant push factor is many area of migrant origin – as well as the major factor pulling people towards Europe.

The logic behind the argumentation presented relies on the perspective that recent widespread securitization is not simply an attempt to close state spaces and that the borders are not merely either open or closed. The borders are not the same for all, and the ability to cross them depends a lot on who we are and to where we perceived to belong. What is thus happening is an attempt not to close borders but to filter the flows that cross them and to sort them by defining who is welcome and who is unwanted, who is legal and who is not. The real question thus is, on what basis this is done. What sorts of criteria is used when selecting who to admit and who to exclude? Can, say, certain religious, linguistic, or ethnic affiliations be legitimately favoured in this process for the sake of managing compatibility?

These questions bring us to the debate on what exactly the EU is expected to be. The criteria on the basis of which bordering is made tell us a lot about how and what the EU is envisioned to be and become. Based on the public debate on the matter in various European countries, identity and values play an important role in these decisions. It is clear that much of the resistance in Europe towards the influx of foreigners is based on the perception that that it will destabilise their customary and comfortable cultures. In largely Christian Europe, these fears have been accentuated by fact that most of the new arrivals have been Muslim. Recent studies have shown that generally speaking the European citizens have a strong preference for refugees with a similar religious background, and higher levels of education; i.e. Muslims are more likely to be rejected than Christians and the greater the expected economic benefit leads to the greater the acceptance (Banksak, Hainmueller & Hangartner 2016). The Visigrád states (Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Poland), in particular, have formally articulated a strong preference for taking Christian refugees before others. The tendency is not limited to Europe, but similar state-directed prejudice has been put in practice for instance in Australia, where Christians explicitly favoured, even though they are a vast minority of those seeking refuge, and in the United States, where Muslims have become downright demonized following the Trump presidency.

While these fears are understandable, it is debatable how they actually have to do with the religious value and how much the question is simply about the fear of the unknown. If, and only if, the Christian values are used to back up the arguments, a more receptive stance might be more justified. Every person has been created in the image and likeness of God (Genesis 1:27), and as Hollenbach (2016, 151) notes, this common creation gives every person a shared dignity and worth that reaches across all boundaries that are humanly constructed, including the borders between nation-states, which are by no means absolute. It is exactly this very biblical vision on which Pope Francis drew on his 2016 visit to the Mòria Refugee Camp at Greek island of Lesvos, where he assured Syrian refugees seeking entrance into Europe that “God created mankind to be one family” and called Europe to “build bridges” rather than “putting up walls” (Francis 2016a, 2016b), building on Pope John XXIII’s earlier appeal to normative universalism in his affirmation that national boundaries do not limit the reach of moral duty (John XXIII 1963, no. 25) Later on, Pope Francis continued in similar vein in saying to that “a person who thinks only about building walls, wherever they may be, and not building bridges, is not Christian” making a direct even if veiled criticism of Mr. Trump’s migration policies (See: Francis 2017a) The “best antidote to fear is mercy” which is “much more effective than walls, iron bars, alarms and weapons. And it is free.” (Francis 2017b) Thus, if the Christian argument is used, it must factor in that the duty to protect human rights reaches across borders. Such trans-border duties have particular relevance to the plight of refugees, who by definition lack the protection that would normally be provided by their home state (Hollenbach 2016, 152). All things considered, Einstein (1930) may have indeed had a point is arguing that “[a] man’s ethical behaviour should be based effectually on sympathy, education, and social ties and needs; no religious basis is necessary”.

Be it as it may, fear is a factor that cannot be overlooked. The essentialised imaginaries of security threats based on exaggerated representations and imaginaries of foundational difference between people, cultures and states (Rumelili 2015a) cannot be ignored as within contexts of socio-economic stress and geopolitical instability, the sense of insecurity can dramatically increase, regardless of whether the assessment made is rational or not. The feeling of insecurity can escalate to the point that it hinders one’s ability to manage the uncertainties of the daily life and erodes the sense of confidence and trust that the world is what it appears to be (Kinnvall 2004, 746). As Giddens (1991, 98) explains, that social actors need basic trust in the continuity of the factors that give them their sense of identity in order for them to have agency, to set objectives, define interests and act strategically. A lack of confidence for and assurance of the existence and what the future may bring fosters ontologically insecurity; i.e. concern with the continuity of the self and the security of being. In the current turbulent era with multiple crises, the actual cause of insecurity is not always easy to pinpoint. As the security threat is unclear or too complex to be grasped, it is also difficult to manage or tackle. Uncertainty makes it difficult to act and to sustain a self-conception, leading to the deep, incapacitating state of not knowing which dangers to confront and which to ignore (Mitzen 2006a, 345).

Security threats do not exist objectively but are the outcome of an inter-subjective ideational social construction. One of the reason why borders have become to play such a key role in the debate has to do with their perceived role as barriers to undesirable influences and threat from the other side. Rational or not, border can thus be seen to bring a sort of psychological comfort and fostering the constitutive of social orders and categories of binary nature (self and other, us and them, inside and outside, European and non-European) that play an important role in identity construction. In this process, the migrants, particularly the refugees, has often become depicted as threatening other. For example, in the United Kingdom, a petition, though unsuccessful in the end, was made to the Government and the Parliament to “Stop all immigration and close the UK borders until ISIS is defeated” and in Finland the right-wing extremists have organised numerous anti-refugee demonstration demanding the government to close the borders in order to battle against what they perceive as the “Islamic invasion” to the Finnish motherland. Many other such examples could be given.

Fear, Kierkegaard (1844/1944) deduced, turns into anxiety if it does not have an outlet. The othering of refugees can be seen as a strategy to fight against the paralyzing anxieties in search of a stability – be it societal or identiary. What defines us, is how we cope with the fear and anxiety. Do we let it compromise our own core values to the extent that that the fear begins to determine our mode of behaviour? As Durkheim (in Sparks, Girling & Loader 2001) put it, whom and what we fear, and how we express and act upon our fearing, is in some quite important sense constitutive of who we are. Having another set of norms of ‘us’ and another for ‘them’ is prime example of unethical bordering. Yet, following Kant, one might argue that if it is considering ethically and morally viable to allow people to exercise their freedom and express their dignity by moving around with no respect to borders, should it then be ethically and morally correct also to allow those who so wish to express their freedom and dignity by associating with who they prefer, shape their own institutions and created their own borders? Would it not be unjust and unethical to derive these freedoms for one for the sake of ensuring those to another?

Question such as these urge us to consider not just border but the practices of bordering; the processes of border making and the politics of difference they imply. On what ground the border are drawn and the maintained, and for which purpose? The they drawn to discriminate and exclude, or perhaps in search of psychological comfort or to protect one’s self identity and the sense of self-integrity? Borders play an important role as marker of difference and in identity construction. Accordingly, following Korsgaard’s (2009) work on “self-constitution,” we can understand much of the reaction to the refugee ‘crisis’ as identity-driven, and one of the most fundamental sources of normativity is indeed identity. That is to say that even if refugees or any immigrant for that matter, would not be consider as a threat in physical sense, they may be perceived to challenge the social clue that is perceived to hold a particular, even if imagined, nation together. As Betts (2015) have noted, identity and values often play an important role in deciding not just whether or not refugees should be accepted, but more importantly in deciding if refugees from certain counties should be privileged.

The question thus becomes about where exactly our values stem from and if they can be demarcated to a particular territorial division, such a nation state, or a continent, say Europe. If different values separate people, shouldn’t common values then bring people together? The universality of the principle of humanity put forth by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC 1986) forms the normative basis of the modern human rights movement but has also clearly include the universalist cosmopolitan ethic echoed in the thinking of Nussbaum (2002) or other who depict nationalities and national borders immoral. In short, human rights are rooted in the universal and equal dignity of all human beings – not just those belonging to particular nations, religions, or ethnicities: i.e. all persons possess human rights without distinctions based on “race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin.”2 The ethos that derives from this thus seeks to tear down the break down the barriers dividing people into those who matter and those who do not. It is also this realization based on which Hollenbach (2016, 150) puts forth that ethnic or national identities are never legitimate grounds for excluding people from their human dignity.

Those who advocate continuing to welcome refugees tend to argue that we need to fight through our fears because they are unfounded, irrational or extreme. Fear and anxiety may not, however, be eased by claiming that they are unfounded or irrational; the mere dismissal of the concern does not make it go away. What is needed is assurance that despite the unpredictability and instability, one’s daily life can go on without major interruptions and that the uncertainly can be managed (Laine 2018, forthcoming). In the other extreme, fears are deliberately politicised by feeding xenophobic readings of the situation by populist right-wing politicians – and the people who share their views – with the hope harnessing out fears in order to advance political goals. Fear is however a psychological phenomenon, not a political one. When it comes to the existing refugee situation, it cannot be dismissed. To feel lost in the changed circumstances, such as in the aftermath of the quite sudden refugee influx to many European countries, is well understandable and so it is to feel fearful and unsure about what is taking place.

Still, rather than being purely psychological, fear is socially constructed. Fear does not just happen; it is socially constructed and then manipulated by those who seek to benefit (Altheide 2002). There is an interrelationship between fear and knowledge, both individual and social, and the “fear of the unknown” is a recurrent phenomenon in times of crisis (Riezler 1944). In many senses the situation is reminiscent of a moral panic caused by a feeling of fear there is a threat to the well-being of society and identity. As Cohen (1972, 9) explains moral panic happens when “a condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests”. The media are key players in the dissemination of moral indignation arousing social concern, even when they do not appear to be consciously engaged in crusading or muckraking (Ibid.). Simply reporting the facts can be enough to generate concern, anxiety, or panic, especially given that to report of something is always a decision also about not to report something else. For example, crimes committed by refugees tend to be more newsworthy than crimes committed by average population, which naturally fosters the image that refugees pose a threat to public safety. Moral panic has also been defined as a situation in which public fears and state interventions greatly exceed the objective threat posed to society by a particular individual or group who is/are claimed to be responsible for creating the threat in the first place (Bonn 2015).

Fears and anxieties do not simply depend on an individual, but are rather determined his/her relations to other people and by the situation people find themselves in (Elias 1982). The intensity of fear is not directly proportional to the objective character of the specific threat, but our responses to specific circumstances are rather mediated through cultural norms, which inform people of what is expected of them and how they should feel (Furedi 2006). Hochschild (1979) termed these unwritten expectations as “feeling rules” – semi-conscious near instant responses to encounters with difference – between generations and groups that tell us on what we ought to fear, and how we ought to fear it. A similar idea was put later on by Giddens (1991), according to whom people rely on an assemblage of emotional and behavioural “formulae” as a part of their everyday practice in cope with potential fears and dangers.

Epilogue

The European attempts to ‘secure’ or ‘protect’ the borders have undoubtedly failed. Much of this is due to the fact that migration is often taken as a border security issue, as something that needs to be combatted against. In this equation, borders tend to get depicted as protective, yet at the same time vulnerable, walls safeguarding the inside from the perceived, even if irrational, threat from the other side. Once migration has been framed as an emergency in need of a security response, a distinct system develops to fill this frame (Andersson 2016, 7). Borders, however, are nothing but an end-of-pipe solution to a much broader phenomenon that cannot be managed with addressing its root causes. Borders, that is, will not make the ostensible problem go away as they are themselves a fundamental part of the problem. While it is difficult to provide a clear cut solution or a road map regarding what exactly should be done, this chapter has attempted to break away from the simplistic understanding of borders and advocated for a more holistic perspective that would allow us to move beyond the unfounded territorialisation of the security imaginary and a reduction of the analytical focus only to the boundaries of the nation-states.

In all, the increased securitization aimed at combatting the perceived threat has created a logic that has generated a number of counterproductive dynamics. Irregular mobility has not only become oversimplified, but what is more has become spectacularised both by the politicians as well as the media, which in itself has created further market for the security apparatus. The more alarming the crisis is reported to be, the more it creates an ostensible need to enforce the border, which makes the illegality industry grows only further. As Andersson (2016, 1060–1) explains, the prevalent emergency frame, in repeatedly presenting the migratory situation as an ‘unprecedented crisis’, does not only enable a two-faced reactive response of ‘humanitarian’ action and more policing, but also project these two in opposition of one another as the rescues are often thought of in opposition to border security, despite the recent trend whereby an increasing integration of these responses within a common emergency frame has become reality (Cuttitta 2014; Pallister-Wilkins 2015).

The stricter the rules guiding the policing and control at the border is, the greater share of mobility becomes defined as illegal. As the stakes of crossing the border becomes higher, so become the risks that people seeking cross borders are willing to take. This does not only make smuggling of goods, substances, or especially so that of people more profitable, and thus more alluring for those who facilitate it. Given that smuggling is a market driven by rampant demand, punitive measures only tend to drive business further underground while new risks are transferred downwards, from provider to client (Andersson 2016, 1061). Moreover, stricter policing has also made border crossings more precarious – and, quite frankly, lethal. The statistics indicate clearly that there is a correlation between the stricter border policies and the number of migrant deaths as the number of deaths at Europe’s borders have been increasingly year by year bringing about a huge human cost to border control – and making the EU external border the deadliest border in the world. The situation may be the best captured by the statistics provided by the UN Refugee Agency and the International Organization for Migration[3] which indicate that while the number of people found dead trying to reach Europe between 1990 and 2013 was in to 3,188, in 2014 alone the figure was already at 3,072 and in 2015 no less than 3,771. In 2016, the deaths linked to crossings by migrants trying to reach Europe have spiked over 5,000.

The problem is to decide what would be the ethically and morally correct way of dealing with situation. Should we aim for a democratic world state or make a global migration agreement? How come it is particularly the constituents within states, yet seldom within any other territorial units, that must have control over admissions? From a normative point of view, an authentically cosmopolitan ethos calls for recognition that while all persons share a common humanity, showing concrete respect for all will require recognizing that every person also has distinctive characteristics, including diverse bonds of kinship, culture, and shared citizenship (Hollenbach 2016, 152). Thus, respecting people as they are calls for respect both for their common humanity, but also for the ways they differ from each other (Appiah 2006, xiv-xviii). One of the key differences between people is their undoubtedly their nationality and citizenship, their belongingness; i.e. the state of being an essential or important part of something meaningful, familiar and secure. Recognising this makes Nussbausm’s (2002) claim that national borders are morally irrelevant sound rather simplistic and naïve, as recognised also by herself later on (Nussbaum 2006). If people should be able to express their freedom by moving around freely regardless of borders, the they should be equally allowed to exercise their freedom and express their dignity and identity by shaping the institutions of their own nation-state.

In attempting to respond to the so-called refugee ‘crisis,’ the EU as well as much of the state structures within it, have showed its inability address the situation in its complexity. Here, the problem has been that like the nocturnal drunkard, who searches for his lost keys under a streetlight because that is where they are easiest to see, so politicians have continued to look for solutions to the problems encountered in the areas illuminated by their past state oriented practices. Following Andersson (2016, 1071–2), this chapter contents that migration cannot be treated as a separate policy sphere, but rather needs to be considered in relation to larger political and economic fields in order for the mixed migration flows of today need to be dealt with thoroughly and intellectually. We are indeed looking in the wrong ‘places’ (borders) and at the wrong kind of measure (security) to ‘solve’ the migration ‘problem’ (Ibid.), and it is therein that lies the crisis. Rather than a ‘refugee crisis,’ the EU is facing a crisis management crisis and lacks leadership in managing irregular movements effectively and in collaboration with third-states in the neighbourhood and beyond. There are no quick fixes, unfortunately. Yet, rather than solving anything the augmented securitisation of borders bears a risk of bringing about excessive fear and paranoia, which in turn can lead, and already have led, to xenophobic responses and other counterproductive tendencies. No punitive policy will keep anyone seeking for a better life.

In the long-term, we must move towards a global model for mobility that would allow the changing migration patterns to be managed in a way that ends the discrimination by birth and takes the also ethical considerations into account. The discussion presented above may have been unable to provide concrete solutions the problems it has outlined, and rather open new ones for deliberation. With this chapter, I have however attempted to shift the conversation from the anthropological concerns about the ethics across borders, to one that seeks to understand how others relate ethically across and to borders. I argue that borders are not inherently bad and should not be treated as such. Borders continue to serve a purpose – various purposes, that it, and they may not be the same for us all. They cannot however be simply open or closed, but a balance should be sought in border that are porous enough as to allow fundamental rights of all to be met.

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Double-Speed Europe:

A New Round of Border Frames within

European Integration

Teodor Gyelnik

Central European Service for Cross-Border Initiatives (CESCI)

teodor.gyelnik@cesci-net.eu

Introduction

The European Union is often presented as a political entity that is substantially different from the pre-existing European cooperating structures and European nation-states. The ‘old Europe’ is often associated with wars, conflicts, power relations, national self-interests, isolationism, non-cooperation, heavy borders, Hobbesian strategy, etc.; however, the ‘new Europe’ is described as something unique, absolutely new, postmodern, enlightened, peace-driven, cooperative, without borders, tolerant, cosmopolitan, supranational, Kantian, etc. Hence, creating a powerful impression that the contemporary constellation of Europe has substantially progressed within the stadio-historical stage.

Nevertheless, this ‘unidentified political object’, using the narrative of Jacques Delors from 1985, has been experiencing serious and deep penetrating existential crisis which may even de-integrate the whole process and renew the animosity between the European nations and states. Subsequently, the study offers a qualitative approach based on desk research which scrutinizes the published articles and books regarding the contemporary European Union and integration process. It investigates the actual crisis constellation within the integration project and the strongly resonating and echoing idea of the double/multi speed Europe as a possible solution for the EU.

The study aims to understand the idea of double-speed Europe from a historical perspective of the European continent. To be specific, the paper understands the proposed idea as an institutional tool and integration frame which might undertake and unleash deep differentiation and border creation processes within the European integration project, namely differentiation between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, where the former is situated in a privileged position, while the latter is powerfully stigmatized. Furthermore, it is highly important to underline that the concept of borders which is used in this paper reflects a constructivist notion of borders (e.g. see Coplan 2012; Houtum 2003; 2012; Kaiser 2012; Newmann 2003; 2011; Paasi 1998) instead of understanding of borders as strict lines, physical entities and/or as demarcations. Henk van Houtum (2012, 412) puts it brilliantly,

“A line is geometry, a border is interpretation (…) A border can be drawn spatially everywhere. It is the symbolic meaning attributed to the appearance of the line which must be seen as constructor of the normative form. A border is made real through imagination. So what is important to the study of borders is not the item of the border per se, but the objectification process of the border, the socially constituent power practices attached to a border that construct a spatial effect and which give a demarcation in space its meaning and influence.“

Simply, the concept of border is understood as a result of particular narratives and discourses that are able to generate specific cognitive frames with the ability to differentiate, separate between actors, to create normative frames, to exercise power structures in specific manner with the ability to establish what Bourdieu (1984) identifies as ‘symbolic capital’.

The paper is divided into five parts. The first part looks at the European Union whether it represents a novelty, unique stage of development, or rather it mirrors historicity. Reflection of this part of the integration is important because the basic definition of the EU may establish certain ‘path dependency’ in understanding of the events within the integration processes. Second part presents the clash of understanding of the crisis itself, namely crisis as raison d’être of European integration and crisis as the contour of a new divided Europe. Involvement of the crisis phenomenon is highly important since the integration theories acknowledge that crises have substantial effects on the progress of the integration, thus reflection of this domain has a crucial role in order to understand the contemporary constellation of the integration. Third part introduces the proposed scenarios by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, as identified strategies to counter the existing crises of the European integration. Fourth part analyses the path to double-speed Europe and it briefly introduces the former similar opinions that flirted with the idea of multi/double-speed Europe. The last part applies postcolonial insight into the Western European logic of differentiation and phenomenon of separation and its resonance to double-speed Europe, as a reproduction of differentiation and invisible border structures in Europe.

Understandings of the Contemporary European Union: Novelty or Historicity?

Various creative and highly celebrated ideas of newness and freshness of the European Union and the European continent have appeared and spread across during the last few decades. Simon Hix (1998, 39) characterizes the EU as substantially new form of governance structure, “Governance within this new polity is sui generis: through a unique set of multi-level, non-hierarchical and regulatory institutions, and a hybrid mix of state and non-state actors.” Herman Van Rumpoy and José Manuel Barroso expressed at the Nobel Prize conference in 2012 that the EU is a ‘new legal order’ which is not based on power politics, but it is built on the free consent and shared sovereignty, “The uniqueness of the European project is to have combined the legitimacy of democratic states with the legitimacy of supranational institutions”, and this unique formation has generated a political system which “developed a unique transnational democracy.” John Fossum and Erik Oddvar Eriksen (2007, 5) situate the EU as a possible model and ground for a new cosmopolitan/deliberative democracy, where the EU represents new forms of political governance beyond the regular states, hence it generates a new frame of political order which bypasses the existing intergovernmental and/or nation-state levels (Eriksen, 2005). What is more, Guy Verhofstadt and Cohn Bendit (2012, 70) writes, “Europe is (…) our only means of entering the supranational or post-national world which is in the making. A world of continents and sub-continents and not of states.”

The other appearing creative ideas of Europe are the following ones: Europe as a ‘harbour of peace’ (Hill – Smith, 2005) which has assured long-term strategic cooperation and peace on the continents; a ‘Kantian paradise’ (Kagan, 2003) which has left the brutish insecure world of Hobbes behind and which has introduced a Kantian strategies of cooperation[1]; a ‘post-imperial empire’ (Beck – Grande, 2007) that imagines an entity situated within the second modernity with desires of interconnectedness and cosmopolitanism which has bypassed the simplicity and self-interest of the first modernity; a ‘normative Europe’ (Manners, 2002; 2010 and/or Sjursen, 2006) where the EU has the capacity to diffuse its norms and its methods of governance into the wider world; a ‘green Europe’ (Lenschow – Sprungk, 2010) where the European Union environmental policy is used as a tool of identity-building and justifier of European activities; the European Union as a bearer of ‘pooled/limited sovereignty’ (Keohane, 2003) which traverses the classical concept of Westphalian sovereignty; a ‘postmodern state’ (Cooper, 2002) which is an entity that does not think about security in terms of conquest; a ‘gender equal’ Europe (Macrae, 2010);); ‘force for good’ (Pace, 2008); ‘post-national Europe’ (Verhofstadt, Cohn-Bendit, 2012); ‘cosmopolitan polity’ (Eriksen, 2005); ‘Venus’ (Börzel, Risse 2009), or the notion of ‘civilian power’ proposed by François Duchêne in the beginning of the 70s. What is more, even the popular and non-academic Wikipedia speaks about the EU politics in similar tones, “The Politics of the European Union are different from other organisations and states due to the unique nature of the European Union.”[2] Simply, there is a powerful narration of contemporary European Union, and even Europe itself, as a new level of societal improvement on the linear stage of development.

These creative narratives of newness of the EU indicate that the European Union is a ‘hybrid polity’ which has bypassed the old traditional/modern Westphalian inter-state model, and the narratives formulate a ‘modernist approach’ which often give Messianic reality (a modernist phenomenon) to the New times/modernity, boxing, sealing and silencing the past. Habermas (1990, 6) explicitly expresses this modernist phenomenon in the following words, “because the new, the modern world is distinguished from the old by the fact that it opens itself to the future, the epochal new beginning is rendered constant with each moment that gives birth to the new.”

This modernist approach is explicitly and openly forward looking, where the interconnection between past and present is exploded (Benjamin, 1969), thus it applies so called ‘chronofetishist’ paradigm[3] (Hobson 2002, 2007). Simply, Europe and the European Union are often described as something fundamentally new, as an emerging new entity, a new agent of History and which should directly shape world politics. Although, does it really the case, or it is just a new epistemological appearance of the old Eurocentric contours of Europe, where the Western European states eagerly generate differentiations, separations and new cognitive borders between different actors who are situated on different stage of the imagined societal development?

That means the contemporary European Union is not seen from the ‘modernist’ perspective, where certain Messianic Times emerge, like Habermas (1990) and other philosophers and/or historians of modernity articulate it, but the EU is rather understood through historic prism. Edward Said (1994) strongly underlines that the ‘pastness of the past’ is essential when we want to fully comprehend the contemporary formulation of politics and world. It is important to acknowledge that there is no clear dividing line between past and present, there is no way in which the past could be ‘quarantined’ from the present, but they are simply interconnected with each other. Hence, the past cannot be reduced to a closed chapter. Subsequently, the task lies at the interrogation and elaboration of the ways and methods how the past still informs present (Kapur, 2005). Or, it lies within the Žižekian dialectics of ‘Old and New’,

“Therein resides the dialectic of the Old and the New: it is those who propose the constant creation of new terms (“postmodern society:’ “risk society:’ “informational society: ‘postindustrial society:’ etc. ) in order to grasp what is going on today who miss the contours of what is actually New. The only way to grasp the true novelty of the New is to analyze the world through the lenses of what was “eternal” in the Old.” (Žižek, 2009, 6).

Moreover, Hobden (in Hobson, 2002, 13) writes,

“social relations do not stand apart from time. All social interactions are affected by what has gone before, and in the understanding of the present the past cannot be avoided” and/or “The ‘past’ is ... never really ‘past’ but continuously constitutive of the ‘present’, as a cumulatively and selectively reproduced ensemble of practices and ideas that ‘channel’ and impart directionality to ongoing human agency. The present, in other words, is what the past - as received and creatively interpreted by the present - has made it.” (Bryant in Hobson, 2002, 13).

In other words, the current study does not understand the novel ideas and narratives about the European Union as the contours of novelty, newness, innovation and/or uniqueness, but it underlines that the Western European behaviour of separation has not been erased and/or remedied even within the integration process, yet.

However, new/neo institutionalism seems to be an appropriate conceptual approach in understanding the powerful stream of newness, freshness and innovation. Meyer and Rowan (1977) note that one of the principal performance of social organization is to generate narratives, myths and ceremonies which explain the meaning and reason of their own being. Subsequently, all the ideas of the flexible discourses of freshness may be seen as a certain process of legitimation and/or justification. Furthermore, Berger and Luckmann (1966/1991, 111-112) explain that the ‘principal problem of legitimation appear when institutional order are to be transmitted to a new generation. In order to restore legitimacy, there must be explanations and justifications. Legitimation contains explicit theories by which an institutional sector is legitimated in terms of a differentiated body’. Simply, the European Union openly aims to perform an institutional revolution with the aim to change the structures of sovereignty and diplomatic structures (e.g. see Bátora and Hynek, 2014; or Spence and Bátora, 2015), and these modifications are narrated through novel ideas. That means the attempt is visible to transmit the institutional order to new political and organizational structures. Nevertheless, the European Union suffers principal problems of its own legitimation; hence explicit theories are needed and generated in order to feed the myths, to fulfil the reasons of being and to support the transmission of sovereignty. The trap of ‘lack of legitimacy’ seems to be impossible. To be specific, the European Union is identified as an ‘unidentified political object’ (Delors, 1985), as an ‘unsettled polity’ (Olsen, 2011, 9), where it is much easier to catalogue ‘what the EU is not’, rather than openly say what it is (Beck-Grande, 2007), hence this unclear, blurred and ambiguous nature of the EU directly challenges its ability and capacity to substitute the state system. On the one side, this ambiguous structure of the EU may directly function as the EU´s modus vivendi (Bátora, 2011), i.e. undecided nature allows wide support from different political angles; however, at the same time this doubtfulness generates a substantial danger, namely, misconceptualization of the European Union through the so called ‘Mitrailleuse Effect’ (Bátora, 2013).

What is more, this vagueness around the EU directly shatters its own attempts for full legitimacy, as Meyer and Scott (1983, 201) explicitly warned, “A completely legitimate organization would be one about which no question could be raised. [Every goal, mean, resource, and control system is necessary, specified, complete, and without alternative.] Perfect legitimation is perfect theory, complete (i.e., without uncertainty) and confronted by no alternatives.” As it is visible, the European Union bears a huge unidentified nature that only further fuels its own multitude and multilayer crises, thus the next part of the paper looks at the concept of crisis within the integration process.

From Crises as Raison d’Être of European Integration, to a Crisis as a Contour of a New Divided Europe

Europe has been experiencing severe and deep penetrating series of crises, like financial crisis, economic crisis, debt crisis, currency crisis, demographic crisis, migration crisis, democratic crisis, crisis of the political/electoral systems, identity crisis, crisis of values, religious crisis, security crisis, crisis between the old and new member states and/or institutional crisis of the European Union itself. However, crisis may be explained as fundamental feature of the European integration process, especially when we see that cooperation on the European integration and the European Communities were created out of the agony of war and as a response to the Holocaust crimes.

The crisis itself may move the members forward on the path of European integration (Veber 2004; Fiala – Pitrová 2003). This idea was explicitly expressed by the father of European integration, Jean Monnet, “Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.”, or by Philippe Schmitter (draft paper, 1), “There is nothing new about crises in the process of European integration.  One could even say that they have been an integral part of it and, moreover, they have had a positive effect.” Furthermore, Johan P. Olsen (2010, 12) expresses that real and path-breaking steps and changes in ‘living’ institutions and political orders happen when they are under stress of severe crises; subsequently, crises have become a certain legitimating factor of the European unifying process. In other words, a precise ‘forward-through crisis discourse’ is present within the teleological narration of the European integration process, and this believes that a quasi-inevitable progress is present within the integration. This stream hypothesises that the crisis has the capacity to move the integration forward and to translate the economic integration into political one.

Divisions, differentiations and rifts were present within the European Union even before the ‘big crisis’, like the division between the Eurozone and EU members, division between the Eurozone itself, division between creditor and debtor nations, and many other smaller disagreements and rifts between the members. These differentiations often and strongly resonated within the discourses about the EU, but they were not so powerful that they could profoundly determine and alter the line of integration. Nevertheless, progression and deepening of European crises have deeply altered the structures within the European integration and in the EU, hence contemporary integration process is profoundly dominated by Germany and or by German euro-nationalism, what Ulrich Beck (2013, 64-65) calls as ‘German Europe’,

“equitable participation has been sidelined and replaced with increasing frequency by forms of hierarchical dependency (…) A German Europe violates (…) basic principles of any viable European society. Tactics such as delaying decisions and taming and disciplining weaker members destroy the mutual trust of ordinary citizens. They turn the vision of a united Europe into its opposite: the vision of Europe as an enemy.”

That means contemporary crises of the European integration seem to rather deepen conflicts between the member states instead of pushing integration, cooperation, mutual trust forward, and new separation lines have been already established. Beck (2013) highlights that economic and Euro/monetary crisis have substantially altered the microcosm of rules and institutions within the European Union. The first striking and explicit example of these shifts appeared in October 2011, when the heads of the EU members met in order to discuss the future of the community and to rescue the European currency. The debate was protracted and the President of the Council, Van Rompuy, suddenly broke a taboo within the process of European integration and he ordered that the non-Eurozone heads of member states should leave the negotiation room, hence only a smaller ‘VIP group of states’ continued the negotiation. Heavy weight countries like the United Kingdom and/or Poland had to leave the room and they were not part of further discussions, thus the loss of influence of non-Eurozone members has been powerfully and vividly demonstrated already in 2011.

The second example of this change of microcosm of rules and institutions was the emergence of the so called ‘Merkozy’ phenomenon. Namely, it was a term for the unified position of Germany and France during the beginning of the 21st century in the midst of the European sovereign debt crises. Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy regularly withdrew themselves from the European meetings in order to perform an exclusive bilateral consultations about the positon of Germany and France. Subsequently, other European leaders were reduced to a ‘second class’ leaders who simply had to wait for the bilateral negotiation of Sarkozy and Merkel. According to Habermas (2011), this Merkozy duo has established a ‘post-democratic’ constellation, where the power of the European Parliament is limited and where the power of the Council deeply engages within politics without authorization. Although, substitution of Sarkozy by François Holland, could not fill the gap after Sarkozy and a new phenomenon has appeared and it is described by Ulrich Beck (2013) as ‹Merkiavelli› (Beck, 2013), i.e. the European Union has been dominated by Germany and the behaviour of the German Chancellor copies the ruthless strategies proposed by Niccolò Machiavelli.

The third significant sign of shift of microcosm of rules and institutions was the crisis in Greece, when the German Parliament voted on the aid package for Greece. Simply, it was Germany who made a decision on the fate of Greece instead of Greece itself, thus echoing the republican dilemma of democratic decision-making (e.g. Bohman, 2010). In other words, a new stigmatized entities have appeared which are implicitly identified as the new ‹underclass› of the EU; subsequently, they partly lose their sovereignty, their pride is shattered and their self-determination is profoundly minimized. This alteration of microcosm have established a European constellation that the former finance minister of Greece, Yanis Varoufakis, aptly noted as ‹the weak suffer what they must›, and the weak have suffered since linking credits to rigorous neo-liberal reforms and control mechanisms have caused social decline of numerous regions, social decline for people and which even might have the danger of neo-colonial contours, too. (Beck, 2013) At this point, the notion of Zygmunt Bauman (2006, 186) is accurate, “the refusal to play the game by the new global rules is the most mercilessly punishable crime.”

To conclude, the current European crises seem to deepen the differences, distances between the European nations on the one side, and they insert strict divisions among the members of the European Union instead of bringing them closer and moving integration forward. Hence, social construction of new dividing lines, diverse categories for the member states and separations may substantially return dangerous hostilities and animosities into Europe. Behaviour of the most powerful entity from the EU members directly undermine the idea of trust, cooperation and solidarity, and the celebrated idea ‘forward-through crisis’ seems to be exhausted in the second decade of the 21st century. The next part of the paper investigates the ideas presented by the President of the European Commission as strategies to solve the multiple crises within the European Union.

Strategies of European Integration Proposed by Juncker

President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, proposed five alternative paths/scenarios about the future of the European integration as an answer to the contemporary crises of the European integration development. The first scenario is presented with title, “carrying on”. This scenario underlines the implementation and upgrade of the current positive reform agenda. This strategy continues the current path of the EU. That means member states pursue a joint agenda for action, decision-making and its pace is directly depended on the ability and capacity to overcome the existing differences. The basic advantage of this strategy is that it follows the already existing path; subsequently, everybody knows what can be expected from the European Union. This scenario maintains the shallow, but functioning, unity of the European continent; nevertheless, a major dispute can tear apart the integration process. Simply, the carrying on strategy allows achieving some goals, underperforming some others and totally failing to achieve the highest integration level due to lack of ambition or will.

The second scenario is the so called “nothing but the single market” and it can be identified as one of the two extreme proposals. This scenario reflects the unwillingness of the member states to perform a deeper cooperation in various policy areas; subsequently, the activities of the European integration focus on deepening of the single market, but nothing else. The primary structure of cooperation will be the single market and the attempts to fully remove trade barriers. That means to make the existing barriers, like physical (borders), technical (standards) and fiscal (customs) more penetrating to the maximum possible extent between the cooperating parties. Hence, cooperation of the member states, ‘follow-on policies’ are rolled back and cooperation focuses on free movement of four freedoms without other policy areas, like foreign policy, security, defensive cooperation, migration and/or justice/home affairs. The remaining policy areas, where cooperation is not implemented, are dealt through bilateral negotiations and agreements. At this point, the single market and its functioning becomes the “raison d’être” of the European Union. Further progress of the integration is directly connected to the development and progress of the cooperation in the field of single market. Nevertheless, this scenario may promote a certain competition ‘race to the bottom’ between the cooperating partners. On the other side, the limited area of cooperation generates that decision-making and agreements will be made much faster and they become simpler. Although, when Jean-Claude Juncker presented the scenarios, he firmly opposed the scenario that the EU is regressed into the level of the single market.

The third scenario was presented under title “those who want more do more” and it represents the second extreme from the given five alternatives. This option is based on the idea that those who want to deepen their cooperation should not be limited by those who do not want to participate. Hence, a “coalition of the willing” appears who may perform a deeper cooperation in various areas. This scenarios is already present in the contemporary constellation of the European integration and it is mainly performed through so called “opt-outs”, e.g. Schengen Agreement without the United Kingdom and Ireland; economic and monetary union without Denmark and the United Kingdom; Common Security and Defence Policy without Denmark; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union without Poland and the United Kingdom; area of freedom, security and justice without Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom; citizenship without Denmark. This scenario, where the willing parties cooperate and where the non-willing parties do not block a deeper cooperation, preserves the unity of the integration, but at the same time a deepening option also appears as a possibility. Nevertheless, this scenario will have to solve a crucial question, namely different levels of cooperation of the willing may generate different layers of decision-making. This scenario supports the cooperation in the domains of the single market, economic & monetary union, Schengen, migration & security, foreign policy & defence, EU budget, and capacity to deliver.

The European Commission prepared two middling alternatives which were covered by the fourth and the fifth scenarios. The fourth possible option of European integration appears under title “doing less more efficiently”. This path of the European integration underlines that the European Union should concentrate on reduced policy priorities. That means the European integration identifies those areas, where cooperation can be progressed. Subsequently, cooperation is performed in selected policy areas, hence the European Union and its decision-making becomes much faster. Moreover, this scenario and the reduced version of the EU towards more efficiency in fewer areas may allow to the EU citizens that they understand the processes in the European Union. This version could have serious impacts on several cooperating areas. For example, common standards in the field of single market and trade are set to a minimum, but the minimized frame is much more vivid and its enforcement is strengthened. Nevertheless, this alternative immediately meets a huge disagreement and divergence, namely which will be those areas that will be prioritized and those areas which will be reduced?

The last proposed scenario is the so called “doing much more together”. This alternative derives from the basic idea that the world is such complicated and interconnected that only deep and more cooperation can be effective. Hence, neither the contemporary frame of the EU cooperation nor the individual activity of the states are able to effectively and successfully cope with the postmodern challenges. Thus, member states are ready to transfer and share more legitimacy, sovereignty, resources and decision-making with the EU structures. Transfer of more power will directly lead to deeper and more complex cooperation in all the domains. In other words, this scenario is an implicit version of a federative constellation of the European Union. This approach would strengthen the single market by harmonizing the trade standards. Moreover, this would formulate a European Union which is represented by one seat in most international fora. This path of the European integration promotes a decision-making structure, where the agreed decisions are rapidly enforced. Nevertheless, this scenario bears a huge problem, the ever growing suspicion about non-legitimacy of the European Union and its federative route may directly undermine this alternative path of the European integration.

Although, it is clear that the President of the European Commission and the Western European leaders favors the third proposed scenario, “those who want more do more”. This European integration strategy means that individual member states of the European Union can form groupings in order to undertake specific objects and projects, even in the case when other member states are not willing to join; although, as one senior European diplomat expressed, “It (double-speed Europe - note of the author) appears every once in a while but we have never seen it.” (La Baume, 2017) Since the third strategy seems to widely accepted by the leaders of the Western member states, it would be highly important and useful to reflect the former ideas on the double/multi speed Europe, thus seeing the path of this idea as a certain prelude to the idea of Jean-Claude Juncker.

A Road to Double-Speed Europe

The idea of a multispeed, double-speed and/or variable geometry Europe is very popular and it has been resonating with an enormous attractive power, especially in the midst of uncertainty, doubts and crises in Europe. For example, the former French President François Hollande spoke about ‘differentiated cooperation’, the Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni underlined ‘different levels of integration’ and/or the German Chancellor Angela Merkel talked about ‘Europe of different speeds’. Mainstream media also seems to support this idea, “We certainly learned from the history of the last years that there will be as well a European Union with different speeds, that not all will participate every time in all steps of integration” (The Guardian, 2017), “We need to have the courage for some countries to go ahead if not everyone wants to participate. A Europe of different speeds is necessary, otherwise we will probably get stuck.” (Zalan, 2017a) And, respected members of the academia also support the idea, like Jürgen Habermas, “For only a properly functioning core Europe could convince the presently polarised populations of all member states that the project makes sense. It’s only on this basis that those populations that prefer meanwhile to hold fast to their sovereignty may gradually be won over to join – a decision that’s always open”[4]

Although, the idea of a double-speed Europe, which is currently favored by major European politicians, is definitely not a new idea in Europe. It explicitly and openly appeared in 1994, when Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers proposed it as a new vision and idea for Europe. Their vision was influenced by fears, regressive nationalism, deep structural economic changes, mass unemployment and migration. Subsequently, they proposed that the European integration should take a more elastic, flexible form, methods of variable geometry and multiple speeds which may strengthen the core states of Europe, hence promoting European unification. Subsequently, this hard core Europe should be formed around France and Germany which coordinate their activities and policies with the aim to lead the Union as a whole. In their reading, political union, with the frame of the Eurozone, could be a group of states which are ready to deepen their cooperation. It is important to underline that the proposed multispeed idea of Schäuble and Lamers explicitly flirted with the idea of a federative establishment in Europe (Grabble, Guérot 2004).

A few years later in 2000, the idea of hard core once again re-emerged in Germany, but that time it was articulated by the Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer. In contrast with Schäuble and Lamers, Fischer did not spoke for federative frame of the European integration. Fischer called for a so called ‘avant-garde’ structure, to be specific, “Such a centre of gravity would have to be the avant-garde, the driving force for the completion of political integration and should from the start comprise all the elements of the future federation.” (Fischer, 2000) In other words, Fischer understood this avant-garde as a last resort, when Germany should take the leading role when nobody else is willing to take the leadership within the integration (Grabble, Guérot, 2004). Moreover, Fischer did not support the idea of ‘core states’, but rather he put forward the notion of enhanced cooperation and closer cooperation.[5] What is more, the French President Jacques Chirac reacted to the ideas of Joschka Ficher and he claimed that there is a need for a ‘pioneer group’ of member states which are ready and able to push the European integration forward.

According to Gilles Andréani (2001), certain continuity can be identified between the ideas of Schäuble-Lamers and Fischer, namely both ideas defend the principle of subsidiarity and reallocation of competences between the national and supranational levels, and both ideas look at France and Germany as the main leading member states which may lead the advanced group of the most willing and integrationist members of the European Union. However, substantial differences can be found between the ideas of core Europe in the 90s and in contemporary debates. To be specific, during the 90s, the idea of a core was powerfully driven by the ideas of a European federation, e.g. Schäuble and Lamers proposed that the federative frame of Germany should be ‘translated’ into the European level and for the whole EU. Thus, close cooperation between France and Germany should formulate the leading role within the frame of the European integration. The contemporary debates on multispeed Europe have two important changes. First is that the core is no longer represented by the Germany-France tandem, but it is dominated by Germany and by the so called ‘Merkiavelli’. Second, the idea of a core and non-participating countries were seen as a normal structure of the integration during the 90s, hence the non-participating countries, through application of ‘opt-outs’, were not stigmatized, and it was understood as a standard constellation of the integration process, namely, some members were not willing to deepen the level of integration at specific time within specific domain. On the other side, contemporary discourses on multispeed/double-speed Europe seems to be profoundly different from the previous dichotomy because deep stigmatization signs are already present between the core and the periphery. The debate about the core and the periphery is situated within a totally new position as it was during the previous decades. The periphery is no longer seen as a group of ‘respected countries’ which do not want to go deeper within certain domains of the European integration, but they are understood as laggards, who slow down the process of integration and who should be overcome within the integration frames. A new round of differentiation seems to be on a horizon in the European continent. New insiders with symbolic capital and new outsiders with stigma are on the horizon of the integration process in Europe, thus a profound symbolic meaning may be drawn between them.

Even the former German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl (2004) directly underlined that there is a huge threat in the idea of two-speed Europe, “It would be harmful to allow a two-speed Europe (…) Whoever demands a two-speed Europe must ask the other members for their permission. (…) But none of the new members is interested in a two-speed Europe that demotes them to outsiders.”[6] Subsequently, next part of the paper looks at the emerging phenomenon of differentiation and separation as practices of emerging invisible borders within the European continent.

Double-speed Europe as a Reproduction of Differentiation in Europe

The idea of a double-speed Europe is seen as a clear and explicit reproduction of Self/Other differentiation and insertion of cognitive border frames within the European integration project itself, since it may unleash processes of invisible borders, separations and stigmatizations. At this point, it is important to mention the ‘Winston Parva Study’, an analysis of social dynamics in Leicester that was performed by Norbert Elias.

To be specific, Winston Parva was organized in three districts, namely Zone 1, 2, 3. Zone 1 was inhabited by white-collar professionals and the other two zones were inhabited by working class citizens. It was generally accepted that the best area for life was the Zone 1. However, the inhabitants of the Zone 2 considered their areas as a respectable space with high degree of generational cohesion and they despised the Zone 3 which was inhabited by the newcomers. Subsequently, Zone 3 was without proper generational and social cohesion and parts of the Zone were dirty and quarrelsome. The most shocking part of the research was that inhabitants of the Zone 3 understood themselves in certain shame, they “seemed to accept, with a kind of puzzled resignation, that they belonged to a group of less virtue and respectability.” (Elias, Scotson, 1995, xvi) That means the established groups (Zone 1 and 2) performed a monopolization of privilege and identified themselves as masters, while the Zone 3 and the newcomers were stigmatized and characterized as anomic, lawless, dirty, undisciplined with loose morals and they were identified as socially inferior people.

“Just as established groups, as a matter of course, regard their superior power as a sign of their higher human value, so outsider groups, as long as the power differential is great and submission inescapable, emotionally experience their power inferiority as a sign of human inferiority” (Ibid, xxvi), “in all these cases the more powerful group look upon themselves as the better people, as endowed with a kind of group charisma, with a specific virtue shared by all its members and lacked by others. (…) the ‘superior’ people may make the less powerful people themselves feel that they lack virtue – that they are inferior in human terms.” (Ibid, xvi)

The Winston Parva study underlines the processes of stigmatization, separation and formulation of power and privilege positions within a society. Although expressions of this power structure emerge between states and nations, thus the process of privilege and stigmatization is present there, too. Ayse Zarakol (2011, 58) notes, the social dynamic which was identified in Leicester may duplicate itself in most power relations and it may generate a dichotomy between full and relative sovereignty. The ‘established and outsider’ dichotomy may appear also during great overlap between the entities, hence the basic attribute of hierarchical establishment is generated by deeds, actions and/or through performances (e.g. see Ringmar 2013), like “one part thought of themselves as vastly superior to those of the Other and as a corollary, this in-group was able to both monopolize privileges and at the same time make those who were excluded feel that they were socially inferior.”

Subsequently, the idea of double, multi speed Europe immediately echoed similar opinions on privilege positions, hierarchies and stigmas. The given reactions from some states on the proposed ideas of double/multispeed Europe show a certain agreement with the theory of Norbert Elias, discovered in Leicester. Hence, conflict between the ‘old’ Europe and ‘new’ Europe is profoundly present through this proposed institutional frame, and voices have appeared that the proposed path of the European integration may generate new divisions, borders and invisible Iron Curtain between Western and Central/Eastern part of the continent, where the former is the bearer of pride, virtue, charism and progress, while the latter is narrated as slacked and subject of shame. That means international society performs a categorizing activity among its members. Subsequently, this categorization and given attributions make deep penetrating anticipations about the behaviour of members, as Erving Goffman (1963, 11) notes, ‘anticipations within a society produce normative expectations, demands toward the stigmatized members’, and the narrated social standards masquerade themselves as objective assessments with the ability and capacity to establish new power hierarchies (Zarakol, 2011).

In other words, the phenomenon of stigmatization has been visible even in the central decision-making bodies of the EU and even the President of the European Commission himself expressed as a reaction to the fears and anxieties about double-speed Europe, “introducing a new dividing line, a new iron curtain between East and West and that is not the intention.” (Euractiv, 2017) However, the Visegrád countries, comprising the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia articulate significant opposition to the ideas of core Europe and their logic is built on the ideas that were theoretically introduced and described above.

At this point it is relevant to mention postcolonial theories, too. Western Europe´s fictions about its orders are embedded in the symptom of Lacanian ‘jouissance’ and enjoyment, where the European fiction/fantasy becomes a political factor (Grosrichard, 1998), where the subject is supposed to enjoy its own fantasy of superiority, where the subject supposed to believe in its own superiority and pride. Using Žižek´s idea, the enjoyment becomes a political factor and from this factor the subject simply cannot get away. This enjoyment and/or myth is powerfully maintained and reimagined over and over.

In other words, the old Western European logic of differentiation, stigmatization, separation and border creation between states might take various forms and narratives, what Anghie (2004) calls as ‘problem of difference’ or ‘dynamic difference’ and/or as ‘philosophical allergy’ described by Emmanuel Levinas (1986, 346):

“Western philosophy coincides with the disclosure of the other where the other, in manifesting itself as a being, loses its alterity. From its infancy philosophy has been struck with a horror of the other that remains other – with an insurmountable allergy....Hegel’s philosophy represents the logical outcome of this underlying allergy of philosophy.“

The existing myth of superiority is very rigid and it does not easily accommodate change as it is based on a very simple idea, namely, that Western Europe is better than the rest. However, this rigid idea has needed flexible interpretation in order to maintain itself through centuries. This flexibility is generated by ‘narrative sociability’, or it may be called also as ‘socio-normativity’ which identifies the Self and Other nexus through ontological differentiation from each other, by privileging/hyper-valorizing of the former and reduction of the latter. Narrative sociability and/or socio-normative hierarchy indicates a certain ‘spacing’ of the Self and Other, where the former possess optical, geometric, measured, standardized, partitioned or disciplined space, while the other´s spacing is primitive, corporeal, wild, irregular or labyrinthine (Gregory, 2004).

Judith Butler (in McCarthy, 2009) aptly and clearly explains that the notion of ‘universal’ has a non-exhaustible possibilities to articulate itself as universal, legitimate, and this articulation of universal is performed through narrative sociability. Slavoj Žižek (2011) speaks about ‘Hegelian concrete universality’, i.e. a need to reinvent the idea of superiority and pride in each historical situation. Hence, the Foucauldian ‘madness’ is recreated, specifically, the exclusion, stigmatization and the social expulsion of the leper did not disappear with the cessation of leprosy, hence new and new socio-normative hierarchies are established, e.g. form of ‘purity and pollution’ (Inayatullah - Blaney 2004), ‘established and latecomer’ (Elias – Scotson, 1995), ‘Christian and pagan’ (Juan Givés de Sepúlveda in Wallerstein, 2006; Bowden, 2009; Todorov, 1999), ‘functioning states vs. failed/rouge states’ (Doty, 1996), ‘good governance vs. bad governance’ (Abrahamsen, 2000), ‘homo vs. homo sacer’ (Agamben, 1995) and/or deep analysis of Foucault (1995) how the position of the vagabond substituted the negative position of the leper in the society. In other words, the Western European logic is deeply embedded within the behaviour of differentiation. Subsequently, the idea of double-speed Europe appears to copy this logic and frame of differentiation and internal border creation between the entities, but this time it appears inside of the European continent and within the integration process.

Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the former Prime Minister and the leader of the governing Law and Justice Party expressed, “We cannot accept any announcements of a two-speed Europe (…) This would mean either pushing us out of the European Union or downgrading us to an inferior category of members” (Reuters, 2017a), and he warned the German Chancellor that a move and push toward a two-speed Europe will cause that the integration process will fall apart, thus inserting a two-speed European frame into the integration process may lead to breakdown and it may even liquidate the European Union within its current sense. (The Guardian, 2017) Moreover, the Prime Minister of Poland, Beata Szydło, expressed that a double/multi-speed Europe may generate a crisis within the European Union which may cause ‘permanent cracks’ within the integration ‘process’, and she said, “We will not agree to division within the EU, because that leads directly to disintegration” (in Zalan, 2017b), hence the debate should not be about more or less Europe, but to find a way to build a better Europe (Visegrad Post, 2017). Moreover, she expressed that a multispeed Europe “is an attempt to divide the European Union… (our interest) is about those regions that want European unity, mutual respect, equal chances. And they are mostly Central and Eastern European countries” (Euronews 2017).

Hungary, with the leadership of Viktor Orbán, has also dismissed a two-speed integration ideas and path. According to him, the idea of a two/multi-speed Europe is an affront towards the Central and Eastern part of the Union. (Wintour, 2017a) He expressed:

“We must not have a ‘two-speed Europe’: there is no first-class and second-class Europe; there is no core and periphery. In general, this whole question of a two-speed Europe is one of the most abhorrent ideas for us. At the same time, through strengthened cooperation we are not opposed to the idea of some countries making more progress than others on some issues. (…) We allow everyone to move further forward than others in accordance with their own best interests, but within certain boundaries.” (Miniszterelnök.hu, 2017)

Furthermore, the Hungarian state secretary for EU Affairs underlined that the resonating idea to rebuild the contemporary EU into a two/multi-speed cannot be a viable option, but it rather may create such a deep division that it may mean the end of the EU in its present form.

The political leadership of the Czech Republic has articulated similar opinion. The former President of the Czech Republic, Václav Klaus, has been deeply critical towards the European Union and European integration. The minister of Foreign Affairs of the Sobotka Government, Lubomir Zaoralek, expressed that dividing Europe into two groups with two different speeds of integration is an unfortunate and bad idea which may weaken the whole Union, “The dual speed seems to me just like a precursor to further shrinking and decline. When you lose the ability to convince, win, include others, then you are on a path to shrink inwards.” (in Lopatka, Muller, 2017) Although, the new candidate for the post of Czech Prime Minister, Andrej Babiš, expressed very critical opinions on the integration process with denial of the Monetary Union and any further integration of the EU. Babiš verbally supported the idea of the multispeed Europe, claiming that the Czech Republic should not participate in any further integration (in Týden, 2017), hence even accepting that the Czech Republic may get into the periphery of the European integration. That means Babiš supports the idea of multispeed Europe, claiming that Western Europe can make further integration but without the Czech Republic. Although, his position is profoundly different from the Slovakian support and eager to be at the center of the double-speed EU.

Slovakia follows a double road since it disagrees with the Western states on some domains, but it still wants to be part of core of the integration process. To be specific, Robert Fico as Prime Minister expressed, “The fundamentals of my policy are being close to the (EU) core, close to France, to Germany” (…) I am very much interested in regional cooperation within the Visegrad Four but Slovakia’s vital interest is the EU” (Reuters, 2017b). Furthermore, the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Republic expressed that they support the Slovakian integration within the core of the European Union (HN Online, 2017).

Moreover, even Romania has signalled its fears about the idea of double-speed Europe when the Romanian Senate leader expressed that the double and multi speed Europe may generate new divisions within the European Union that could be similar to the Iron Curtain during the communist period (Morgan, 2017).

Simply, the idea of multispeed Europe appears as a profound challenge for Central Europe. According to Anderson (2016), Central Europe embodies a certain ‘grey zone’, where the countries are committed to integration and the Eurozone but without exact dates. That means this grey zone faces a choice, either it will be part of the core, or it may turn into a new eastern periphery. Hence, creating a core group of states could mean that a group of EU member states may arrive at consensus faster and more likely and the outer zone of states may be relegated into a status of second class states (Bershidsky, 2017).

Conclusion

The deep and severe crisis in Europe and within the frames of the European Union has generated a revival of an old idea, where the different states of the integration process seems to be deeply differentiated, separated and a new invisible border has been installed among them. Currently, mainstream ideas in Europe support that crisis should be handled by promoting a multi/double-speed Europe, where certain member states formulate a ‘core’ of the integration process and they powerfully push forward further deep unification of the continent. This idea is not new since the Western part of the continent has been flirting with this idea for more than two decades. Nevertheless, one fundamental change has been made within the idea of multi/double-speed Europe, i.e. those members, who do not want to move forward in the integration, have become stigmatized and they are narrated as countries which do not respect the European values, slow down integration and bring tension into the community. In other words, the countries which prefer slower integration are stigmatised, thus the contours of a new dichotomy are on the horizon that make deep separation, differentiation between the members and it resembles to the duality of ‘established and outsider’, where the ‘core states’ are armoured with ‘pride’, while the members on the periphery are attempted to be deprived of their own pride.

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1th century, namely, Richard Cobden, John Bright and/or Norman Angell. They enthusiastically wrote about the peaceful mission of the British empire, e.g. “the methods and processes of Spain, Portugal, and France were military, while those of the Anglo-Saxon world were commercial and peaceful. ... The difference ... was that one was a process of conquest, and the other of colonizing, or non-military administration for commercial purposes. The one embodied the ... Cobdenite idea ... the other the lofty [realist] military ideal. The one was parasitism; the other co-operation.” (Angell, 1913, 240 in Hobson, 2012, 44)

2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_European_Union

3dogenous Self.

4 https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/07/core-europe-to-the-rescue/

5an integration.

6https://www.irishtimes.com/news/kohl-weighs-in-against-two-tier-europe-1.1131159

Cross-Border Shopping Tourism

in Socialist Yugoslavia: Gender, Socialist Economy and Reconfiguration of Borders

Polona Sitar

Institute of Culture and Memory Studies,

Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts

polona.sitar@zrc-sazu.si

Introduction

This contribution examines cross-border shopping to ‘Western’ capitalist countries in the period between the mid-1960s, when Yugoslavia opened up towards the West and the late 1980s. Cross-border shopping is a common activity in many parts of the world and a border-related phenomena. According to O’Dowd (2001: 67) political borders are the inevitable outcome of the range and limits of power and coercion, social organization, the division of labor and the promotion of a collective identity within a delimited territory. In this context borders are understood as multidimensional, complex, ambiguous, contradictory, flexible and durable (O’Dowd, 2001: 69). As stated in Timothy (1995: 525) international boundaries are invisible vertical planes that transect the airspace, the soil and the subsoil between adjoining states, marking the limit of territory in which a state can exercise its sovereign authority. Borders limit contact between people and can function as lines of economic containment and military defence (Prescott, 1987). However, in addition to their role as lines of separation, boundaries may also be viewed as lines of contact: places where similar dissimilar cultures and economies converge (Timothy, 1995: 526).

There is little information in the literature to offer a conceptual basis for studying the relationship between political boundaries, consumption and tourism therefore, the purpose of this paper is to address these gaps by examining the perception of people on cross-border shopping in the context of gender division. A special attention is placed on newly acquired cultural capital. Also, the paper will point out the perception of individuals on cross-border shopping in the context of the political implications of the historical changes and processes of de- and re-bordering in post-socialist Yugoslavia after its disintegration in 1991. The analysis consists of open interviews with mainly female informants, born before and immediately after WW2, living their active lives in the time of socialism. Through their experiences of shopping abroad, particularly in Italy and Austria, the article will demonstrate how consumption and tourism were interconnected, including discourses of other informants to provide a broader context.

The oral history approach will be used to explore women’s history from the perspective of subjective interpretation, arguing that the oral history method is usable not to obtain objective, but subjective information (see Oakley, 2003; Riessman, 1987; Ritchie, 1995; Thompson, 2000). By using the oral history approach, it is not aimed to reconstruct the socialist past, but to provide a different perspective on it, based on the experiences of women’s everyday practices. In this way an additional discourse will be added to the already existing official historic narratives, filling a gap by including the cultural and social narration about the every-day life of ordinary people. It must be taken into account that memory is always a reconstruction and representation of the past with an active production of the meaning by informants (see Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Crowley and Reid, 2000; Koleva, 2012). We will try to understand the meanings that the informants now ascribe to the past, how they perceive it, feel about it and shape it in accordance to the present.

Since the beginning of the 1950s, socialist Yugoslavia was very different from the Eastern European socialist countries in terms of personal life standard, tourism, travelling, shopping abroad and the imitation of the Western way of life.

Freedom to travel and consume established Yugoslavia’s status as a hybrid between East and West and marked its separate road to communism. The country was more open to Western influences in terms of consumption trends and nurturing the belief that every citizen is entitled to a good quality of life, measured in accordance with consumption objects (Mikula, 2010; Patterson 2011). In the early 1950s, Tito’s regime embarked on a number of reforms, such as retreat from central planning towards market socialism, consumer orientation and openness to the West. Simultaneously with ongoing industrialization, a rapid urbanization and general modernization of society took place after World War Two. The basic social welfare was represented in the form of consumption and leisure time (Duda, 2005: 143).

In terms of territory, Slovenia was not a large part of Yugoslavia. Slovenes represented 8.4 % of the Yugoslav population. However, Slovenia had an important political influence within Yugoslav federalism. Slovenian policy was in favor of more liberal economic-political discourses, especially regarding a larger role of market and political decentralization of power. Following the introduction of the free-market system in Yugoslavia, which allowed the development of a lifestyle superior to that of any other country in the Eastern Block, the official discourse on consumption produced mixed messages. According to Repe (1998) on one hand, consumption was seen as a reward for workers, and on the other as social evil. The Slovenes found themselves in a paradoxical position, because they believed in selfmanagement, Tito and the non-alignment movement, but also in washing machines, televisions and other consumer products.

Between 1960 and 1970, there was a rapid increase of the standard of living in Yugoslavia. This was partly a result of a high level of employment and wage increases. The American culture, portrayed in the form of movies, rock and roll, new household appliances and the idea of freedom of choice in modern supermarkets gave Yugoslavs a different perspective on how spending their leisure. Images of the Western world created the expectations of a future with a better life and social wellbeing (Vučetić, 2012: 364). It turned out that people took the dream of a better and happier world more seriously, than the state ever imagined.

‘Cross-Border Shopping’ vs. ‘Tourist Shopping’ in a Socialist Economic Context

The nature of cross-border shopping in the former Yugoslavia changed over time, reflecting the evolving political and economic processes after the World War II. In the early 1950s and early 1960s trips abroad were still restricted and limited. From the late 1950s, travelling abroad became easier for Yugoslav citizens because of easily accessible passports and the establishment of a visa regime for leisure travel. Until the year 1954, when the London Memorandum resolved the distribution of an independent territory of Trieste to Italy and Yugoslavia, Yugoslavs rarely travelled to Italy. In 1955, Yugoslavia and Italy singed the Videm agreement on local border traffic, according to which the permission for border crossing was extended to all border population within ten kilometers of the border. Border crossings became more common. People not living close to the border were able to cross with a passport.

According to Repe (1998: 94) the Ossim agreements between Italy and Yugoslavia in 1975 turned the Yugoslav-Italian border to the most open border between any capitalist and socialist state. From 1962 onwards, Yugoslavs could legally buy foreign currency and keep foreign-currency bank accounts. In shopping destinations across the border shopkeepers accepted the Yugoslav Dinar at an exchange rate more favorable than the official one. The proximity of the Western borders contributed significantly to the expansion of consumer mentality. Because of the neighboring countries, the citizens of Yugoslavia were more familiar with the western lifestyle than elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain. Among the republics of Yugoslavia, Slovenia had a privileged position in terms of access to products from Western capitalist countries due to the borders with Italy and Austria. Therefore Slovenian consumerism has developed to a greater extent than in other republics of the socialist Yugoslavia (see Mikula, 2010; Repe, 1998; Švab, 1998). However, its geographical position and the proximity of the western borders were not the only factors. According to Mikula (2010), the nature of cross-border shopping changed over time also due to the economic and political processes. In the 1950s and early 1960s travelling abroad was still very restricted, but in the 1960s Yugoslavia accepted economic reforms and incorporated elements of the free market system which eventually lead to the heyday of former Yugoslav cross-border shopping. The economic reform in 1965 had reduced the role of the state in the economy and gradually started to deploy market socialism. Goals of the new five year plan (1966–70) strived to increase personal consumption, modernization and greater freedom in the marketplace, since the state and the Communist Party realized, that the desired satisfaction could no longer be postponed into the future. All this resulted in the fact that Yugoslavs could travel abroad, explore, buy items and bring them home. Thus, in between the mid-1960s and early 1980s cross-border shopping blossomed in Yugoslavia.

Until today, many researchers have studied the cultural significance and influence of shopping in the neighboring capitalist countries Austria and Italy and their influence on the daily lives of Slovenians (see Luthar, 2006; Mikula, 2010; Repe, 1998; Švab, 1998). Mikula (2010) uses the term ‘cross-border shopping’, which is defined as the ‘movement of people across an international border with the expressed intention of buying goods and then returning home’ (Donnan and Wilson in Mikula, 2010: 214). Wessely (2002, 6–8) defines ‘shopping tourism’ in opposition to ‘tourism shopping’ as the ‘travel abroad with the explicit aim to buy goods that are unavailable or difficult to find in one’s home country’. In her opinion, ‘shopping tourism’ is leisure travel combined with purposive economic activity. It represents one of the manifestations of an informal ‘private economy’ within the social system, therefore it had different meanings and functions in the lives of the various socioeconomic strata.

‘Tourist shopping’ can represent a form of leisure activity in the form of an excursion or a rational economic transaction, which means consuming products and services abroad, where they are significantly cheaper than in home countries. Nevertheless, as Bracewell (2006) points out, shopping and tourism are always intertwined since shopping was what a Yugoslav tourists did. International crossborder shopping is not only an economic activity, but it can be understood as a pleasure-based form of recreational travel and a major tourism generator in border areas (Timothy and Butler, 1995).

Chelcea (2002: 26, 30), who researched shopping trips in Hungary, distinguishes between three types of trader-tourists: ‘household-oriented’, ‘profitoriented’ and ‘leisure seeking’. ‘Household-oriented’ are those travelers, who are doing ‘cross-border shopping’ for the needs of their own household as opposed to ‘profit-oriented’, who resell goods, bought abroad. They do not perform the usual tourist activities, because their trips are standardized and time limited. Unlike them, ‘leisure seekers’ practice ‘shopping tourism’, which requires more free time of the traveler.

Švab (1998) uses the term ‘shopping tourism’ without problematizing it, while Luthar (2010: 362) considers that in the case of Yugoslavs shopping in Trieste, the term ‘shopping tourism’ is not appropriate because the performed tourism does not have much in common with tourism as a specific cultural form. Shopping in Trieste was not a recreational practice as in the case of ‘shopping tourism’, which also includes browsing through exhibited goods in the shops and doing sightseeing.

This kind of shopping was experienced as deliberate and planned work and not as hedonistic wandering. Arguably in trying to define shopping abroad, it is necessary to derive from the experiences of informants. They perceive shopping in neighboring Austria and Italy as work, but also as a trip. When discussing shopping in neighboring Austria and Italy with an exclusive purpose of buying goods, from which touristic sightseeing was excluded, the term ‘cross-border shopping’ will be used. When talking about a trip which basic aim is not shopping, but rather touristic sightseeing, the term ‘touristic shopping’ will be used.

As Appadurai (1996: 83) points out, consumption is a serious form of work in terms of governing the consumer credit, reading fashion messages, managing finances and dreaming, all which is necessary for the desire for new goods. When Meta, an accountant, born in 1928 in Domžale near Ljubljana, went shopping to Ponte Rosso, she did not go sightseeing. She saw only stands and stores while shopping. Other informants said that they did not have the time to do sight-seeing because they rather used their precious time for shopping. Meta usually went on the one day ‘cross-border shopping’, which was ‘domestic oriented’ and motivated by the explicit aim of purchasing goods. These trips took place during the weekend and began early in the morning. She returned home on the same day. She remembered that she did not buy lunch in Italy, just snacks. She ate lunch with her friends in Slovenia, next to the border, because it was cheaper. However, when she arrived to Trieste, she always went for coffee: “Coffee there was so good. Oh god! You could cut the Cappuccino’s foam!”

Doing ‘cross-border shopping’, Slovenians were becoming skilled buyers. Their consumption culture was based on oral information about products and pricing. Unlike ‘flaneur’ browsing (Wilson, 1992) in shopping centers, the socialist consumer prepared for shopping, analyzing thoughtfully the use of the goods, looking for useful contacts. According to informants, the reasons for shopping in neighboring countries were connected with the insufficient and overpriced supply at home, just as with the low quality and the unfashionable appearance of domestic products. Meta was buying products that were of a better appearance than those back home and she was impressed by the great choice. She remembered:

“Once I bought boots. I had skinny feet and boots, made at home, did not fit me. Italian women have very thin feet. Never in my life had I such beautiful boots. They were the first boots that I bought by myself. Before that, I wore my sister’s boots. They were really beautiful, brown. In Italy, they had very beautiful things, but at home the boot was bigger than the foot. If I wanted to buy something, I bought something beautiful and at home there was not much to choose from.”

‘Cross-border shopping’ can be understood as a critique of the socialist system and its unsatisfactory supply of products at home, differing from one time period to the other. Particularly in the 1950s and in the first half of the 1960s, purchases abroad were conditioned by the low standard of life in Yugoslavia. The increasing lifestyle in Yugoslavia was reflected in a greater choice and quality of available products. Meta remembered: “Later, after the 1970s, it was possible to get many products at home and it was not worth going shopping abroad. Going abroad also meant travel expenses.”

Today, Meta shakes her head when she hears that it was not possible to buy things in Yugoslavia - since the late socialist era she was mostly satisfied with what could be found in domestic stores. She pointed out that products bought back then, were of a better quality and more beautiful than they are today. She proudly told that she is still wearing pieces of clothing, bought in socialist Yugoslavia. Her comments point out that we need to critically re-evaluate the anthropological studies of the post-socialist material culture, which are mainly based on Kornai’s (1992) definition of socialism as an ‘economy of shortage’, while according to Shalins (in Fehérváry 2009: 434), the very expression ‘rarity’ was created from the perspective of a society, marked by abundance. Fehérváry (2009: 454) points out that socialist material culture became the symbol of the failed economic system and Western goods became icons of the superior capitalist political system. The Western goods were perceived as high quality, with a nice design, comfortable and the promise of pleasure. Their very qualities seemed more than simply the result of a better production system, but as iconic of a superior political system based upon human dignity. The daily encounters with a variety of goods andcommercial spheres have also contributed to the gradual materialization of political subjectivity.

Meta did her shopping in Ponte Rosso in Trieste, buying mainly washing powder, coffee and clothing. At first, she did the shopping there because the products were not available at home and later because they were cheaper there. She recalls Ponte Rosso as a place with cheap products of poor quality and unfriendly salesmen. She remembered:

“I and my friend brought an umbrella from Italy. When I opened it at home, there was a hole in the new umbrella! At Ponte Rosso you could find this kind of goods. I almost took a beating once because I reserved a handbag and said I will come to get it soon. The salesmen saw I bought it elsewhere and he was very angry with me.”

According to Vidmar-Horvat (2010: 31, 37), not all consumer goods produced in a socialist country were perceived as tasteless, nor were all adopted or rejected because of their socialist origin. At the same time not all Western products were regarded approvingly by socialist consumers. Socialist culture produced citizens who were faithful and unfaithful to the state at the same time – not necessarily because of the political belief, but because consumers were caught up in consumer practices that were not based on ideological considerations of the ‘political correctness’. However, as Fehérváry (2009: 445–6) states, through the contemporary perspective of capitalist consumption, socialism is being perceived as materially poor and the socialist country is being constructed as an entity, which neglected its citizens. Within this policy and material worlds, the iconic Western goods adopted a remarkable importance, as they became a symbol of the system that produced them. In the anthropological analysis of post-socialism, as recalled by Thelen (2011: 53–4), the socialist economy is studied insufficient.

During the period of socialism, studies of socialist societies were conducted with the use of analytical tools of the Western countries. Through the process of post-socialist reforms that made the socialist institutions seemingly look more like capitalistic ones, the socialist actors, previously perceived as ‘similar’, now became ‘others’. As noted by Vidmar-Horvat (2010: 28–31), Western Europe continues to be represented as an important point of reference in the current ‘new Europe’. Consumers from the former socialist countries are once again embedded into the category of the European ‘other’ on the basis of memories of the traumatic experiences and the denial of consumer wishes, which is based on the past imagery of the cultural subordination of the East – and the historical domination of the West. When Meta went to neighboring Austria on a trade-union trip with her coworkers, the venture lasted at least two days, so they stayed in a hotel. Often they went on a trade-union trip during holidays, such as the Republic Day on November 29 or May 1.

“When we went to Klagenfurt with the company, we did lots of sightseeing. We left home in the morning, I think it was Saturday. Our goal was not to shop. If you found something beautiful, then yes. And if you had money.”

These trips were mostly connected with touristic activities, not shopping. Meta remembered that she bought only nail accessories as she went there with the purpose to do sightseeing. Meta was a ‘leisure seeker’ that practiced ‘touristic shopping’, which demanded a greater amount of free time. When Meta was shopping in neighboring Italy, in Trieste or Rome, she did not perceive this as mere shopping, but also as a trip, since she visited exhibitions, churches, monuments. In Trieste she went to see the sea, the Miramare castle and the main square. Also, when she went on a trade-union trip to the Netherlands, she did not go with the purpose of shopping, but she went there as a tourist, to see the Netherlands, its tulips, paintings of the famous painters in the galleries. “I went to see scientific things”, Meta remembered, and continued: “When travelling around the world, I bought some trivialities, souvenirs for others and things like that. And we did not stroll around in the stores a lot, because we preferred to see other things.”

Since the beginning of the 1970s, Yugoslav tourist agencies organized touristic and shopping trips to European metropolises in addition to holidays in foreign countries. Those shopping trips were mainly focused on buying technical goods for amusement, leather goods and clothes (Repe, 1998: 264). Due to the proximity of the Slovenian coast, informants also used the vacation at the sea side to quickly go and shop in neighboring Italy. Vera, an economist, born in Maribor in 1929, remembered: “We went to the sea side at least once a year. We went to Koper and Portorož. We took advantage of this proximity with the border and we crossed it to buy something. However, we regularly went to Austria, at least twice per month.”

Meta bought ‘more beautiful things’ or ‘everyday luxuries’, which marked the Yugoslav experience of well-being (Patterson, 2011: 264). ‘Cross-border shopping’ was one of the ways of achieving the ‘good life’ in socialist Yugoslavia because consumption is also a source of happiness and joy. It must be pointed out that the Yugoslav society was also able to produce happiness through the production of concrete products, available for people to buy in their own country. A satisfactory life was therefore not only an idea, projected into the distant future, but a reality of living and a foundation for achieving the ‘normal’ life of socialist citizens.

Cultural Capital, Gender and Rebordering of

Post-Socialist Yugoslavia

“Products bought on stands in Ponte Rosso were cheaper and of worse quality than those, bought in stores, so you had to be very cautious…” Meta often said. She learned that sometimes it was better not to buy anything than to buy a cheap and broken object. On the other hand, at the stands it was possible to haggle over the price, unlike in stores, where the price was fixed. According to distance and type of products, informants had to calculate which city in Italy to choose for shopping.

Many people preferred to shop in Gorica because it was closer to their home than Trieste. Also the products were of better quality. In Meta’s opinion, Rome was known as an expensive city for shopping, Trieste was the best place to buy jeans and Treviso had the best selection and quality of products in Italy.

Through their experiences with ‘cross-border shopping’ and learning how to shop, how to pay, what one could and could not get abroad, dealing with scarcity, abundance, choice or its absence, Meta and other Slovenians were gaining cultural capital, which manifested in cultural competences and in knowledge on how to consume. They were actively participating in the interpretation of the cultural meanings of the desired goods that acquired new meanings (compare to Bartlett, 2010; Berdahl, 2010; Yurchak 2005 etc.).

‘Cross-border shopping’ had different meanings for different socioeconomic classes. According to Bartlett (2010: 241–2) shopping trips, travelling abroad and foreign goods provided an experience enriching the cultural capital of the middle classes in socialism. Wessely (2002: 7) notes that for the socialist middle class it served for showing off their status and maintain a social differentiation. Further it provided an additional income to the lower-middle or working class. ‘Cross border shopping’ in neighboring Austria and Italy did not only mean creating stockpiles, but it became as well a status symbol. Danica, an opera singer, born in 1958 to a working family in Ljubljana’s surroundings, remembered: “I remember my classmate, who came from a family of teachers. I admired them because they were so educated and cultivated and she admired me because we were going to Austria to shop and they did not.”

Social stratification of ‘cross-border shopping’ manifested itself in space. In the 1970s, Ponte Rosso became a symbol of a consumer mentality, adjusted to socialist consumers with not much money (Repe, 1998: 94). According to the narration of female informants, the biggest difference between Slovenes existed in the fact that poor people went to shop in Ponte Rosso with cheap stands and cheap goods and wealthier visited shopping centers – magazines (Via Mazzini, Corso Italia, Via Cardussi) in Trieste. Stores had been more expensive, but provided products of better quality. Informants’ perception of shopping abroad was influenced by their social status, education, income and their worldview. The fact that the political elite, the working class and the critics of the regime met in Italy and Austria while shopping is, according to Repe (1998: 96), a reason why self-managed socialism was not taken seriously by many in the last two decades of its existence.

According to Bowbly (1997: 99), shopping is not only hard work, but is primarily an ‘experience’. While talking about their ‘cross-border shopping’ experiences, many informants often added that they went abroad to see something and to have fun. Meta would browse through products while doing shopping in Italy and Austria, sometimes without buying anything: “Me and my friend got lost once in Italy. We were walking and walking. She had other desires than me. We were window-shopping in different stores … In the end we did not buy anything there.”

In practice, Meta experienced shopping as a leisure activity with windowshopping, browsing and daydreaming, which did not necessarily lead to a purchase. As stated in Švab (2002: 70), reasons for shopping abroad were based on irrational complex reasons, stemming from the experience of longing. Marija, a housewife, born in Most na Soči in 1941, remembered: “When we went to Italy, we went there to feast our eyes. Like nowadays, for example, when you go to a store in Ljubljana. You do not go there with an exclusive intention of buying something, but it is nice to see what they have.”

Danica, born in 1944 in Celje, remembered shopping in Austria:

“When we arrived there, it was … Even we, oldies, had big eyes and were impressed by everything we could see there in contrast to the conditions at home. When children grew a little bit, we went there all together by car. We could hardly get them out of the store. It was necessary to feast your eyes and we bought something also.”

Campbell (2001: 98, 102) points out that longing creates desire for unattainable goods. Shopping is performed in order to experience pleasure, which is a consequence of the self-allusive hedonism; but first the discomfort, associated with the need and the belief that the satisfaction will bring pleasure. The main motive of consumers is the desire to experience the pleasant scenes that their imagination is generating. Although needs are rapidly extinguished, the longing, generated by daydreaming, is not, and consumers are constantly looking for new products to replace the object of desire (Campbell, 2001: 136–7). Appadurai (1996: 136–7) points out that the search for novelty is only a symptom of a deeper consuming discipline, in which desire is organized around the moral, aesthetic and material practice of short duration. The meaning of consumption is the longing itself, therefore the main motive of the modern consumer is unmaterialistic - the ultimate goal is the experience of pleasure, not the possession of the objects of consumption (Bauman, 2001: 13). “When I entered the store, I would buy everything! My husband said: ‘You know what, if I would give you my credit card, you would empty it’ (laughing). You had wishes. I had terrible desires for clothing.”

This is how shopping in Italy was remembered by Tatjana, a social worker, born in Celje in 1958. Luthar (2010: 352, 356) notes that for women strolling in the company of other women and the pleasure of looking at objects in Trieste was an integral part of the ‘female’ shopping. Although informants mainly perceived crossborder consumption as hard-work, connected with the household, they also felt a longing for the fashionable Western products. As stated by informants there was a differentiation between genders in regard to shopping across the border and regarding the product selection. Women were mainly buying food and household products, clothes and cosmetics while men bought technical products. While shopping together, men and women were, according to informants, buying products connected with home equipment, such as ceramic tiles, wallpapers, television sets.

When buying bigger appliances such as washing machines or cars, men would perform the purchase alone or in the company of other men. When it comes to the experience of ‘cross-border shopping’, almost without exception women informants expressed a bigger longing for objects than men which confirms Campbell’s (1997) findings that male shopping rhetoric is focused on the need, while woman’s rhetoric is concentrated on the desire and longing. Campbell (1997: 171) assumes that women find it easier than men to obtain enjoyment from shopping because female fantasies tend to resolve around what they look like much more than it is true for males and also because they daydream more than men and it can be more easily related to clothes and adornment. Also, females are socialized into being the aesthetically skilled gender and find it easier to appraise aesthetically significant goods. Both ideologies present each gender’s shopping style as the ‘natural’ and ‘rational’ way to shop. The male ideology supplies them with arguments with which to portray the feminine mode of shopping as ‘irrational’ and reinforcing the general male stereotype of women as prone to impulsive and irrational conduct.

The decline of border shopping began with the economic crisis of the early 1980s, when the indebted Yugoslav government restricted the outflow of private capital by introducing heavy deposits for cross-border travel. Another factor was the war that led to Yugoslavia’s disintegration in 1991. Slovenia separated from Yugoslavia in 1991 and began the process of entering the EU. In 2004, it fulfilled all requirements and became a full EU member state. A new border was established in a place where it had not existed before, now between ex-Yugoslav states. Consequently, with the unification of the European market, cross-border shopping, which today still has an integrative role between all countries within the EU, became less frequent between Slovenia and Italy/Austria, as the newly independent states opened up their markets and became part of the global flows of capital and commodities.

After Slovenia gained independence in 1991, most of informants no longer went shopping in neighboring Austria and Italy. If they went to Trieste, they went there to visit their relatives or do sight-seeing, but seldom for the purpose of shopping. Trieste was the largest city near to the border with Italy. Its shops, bars, restaurants, and lively streets and especially squares such as Ponte Rosso, looked like a gigantic urban mall. According to informants, after 1991 Trieste was no longer a city that they once knew and liked – it became dull and uninteresting. Ponte Rosso was gone, together with its markets and stalls. Trieste was depopulated and its shops were moved to the south. Milena, born in 1955 in Trzin near Ljubljana, an administrator, remembered:

“The attitude of traders towards us changed after Slovenia became independent. Also, traders became more reserved, introverted and unfriendly towards buyers and no longer gave them the impression, that consumer is a king, as they did before 1991. We did actually spend a lot of money there.”

Silva, born in 1941 near Maribor, an administrator, added:

“They regarded us as a purchasing power as we left loads of our money there. After we became independent, they looked down on us, superiorly, like they are something more than we are.”

It should be noted that informants spoke from the perspective of a consumer, who is interested in the price of products and not from the perspective of an employed trader or producer that would be interested in understanding the condition, under which employed traders work today. Narratives vary depending on the perspective, from which informants speak, so they must be understood according to this perspective and the wider context (compare to Tsing, 2009).

After 1991, the post-socialist transition led to the process of privatization and expansion of global trade through taking over the former East European markets (see Dunn, 2004; Vodopivec, 2007; etc.) in which according to Petrović (2013) the worker as an ideological figure and a symbol of the value of labor disappeared from public spaces. As stated in O’Dowd (2001: 70), the neoliberal system created a ’borderless‘ single market, which reduced transaction costs and increased competitiveness by creating a division of labor that would benefit from economies of scale in competition with North America and Japan. State borders have multiplied following the post-1989 collapse of the Soviet empire and despite the rather misleading slogan of the Single European Market – a ‘Europe without Frontiers’ – the process of European integration has been one of managing an ever-increasing number of national frontiers (O’Dowd, 2001: 68). As stated by Scott (2015: 30) one of the defining characteristics of Post-Cold War Europe coincided with the proliferation of discourses of ‘borderlessness’ and nation-state decline, has been the driver for national self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe. This drive for re-asserted sovereignty has shifted the political map of Europe, creating new borders and having a fatal blow to multinational federations such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

The newly independent ex-Yugoslav states opened their markets and were integrated into the global flows of capital and commodities. In the period of post-socialism, a transformation of the meanings of socialist consumer items took place. With easily accessible goods previously rare and desired objects became trivial and mundane. As years went by, cross-border shopping became less and less frequent, also because the products, displayed in stores at home and abroad, became more and more similar. New Chinese traders appeared in Trieste (Italy) and in Slovenia. The informants did not find Chinese stores interesting since in their opinion they have too similar appearance and offer. They also described the goods in Chinese stores as cheap and of poor quality. In the current process of rather reconfiguring than obliterating state borders in the EU, it is important to consider that some informants associated the described circumstances with the financial crisis and fear of outflow of capital. The context of a global reorganization of capitalism with foreign investments is illustrated by the informants in the case of the spreading of Chinese markets.

Nowadays, citizens of Slovenia do not feel the same need to cross borders to access foreign goods, since international retail chains have their outlets in most cities and imported goods are easily available at home also. However, the phenomena of cross-border shopping has not completely disappeared. Reasons for the contemporary cross-border shopping are as pragmatic as they were in socialism. Despite the good availability of imported products in their domestic stores, Slovenes still shop in neighboring Austria and Italy mainly due to the lower prices of products in the stores.

Conclusion

The article pointed out the important distinction between shopping tourism and leisure tourism, providing a distinctive understanding of cross-border shopping in socialist Slovenia. It discussed the people’s perception on cross-border shopping in the context of gender division, paying special attention to a newly acquired cultural capital. Through the experience of cross-border shopping and by learning where, what and how to shop, informants were gaining cultural capital, which manifested itself in cultural competences and knowledge of how to consume. This contribution critically evaluated the influence of the construction of the socialist ‘Other’ in the anthropological analyses of post-socialism. The socialist economy is understood in this context as insufficient, constructed and neglecting its citizen. It was shown that cross-border shopping evokes pleasant memories by informants and associations with the Yugoslav era of peace and plenty and people’s notions of what constitutes the ‘good life’ in the Yugoslav society.

According to Mikula (2010) the practice of cross-border shopping is deeply implicated in the former Yugoslav nation-building narratives and in the identities of the citizens of the ex-Yugoslav independent countries. The narratives enacted the hegemonic narrative of Yugoslavia’s ‘uniqueness’ by translating it into the lived experience of pleasures, unavailable in the countries of the Eastern Block. According to Repe (1998: 96) the shopping abroad between 1950 and 1970 has to be understood in a broader context, including movies, television, the development of foreign tourism in Slovenia and economic orientation towards more liberal social and economic policies while trying to become a part of the Western consumption culture.

By consuming abroad Yugoslavs were indirectly putting pressure on the domestic politics, taking into account the demands for a higher standard of living.

With the onset of capitalism and Slovenia joining the EU the country saw a rise in poverty, unemployment, discontent with the market economy and social inequality. Discourses, reflecting the disappointment of informants regarding the closed shops in Trieste and the unkindness of traders on cross-border shopping must be understood also in the context of political implications of the historical changes and processes of de- and re-bordering in post-socialist Yugoslavia that occurred after its disintegration in 1991 and lead to the Europe we know today. We also need to take into consideration the dissatisfaction with the sale of public property and with contemporary discourses, present in the Slovenian public sphere, which are surrounding the sale, and the loss of rights that ex-Yugoslav citizens had under socialism, such as guaranteed paid work and other social rights. The discourses are not necessarily evidence of nostalgia, but rather a response to today‘s feeling of insecurity in the framework of discontentment with the capitalist market economy in former socialist countries, which gives priority to capital rather than people and their social protection. Therefore the narratives of informants on cross-border shopping ,together with other forms of post-socialist nostalgia, represent a critique of capitalism and a longing for an alternative economic, social and moral system.

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Connectivity vs. Disconnectivity –

the Influence of EU Border policies on Regions.

A Case Study of Poland’s Western and Eastern Borders

Martin Barthel

University of Eastern Finland, Karelian Institute

martin.barthel@uef.fi

Introduction

The cross-border metro region along the Öresund, connecting the Danish Copenhagen and Swedish Malmö, has from the beginning been labelled as a European success story. Shortly after the opening of the metro and street link, the OECD identified this new infrastructure as an examplary ‘European Approach’, stating that: “The Örsesund clearly follows the European approach, which includes the supranational INTERREG programmes to spur integration, in addition to economic, philosophical views on cross-border integration and which foster a wide range of horizontal and vertical partnerships.” (OECD 2003: 168). The bridge became a symbol for overcoming borders and creating a common Europe by connectivity. The bridge was crossed in 2015 by more than 7 million vehicles (Orseundbron 2017). More than 11 million passengers used the train link between both countries in 2014 (Sund-Baelt 2017), most of them commuters, taking the advantage of a cross-border metropolitan area. Consequently, the European Commission, underlining the positive role of the transnational rail system for connectivity in Europe by using it as an iconic Interreg project when celebrating its 25th Anniversary in 2015 (European Commission 2015).

The project’s iconic role was acknowledged by scholars such as Ryszard Czarny (2017), who in his book A Modern Nordic Saga, portrayed the Öresund Region as the new core area of Scandinavia, moving the center of Europe further North. For him, the bridge and the connectivity in the region, not just due to infrastructure, but also to university cooperation, bio-tech and medical industry clusters (the so called Medicon Valley) and, not least, new commuting patterns, were creating an integrated socio-economic space (Czarny 2017: 47-68). We can also assume that the positive role of connectivity seems to be particularly evident in relatively homogenous border regions such as the Öresund. Denmark and Sweden share similar languages, religions and cultural backgrounds. The recent past has seen with the Nordic Union a cooperative rather than confrontational relationship notion and both countries are rather wealthy and are EU budget contributors (Czarny 2017: 31).

This positive scenario notwithstanding, the everyday life of commuters was subject to some turmoil at the end of 2015, when the Swedish government decided to reintroduce border controls. The train line, which offered 15-minute interval connections, was cut and passengers had to leave the train at Kastrup airport, cross the station and re-enter after identity checks. The average travel time increased by 40 minutes. The official reason for this measure was fear of an uncontrolled influx of illegal migrants, despite the fact that overall numbers of asylum application in all of Sweden were dropping (Swedish Migration Agency 2015). Understandably, the reaction in the border region was one of outrage and local newspapers highlighted the negative impact on their region. Border checks resulted in a drop of passenger traffic of up to 15% (Copenhague Post 2016) and 565 commuters sued the Swedish government, as they had to buy a car or in some cases lost their jobs (Helsingborg Dagblad 2016).

This sudden throwback from being connected to dis-connectivity reminded the region that the border, at least as perceived by locals, did not disappear, but in fact remained a powerful symbol of national sovereignty and control.

What does the Oresund story tell us in more general terms? I suggest that we need to look beyond this exemplary case to other cross-border contexts, for comparison we can look at phenomena of dis/connectivity at Poland’s borders. In the case of the German-Polish border two-thirds of the population classify themselves as either neutral or unfriendly towards their respective neighbours. Scholars such as McCall (2017), Stokolosa (2015) or Balogh (2015), confirm that the border is perceived as a ‘hard’ one. At the same time, the Polish-Ukrainian border has been described as closed (McCall 2017: 11-23). Both of these border regions have gone through processes of shaping and re-shaping after the Second World War and are thus very much affected by recent history. Between 1945 and 1947, German-Polish and the Polish-Ukrainian border regions both witnessed the re-settlement of large parts of the population, alienating the border regions, and creating a local society with broken identities. While the exchange of population and territory has been the bitter reality, the postwar socialist societies refused to discuss the rationales of these new state borders. Heavy guarded and securitized, borders served as ideological symbols of socialist friendship (Barthel 2016: 207).

With the end of the Cold War and the EU enlargement a re-definition of the understanding of identity and borders became necessary. The border with Germany became an internal EU border, facilitating free cross-border mobility and deregulation. The border with Ukraine became part of the heavy controlled EU external border with a Visa regime, leading to a gradual closure of the border (Stoklosa 2012: 245-255).

This article strives to understand local processes at the German-Polish and Polish-Ukrainian border. Due to the post -war history, EU policies, language, cultural and religious barriers, the border regions seem to be rather dis-connected. The article will examine in two case studies the local interaction patterns along the border and investigate the role of EU policies. In the conclusion, the author will try to evaluate the role of connectivity and if the approach can help to overcome the above-mentioned barriers.

Narrating the Border in Regional Discourses

In order to understand the developing paths of the two mentioned border regions, it is insightful to analyze the local discourses on the border after 1989, which had tremendous impacts on the regions and conditioned practices and patterns of cross-border interaction. The relations at the German-Polish border had been heavily impacted not just by the Post-War history but by the narration of the 80s. While the Poles perceived the economic situation in the GDR as positive, the Germans appreciated the relative freedom in Poland. The local German authorities observed this attraction rather suspiciously and worked from 1980 openly with anti-Polish resentment, condemning Solidarność. The interactions between the neighbors came to a hold and the alienation continued until 1989. In the wake of the German reunification after 1990, the respond in the border area was twofold – while the local Poles felt that the status of the border became insecure, local Polish authorities realized the chances of neighboring a strong economy in the European Community (Hinrichsen 2015: 497-521).

The Germans where concerned of the wealth gap and became afraid of border related crime and corruption – which has in their perception of the Eastern neighbor an exaggerated impact (Beurskens et al. 2015). The open border enabled a new degree of interaction, Poles started to work in Germany, while Germans went to Poland buying cigarettes, petrol and alcohol. The citizens of Szczecin started in the late 90ties to discover the German heritage of the city, enabling a stream of novels and literature which contributed to a new regional identity where the memory of the German grandparents’ generation started to be preserved by a Polish grandchildren generation (Musekamp 2013). Although resentment and attacks of German Neo-Nazis on Poles were regularly reported in the local media, the broader discourse was generally in favor of cooperation.

Established in 1995, the Euroregion Pomerania consists of the border areas of Germany, Poland and southern Scandia (Sweden). At its inauguration it provided a superb ground for institutionalized cooperation. With the accession of Poland to the EU in 2004 and the Schengen acquis in 2007, the border started to fade in the everyday life. Due to the raising housing prices in Szczecin and the good connection towards the town, a new transnational cohabitation area occurred on the German side. In Szczecin’s traditional western hinterland, the communities started to realize the positive metropolitan effects coming from the neighboring city caused by increasing suburbanization. Poles moved into empty houses and apartments in German towns like Löcknitz or Gartz, commuting daily towards work in Poland. The new dwellers had been positive received by the communes, who had been faced as German economic periphery with prospects of shrinking and decline (Lis 2011; Barthel, F. 2010).

These new dynamics raised the question as to how those processes could be integrated in spatial planning. The German side faced ignorance from regional planers, while the Polish communes where confronted with resistance from their planning authorities, who did not favor the establishment of a transnational planning structure. Cooperation was in the beginning therefore initiated through personal contacts and funded by first cross-border funds and programs of the EU. Those networks depended on individuals, providing a limited degree of sustainability. With the revision of the national planning policies and the urge to create metropolitan regions in the frame of the European spatial planning, Szczecin went ahead and initiated together with its Polish neighbor communes the Association of the Szczecin Metropolitan Area (Stowarzyszenie Szczecinskiego Obszaru Metropolitarnego) in 2009 (Malachowski 2013).

This degree of interaction was still too little for German municipalities. Spurred on by its mayor, Gartz strived to become an associated member of the area. Finally, in 2015 the German-Polish development concept for the trans-border metropolitan region Szczecin brought together the regional planning authorities from Germany (the Länder Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Brandenburg) with those from Poland (the Voivodeship and the city and powiat of Szczecin) enabling trans-national planning for a common cross-border metropolis (MIR 2014). The ongoing spatial integration was supported through the Cohesion Policy of the EU, enabling the local transnational cooperation even against resistance from the nation states. Scholars like Lis claimed that the cross-border area will be turned into a laboratory for everyday life, language, education, work and leisure – providing a space of ideas of how Poles and Germans can develop the region together and test new forms of European Identity (Lis et al. 2014).

In 1991 the Polish-Ukrainian border was in a similar situation. The drawing of the border was a product of the Second World War, resulting in forceful population exchange and civil war. The creation of the border had been tabooed by the communist regime, which led to an atmosphere of conspiracy and rumors, considering the past. With the independence of Ukraine, the border became wide open and for the first time since 1945 interaction across the border became possible. Despite the difficult past, Poland as a nation had vivid interests in the Europeanization of Ukraine. Since 1995 Warsaw strived for deeper cooperation with Kiev, which lead to a liberal border regime, opening the border wide (Wolczuk 2008).

However, the open border has also created a series of strong local nationalistic replies in Przemyśl, which had back-slashed on the bilateral relations (Buzalka 2008). Exploiting the perceived fear of ‘Ukrainisation’ of the town the former vice-voivod Stanisław Żółkiewicz became the most important single actor, favoring local discourses on national uniformity. When in 1991 the Catholic Church had plans to return the Carmelite Church in Przemyśl to the Ukrainian Church, his local committee for defending the Poles in Przemyśl was formed and occupied the church even against the will of the Vatican. In 1993 he organized a movement against the accession of Przemyśl to the Euroregion Carpathia (Hann 2000:101) and blocked in 1995 with his ‘Stowarzyszenia Obroncow Pamięci Orląt Przemyskich’ (the society of the defenders of the memory of the Eagle of Przemyśl) the plans to hold a festival of the Ukrainian minority in Przemyśl, narrating the festival as an attempt of a re-Ukrainisation of the region (Hobal 2008).

Despite the nationalistic activities, which dominated headlines, the cross-border cooperation at the institutional level and between civil society groups increased. Public servants, NGOs and local business realized that the border formed a resource for regional development. The national symbolic function of the border became for relevant and local elites embraced narratives on cooperation. Consequently in 2007 the town recognized in the ‘Strategia sukcesu’ (Strategy for success) the border as the key resource for future structural development (Rada Miejskie w Przemyslu 2014).

Local historical identity patterns such as ‘Galicja’ or ‘Ziemia przemyska’ became more relevant than the rather nationalistic narratives of ‘Podkarpackie’ or ‘Kresy’ which harked back to the heydays of Poland’s largest territorial expansion in the 18th Century. Interviews conducted during fieldwork revealed a certain identification with ‘living at the border’ and a with a regional identity in the making. Trans-national oriented circles were striving to institutionalize the border for regional cooperation and development. Within this context, ethnic minorities have played a key role in cross-border relations as the Polish minority in Ukraine is the natural partner for many local NGOs. The Ukrainian minority in Poland also began to act trans-national, but in a much more low-key capacity in order to avoid possible tensions. During the interviews it was stated that cooperation between Ukrainian minorities with Polish institutions increased with distance from Przemyśl, the border region urban centre (Barthel 2016: 209).

At another level, an important transnational catalyst have been bazaar markets which developed into prime spaces for cross-border personal contacts (Barthel 2010). The traders, who are most dependent on the border, sense a feeling of otherness and are strong advocates for a border identity. Unfortunately, the difficult past has a negative effect on collaboration, requiring mechanisms that Paasi describes as healing the border can be observed (Paasi 1995). The border provides for each generation a different symbolic meaning. While the older generation holds on to imagined or real wounds of history, the younger generation is more relaxed about these issues; for them the border has always been there and they have become accustomed to its open character (Kennard 2004).

Both regions, despite being at the internal and external border of the EU, share a series of common features. The impact of individual actors on the cross-border interaction is immense and a sense of otherness and of being ‘left-behind’ can be witnessed, fed by a ‘borderlanders identity’ in the making supported through cohesive EU policies. The border is used as a local resource. While in Przemysl locals engage in various forms of border trade, Szczecin is aspiring to create a wider trans-national cross-border metropolitan area, each helping to foster local development.

The main difference is the connectivity across the border. While the divide faded in the German-Polish region, enabling cross-border commuting and rethinking the border area as a bi-national Laboratory of ideas, the Polish-Ukrainian border region is perceiving the border as a filter or an obstacle. Alas, the language barrier is lower, the interaction is mostly limited to commercial activities and for the locals the border is the only peculiarity of the town. Therefore, they favor an open border, but are afraid of its disappearing, since in their narrative it will turn the area into ‘just another’ periphery, deployed from any development perspective.

Otherness – Using the Border as Local Resource and the Impact on the Border Regions

Border scholars Oscar Martinez and Liam O’Dowd have argued that ‘Otherness’ - a sense of difference at and across borders - is indicative of situations where borders are used as local resources (Martinez 1994; O’Dowd 2004). As a resource, the border is determining the local everyday lives and influence the individual social-economic strategies of the borderlanders. The border is charged with personal and local symbolism, which tend to differ from the narratives of the national state. The gap between National and local narratives might lead to a notion of feeling left-behind, which is favoring the creation of a regional identity. As discussed both border regions have this notion, manifesting in diverging regional narratives of the border, both centered around exploiting the border.

The Polish city of Przemyśl benefits foremost through border trade. The city is often described as the most important’ inland harbor’ of Poland, underlining the hub-function of the Medyka crossing point for the traffic between Ukraine and the EU and as a nucleus for a cluster for trade, transit and logistic firms (Voznyak 2000). The region is increasingly profiting from the evolution of border trade – facilitating a process of professionalization and legalization since the opening the border in 1991. The first border trade activities at the Polish-Soviet border though started already in the late eighties. During organised trips individuals bought and sold products which were either cheaper or not available, limited to the content of a suitcase, referred to as ‘suitcase trade (Stoklosa 2013).

After 1991, due to the liberal border regime and the economic impact of the economic transformation, smuggling and the ‘mrowki’ (ant trade) became legitimate ways of substituting the individual economic situation. Borderlanders used the price differences to buy alcohol and cigarettes on the Ukrainian side, sell them on the Polish and returning with groceries to Ukraine (Byrska-Szklarczyk, 2012: 99). The ant trade resulted in the establishing of bazaars, where former ants bought stands and started to sell clothes and groceries to Ukrainians. In 2004 the bazars covered 50% of the retail areas in the town (Barthel 2010: 145).

In an interview with the regional chamber of commerce it was stated that the bazars had been the nucleus for the development of bigger trade companies specialized on trade with Ukraine. Nowadays the ant trade, the bazars and the SMEs exists parallel. In the years after 2006 due to the increasing cross-border shopping and the proximity to Lviv, international companies opened outlets in Przemyśl. Retail chains like Tesco, Carrefour, Mediamarkt and Castorama settled on the road to Medyka and the huge shopping mall ‘Galeria Sanowa’, containing many big cloth retailers, opened. The products and services are oriented towards Ukrainian customers and compete directly with the bazars, resulting in a decline of their importance for the local economy. The SMEs cluster, an influx of additional work places due to the retail chains and permanent substitution of transformation disadvantages through ant trade are stimulated by the border. The trade is mostly facilitated through the border crossing point in Medyka. In 2012 roughly 4,5 million people crossed the border spending in average 700 Zloty per person in the region (Mrozek 2015).

The evolution of trade is accompanied by a changing perception of the neighbor. While Poles felt superior to the mainly Ukrainian ants, they met in the bazaars as equal traders. In the huge supermarkets, the role changed. Ukrainians are customers which are served by Polish employees, resulting in a re-definition on the neighbor, resulting in a similar shock as the Germans in the Szczecin region experienced.

At the German-Polish border political and everyday feelings of superiority from Germans over Poles prevailed although the Germans felt helplessness and fatalism regarding the future development. In Poland, the accession to the EU fed political and everyday attitudes displaying pragmatism and optimism. After joining Schengen, the rising housing vacancies in Germany coupled with a massive demand in Poland resulted in cross-border commuting, bringing the Polish middle class, with their optimistic everyday culture to the new German suburbs (Bürkner 2015). The process was enhanced by pull factors like cheaper housing costs, the good infrastructure, the existence of German-Polish institutions, schools and kindergarten, and nonetheless the positive attitude of local institutions. Cohesion Policies of the European Union have enabled processes of de-bordering but also promoted new, unexpected forms of migration, which turned the border into a local resource for regional development (Janczak 2017).

The construction of this new cross-border urban agglomeration had been either ignored by German planners or opposed in Polish regional development thinking. The borderlanders perceived the ignorance/resistance as an negative impact on the regional development. In local debates “Schwerin” or “Warsaw” are often blamed to not understand local needs – uniting both sides in a notion of feeling left behind.

Commonalities and Differences: How the Border Created Two Different Regions

In this rather comprehensive overview on the everyday life in both border regions, a couple of similar development features are visible. In both regions, the border was a result of the second world war, connected with forceful repatriation of major parts of the population. The forceful creation of the border and the re-settling alienated the neighbors and due to the tabooing of the past, the scars of history are influencing the cross-border interaction until today. Still, in both regions the border is an everyday resource for its inhabitants. While at the German-Polish border the borderlanders are exploiting the differences in prices to buy property on the other side, the border is facilitated at the Polish-Ukrainian region for trade and income substitution.

The administrations in both regions realized the role of the border as a regional resource for development. Przemysl is exploiting the cross-border trade and the proximity to Ukraine to attract investments and tourists, Szczecin and the German suburbs seek to create a transnational metropolitan region. Communes like Löcknitz and Gartz are aware that the proximity to Szczecin and the creation of a cross-border suburbia is their only chance for local development and securing their infrastructure and relevance. Furthermore, cross-border interaction is driven by single individual actors, who influence the local transnational relation positively or negatively. While the cooperation in Szczecin became more institutionalized and hardly reversible, the situation in Przemysl is more fluid and under threat from national oriented circles.

A common feature is finally a certain sense of otherness, which Martinez used to indicate as a first step towards a regional identity. The feeling of otherness is closely connected to the everyday life at the border. Both regions feel left behind from the capital. Szczecin due to its struggle to let the trans-border metropolitan region being recognized and Przemysl partly due to the peripheralization of the town after the loss of the voivodship function in 1999 and partly due to the changing border regime, influencing directly the economic situation of the borderlanders. However, the national identity is more relevant than the regional identity, preventing until today the feeling of separateness.

The most crucial difference and perhaps the most important factor for the success of the German-Polish border regions is the openness and connectivity across the border. As a direct result of the cohesive policies of the EU borders between member states are becoming less relevant. The process is increasing the connectivity and influencing the local everyday life. Connectivity is becoming a crucial resource for the regions – enabling the creation of a transnational contact zone which can benefit economically from being at the intersection between two states. The Polish-Ukrainian border region witnessed the negative impact of EU policies. Because of Poland’s accession to Schengen, the region is located at the external EU border. The divide became highly securitized and due to the visa regime, the bureaucratic hurdles rose. The increasing dis-connectivity had been perceived by the locals as a threat to the border trade and their way of living. On both sides protests occurred and the feeling of being left behind increased. The EU policies had been understood as negatively. Alas national discourses favor control and dis-connectivity the local discourse tend towards connectivity. This differences in understanding chess-border interaction is feeding a regional identity in the making. The regional resistance towards the ‘new walls and fences’, can be sensed at other border regions. Places like the Öresund region or at the German-Austrian border, where communes facing increasing dis-connectivity, lobby against controls, and fences, this dis-connectivity has a negative impact on their way of living. Scholars like Khanna argue, that the terms hard or soft borders are attributing a kind of organic nature to borders. Instead the degree of connectivity is determining the development chances for a border region and influence the interactions across them (Khanna 2016: 389).

The regions are here supported by EU, which is enabling connectivity by building infrastructure and lowering barriers for cross–border interaction trough the frame of the Cohesion Policies (Mc Cann et al 2015). The nation states in all three cases favor dis–connectivity by enforcing control and as a source of national symbolism. The locals are torn between those two tendencies. In this stress field, connectivity is becoming a crucial resource for the regions – enabling the creation of a transnational contact zone which can benefit economically from being at the intersection between two states. A sustainable border policy should reflect the interest of the borderlanders, since those regions will be turned into socio-economic peripheries again, when policies towards dis-connectivity prevail.

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Migration Perspectives within Southern Africa: Challenges for State Policies on Migration Management in Post-war Mozambique and

Post-apartheid South Africa

Fulgêncio Lucas Seda[1]

Police Sciences Academy (ACIPOL), Mozambique

lucas_seda@yahoo.co.uk

Introduction

The end of the war in Mozambique and the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa constituted two major events that converged to produce new patterns of migration in the Southern African region. To respond, both the Mozambican and South African governments focused onto making their borders more secured with the argumentation of stopping criminals at the border (Gastrow, 2010). In doing so, the Mozambican government has undertaken border control responses focused on deployment of more border patrollers, arrests, and the deportation of immigrants. Likewise, South Africa has prioritised the arrest and deportation of immigrants, accusing them of criminality, fuelling unemployment and spreading disease (Crush, 1999; SAMP, 2014).

While day-to-day practices of border control by both the Mozambican and South African governments have prioritised deterring migrants, who are perceived as a threat to socio-economic stability and security, this paper explores how intra- Southern African migration anchored in a colonial heritage of divided communities embodies a potential alternative for migration management and border control in the region. The paper relies on literature and reports from the Mozambique border authorities as well as in-depth interviews conducted with border patrol officers of the National Commander of Border Police of Mozambique. By combining these sources, the paper explores both the current discourse on migration management and border controls vis-à-vis the day-to-day experiences of border authorities. Findings indicate that primarily, the approach of the Mozambican government to border control has been informed by incursions perpetuated by elements of apartheid during the war. Such a perspective has led to the adoption of tighter border controls, particularly at points identified as potential routes for clandestine border crossings. To some extent, this has strengthened anti-criminal border control responses. However, regarding local cross border interaction, many migrants who use these crossing points have other intentions and needs, such as medical assistance, schools and casual jobs on either side of the border.

Similarly, post-apartheid South Africa has implemented border control practices that seem to have perpetuated anti-immigration policies, which has had dire consequences for present day social relations. A lack of legal protections for immigrants, combined with social discrimination, their experiences of police brutality, a lack of respect for their human rights, and the exploitation of immigrant labour, combine to support anti-immigration policies in post-apartheid South Africa (Trimikliniotis et al., 2008; Crush and Dodson, 2007). Based on its long and traditional history as immigrants receiving country, South Africa has been struggling to implement migration management policies, counterbalancing sovereignty protection and mutual interdependence.

The paper is divided into three main parts. Part one contextualizes migration trends in the post-war Mozambique and analyses corresponding states’ responses. Part two focus on Post-apartheid South Africa migration policies both on border control and on integration of immigrants. Part three interrogates how south-south migration approach could help both countries explore the advantages of migration, including policies that could help to integrate immigrants.

PART I

Transnational and International Patterns of Migration in Post-war Mozambique

Migration patterns across Mozambique are closely related to the end of the war in the country, the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the effects of the end of the Cold War (Emerson, 2014). With the end of the war in Mozambique in 1992 and the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994, the Southern African region has been fully reconnected to the circuits of the global economy. At the same time, more attention than ever has been given to controlling the movements of people across intra-regional borders, giving rise to a sharp distinction between regular and irregular migration, the latter being defined mainly as a response to the powerful attraction for regional migrants of the South African economy (Crush, Williams and Peberdy, 2005; Raimundo, 2009; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002; Andreas, 2003; Adamson, 2006). In the case of Mozambique, the dominant discourse among academics is that soon after the end of the armed conflict, borders became more permeable to the trafficking of drugs and human beings, to smuggling and to other crimes such as money laundering, homicides, vehicle theft and bank robbery (Chachiua, 2000; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002). Press reports constantly point to the Mavalane Airport in Maputo as a transit point for cocaine shipped en route from Colombia and Brazil to Europe and East Asia, or for heroin and hashish shipped from Pakistan to Dubai. (Gastrow and Mosse, 2011; 2002).

Concomitantly, post-war Mozambique has been marked by the ‘feminisation’ of migration or the greater visibility of women migrants within the Southern African region (Crush et al., 2005). Women’s visibility in networks of cross-border migration in SSA is a new pattern whereby women traders support their dependents including spouses, children and extended families by providing housing, food and funds for the education of children (Peberdy, 2000). From the perspective of state’s concerns with border control, the massive increase in female migration within the Southern African region has also been associated with transnational crime, particularly across the Mozambican-South African border (Ama, Mangadi, and Ama, 2014; Peberdy, 2000). According to some sources, circuits of transnational crime involve both Mozambican and South African men and women trafficking migrants and refugees from other, third countries across the Mozambican border into South Africa (Crush, 2005: 79).

From a socio-economic standpoint, women in international migration flows is not a new phenomenon, although women traders now may constitute the majority of traders crossing the Mozambican-South African border. As studies have shown, their economic activities often support the housing, food and schooling not only for their spouses and children, but also for siblings (Peberdy, 2014; 2000). As contemporary cross-border migration has become more gender-balanced, the active economic roles of these women have become more evident. Thus the flow of women in international migration demands a shift to a migration structure based on their historical and current participation in household decision-making and responsibility. It is important to see that women who migrate still live within their larger household, while, particularly in the context of the Southern African region, men are migrating for periods associated with residence-based labour contracts, particularly in the mining industry in South Africa (Posel and Marx, 2013; Posel, 2004). Notwithstanding the differences between male and female migration, and the increase in socio-economic-led migration more generally, Mozambique and other states in the region have prioritised national security-driven migration and border control arrangements.

Post-War Border Control Perspectives

During the war, the Mozambican government was concerned with counteracting the infiltration of apartheid elements into Mozambican territory who were engaged in supplying the opposition rebel movement (known as National Resistance of Mozambique) with weapons, ammunition systems, uniforms, financial assistance, intelligence support and training. This was described by Emerson (2009:64): “to assist in the infiltration and exfiltration of guerrillas across the Rhodesian Mozambican border, [in 1979] the South Africans supplied some seven vehicles, including heavy duty tracks.” Based on these facts, the Mozambican government’s major priority was to establish a modernised and professionalised army capable of responding to conventional attacks from apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia (Chachiua, 2000:55). The intensification of war and penetration of elements of the apartheid regime across the Mozambican borders also led to the signing on 16 March 1984 of the Inkomati Accord of non-aggression and good neighbourliness between the Mozambican government and the South African apartheid regime. The key aim of the Accord was to end the war and its legacies since it was believed that if Pretoria would fulfil its goals under the accord, the intensity of bandit activity would rapidly decline (Davies, 1987). Internally, the government introduced the systematic control of movement of people, based on four security divisions that were acting within the Immigration Department: economic, ideological, military and counter-intelligence affairs. As a result of these reforms, the immigration department was renamed the National Department for Migration (NDM) and subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior. At a later point, the NDM was integrated into the State Intelligence Information Bureau (Serviços de Informação Secreta do Estado SISE). As these reforms were taking place, the Mozambican government created the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) subordinated to the army. These parallel security sectors were established to protect territorial sovereignty, to stop cross-border criminal activities and to prevent populations in the border regions and state-owned properties from the most serious external threats (NDM Report, 1999).

While the government perspective on border control was to fight external security threats (including cross-border crime), the new democratic dispensation began to pressure the country to implement security and legal reforms that would contribute to sustainable democracy, good governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and protection of the most vulnerable populations (Lalá, 2003). As part of the response to these demands, the National Assembly passed an anti-trafficking law in 2008 aimed at protecting women and children against sexual and labour exploitation. At the level of border management, since 1992, the Mozambican government has given priority to reaffirmation and delimitation of the country’s borders. Reaffirmation is a topographic activity that is conducted using maps and previous border treaties to replace milestones that have been removed or destroyed during a period of war, by animals or by natural phenomena. Delimitation of the border is the description of its line in text, maps or cartographic letters, and it is different from demarcation, which is an indication of the physical alignment of the border in the ground (Brownile, 1987).

In response to the new border dynamics in post-war period, the Mozambican government assigned responsibility for the reaffirmation process to the Institute of the Sea and Borders (IMAF), which coordinates activities with other sectors such as the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Agriculture and Health. This, the Mozambican President of the Institute of the Sea and Borders stated in an interview conducted during fieldwork in 2012 that:

the rise in mineral resources discovery that has attracted international firms to invest in the country, which requires clearly delimited borders in order to prevent resources-driven conflicts with neighbouring states, ensure better control of immigration flows, and better protection of states.

It is thus evident that borders are assigned different roles based on the position one takes. For example, as the above comment suggests, delimited borders can establish the legal possession of natural resources to the extent that no other state can make a claim to these resources. From the perspective of national sovereignty, borders of neighbouring states can now be regarded as international rather than transnational, which in turn underpins the tension between border authorities and communities in cross-border (Adepojou, 2006; Adepojou, 2000).

The establishment of the Mozambique Border Police

Following the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992, the Mozambican government created the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM), which replaced the People’s Police of Mozambique (Polícia Popular de Moçambique). Within this reform, the PRM created the Mozambique Border Police (MBP) as a special division assigned to control the border, particularly to prevent cross-border crime and to preserve territorial sovereignty. In 1997, government implemented major reforms in the security sector, in which the erstwhile National Service Public Security (SNASP) was renamed SISE and the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FLM) was renamed the Mozambique Armed Defence Forces (FADM).

The FADM are entrusted with preserving national independence, state sovereignty, and the protection of territorial integrity from external threats including armed aggression. For example, the 48th anniversary of the FADM in 2012 was celebrated by the holding officers with their great commitment and readiness to preserve state sovereignty and territorial integrity (Jornal Notícias, September 20, 2012). Although the government has constantly implemented reforms in the security sector, the country has not yet achieved visible change, since the police are poorly trained and under-resourced and thus unable to effectively provide public security in this new environment (Alar, 2010; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002). In part, Mozambique has been relying on joint border patrol operations with neighbouring states aimed to address what are believed to be common problems, ranging from clandestine migration and smuggling to poaching. At the same time, the Mozambican border authorities have established simplified crossing points aimed at facilitating socio-economic interaction between communities in restricted border zones of Mozambique and neighbouring countries. A restricted border zone is the territory within the administrative boundaries immediately adjacent to the state border line, the territorial length of which stretches up to 20 km from the official border line. This area includes Mozambican inland waters, rivers, lakes and islands.

In principle, a simplified border regime allows communities who live in the border areas to cross the border regularly for socio-economic reasons, without being checked automatically. Such reasons may range from family visits, to medical treatment and attendance of ceremonies such as marriages or burials. In an interview conducted during fieldwork in 2012, the National Commander of the Mozambique Border Police observed that individuals crossing through simplified crossing points should carry ID cards, and simply sign a register when moving back and forth across the border. The main reason pointed by the National Commander of Border Police is that simplified borders are not characterised by the same stringent controls as official crossing points, where a passport regime is supposed to be enforced.

However, Mozambique did not receive any cooperation from neighbouring states in implementing simplified border crossing regime, since those countries continued to rely on bilateral agreements aimed at fighting crime (Crush and Dodson, 2007). This has resulted in different regimes of border control and migration management regardless of their inadequacy in the post-colonial African context. In pursuance of regime-based border control, the Mozambican border police also tend to pay little attention to socio-economic convergence factors across border regions.

The Mozambique Border Police Border Controls a Priority

With the primary interest lying in fighting cross-border crime, the MBP have become more concerned with the modus operandi of the perpetrators and the categories into which they fall. In an interview conducted during fieldwork in 2012, the National Commander of the MBP explained that “border violators can be divided into simple violators and criminal-related immigrants”. From his perspective, and for the MBP generally, a ‘simple violator’ refers to any immigrant from a neighbouring state who enters Mozambique through a non-official crossing point in search of casual work, medical assistance, a family visit or any other socio-economic need, in other words for any non-criminal purpose. The ‘criminal-related immigrant’ referred to as an unauthorised immigrant, often coming from beyond the borders of neighbouring states, who is involved or suspected of criminal-related activity. These immigrants are defined in categories that range from smugglers, counterfeiters, traffickers to thieves.

Since the MBP are concerned with understanding the modus operandi of those involved in cross-border crime, they have established an internal intelligence division, which is tasked with conducting a deep trial process with intercepted border violators. In the same interview quoted above, the National Commander of the MBP added that

“among asylum seekers, refugees, and deported immigrants, we are always concerned with potential spies, which is why we need more detention centres so that the trial process can be conducted in a more detailed manner”.

As well as reflecting a generally hostile attitude towards foreigners, something which is also evident in, for example, approaches to border control in the European Union, this remark suggests that the civil war and the apartheid era has left its mark on the MBP today. As is reflected in the establishment of FRONTEX, which was aimed at stopping asylum seekers and refugees, a further legacy of the era of apartheid has been a heightened suspicion of infiltrators from South Africa (Léonard, 2010). The distinction between unauthorised border violators without criminal intent and those whose aims are criminal in the context of the Southern African region is summarised in Table 1 below. The distinguishing categories range from nationality, destination, used routes and reasons for relocation.

1. Table 1: Categories used by the MBP to classify immigrants crossing Mozambique borders

Trial categories

National citizens and foreigners from neighbouring states

Foreigners from other parts of the region

Nationality

Simple border violators; spies

Illegal immigrants; drug traffickers; spies

Destination

Neighbouring countries; livelihoods; firewood; arable land

Economic reasons; transit country; trafficking

Used routes

Porosity; common borders; cross-border communities

Porosity; international borders

Reasons for relocation

Hospital treatment; traditional ceremonies; family visits; informal cross-border trading; smuggling; facilitation of clandestine migration; unsustainable extraction of resources

Spying; terrorism; asylum seekers; refugees; illegal extraction of natural resources; political instability: ethnic or religious conflicts; family reunification

Source: Compiled based on interviews conducted with Mozambique border officials.

In line with the categories presented in the table above, the MBP understands that immigrants from neighbouring states such as Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwe, particularly those who live in the border regions, mostly cross the border for socio-economic reasons. Regardless of such socio-economically driven border crossing, the MBP believes that immigrants from neighbouring states can be involved in spying, which is why they urge local communities to be vigilant. With regard to immigrants from outside the neighbouring states, the MBP believes that these are mostly economically driven and are closely linked to criminal activities such as trafficking and smuggling. On many occasions, such immigrants try to find a transit country (with less secure borders) to reach their destination. As far as the literature is concerned, Africa is characterised by permanent interaction of people across border regions, but the continent is also viewed negatively as a relatively safe migratory route to Europe, as a result of the permeability and weak monitoring of borders as well as the ease with which false documents can be acquired (Melde et al., 2014; Ramirez, 2009; Ratha and Shaw, 2007). In the context of Mozambique, in an interview conducted during fieldwork in 2012, a senior border police officer stated that:

“Country of origin is a fundamental element to take into account to the extent that most immigrants who are involved in trafficking and exploitation of natural resources are from non-neighbouring states. Therefore, information on country of origin allows accurate decisions about real reasons leading to the relocation of the immigrant concerned”.

Based on the above, the distinction between simple border violators (from neighbouring states) and unauthorised immigrants (from outside neighbouring states) provides the field of migration studies with an alternative discourse that can better differentiate the context of border regions in post-colonial African states from those in Europe. It can also be seen as an emerging discourse in migration studies that can help to distinguish undocumented from unauthorised migrants in the context of intra-Southern African migration. For example, South African authorities understand undocumented immigrants to be those from neighbouring states, including Mozambique. On the other hand, unauthorised immigrants are generally defined in South Africa as being those from the rest of Africa, Asia, Europe and America, more often expected to use illegal routes to reach their destinations (Sablonnière et al., 2013; Crush and McDonald, 2000).

On the subject of illegal immigration routes, the MBP accepts that immigrants from beyond the borders of neighbouring states use illegal routes either to reach Mozambique or to enter South Africa (the main destination for immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa). The map below (Figure 1) indicates routes used frequently by unauthorised immigrants (across land and borders), as classified by the MBP over the last few years.

1. Figure 1: Illegal immigration routes across Mozambique by land and sea borders

Source: google maps, modified by the author using information for 2012/2013,

provided by the Mozambican Border Police.

The MBP is thus aware that two inter-related factors have made these routes the most accessible to unauthorised immigration: immigrants’ country of origin and language similarity. With regard to country of origin, the bulk of unauthorised immigrants who are arrested by border patrollers are from Ethiopia, Somalia, Congo and Burundi, reaching Mozambique through Cabo Delgado province (by crossing the Rovuma river). These immigrants can easily reach Pemba and Nampula by flying to Ethiopia or Kenya on scheduled flights. Further, according to the National Commander of the MBP interviewed during fieldwork in 2012, “Mozambique has been targeted by immigrants from the democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Rwanda as a final destination while South Africa (often via Mozambique) is the final destination sought by immigrants from Ethiopia and Somalia”. He explained that unauthorised immigrants reach Mozambique predominantly across the northern and the central borders. The northern border comprises three provinces, namely Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula. The central border includes four provinces, namely Tete, Manica, Zambézia and Sofala. The northern Cabo Delgado Province has become a point of easy entry for unauthorised immigrants into the country, particularly Tanzanians and those who come from the Great Lakes. According to the Mozambique Information Agency (AIM), fishermen in Cabo Delgado make illegal crossings of the Rovuma River, using their small boats at night and unloading them in the coastal districts of Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, Quissanga and Macomia. From there, immigrants are directed to other points where they either make their way to other parts of Mozambique on long distance trucks or head to South Africa (AIM, 2012). Although unauthorised Tanzanian immigrants are referred to as simple border violators (since they come from a neighbouring state), the Mozambican border authorities believe that they are also involved in illegal exploitation of natural resources, particularly in very remote areas where local authorities are unable to access current patrolling capabilities.

As for language similarity, most immigrants from the countries of the Great Lakes speak Kiswahili, which facilitates East African communication generally and in this case rapid informal integration in the Northern provinces of Mozambique. On many occasions, immigrants are hosted and integrated in local communities by relatives while preparing to migrate to South Africa, a preferred destination for various categories of migrants given its attractive economy and the relatively easy border crossing from Mozambique (Raimundo, 2009).

The political stability since the end of the war in Mozambique has also turned Mozambique itself into a destination for asylum seekers and refugees, especially the Marratane Refugee Centre in Nampula Province in the Northern part of the country. With regard to refugee centres, some members of parliament from the Frelimo and Renamo political parties claim that Mozambique has been unable to control the flow of refugees, which from the perspective of both economics and security has become a burden to the country. For example, a member of parliament from Frelimo Party interviewed during fieldwork in 2012 stated that “with more detention centres, refugees would not be able to mingle with Mozambicans and compete for access to basic services”.

In this context order is interpreted from different perspectives. For example, some members of parliament in Mozambique are of the opinion that strong border control or detention centres can prevent desperate immigrants from entering Mozambique. A similar response occurred in post-apartheid South Africa as a way of discouraging refugees and asylum seekers. In that case, the South Africa Department of Home Affairs proposed the establishment of a detention centre to host asylum seekers while their applications were being processed (Truong et al., 2014; Handmaker, 2001). As the following section argues, in implementing these immigration reforms, the post-apartheid South African government has been reinforcing anti-immigration policies that have impacts ranging from human rights abuse, incitement of violence to xenophobia.

PART II

Post-Apartheid South African Migration Management

As noted in previous sections, the end of apartheid in South Africa and the end of armed conflict in Mozambique resulted in the intensification of both regular and irregular forms of migration across the borders of neighbouring states. Accordingly, the Mozambique border authorities have given priority to the control of entry by unauthorised immigrants and cross-border crime. At the same time, the post-apartheid South African government has adopted cross-border management policies guided by national migration and refugee legislation (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; Oucho, 2014; Crush et al., 2005). These policy reforms, institutional reforms, and border control arrangements deserve further scrutiny.

Legacies of the past

Prior to 1994, South Africa had very restrictive security-oriented migration policies. As Handmaker and Parsley (2001:42) point out, “the security and control oriented approach was evident in the focus on deterring undocumented migrants and bogus asylum seekers.” By implementing contract-based employment and the Aliens Control Act of 1991, apartheid South Africa was able to control the movements of people (inside the country and from other African countries). In order to limit permanent employment for immigrants and to restrict movement of people from rural to urban centres, immigrants were contracted for a maximum period of two years, after which they could be repatriated (Posel and Marx, 2013; Posel, 2004).

Restrictive migration policies under the apartheid regime were based on the prototype of British colonial policies designed to exclude the entry of Indians, Jews and communists as well as foreign activists and journalists into South Africa (Truong et al., 2014; Oucho, 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001; Handmaker, 2001). As a result of massive flows of undocumented immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees (particular from Mozambique) into the country, South Africa continued to give priority to repatriation operations and strictly controlled entry and residence by immigrants (Meldes et al, 2014). Thus with the dawn of a democratic South Africa, one of their major challenges was the implementation of far-reaching migration reforms aimed at achieving higher standards of administrative justice.

Migration policy reforms

The first attempt to bring about reform of the migration policy in post-apartheid South Africa came in 1995. This was aimed at amending the Aliens Control Act (ACA of 1991). The ACA was considered draconian and an apartheid dinosaur, with policies rooted in racism that perpetuated the violation of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers (Oucho, 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). The major objective of the 1995 amendment was to review the detention period under which people could be held without judicial decision. Where the ACA had established that detained persons could be held in detention indefinitely, the 1995 amendment removed this provision and stipulated that detentions of longer than a period of three days should be reviewed (Oucho, 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). However, the 1995 amendment has not brought any change since the provisions have been applied, pointing to the need for further reforms.

The next attempt to reform migration policy came through the Green Paper on International Migration in 1997 and the Refugee Act of 1998. The point of departure for the establishment of the Green Paper was the lack of protection afforded asylum seekers and refugees, since they could be repatriated at any time. Therefore, the Green Paper fixed a five-year period in which either repatriation of a refugee or the granting of permanent residence in South Africa could occur (Handmaker, 1999). The main objective of the Green Paper was to “provide temporary protection to persons whose basic human rights were at risk in their country of origin, until they could return home safely” (Handmaker, 1999:300). The Refugee Act of 1998 was intended to protect vulnerable groups on a permanent basis in accordance with international practices, reflecting South Africa’s obligations and various international human rights conventions (Donnelly, 2014; Handmaker, 1999). The Green Paper was contested by the Human Rights Commission for its consistent failure to achieve standards for the protection of human rights, particularly with regard to repatriation within five years.

Regardless of people’s expectations of the Refugee Act 1998, its implementation has raised concerns because of its origins in the ACA, thus representing a continuation of a draconian regime (Melde et al., 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). Due to this failure, efforts to produce more contextualised migration policies continued in Post-apartheid South Africa. In 2000, the South African Government took into implementation a new Immigration Act, which was later amended in 2004. The immigration Act has embodied a different approach to immigration control, with particular focus on economic-related immigration and a link to border control (inside the country and on the remainder of the border).

In doing so, the Immigration Act of 2000 in its preamble provides that the new immigration control system aims at ensuring inter alia that (1) security considerations when entering South Africa are completely satisfied, including strengthening border monitoring aimed at preventing illegal immigrants and deporting them in cases where they are detected; (2) foreigners promote and contribute to the growth of South Africa’s economy. Based on the current dynamics of migration in cross-border communities, Post-apartheid South African migration reforms contribute to exclude less skilled immigrants and largely desperate immigrants from within the Southern African region. However, some reforms of labour and immigration policy undertaken by the Post-apartheid South Africa have had an impact.

Integration of immigrants: a losing battle

Labour policy

Despite different attempts to adapt post-apartheid South Africa to a new migration context aimed at establishing a less racialised society and promoting respect for human rights, the country’s migration policies have left many migrant workers from neigbouring countries undocumented and exposed to labour exploitation and police brutality (Trimikliniotis et al., 2008). As Crush and Dodson (2007:451) point out, “since 1994, there has been a growing disconnect between the regional reality of migration and the inherited policy tools which seek to manage those movements”. In the matter of labour migration, post-apartheid South Africa has been plagued by high rates of unemployment, a result of downsizing policies in the mining sector and job restrictions applied to low skilled workers. This has increased hostile sentiments regarding immigrants (Fine, 2014; Spaan, and van Moppes, 2006; Wentzel and Tlabela; 2001; Posel, 2004). For example, the 1996 Amendment Act prescribes that if qualified South Africans are available, South Africa will no longer grant foreign work or immigration permits (Crush, 1999:6). At the same time, South Africa has undertaken further labour adjustments, including the signing of bilateral labour agreements with Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi and Swaziland, aimed at ensuring legal access to South Africa by workers from these states (Fine, 2014; Melde et al., 2014; Crush, 1999).

Apart from these arrangements, the South African government has made specific recommendations to neighbouring states stating, inter alia, that (1) all governments should provide work for their own citizens; (2) problems of immigration can only be solved by a coordinated regional and international strategy; and (3) there should be a fair and proper control of entry of migrant workers into host countries (Melde et al., 2014; Oucho and Crush, 2001). This suggests that countries in the region that are relatively advanced in terms of economic development, such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, tend to see other states as transit points for unauthorised immigrants on the grounds that those countries’ borders are less well protected and there may be higher levels of corruption among their border officials (Solomon, 1997). Based on this, South African recommendations to neighbouring states could be regarded as a manifesto of hegemonic power in the region, which could seriously undermine mutual coexistence. Moreover, with this hegemonic positioning, other states in the region may find it difficult to cooperate openly in integration on the grounds that they might be dominated by South Africa (Ngoma, 2003).

Against this background, the former Vice President of South Africa (Thabo Mbeki) appealed to South African authorities to look carefully and holistically at causal factors and their potential impact on neighbouring countries. Job losses among mine workers, for instance, could easily intensify clandestine immigration, which in turn would undermine South Africa’s own interests as well as those of neighbouring countries (Crush and Dodson, 2007; Davies and Head, 1995). Despite this concern, South Africa has not yet adopted new immigration policies other than repatriation and securitisation of borders.

Border control

As has been highlighted in the previous sections, post-apartheid South Africa’s immigration policies and border controls have prioritised pre-dawn searches and repatriation of immigrants who have irregular status in South Africa. These operations have been implemented under the argument of deterring cross-border crime (particularly trafficking) and have been characterised by police brutality and little respect for human rights, provoking criticism from humanitarian organisations who believe that these acts impair democracy and ignore the rule of law. As Crush et al. (2005:25) point out, “arrest, detention and repatriation procedures do not always protect irregular and regular migrants from abuse and have the potential to cause conflict between neighbouring countries”. As a result of these practices, the bulk of the literature proclaims that

“South Africa’s new democratic government inherited a system of cross-border migration management rooted in the abusive practices of the past, which became in direct conflict with government to transparency, equality, accountability, and fundamental human rights” (Crush, 1999:1).

In the matter of patrol operations, South Africa has raised concerns with its control of its extensive land borders, particularly those with Mozambique, where the border has been electrified and is patrolled by the South African National Defence Force (Melde et al.¸ 2014; Vigneswaran, 2013; Crush, 1999). Concomitantly, the post-apartheid South African government has increased its budget and resources for police raids and deportation operations including the tracing, arrest and repatriation of refugees and undocumented immigrants, particularly Mozambicans and Zimbabweans (Vigneswaran, 2013; Crush and Dodson, 2007; Crush, 1999). As a result, in 1994 the South African immigration authorities deported about 91000 immigrants to Mozambique and Zimbabwe whom they believed to have entered South Africa clandestinely (Oucho, 2014; Oucho and Crush, 2001). As these operations have continued, South African authorities have also begun to deport non-Mozambican foreign immigrants (such as Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian and Chinese immigrants, as well as people from other parts of the region) on the grounds that they entered the country through Mozambique. This has damaged diplomatic relations between the two states (Melde et al., 2014; Crush, 1999).

Briefly stated, the increase in the budget for restrictive border control measures has not produced sustainable results for the South African government. From the legal perspective, South African arrest and deportation operations have fallen below international standards for the protection of human rights. From an economic perspective, South African arrest and deportation operations cost the government large sums of money, while the impact of this expenditure is nil (Vigneswaran, 2013; Oucho and Crush, 2001). From a socio-economic perspective, the focus on highly skilled immigrants who will meet the country’s economic demands has resulted in the marginalisation of the majority of immigrants, who have had to ‘fight’ for their own survival.

Legal Protection of Immigrants and Social Discrimination

While police brutality against immigrants has been quite noticeable in South Africa – examples including police dog attacks on Mozambican immigrants in 2001 (Crush and Dodson, 2007) – negative sentiment about immigrants has grown apace. As far as the literature is concerned, massive arrest and deportation operations have embodied a discourse in which foreign citizens are seen as the cause of high rates of unemployment and crime, and this has sparked conflicts with local citizens (SAMP, 2014; Crush, 1999). One response to this would be the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP), an international organisation founded in 1996 in Cape Town aiming at promoting awareness of migration-development linkages in the SADC region. Another is that “South Africa is reported to be experiencing a pronounced and worsening climate of anti-foreigner sentiment, extending to widespread social discrimination, which has occasionally translated into violent attacks” (Handmaker 1999:292).

Examples would include the xenophobic attacks in May 2008 (resulting in several deaths, and destruction and looting of foreigners’ property). Such attacks reflect the fact that post-apartheid South Africa has prioritised selective immigration policies such as economically driven immigration (Adjai and Lazaridis, 2014; Crush and Dodson, 2007). In the context of refugees and asylum seekers, South African anti-immigration policies have deprived immigrants of several of their rights. For example, section 22 of the Refugee Act of 1998 prescribes that asylum seekers have no right to study or work for 180 days while their status is being processed (Handmaker and Parsley, 2001: 43). Post-apartheid South African immigration policies have tended to move in tandem with Western receiving countries’ models, in which immigrants face tremendous difficulties in achieving social integration ranging from shrinking opportunities for language instruction, xenophobia and racist public opinion concerning immigrants (Boucher and Gest, 2014).

While post-apartheid South Africa’ responses to immigration have resulted in violations of human rights, discrimination and raised anti-foreigner sentiment, its policy makers seem also to have failed to explore migration policies adequate to inherent changes (Vigneswaran, 2013; Crush and Dodson, 2007; Crush, 1999). Importantly, new migration trends in the context of post-colonial states challenges policy makers and border authorities to think in a concept of intra-Southern African migration. This concept is grounded in the historical context of migration between Southern Africa states. Moreover, it can be better understood in the context of south-south migration as an alternative to migration management in an ongoing process of regional integration in SADC.

In the case of the Southern African region, as table 2 below illustrates, the socio-economic and ethno-cultural factors of cross-border interaction stand as fundamental features of intra-Southern African migration. These deserve further discussion towards finding an alternative approach to migration studies in the region. Cross-border interactions can offer an alternative to migration management, and offer an alternative to the current international standards of border control, which are fundamentally designed to criminalise and restrict movements across international borders. Intra-Southern African migration might then diverge from the criminal-migration nexus of border control.

PART III

Prospects of Intra-Southern African Migration: A Response to Anti-Immigration Policies

Up to this point, this paper has considered various legal and institutional reforms implemented since the end of the war in Mozambique and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, and the impact of these on the movements of people. Evidence from the literature indicates that these reforms have perpetuated anti-immigration ideology and have led to the spread of xenophobic sentiments about foreign immigrants (Boucher and Gest, 2014; Fine, 2014; Handmaker, 1999).

However, as Table 2 below illustrates, migration flows from and within the Southern African region are marked by local dynamics of border crossing intertwined with the effects of the ends of war and apartheid and by historical labour migration to South Africa. These require a deeper analysis of the usefulness of international models of border control that seek to lock down borders against so-called unwanted immigrants across Western countries. By focusing on migration from and within the Southern African region, an alternative to international models of border control could emphasise the views of local people in cross-border regions rather than the sovereignty that concerns nation states (Asiwaju, 2011).

1. Table 2: Cross-border key interaction factors shaping intra-Southern African migration

Countries

bordering

Mozambique

Border

length

(km)

Transboundary

ethnic/linguistic

groups

Transboundary

legally trafficked goods

Transboundary

illegally trafficked goods

Transboundary

prominent concerns

Security regime

type

Tanzania

800

Makonde; Yao

Fabrics; consumer goods; electronic items; bicycles and spare parts

Minerals; timber

Poaching; illegal extraction of minerals; smuggling; illegal migration

Weak:

extensive with few patrol units

Malawi

1500

Emacua; Chiyao; Chichewa

Maize; beans; salt; vegetables; soft drinks; bicycles, motorbikes and spare parts; mattresses

Fertilisers; firewood; timber; bamboo; rustled cattle; alcohol

Smuggling; land disputes; illegal fishing; felling of trees

Weak:

very extensive and porous border; land-oriented border crossings; limited control capacity

Zambia

400

Nyanja; Nyungwe

Dried fish; maize; beans; potatoes; plastic items; fabrics; soft drinks

Bales of second-hand clothes; spirits; cigarettes; minerals; rustled cattle

Smuggling; illegal migration

Weak:

Porous; search for livelihoods on both sides of borders

Zimbabwe

1200

Shona; Manhyka

Sugar; maize flour; rice; meat; milk; soap

Bales of second-hand clothes; spirits; cigarettes; minerals; rustled cattle

Smuggling; illegal migration; illegal extraction of minerals; water for agriculture

Strong:

Constantly patrolled border; socio-economically oriented crossing

Swaziland

100

Swazi; Chichangana

Meat; maize flour; potatoes; tomatoes; clothing; shoes

Rustled cattle; stolen vehicles; firearms

Smuggling of goods and rustled cattle

Strong:

Patrolled border; economically oriented crossing

South Africa

500

Tsonga; Chichangana; Zulus

Meat; maize flour; shoes, clothes; plastic items (chairs, tables; bowls, basins); soft drinks; mattresses

Cosmetics; drugs; stolen vehicles; firearms; spirits; cigarettes; rustled cattle

Smuggling; trafficking; illegal migration; poaching of rhinos; rustled cattle

Very strong:

Highly patrolled border; economically oriented crossing

Source: Data collated by the author on the basis of interviews in the field

In the case of migration from and within the Southern African region, communities living in cross-border regions interact on both sides of the border on a day-to-day basis for different reasons, particularly reasons related to socio-economic needs. As the table illustrates, since the end of the war in Mozambique cross-border interaction has increased and local communities have been able to expand their informal trade activities across borders to access water, firewood and arable land, all vital to their livelihoods. As this cross-border interaction has tended to intensify, variations have occurred in border control regimes from country to country.

These variations in border control (weak, strong and very strong) are related to each country’s material capacity to monitor the border, and at the same time in all variation, states have tended to develop similar concerns about border control that are often in conflict with the concerns of the local population. In short, these regimes of border control reflect states’ perspectives of border security, which do not differentiate between transboundary socio-economic interactions and cross-border crime, particularly poaching, illegal exploitation of mineral resources and smuggling.

Historically, the discovery of minerals in Witwatersrand and in Kimberley stimulated labour migration by creating a demand for a labour force from several neighbouring countries: Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Uganda (Fine, 2014; Wentzel and Tlabela, 2001). This migration has always been economically driven, which is a crucial factor underlying intra-Southern African migration. For example, following the end of the war in Mozambique and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, immigrants from other Southern African countries such as Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe began to look for alternative destinations such as Mozambique and Botswana for trade opportunities and better living conditions. This gave new impetus to regional economies and represents a resource for local populations (Ama et al., 2014; Peberdy, 2000).

The renaissance of migration from and within the Southern African region, the concept of intra-Southern African migration, can be expressed in the idea of South-South migration, i.e. migration that occurs between developing countries or regions (Melde et al., 2014; Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Bakewell, 2009). Broadly speaking, there are different categories or interest and scholarly approaches to South-South migration employed by international organisations and by individual scholars, which makes this concept rather fuzzy. The categories range from geographic area to national income and Human Development Index (Bakwell, 2009). To mention two examples, for the World Bank Development Indicators, developing countries are characterised by low income, low levels of human capital and economic vulnerability (Bakewell, 2009). Conversely, for Stefania Donzelli, South-South migration has been intensified by globalisation and by the increase in regional agreements on the free movements of people (Donzelli, 2013).

Given the diversity of perspectives, it seems that south-south migration might be better explored in the context intra-southern Africa migration, in which issues related to push-pull factors, poverty and social protection as well as sustainable utilisation of transboundary resources are central to the migration-development nexus. Accordingly, Southern African countries could use a more reconciled approach to border, aimed at the building of a more interconnected society in which the exchange of skills and culture better reflects the needs of communities divided by the legal lines of state borders. Evidence from the field indicate that local inhabitants tend to view migrating foreigners from the perspective of partnerships and skills exchange for local development. For example, in an interview conducted during fieldwork in 2013, a resident in the Ressano Garcia community (Mozambique-South Africa border) stated that “people from the great lakes have shown different experiences by introducing container-based grocery shops, which are now common in the country”.

In the Machipanda community (Mozambique-Zimbabwe border), local residents understand that Zimbabwean immigrants (who come in search of jobs) have skills in areas such as construction and plumbing, from which they can benefit. In the same perspective, a senior immigration officer interviewed during fieldwork in 2012 stated that “it is relatively easier to hire and pay relatively low wages to persons from developing countries rather than European worker”. Such comments imply that intra-Southern African migration may arise as an alternative concept in the context of post-colonial Africa. It may help deconstruct socio-economic development from the perspective of post-colonial cross-border communities on issues related to use of transboundary resources, petty trade, and ethnic networks (Melde et al., 2014; Hujo and Piper, 2014; Hujo and Piper, 2007; Ratha and Shaw, 2007).

However, as has been emphasised in the previous sections, Mozambique and South Africa together with other Southern African states have prioritised border controls that have tended to view immigration as a threat rather than as an opportunity, and this has prevented them from incorporating migration management into social policy frameworks such as poverty reduction (Hujo and Piper, 2014; Hujo and Piper, 2007; Crush et al., 2005). Instead, each country in the Southern African region has been concerned with the control of immigrants in terms of “who is allowed to enter the country, for what purposes and under what conditions, but fundamentally also about the settlement and integration of migrants who intend to remain in the country” (SAMP, 2014:5).

This notion can be separated into two strands of integration: economic and political. From the perspective of economic integration, states in the Southern African region may need to explore the core values and potential contribution of immigration to their development strategies (SAMP, 2014). As the literature makes evident, states may need to refrain from regarding immigrants as a threat and instead treat them as an opportunity (Adjai and Lazaridis, 2014; Sablonnière et al., 2013; Crush et al., 2005). At the practical level, they may need to work with local communities and immigrants to establish development strategies in which nationals and immigrants participate, to facilitate and strengthen both immigrant integration and the hosting communities and countries.

In terms of political integration, development strategies established to achieve the integration of immigrants can contribute to social cohesion and the building of a national identity beyond cultural similarities and territorial belonging. From this perspective, social cohesion and national identity mean more than living together in the same neighbourhood; they include how foreign immigrants are integrated into local communities (SAMP, 2014).

Southern African countries may need to view borders as points of contact rather than as barriers, particularly since modern borders are no longer be confined by political geography and territorial identity, owing to the volatile nature of these subjects (Newman, 2006a; Kolossov and O’Loughlin, 1998). Moreover, state border officials, particularly in the context of post-colonial border regions, need to be adaptive and adaptable to security complexities influencing global policing. This represents a structural demand in that states and communities in the border regions may need to frame a concept of security that balances socio-economic, cultural and sovereignty interests.

Conclusion

Despite considerable efforts by both the Mozambican and the South African border authorities in combating irregular forms of migration, cross-border migratory flows have not declined. It is clear that the Southern African region has not yet explored the meaning of day-to-day interaction among cross-border communities in ongoing policies and practices of border control between neighbouring states. The prevailing ethno-cultural affinities of communities divided by the political boundaries, together with economic differences between neighbouring states, have led to new trends in migration that demand new approaches. In pursuance of this objective, this paper has examined border control strategies adopted in post-war Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa, and the driving forces that have led to these strategies.

It is clear that the Mozambican government has implemented several reforms aimed at keeping the border protected against unauthorised immigration and cross-border crime it views as serious threats to security (such as human trafficking, smuggling and the illegal exploitation of natural resources). Further, the reconnection of South Africa to global chains of transaction has resulted in the implementation of migration reforms that have punished the majority of unskilled labour migrants from rural Southern Africa and from neighbouring states. Post-apartheid South African migration policies and border control strategies have continued the segregation policies of the past when dealing with migrants, particularly those from neighbouring countries.

Above all, neither Mozambique nor South Africa has yet been able to implement migration management based on day-to-day interactions in the cross-border regions. As a result, both use borrowed practices as an alternative to more locally grounded migration policies for the Southern African region.

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1 The author would like to thank Linda McPhee for her great contribution to this paper on language aspects from the very first draft to the final draft for publication.

From European Union to everyday neighborhood in border studies? A conceptual analysis

Virpi Kaisto

University of Eastern Finland, Karelian Institute

virpi.kaisto@uef.fi

Introduction

During the last few years, scholars in the field of border studies have been arguing for an alternative approach to “neighborhood”. They have claimed that the concept has been tied to the European Union Neighborhood Policy and that research focusing on EU external border areas has concentrated on studying the effects and limitations of the policy (see Laine 2016). Laine (2016) has called for a bottom-up alternative for understanding and studying neighborhood, not limited to EU policies or EU funded activities and looking at everyday interaction across borders. This paper argues that in order to build alternative research agendas for studying neighborhood in EU external (or any other) border areas, it is necessary to have a proper understanding of the concept and meanings given to it. Thus, the aim of this paper is to scrutinize the concept of neighborhood by reviewing how it has been applied in two fields of social sciences; border studies and urban studies. By looking into these two interdisciplinary fields, the paper aims to broaden the understanding of neighborhood in border studies and offer possible ways of engaging in alternative research on neighborhood in border areas.

A search in the Scopus database (the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature in the field of social sciences and humanities) with the term “neighborhood1” in article title yields 13 894 papers published between years 2000–2017. The largest part (40 %) of the papers has been published in the field of social sciences, followed by medicine (29 %), mathematics (12 %), and computer science (12 %). In social sciences, the concept has been used most often in journals related to health and urban issues, the most popular journals being those of “Health and Place”, “Social Science and Medicine”, “Urban Studies”, “Journal of Urban Health”, and “Housing Studies”. As the interests of this paper lie outside the field of medicine and health, urban research has been selected as a potential field for finding theoretical definitions for the concept of neighborhood.

This paper starts with a short description of method and materials. After that, literal and theoretical definitions to the concept of neighborhood will be discussed in three chapters. The first one shortly introduces the dictionary definition of the concept, and the second and third one discuss scholarly approaches to the concept in border and urban studies. In the conclusion, possible new scenarios for studying border areas with the notion of neighborhood will be drafted.

Research Method and Materials

As the above Scopus analytics show, the concept of neighborhood has been widely applied in the social sciences. In order to find relevant studies in the fields of urban and border research, the following methods were applied. In urban studies, the selection of articles was limited to English language review articles in the field of urban studies published between 1997 and 2017, and major databases (Scopus, Taylor & Francis and Web of Science) were searched with the terms ”concept of neighborhood”, ”neighborhood concept”, and ”notion of neighborhood” in article title, abstract or keywords. As a result, eight articles were selected for analysis. The aim of the analysis was to summarize the various uses of the concept identified by the articles. In border studies, the search was limited to English language articles in two journals focusing on border related research, namely Journal of Borderlands Studies (JBS) and Geopolitics. The search was carried out with the term ”neighborhood” in the title of the article, published between 1997 and 2017. The search yielded eight articles in JBS and nine articles in Geopolitics that were all included in the analysis. The analysis aimed at identifying the different ways that the concept of neighborhood has been applied to research, and the different meanings given to the term. While the review articles are believed to give a good overview of the use of the concept in urban research, the seventeen articles published in JBS and Geopolitics by no means constitute a systematic review of literature, but rather give an initial understanding of how the concept has been used in studies related to borders.

Dictionary Definition of the Concept of Neighborhood

Merriam-Webster dictionary (2017) gives five definitions to the noun neighborhood. The first one of these is a friendly, neighborly relationship [neighborliness]. The second one characterizes neighborhood as proximity, being close to something, and the third one as vicinity, a place or region that is nearby (in this meaning, neighborhood also refers to an approximate amount). While the fourth literary definition is purely mathematical, the fifth one relates neighborhood with people and cities. It understands neighborhood as people living near one another (as in “the whole neighborhood heard about it”) or a section of a city lived in by neighbors and usually having distinguishing characteristics.

Neighborhood in Urban Studies

Considering the vast number of studies employing the concept of neighborhood in urban research, there are very few papers reviewing the concept and its uses in scholarly literature. The most comprehensive of these is Deborah G. Martin’s (2003) article “Enacting Neighborhood”, which gives a broad overview of the variety of uses of the concept in the field of urban research. Drawing upon an extensive literature review, Martin classifies studies dealing with neighborhood into four themes. These are studies (1) aiming to define what neighborhood is; (2) equating or comparing neighborhood with community; (3) investigating effects of neighborhood on individuals; and (4) discussing neighborhood as contested space in urban political arenas. The following discussion has been organized according to these themes.

The first group of studies on neighborhood has its roots in the industrial urbanization of the late 19th and early 20th century, when scholars examined how urban living affected forms of social life and individuals’ connections in their communities and society (Martin 2003). Since then, there has been a whole history of debate about how to clarify neighborhood. In 1979, Albert Hunter identified three different epistemological approaches to the concept. These were (a) typologies identifying a set of characteristics of people and the physical environment constituting a neighborhood type; (b) stages of change in a neighborhood related to its economic and demographic developments; and (c) functions and uses of a neighborhood (whether it is an administrative unit, industrial area, a socially cohesive community etc.). In her article, Martin shows with Hunter’s categories and further examples from scholarly literature that the meaning of neighborhood is contingent and depends upon the perspective and agenda of the researcher. There is no general conclusion among geographers and urban scholars as to how to define the concept. Instead, we construct neighborhoods for our purposes in our research and social lives. (Ibid.)

Other scholars also note that there is no universal way of delineating the neighborhood as a unit (Chaskin 1997; Kearns & Parkinson 2001; Jenks & Dempsey 2007). Robert J. Chaskin’s (1997) literature review shows that drawing of neighborhood boundaries is an ongoing process happening simultaneously at many levels and by different actors, such as individuals using and interpreting space, private companies managing their distribution areas, and researchers studying collective representations of neighborhood inhabitants. He concludes that neighborhoods must be identified and defined heuristically, guided by specific aims, informed by a theoretical understanding of the concept, and based on a particular understanding and use of neighborhood in the particular context. Drawing a similar conclusion, Mike Jenks and Nicola Dempsey (2007) discover several characteristics used for defining neighborhood in existing research. First, physical attributes of an area are often used to identify neighborhoods and to tackle seemingly area-based problems (such as poverty and other disadvantages). Second, neighborhoods are defined as functional entities that provide services and support needs of people who live in the area. Third, neighborhoods are approached as social spaces, which people use and socialize in, but which also hold a certain meaning for the people. Neighborhoods are also studied as communities (see below), as a combination of some or all of the above mentioned characteristics, and as a frame of reference, that is how people refer to, understand, and identify with their neighborhood. Allison and Molly De Marco (2010) examine how researchers have conceptualized and measured rural neighborhoods. They point out that definitions of neighborhood from urban settings, and research results based on those definitions, might not be suitable for rural communities. They also conclude that the selected neighborhood conceptualization should reflect the study’s outcome of interest: “…if the outcomes of interest are socially defined then the most appropriate neighborhood definition might be that based on resident perception. However, if the selected outcome were access to health care or the influence of exposure to crime, administrative units, such as catchment areas for local hospitals or police jurisdictions, might be preferred […] Another potential solution […] is to employ multiple definitions in the same study to allow for the measurement of multiple neighborhood processes”(De Marco & De Marco 2010, 109).

The elusiveness of the neighborhood concept is challenging for urban planning and policy making (Chaskin 1997). Rachel Kallus and Hubert Law-Yone (2000) trace the meaning of the neighborhood idea in architecture and planning over time and stress that the concept has been a crucial tool to the design and planning of urban environment, because it represents an appropriate scale and a manageable unit between single houses and the totality of the urban complex. For planners, neighborhoods are at the same time a planning ideal and a product of planning. The authors observe that the meanings of the neighborhood idea in theoretical and practical planning discourse has transformed over time. Originally, in the beginning of the 20th century, neighborhood represented a social framework for humans to live communally and socialize, and the aim of planning was to response to basic human needs of the residents. Later, neighborhood turned into a tool in the planning process. It was conceived as an instrument and a building block in the development of urban structure. Today neighborhood is approached as a unique urban phenomenon that has its everyday residential functions, but that also encompasses the meanings and perceptions that inhabitants attach to it. All these ideas take part in an ongoing discussion and continue to influence urban planning.

The most persistent theme in neighborhood studies has been that of approaching neighborhoods as communities, in other words, viewing them as geographically delineated places where people share similar backgrounds, values, and lifestyles, and even rely upon one another for mutual assistance (Martin 2003). This perspective has received a lot of criticism, because it leads researchers to turn to questions focusing on the “loss” of community. It also obscures social ties that people have outside the neighborhood and hardens social boundaries around neighborhoods, that is creates exclusionary meanings of them (Ibid.). However, studies of neighborhood are rarely free of connotations of connection, inherent to the term community (Chaskin 1997).

David Garrioch and Mark Peel (2006) explain that the roots of paralleling neighborhood with community go back at least to the 15th century European thinking about urban life. In the “theology of the city” developed by key thinkers of the time, neighborhood represents a collectivity of neighbors with moral duties of doing charity and taking care of one another. Until this day, the term neighborhood continues to carry values of solidarity and cooperation among residents. This, on the one hand, plays an important role in plans to improve the quality of urban life and, on the other hand, guides our research questions. Garrioch and Peel claim that historical studies of neighborhood are underpinned by a preconception that in traditional societies neighborhoods were close-knit ideal communities, while in modern (and more recently postmodern) neighborhoods, communality and significance of neighbor relations is disappearing. They show that researchers have been unable to agree over the timing, extent, and causes of this change, and therefore they should ask whether the changes in the meaning and practices of neighboring over time have actually been that great, and whether proximity and interdependence produce essentially similar local environments no matter when or where they exist. As Martin (2003), these authors recognize the need to question the association between neighborhood and community, and the idea that community is a positive thing, because even symbolic and non-territorial communities can be adequate for people. Chaskin (1997) points out that several researchers have responded to the decline-of-community argument by adjusting their working definitions of neighborhood. These scholars have concluded that proponents of the decline-of-community thesis have been looking for community in the wrong place: “The neighborhood or local community may be a less central construct for the concentration of “intimate” ties or networks of “sociability”, but it continues to provide a forum for relationships through which information, aid, services, and connection to broader networks and systems are shared” (Chaskin 1997, p. 531). Garrioch and Peel (2006) have later proposed addressing neighborhoods as dynamic processes, rather than as places with diminished neighborliness due to modernization and increased mobility.

Another popular theme in neighborhood research has been the study of the impacts of the social and physical environment upon individuals and their behavior (Martin 2003). Emily Talen’s (2017) historical literature review shows that neighborhood effect research is part of a larger debate that urban planners and social scientists have had since the beginning of the 20th century around the relationship between the planned neighborhood and its social characteristics. At one end of this discussion is the idea that planned environment can affect social life of people, and at the other end, there is strong criticism against such physical determinism. Many planners have reacted to this problem by ignoring the social aspects of a neighborhood and by addressing neighborhoods as purely service providers; they have been paying attention primarily to a neighborhood’s physical form, land use, accessibility to facilities and services, and economic opportunities. At the same time, social science researchers (and some planners) have developed the scientific methods to study the social effects of the planned neighborhood. A substantial literature now supports the idea that physical qualities of a neighborhood are connected with social outcomes. Among other things, certain neighborhood forms have been witnessed to increase social interaction between residents: pedestrian-based neighborhoods with streets as social connectors show stronger sense of community, place attachment, sense of trust, and social engagement than other types of neighborhoods. Connections outside a neighborhood, on the other hand, can integrate or isolate residents from wider social and economic networks. Literature also documents how a person’s residence can shape one’s health (including health behavior, disease risk, mortality, or levels of stress) and behavior such as trust, tolerance of diversity, political opinions, or perceiving one’s life chances (Milbrath and DeGuzman 2015). Studies of neighborhood effects have been criticized by arguing that neighborhoods alone do not determine a person’s life chances (Martin 2003). Further, by presuming that certain common behavioral norms exist in communities, scholars avoid exploring existing cultures in a non-judgmental way (Ibid.).

The fourth group of studies in Martin’s (2003) categorization approaches neighborhoods as sites of social and political agency. Urban historians, for instance, have had a keen interest in the political role of locally based organizations and in the local impact of larger institutions and authorities (Garrioch and Peel 2006, 664). Martin (2003) argues that neighborhoods are often constituted through activism, when residents collaborate in order to defend their ideas and representations of a neighborhood. She describes two cases of urban activism in Athens, Georgia, to illustrate how residents articulate and defend a neighborhood ideal, because new land-use plans conflict with their neighborhood image. By examining these expressions, it is possible to understand what characteristics and values residents attach to their neighborhoods. It also becomes clear that neighborhoods never have a singular meaning for its residents, but rather are always contingent and produced. Consequently, Martin suggests that instead of settling with strict predefined definitions of neighborhood, we should study meanings that residents give to the concept and approach neighborhoods as flexible, contingent, social, and political products. According to her, this is the only way that neighborhoods can act as meaningful scholarly and social categories.

Despite the differing perspectives to the concept of neighborhood, all the above discussed review articles in the field of urban studies share a common understanding that neighborhoods are residential districts with particular features that people inhabit and experience in their daily lives (see Martin 2003). The next part of this paper examines how the concept has been defined and applied in the field of border studies. Border studies is an interdisciplinary field of inquiry that is interested in state borders and their many forms of social implications. The following analysis illustrates that the concept of neighborhood has different connotations in studies dealing with borders, but that the EU neighborhood is the prevailing one.

Neighborhood in Border Studies

As suggested by some scholars (see Laine 2016), in the field of border studies the concept of neighborhood seems to be strongly associated with the European Union and its Neighborhood Policy (ENP). A thematic grouping of the papers analyzed for this study reveals that fifteen out of the total seventeen articles discuss the concept of neighborhood in relation to the EU. One article (1) regards neighborhood as the EU’s neighboring territory and policy, and examines relations between the EU and its neighboring countries. Yet, all the other papers (fourteen) address the concept as EU’s discourse (2) and scrutinize it critically based on official EU documents, empirical material, and previous scholarly literature on the topic. Finally, in two articles the concept is not related with the EU, but (3) used for describing neighborhood relations of a country and (4) studying an urban neighborhood as a site of everyday geopolitics. What follows, is a discussion of each of these four perspectives to the neighborhood concept in border studies.

Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is EU’s framework for governing relations with its sixteen Eastern and Southern neighboring states (Neighborhood) and it was launched in 2004. Its key priority areas include the promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion in the Neighborhood States (European Union External Action 2017). The ENP has been a popular topic for research, and scholars from different fields such as international relations, law, and political geography have scrutinized, in particular, the basic principles of the ENP, its instruments, and its developments and effectiveness from local to the macroregional scale (Beauguitte et al. 2015). Accordingly, one of the papers included in this analysis, examines relations between the EU and its Neighborhood by discussing the roles that the Baltic States play in the relations between the EU and its eastern neighbors and in facilitating the ENP in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine (see Galbreath & Lamoreaux 2007).

A significant part of the ENP research has seek to critically scrutinize the content of the Policy, and evolved around a few key arguments. Scholars claim that with the ENP, the EU defines itself as distinct from neighbors that are not enough European to join the EU. They also argue that the ENP is a means for the EU to stabilize its neighborhood and to export the European model and preferences to its neighboring countries (this has been called “Europeanisation”). However, the paradox of the ENP is that it blurs the division between those inside and those outside and acts as EU’s soft power for securing its borders. (van Houtum & Boedeltje 2011; Beauguitte et al. 2015.) These same arguments can be found in the papers of the second thematic group of the present analysis. To give a few examples, Bohdana Dimitrovova (2008) explores three bordering discourses that are occurring in the EU in relation to the Neighborhood. The first one is associated with classical nation-state borders and the power of states to control their borders and movement across them. The second one evolves around features of imperialism and the EU’s attempt to assert control of its surrounding territories through cooperation and negotiations with the ENP countries. The third discourse considers networks as an important tool for the EU in engaging with its neighbors, and places emphasis on dialogue, social learning, partnerships, and exchanges. All these discourses include contradictory views and opinions, and illustrate the tensions and dilemmas that exist between softening (opening) and closing (confirming) borders. Dimitrovova argues that until now, the “border confirming” process has dominated and therefore the construction of EU’s neighborhood acts as a test for EU’s claims to openness, solidarity, and inclusiveness. She concludes that a single model of borders for all the neighboring countries is not possible, considering the diversity of the EU Neighboring space.

Pertti Joenniemi (2008; 2012) takes the concept of neighbor to probe the ENP and argues that the formulation of the Policy in the connection with the 2004 major enlargement of the EU testifies of a radical shift in the EU’s essence. Whereas before the enlargement, the countries neighboring the EU were not central to the Union’s identity but Europe’s own past, after the enlargement the Neighborhood represents the “Other” in identity construction. The underlying paradox of the concept of neighbor is that “neighbors” are included in a “ring of friends” through the ENP, but at the same time excluded from “us” based on their difference. Joenniemi argues that the prime reason for the border-drawing between “us” and “not-fully-us” is security; in contrast to the disorderly and threatening world outside, the EU is considered an island of security and stability. Olivier Thomas Kramsch (2011) observes an analogy between ENP and 19th and 20th century European colonialism in envisioning the world beyond Europe. During the colonial period, European states exported the nation-state form with its boundaries to the rest of the globe and laid claim to modernity in science, arts, politics, and culture. Eventually, this signified that geographical distance from Western European core would be associated with increasing degrees of underdevelopment. Finally, Beauguitte et al. (2015) analyze the seven communications on the ENP issued between 2003 and 2013, to contribute to the debate about the EU as an international actor in its neighborhood. In terms of methodology, their quantitative analysis deviates from the majority of studies on EU neighborhood that apply (often implicitly) different qualitative textual analyses as their methods. However, their statistical lexical analysis supports findings of previous studies and suggests that the ENP is Eurocentric in that the global scale is practically missing from the Policy. The ENP privileges the national scale by focusing on bilateral relations between the EU and the ENP countries, rather than treating the ENP countries as one ‘region’. Their findings also show that the EU makes a clear distinction between its Eastern and Southern neighborhoods, and that the ENP largely ignores neighboring countries that are not included in the ENP, but play an important role in the ENP countries (Russia and Turkey are among such countries). Lastly, the authors point out that the ENP rather reacts to significant geopolitical events in its neighborhood than takes an active role in predicting developments. The authors conclude, however, that the EU as an international actor has been able to formulate consistent preferences and a cohesive strategy what comes to its neighborhood.

James Wesley Scott’s (2011) analysis of EU’s geopolitics takes a slightly different stance on EU Neighborhood and steps back from “a priori determinations of the EU’s geopolitical ambitions” (including many of the above-mentioned arguments). He considers the EU’s geopolitical project of reordering Europe and its regional neighbourhood incomplete, but highly influential, and therefore worthy of critical investigation. He regards the ENP the most explicit form of geopolitical integration between the EU and its immediate region. Instead of focusing on the ENP discourse from the EU’s perspective, he studies EU’s geopolitics from the viewpoint of civil society actors in EU’s Eastern Neighborhood. This perspective reveals that more attention should be paid to co-operation dynamics and practical issues in border regions, in order to connect citizens and communities with the EU and add credibility to the abstract notion of a co-operative Neighbourhood.

The above analysis illustrates that when discussing neighborhood in relation to the EU, scholars give different meanings to the concept. They refer to it as the neighboring states to the EU (territory) and EU’s policy regarding these states (policy), in the framework of which EU acts with its neighbors (geopolitical actorness). This points out that despite their often-critical stance on neighborhood; these studies incorporate the EU related definition of the concept rather than trying to define what or where neighborhood is.

Out of the seventeen articles from JBS and Geopolitics, one approaches the concept of neighborhood as relations between neighboring countries. Katarzyna Stokłosa (2012) studies the development of Poland’s neighborhood relations with Germany, Ukraine, and Russia. Her focus is on borders and border regions, as settings for the encounter and interaction between members from different nationalities. She shows how demanding the establishment of successful neighborhood relations is in border regions that often have a troubled history, and it is the mental borders that provide the greatest challenges for good relations on Poland’s Eastern and Western frontiers. The other article not relating neighborhood with the EU, is the paper by Haim Yakobi and Wendy Pullan (2014). These authors study the neighborhood of French Hill in Jerusalem, Israel, to discuss neighborhood planning and production of urban space in contested cities. They use geopolitics as an analytical frame to illustrate how the neighborhood of French Hill is “a microcosm of the Palestine-Israel conflict”. French Hill is one of the first neighborhoods that was planned and built on occupied Palestinian land in East Jerusalem in the 1960s and 1970s. Jewish residents inhabit it, but recently it has been undergoing a demographic transformation as Palestinians have been buying and renting property there, because it offers better quality housing and services than the poorly developed Palestinian neighborhoods. Yakobi and Pullan show how this phenomenon is controversial in a highly segregated city. At the present, Palestinians are hardly participating in Israeli culture and institutions in French Hill and there are a few places in the neighborhood where interaction between Israelis and Palestinians takes place. The authors consider it a necessary quality for inhabitants of a neighborhood to take part in its urban life and culture. They, thus, attach the attribute of interaction and participation to the concept of neighborhood. They also argue that a city neighborhood is a useful analytical scale for studying geopolitical processes. It reveals, first, how urban planning is always a political act and, second, how in urban neighborhoods geopolitics happen “at the minute and everyday level” as residents oppose or undermine dominant narratives of the state and capital.

Discussion and Conclusions

This study aimed to review how scholars have approached the concept of neighborhood in urban and border research, to open possible new agendas for studying border areas as civic or everyday neighborhoods. The above analysis shows that, so far, approaches to neighborhood in these two fields of research have remained separate. In urban research, neighborhoods represent residential districts with particular features that people inhabit and experience in their daily lives. Accordingly, scholars have aimed to define what neighborhood is, compared neighborhoods to communities, investigated effects of neighborhoods on individuals, and discussed neighborhoods as contested spaces in urban political arenas. In border studies, the concept has more varied meanings as it refers to the neighboring countries of the EU, the EU’s Neighborhood Policy, neighborhood relations of a country, and an urban neighborhood. Research has focused largely on critically examining the ENP as EU’s discourse based on official EU documents, empirical material from the Neighborhood, and previous scholarly literature on the topic. Despite these apparently divergent views on the concept, it is possible to find common features in both fields by returning to the dictionary meanings of neighborhood.

First, a neighborhood always refers to a certain territory or place. In urban research, it is a residential area and in border studies, it most often refers to the neighboring states or regions of the EU. Second, neighbors are essential to the definition of neighborhood. In residential districts, neighbors are people that live in the area and interact with each other to varying degrees, and that can be affected by the neighborhood’s characteristics. In research focusing on the EU neighborhood, neighbors are the EU and the states, but also people living and operating in border areas, conditioned by the structures and realities in their neighborhood. Third, researchers are interested in the neighborly relationship of neighbors, be it individuals in city neighborhoods or the EU and its neighboring states. Both urban and border studies have their underlying ideas and values regarding neighboring, including what are good neighborly relations like and how neighbors should act in relation to one another.

Martin (2003) suggests that we should study neighborhoods as places or spaces. Consequently, research on neighborhoods should focus on how neighborhoods are produced socially and physically, through cooperation and conflict. This approach offers possibilities also for exploring border areas as civic or everyday neighborhoods. However, it is not enough to merely rename border spaces as neighborhoods, but it is necessary to reflect upon some of the above-mentioned aspects related to neighborness.

Whatever the topic or agenda, we should consider how we define the concept of neighborhood in our studies, or whether we let our research participants define it for us. We can move away from EU centered study of neighborhood in border research, but we have to be aware of what kind of meanings we attach to term before heading to the field. If we will be looking for community in border areas, we might end up repeating once more, what previous studies have shown: that people seldom develop cross-border identities and feeling of belonging together with inhabitants of the neighboring territory. It is also worth mentioning that the EU and everyday perspectives on neighborhood are by no means exclusive. They can mutually benefit each other and work towards a bottom-up agenda in neighborhood research (see Laine 2016) and a phenomenological study of borders (see Brambilla 2015) that pays attention to everyday life experiences and representations of the border.

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1 Both the British English form “neighbourhood” and the American English form “neighborhood” have been used in all in the searches for this article.

EU Architectures of Cross-Border Regions:

EU Macro Regional Strategy and

European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation

Hiroshi Tanaka

Ritsumeikan University, School of Economics

hirotana@ec.ritsumei.ac.jp

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to construct a fundamental theoretical framework to explain the nature and structure of two types of European Union territorial cooperation: the EU macro region strategy (EUMRS) and the European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). The fundamental theoretical framework refers to ideas of an “Architecture of Regions (AR)”. The EU has adopted four EUMRSs so far; the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region；EUSBSR (2009), the EU Strategy for Danube Region EUSDR (2010), the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region; EUSAIR (2014), the EU Strategy for the Alpine region; EUSALR (2015). While as of the end of 2016, 65 EGTCs existed, most of which remained fairly concentrated in specific European borders, despite the variety of types of EGTCs in terms of their geographic location, players involved, topics covered, and type of tasks have increased considerably over recent years (European Committee of the Regions (2017), EGTC Monitoring Report 2016). The EUMRS has emerged from the micro-local cross-border cooperation (CBC) like the euro regions that we have studied so far (Kojimoto 2014, 102).

Micro/local CBC has developed in the following historical process: the first local-level Euregio was established in 1956, and gave subsequent inspiration to more elaborate forms of cross-border cooperation, including the “Oresund Council” in 1964 and the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) in 1971. Other landmark developments were the establishment of funding instruments for CBC in the 1980s and the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (the Madrid Convention) in 1980. More recently, CBC at different spatial levels has become enshrined within European Cohesion Policy.

As part of this development and Structural Fund reforms, macro-regional strategies emerged in the 1990a. One pilot project of regional cooperation was the Baltic Sea Region, a space where up to that time cross-regional cooperation had progressed most in Europe. Interreg IIIB’s combination with Vision and Strategies Around the Baltic Sea 2010 (VASAB 2010) had evolved this program into an EU strategy (EUSBSR) by 2010 (See Kojimoto 2014, Chapters 5 and 6). Subsequently the following three EUMRSs had been adopted in rapid succession, drawing on the collective wisdom and inspiration from this EUSBSR.

EGTCs and EUMRSs have been promoted by EU economic integration which has pushed forward the realization of the single market and introduction of the euro since the 1980s, triggering the systemic transformation of the East European countries in the 1990s. On the other hand, it has promoted the EU southern, northward and eastern enlargement since the 1990s. The present EUMRS has been gradually crystallized during the interactions between the preparation of and implementing of the EU-wide socio-economic development and transformation strategies, with the EU Cohesion Policy to make efforts to decrease regional disparities, to further promote regional intrinsic development at several regional levels, to accumulate experience of long-term territorial cooperation and Interreg, preparation of the spatial development plan at the European and macro-regional level, to establish Interact Points with provision of services to support Interreg and CBC programs. According to Shimizu (2013), the emergence of the EUMRS are the result of combination of solving defects of CBC type cooperation and promoting the former “Lisbon strategy” and “Europe 2020 strategy”.

Multilevel Governance vs. Cross-Scale Regional Governance

It was not so long ago that studies and researches on EUMRS and meso-regions in Europe started in Japan (Kojimoto 2011; 2014; Tanaka 2013; 2017) with Hasumi (2009), paying specific attention to European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and Russia, and examining experiences of territorial cooperation characterized by “local ownership” of Northern Dimension (ND). This examination analyzes the industry-government-university-cooperation based cluster giving arise to global competitiveness on the Baltic meso-level, and concludes that the effect of this cooperation is still unknown. Tanaka (2013) analyzes weakness of the bottom-up governance of the EU Strategy for Danube Region, various asymmetries in this macro-region, less capability to solve regional problems, insufficiency of policies, funds, and capacities to develop this region, and lack of integral approach of coordination. Its scope of analysis is not adequate to reexamine directly the concept of multi-level governance (MLG) in the EUSDR.

Meanwhile, Kojimoto produced a comprehensive study of the EU macro-regional strategy for the Baltic Sea and the North Sea cooperation, points out inadequate understanding of the distinctive feature of the macro-region that has emerged both with progresses of the EU Regional Policy and the application of MLG in the cross-border regional level; In other words, it criticizes the concept of MLG with a logic that it cannot distinctly distinguish between “jurisdictional area of vertical multilayered government” and “government as an actor” and makes a model of the MLG as an “embedded” state of both “jurisdictional area” and “actor”(pp. 61-62). This criticism includes a suggestion that we should make a sharp distinction between “actor”, “function” and “jurisdiction” logically at the initial stage of analysis in re-fabricating the governance of, especially, transnational and cross-border regions.

In contrast, Kojimoto elucidates the EUDRS from the viewpoint of “Cross-scale Regional Governance” (CSRG), which is thought to be a form of sharing power between scales in the process of enforcing regional policies. Scale means a space unit formed through a specific social process, and individual scales (ex. body, household, neighborhood, city, metropolitan area, province, state, nation state, continent, and global) which have not been immobilized in the actual post-war European integration process. He claims that cross-scale is not hierarchical, not nested, nor can it be divided into specific sizes (p.33-35). Furthermore, Kojikoto suggests the birth of three new different “policy container groups” leading regional policies under the progress of the EU integration as well. Namely, first the policy decision-making concerning the development of cross-border regions was sucked up (uploaded) to the EU as a regional policy of the EU. Then its regional policy was given down (download) from the EU to the corresponding regions. It was likely that this upload and download process, on the one hand, partly took the original reciprocating route of the multilayered MLG (EU-state-regional/local government), while, on the other, partly creating three new “policy container groups” leading to regional policies, different from the original ones.

The point to understand about this new “policy container” lies in admitting that there would be emerged specific “ spaces” of decision-making for the cross-border policies between the EU territorial level and the provincial government territorial level (p.74). It could be observed that three types of scales are emerging in this specific “space”: micro-region, macro-region and mega-region; and it is in the macro region that CSRG is the most explicitly embodied among them. The micro-region corresponding to the EGTC does not fully embody a specific feature of cross-scale-ness, compared with the macro-region, in terms of limitation in kind and number of participating actors. What is more, the cross-scale does not distinctly emerge in the phase of relations between national government and local governments. In other words, although cross-scale-ness of the micro and macro region are essentially the same, the difference could be considered to appear as a difference between lines and faces. It is likely that the difference between them could be interpreted rather as a fractal relationship.

The CSRG view proposed by Kojimoto has another characteristic that divides actors in macro regions into three kinds as follows: The 1st type of actor corresponds to the EU, the state, the local government; and then the 2nd type of actor is equivalent to the chamber of commerce and industry, the fishery cooperative, the company; and finally, the 3rd type is thought to be the environmental and other various NGOs. This classification is classified by what defines the acting actor. Namely, the 1st type of actor is defined by an area, and the second type is defined by a function, and finally the third type is defined by an issue. Therefore, it seems that the macro region exists as a hybrid species of the three actors (pp. 48). Once generating the system of hybrid actors, there would begin a circulation such as the state-ness of the national state, which is at the core of the system of central government, and is sucked up (uploaded) to the EU through “deviation beyond the border”, “departure from embedded scale” and “deviation beyond species”. Then, the system of hybrid actors is taken down (download), finally being embedded again into the heterarchy of micro regions and macro regions (pp. 216 - 223).

The above research clarifies that the EU experiences of transnational and cross-border cooperation building gave birth to distinctive governance within where regional actors implementing regional policies have cross-connections with regions, functions and tasks/issues. This feature seems to be completely different from the multilayered type of multilevel governance that is popular in the EU regional space recognition today.

There is only one doubt concerning the above mentioned three types of actors that are classified from the three view-points of area, function and task respectively. Even though these three actors should be observed from the respect of its range and strength, and the deformations of their mutual relations, it is our understanding for the following studies that each actor has its own independent specific area, function and issue respectively. This research paper, inspired by studying the theoretical breakthrough of the EU regional governance through Kojimoto (2014), tries to approach the EUMRS and the EGTC from a unified theoretical framework of analysis different from Kojimoto.

A Unified Theoretical Framework for Analyzing EUMRS and EGTC

The next question now arises. What is a unified theoretical framework of analysis that is practical for observing the EUMRS and the EGTC? In the following, we would like to seek our approach in the architecture of product/production theory, based on the theoretical framework for evolutionary economics in Japan. Unfortunately, however, both the architecture of product/production theory and evolutionary economics in Japan are becoming globally widespread. In this sense our idea of architecture of region theory (ART) seems to be a new challenge. While, however, the term “architecture” is understood as a “building” on a daily life basis, it is redefined as a basic idea of system design of artificial system or artifact (Fujimoto 2002) below. ‘Monodzukuri management theory’, which is represented by Prof. Takahiro Fujimoto, has been studied with the whole picture and total specific features of production management and business phenomena concerning product/production of Japanese firms, especially car manufacturing, from the architecture of product/production theory (Fujimoto 2003; 2007).

Then, we would realize that there is a large gap between the ways of treating and analyzing product/production and those of region. It would raise a serious question of whether region be understood as an artifact. Is it conceivable to apply some part of the architecture of product/production theory to the study of the EUMRS and the EGTC? First, we must recognize that the EU regional policy studies including the EUMRS and the EGTC are the way to shift from looking at region as a natural and historical region to observing it as a ‘functional region’. Second, on the other hand, the architecture of product/production theory attaches immense importance to functions and fitness between functions in the actual analysis of manufacturing process. These two ways to emphasis could allow us to think that both ART studies and the studies based on the architecture of product/production theory would be a parallel case. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that ART has an advantage in research methodology to explicitly distinguish among areas, functions and actors in the hierarchy system (government or governance) and to pay attention to the hierarchy structure of them respectively.

Regions and the Architecture of Regions

This section explains what AR and ART are. Employing a metaphor from the architecture of product/production theory, region means a space where some design information concerning a specific area is created and transferred to the artifacts (=media; natural/historical environment), and where goods, service, life, and the environment themselves are reproduced in a cyclical repetition. It is not only an administrative scale but also the national border that separates this space into a partly isolated part with some deformation.

The capabilities of one region depend on “fitness” among (a) the regional design philosophy (architecture of region), (b) the place where the reproduction of functions in a certain area is repeating itself, and (c) the organizational capabilities of each actor as an organizer/driver in a certain area. This fitness is cut and blocked by the border and it is difficult to transfer/transcribe these three components and their fitness across the border. How to create certain regional design information and how to transfer/transcribe it to the other media is a fundamental task for the region formation and reproduction even in a border land. Transcription is restricted by the border as well. The organizational capabilities of one region, being an adjusted bundle of organizational capabilities that each actor has accumulated so far, have unique characteristics and attributes depending on their level and scale. They are characterized by a set of their normal behavior patterns (routines) as well. They are also built by learning. The organizational capabilities of one region differ across the border. Therefore, the concept of AR should provide important analytical suggestions when considering the EU regional policies on cohesive restoration of cross-border and transnational territorial regions. This is the outline of ART.

Regional Architecture vs. Architecture of Regions

There is, incidentally, a concept of ‘regional architecture’ similar to the architecture of region. The former mainly expresses regional aspects of world politics and international order. Nolte (2014) claims that there is a ‘regional architecture’ in regional research fields, alternative to concepts of regional integration and regional cooperation, which represents mega regional interactions. This concept started to be used recently, but the definition is not clear. Weixing Hu Richard (2009) regards the Asia-Pacific region as a hybrid of regionalism and characterizes it as “regional organizations, institutions, bilateral and multilateral agreements, dialog forums, and other mechanisms suitable to collectively realize regional safety, prosperity and stability”. In response to this, Biermann et al. (2009) claims that ‘global governance architecture’ is a comprehensive system of private or public institutions that are actively or effectively working in certain problem fields of world politics at the regional level. In the former case no mention is made about the rule setting forced in the space, while the latter defines a regional architecture as a meta-level governance and limits it to specific problem tasks. They claim that regulations and political institutions constituting the regional space of the region should be kept in the core of the concept to differentiate forms of regionalism. This seems to be close to the concept of political institutional governance theory.

The Asian Development Bank (2010), arguing an institutional architecture of Asian integration, shows understanding that the degree of institutionalization in the integration as low is incorrect. In the case of most Asian institutions, the lack of clarity of procedural rules, the small number of tasks undertaken by the permanent secretariats, and the low degree of compulsion for the member countries are the opposite side of an Asian type of consensus method of decision making, unconstrained voluntary commitment, and Asian value respect of the national sovereignty. As a result, its architecture is complex but light. In any case, the regional architecture of the Asian region observed by ADB is characterized by emphasizing central government, smaller role of civil society, elasticity, informality and gradual progress. But it is bound to paying more attention to Asian characteristics of “fitness” between the design philosophy (architecture) of the reproduction process of various functions in the region, and the organizational capabilities of each actor as an integration driver in specific places.

Regarding EU macro regions, Gänzle and Wulf (2014) have developed the concept of the EU macro regional governance architecture, but the concept is not specified. Gänzle and Wulf think that EUMRS governance architecture is incorporated into the current structure of the EU governance that closely links the level of strategy, operation and implementation, because of so-called three Nos (no new institutions, no new legislations, no new funding). It is subsumed not only through the institutions, member states, partner countries, international organizations, subordinate national authorities, private actors, EU HLG, but also networks of NCPs, PA Focal points, PACs and HALs. Gänzle and Kern (2016) claim that this (EUSBSR’s governance) architecture now provides a common basis for cooperation and implementation of the Strategy through the institutionalization of new forms of multi-sector, multi-actor, multilevel coordination and cooperation (p.139). This explanation comes closer to the concept of AR, but it is still an expression of something like expanded EU multilevel governance. Here, it seems that the regional architecture is inclined to explore ways of interacting with various actors of various functions at various levels, and this regional architectural understanding developed in the EU has come a step short of ART.

Six Characteristics of the Architecture of Regions

Reviewing the above discussions of regional architecture, let us enter the consideration characterizing ART, which are summarized as follows:

(1) What we must confirm for a start is the media that the design information of the region is transferred onto. In the case of a manufacturing industry (e.g. automobile) it is a durable and tangible material (e.g. steel plate in the case of a car), while in the case of a service industry it is non-durable and intangible things. However, in the case of AR the media is a combination of nature itself, regional infrastructures and regional institutions. It is equivalent to a mixture of tangible and intangible things, and a mixture of durable and non-durable things. This mixture makes the transcription of the design information of one region far more difficult and beyond our imaginations. This difficulty does not mean any change of the fundamental principle of ART, but means modification, mutation, revision and imitation of the original AR. In the case of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, the media are the Danube River Basin. It is characteristic as well that the media themselves are greatly path-dependent.

(2) There are two major differences between the architecture of product/production and AR. One difference is the following; in the former case, first, the function of product is multilayered from a simple function to a comprehensive/inclusive one. Second, the structure of product is made up of parts, components, and module groups with artificial feature. Third, the designers of the architecture of the product/production are outsiders of product/production process. Whereas, in the latter case, first, the function of region is located vertically and horizontally. Second, the structure of the region is made up of actors who consciously or unconsciously participate in (re)generating and (re)forming the region; in the bottom layer of the borderland live local habitants/citizens, and work municipalities, NGOs, while the top layer is occupied by the EU institutions, member state institutions. The structure is divided into 3 layers (EU - state – region/local). And third, designers of regional philosophy, idea, identity, structure and policy in AR, generally, are almost insiders. The designers and actors are likely to be the same person and/or embedded together in the same regional life, and therefore both get into the regional policy-decision process. This point is decisively different, meaning that its identity and idea become recursively reproduced and more importantly in the case of AR.

The second difference is that in the latter case the flow of funds or money is accompanied by actors, institutions and functions, while in the former there is no flow of funds directly, accompanied by a flow of design information. The flow of funds makes AR more complicated. However not introducing the single currency system like the Euro, but multi-currency system into AR could radically change the design information concerning one specific area.

(3) Let us look at the inside of AR in more details (see Figure 1). AR expresses the hierarchical system of functions of region or actors respectively like an opened dried fish. The left-side triangle of Figure 1 expresses the hierarchical structure of the functions of region; the capital letter <F> expresses the function to realize the overall comprehensive function and goal of the region; in the lower layer, small letter <f> expresses the micro function (production, safety, electricity, welfare, medical care, education, tourism, public service, etc.) in the region. The right-side triangle of the Figure 1 expresses the hierarchical structure of the actors making up the region, with the capital letters <A> and <An> being the EU (institutions) and the central state (institutions), and the lower small letter <a> being the regional micro actor (individuals, consumers, local governments, NGOs, local enterprises and hospital, etc). It represents the actor’s aspect of regional governance. Figure 1 includes the lines (interfaces) horizontally and crossly linking functions <fn> and actors <an> only in the lowest layer. The line showing the interface between capital letters <Fn> and<An> is omitted technically.

1. Figure 1: Architecture of Region: Integral type

Source: Author’s making

In contrast to Kojimoto (2014) showing that the 1st type of actor (EU, national, local government) expresses the area, and the 2nd type of actor (chambers of commerce, fishery cooperatives, company) expresses the function, while the 3rd type of actor (environmental and various NGOs) represents the issue, ART shows us that each actor has its own domain of area, function and issue, but each function is separated from each actor. The area can be understood as a spatial aggregate of the connected various functions. The meaning and significance of areas and issues would vary depending on the environments surrounding AR as well as interpretation of the environments by various actors.

(4) This architecture of region can be largely categorized into the two model types: One is a so called integral type (Figure 1); that is, this model type has deeply mutual and complicated coordination in not only adjustment between functions (F, Fns, fs), and adjustment between actors (A, Ans, as), but also correspondence of cross relationship between each function and each actor (ex. not only Fn2 to an2, fa5 to an5, but also Fn3 to An2, fn3 to an5 and so on). This interface is more complicated.

On the contrary, the other is a so called modular type (Figure 2); that is, in this type, the interfaces between functions and actors are simple, and, at the same time, the connection between each function and each actor is straightforward. What is very important in this modular model type is not mutual coordination, but organizational capabilities of actors and their management over operation and implementation of functions. It seems to be a way of thinking like MLG. Figure 2 shows the modular architecture type of region.

1. Figure 2: Architecture of Region: Modular type

Source: Author’s making

(5) With ART clarified so far, let us immediately to notice the following: Regions are, originally, and complicatedly intertwined with various functions and actors, and many functions and many actors have complicated relationships between one another within these regions. In this regard regions with rich abundance and high productivity can be thought to intrinsically become an integral architecture type. However, when an integral architecture type of region with different national characteristics meets together with another across national borders, a possibility that enormous unimaginable complexity of integral architecture types will emerge. This would let cross-border cooperation and transnational territorial cooperation down into an extreme uncertainty and difficulty.

The emergence of the EU single market does not automatically guarantee simplification of this complicated architecture of region in the cross-border area. Whereas, on the contrary, there are possible cases where underdeveloped regions do not have functions such as f1, f2, f3 in the local authorities. On the other hand, what is a modular architecture type of region? There has been no such research about this topic, but the concept of modular regionalism exits; Gardini (2013) defines Latin American regionalism as a modular regionalism, because Latin American regionalism is in a “salad bowl” state, which means it is difficult to manage and unravel regions in Latin America.

The above consideration and discussion expressing the “salad bowl” state of regions as a modular type makes us feel a little awkward in some ways. However, Gardini (2013) explains that modular regionalism is extremely low in degree of commitment and compliance, and the state selects the members in charge of developing specific regional integration projects, reflecting the priority of national interests and its foreign policy in specific areas. The above explanation makes it possible to interpret modular regionalism as follows; regional integration where the actors designated by the state and the interfaces where the actors can connect with one another can work and operate on a low level in specific areas could be considered as a modular type. ART claims that it is impossible to limit the role of actors only to the state. We can understand it is a modular architecture type wherein the interface between each actor, the interface between functions, and the interface between each actor and each function interact simply in a one-to-one manner.

EGTC would give us one example of the modular architecture type of region. EGTC is the organization with a corporate status, established between national borders, but based on laws in either nation. It has its own asset, budget, and employs staff as a contract authority and a litigation one. It can implement cross-border cooperation programs for strengthening economic, social and territorial cohesion. Its major fields of activities consist of regional and economic policies such as tourism, environmental issues and so on, in the case of Eastern new EU member countries. On the contrary, in the case of the EU core countries, the major fields of activities are rather focused on planning and urban development (culture, sports, education) etc. Although Soós, (2015) insists that EGTC is a laboratory of MLG, EGTC has a strong orientation to transformation from the integral AR to the modular AR in a sense that the EGTC organization can arrange complicated and various interfaces in a simpler and more visible manner.

(6) What kinds of changes are made to Figure 1 when observing the EUMRS from the perspective of ART? Given the so-called three Nos and three Yeses, it does not give birth to a new layer of actors in the right triangle side of this architecture diagram (the structure of the region, the connection between actors). Meanwhile, it is natural to think that if the EUMRS coordinates the local-regional-national-EU policies, aligns the funds on a respective level, extends the platform of cooperation, raises each policy level, and ultimately adjusts linkages between the policy level and the operational level led by the EU or from below, then a new functional space will be born between <F> and <Fn>, that is, between the EU and the national states. This is equivalent to the unique “space” Kojimoto claims.

Paradigm Shift of Regional Policy and a Lucky Break

We explained the basic features of the AR over six points above, but elucidation of the relationships between the AR, the EUMRS and the EGTC would be further required. Understanding the paradigm shift of the EU regional policy could give us an important key to access the relationships. The paradigm shifts in the same period of the latter half of the 2000s provided us with innovative means/tools for shaping the ideas of and implementing the EUMRS and the EGTC as a part of the EU regional policy. The Barca Report (Barca 2009) reveals accurately the core of its transformation. According to Barca (2009), the aim of the paradigm shift in the EU regional policy lies in withdrawal from the regional policy as a fiscal redistribution policy. It claims that a space, called as “place”, where the regional policy is implemented, should actively intervene with the relevant regional policy to control both market and government failures, raise the long-term low level of utilization (inefficiency) of the regional latent potentials, and decrease social exclusion in the region. In this case “place” is also called a functional region.

The method and means are recognized as looking at encountered problems in a regional context, revealing and consolidating local information and preferences, and finally supplying local public goods and services in a bundle. In this way, rejecting top-down, uniformly applied and one-size-fits-all regional policies, Barca calls the approach to pile regional policies up from the bottom as a place-based approach/strategy. He uses the term “place” in order to avoid confusion with the capital letter “R”, Region, and the smaller letter “r”, region. This is the same paradigm shift as the OECD regional development policy theory that was converted recently (OECD 2009). In summary, it is aimed at forming a bottom-up type of AR.

The final question, then, is concerning what concrete factors made this paradigm shift and the emergence of AR successful in the second half of the 21st century. It is thought that the following three historical conditions and factors were involved in this story of the shift: First, as is mentioned in the section 1, the Treaty of Lisbon’s objective required innovation of the existing territorial dimension in the EU policymaking and its implementation. Second, both the EU’s and the EU member states’ budgets, constrained especially after the 2008 global financial economic crisis, have limited budgetary and economic resources to develop macro-regions in the peripheral areas. And third, the EU enlargement toward the more peripheral areas led to both increasing heterogeneity of the regions and interdependencies among them. They seem to be lucky breaks for the emergence of AR.

Conclusions

Finally, let us move to the conclusion without summarizing the above. The architecture of region theory is successful in constructing a fundamental theoretical framework to explain the nature of the EU macro region strategy (EUMRS) and the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), revealing that many of the EGTC, aimed at providing rather monothematic policies and programs, and public goods & services, produce a possibility for the simpler structure to support coordination among activities of MRS along the border line. According to Böhme (2013; 12), informal arguments tells that it would be attractive for the EGTC to become a simple organization to implement MRS programs, but this idea is against the three Nos principles. However, the EGTC seems to try to embed a modular architecture type of region with simpler interfaces between the micro regions in the borderland. Considering synchronously both the EUMRS and the EGTC from the viewpoint of ART, the EU regional policy is making unique efforts to create a space suitable for the next generation of European integration by arranging a micro modular architecture type of region at the bottom of territorial structure of European borderland and a macro integral AR at the top. The EUMRS, which has been separated from and grown out of micro cross-border cooperation, is taking an evolutionary way by subsuming its mother’s womb.

References

Asian Development Bank.（2010): Institutions for Regional Integration: Toward an Asian Economic Community, ADB

Barca, F. (2009): An Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy: A place-based approach to meeting European Union challenges and expectations. Independent Report prepared at the request of Danuta Hübner, Commissioner for Regional Policy

Biermann, F., Pattberg, P., Asselt, v. H., Zelli, F. (2009): The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis. Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp.14-40.

Böhme, K. (2013): Added Value of Macro Regional Strategies: a Governance Perspective. Spatial Foresight Brief, 2013:3, Luxembourg. http://spatialforesight.lu/tl_files/files/editors/dokumente/Brief-2013-3-130710.pdf

European Committee of the Regions, (2017): EGTC Monitoring Report 2016 and impacts of Schengen area crisis on the work of EGTCs. https://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/ressources/Documents/EGTCmonitoringreport_2016.pdf

Fujimoto, T. (2003): Competition for capabilities construction. Chukoshinsho (in Japanese, hereinafter abbreviated as IJ)

Fujimoto, T.（2007）Studies of Monodzukuri management, Chukoshinsho (IJ)

Gänzle, S. — Wulf, J. (2014): The Emerging Core of the EU’s Macro-Regional Governance Architecture. ISL Working Paper 2014:1, Department of Political Science and Management, University of Agder, Kristiansand

Gänzle S. — Kern, K. (2016): The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. In: Gänzle S. — Kern, K. (eds.): A ‘Macro-regional’ Europe in the Making. Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence. Palgrave, London, pp. 123-144.

Gardini, G. L. (2013): The added value of the Pacific Alliance and ‘modular regionalism’ in Latin America. June 25, The London School of Economics and Political Science, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2013/06/the-added-value-of-the-pacific-alliance-and-modular-regionalism-in-latin-america/

Hashimoto, T. — Nishibe, M. (2017): Theoretical Model of Institutional Ecosystems and its Economic Implications. Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Vol. 14. No. 1, pp. 1-27.

Hasumi, Yu. (eds.) (2009): The EU enlargement and the starting of the Baltic economic zone, Showado (IJ)

Hu, R. W. (2009): Building Asia Pacific Regional Architecture: The Challenge of Hybrid regionalism. July 14, Brookings Institution Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies

Kojimoto，H. (2014): Macro Regions in the EU: Comparative Studies of Spatial Planning in the North Sea Region and the Baltic Sea Region, Keisoshobo (IJ)

Nolte, D. (2014): Latin America’s New Regional Architecture: A Cooperative or Segmented Regional Governance Complex? RSCAS Working Paper 2014/89, European University Institute, Fiesole

OECD, (2009): OECD Regions at a Glance 2009. OECD, Paris

Shimizu, K. (2017): History of European territorial cooperation and its new axis. In: Yagi K., Shimizu, K., Tokumaru, N. (eds.): European integration and social-economic innovation. Nihonkeizaihyouronsha (IJ)

Soós, E. (2015): Contribution of EGTCs to multilevel governance. http://egpa.iias-iisa.org/wp-content/uploads/020_SO%C3%93S-Contribution_of_EGTCs_to_Multilevel_Governance-213PSGXIV.pdf

Tanaka, H. (2009): European integration and Euroregion: the third stage of Cross-border cooperation. In: Shinoda, T., Nishiguch, K., Matsushita, K. (eds.): Globalization vs. Regionalization. Ochanomizushobo, (IJ), pp.227-248.

Tanaka, H.（2013): The EU Macro Regional Strategy: the case study of Danube macro region, Risumeikan International Affair, October 2013, pp.1-24 (IJ)

Tanaka, H. (2017): The EU macro regional strategy: from the viewpoint of the architecture of region. In: Yagi K., Shimizu, K., Tokumaru, N. (eds.): European integration and social-economic innovation, Nihonkeizaihyouronsha (IJ)

Wakamori F., Yagi, K., Shimizu K., Nagao, S. (eds.) (2007): The Territorial Dimension of the EU economic integration: the forefront of cross-border cooperation, Minerva-shobo (IJ)

Interdependence – an Obsolete Concept?

James W. Scott

University of Eastern Finland, Karelian Institute

james.scott@uef.fi

As far as many of us can remember, internationalism and the emergence of a global consciousness have been self-evident realities. The Cold War, environmentalism, the “oil crisis” and, then, the dramatic collapse of East-West confrontation all made us aware of just how interconnected our national societies and communities are. To think globally, and holistically, was logical. It just made sense.

For those of us who study International Relations, borders, conflict resolution and matters related to security, there seems no way of escaping the reality of mutual reliance in an interdependent world. And yet, what we now see in the world, and read in social media, among other places, is an increasing denial of interdependence, as if we could just shut out the noise from the outside world and get on with our everyday lives. What many appear to desire, in other words, is independence, not interdependence.

Why is this? Why this dramatic shift in focus? And how could it affect us? The GLASE consortium (www.glase.fi), funded by the Academy of Finland’s Strategic Research Council, is addressing this and other questions regarding security in the contemporary world. As GLASE seeks to better understand the interrelated nature of local, national and global security, the move to a more insular view seems at first glance counter-intuitive. But we can find reasons for it in a wider globalization backlash which involves fear of a loss of local control and domination by transnational economic interests. In addition, as Paul Arbair forcefully argues, we are facing a crisis of complexity, in which a desire for clear and decisive action based on simple solutions has complicated political debate. This helps explain the “Brexit” referendum, Donald Trump’s surprising electoral victory as well as increasing populist sentiment within the EU.

Turning away from interdependence may have major consequences for security, both locally and more globally. For example, without global action, the repercussions of a deteriorating environmental situation many threaten the stability of many states: drought, flooding and rising sea levels could translate into more forced migration and regional conflict. While emerging countries are certainly more vulnerable, Europe and North America will not be shielded, even by higher walls or border fences. Furthermore, the industrialised countries are facing unprecedented economic challenges. Many of the promises of job creation, e.g. through protecting local markets, simply cannot be kept, and popular frustration over decreasing material security could play into the hands of authoritarian leaders.

For this reason, a major security threat lies in the institutionalisation of culturalist and nationalist reactions to globalization. In national conservative circles particularly, internationalism and globalisation are seen as threats to cultural diversity, drivers of a global monoculture that is wiping out diversity rather than increasing it (see Deneen 2009). This view of the world (and diversity) is founded on an identitarian (neo-Herderian!) and highly distorted ideal of the world as composed of countess cultural monocultures and clearly bounded, and often incompatible, cultural spaces. For example, both European and national identity are understood as organic and primordial rather than constructed. Identity is destiny rather than choice. In addition, much quasi-identitarian, national-conservative sentiment closely associates Christian faith with cultural concepts of Europe. Historical experience, including the emergence and spread of Christendom, but also the common experience of the Enlightenment define what is, what is not, and what can never be Europe.

National identity and patriotism are not by definition negative sentiments. However, nationalism becomes a problem when, exacerbated by socio-economic stress and geopolitical instability, it results in obscurantism, identitary bordering and an aggravated accentuation of perceived difference between people, cultures and states. Revanchism, therefore, is anything but benign and, at heart, revanchist identity politics are anti-democratic and authoritarian. To quote O’Meara (2013: 168), a follower of identitary ideas who does not cloak his opinions in mainstream conservatism, by the ‘democratic levelling of liberalism’ that ‘suppresses very healthy expressions of authority and superiority’ and that robs national societies of the ‘the collective liberty of a people of nation to pursue its destiny as it took cultural, historical and biological form rather than merely economical.’

Political xenophobia needs to be understood in political terms and within this context, the concept of ontological security (Rumelili 2015) is particularly salient, as it emphasizes aspects of national identity that are prone to radicalization as well as equates bordering processes to securitization. The revanchist link between identitary bordering and ontological security involves an amplified insistence on the ethics of the particular – ‘a metaphysical struggle for the meaning of space and locality’, to quote Drenthen (2010, 323). Nationalist populism has achieved a degree of commonsense status through threat scenarios of terrorism, increasing social burdens, and islamophobia as well as a general dislike of the European Union. In terms of extreme geographies, it engenders and justifies practices of everyday border-making that transform individuals and groups into ‘security subjects’ merely on the base of personal traits. Securitization is the process by which specific issues, phenomena and/or groups are framed in terms of security (see Waever 1995, Balzacq 2005). However, states and state-like institutions have no monopoly here; one of the most salient and potentially problematic aspects of securitization is the framing of threat in ways that emphasize national and cultural uniqueness in everyday terms (Larsen et. al. 2009) and through the appropriation of ‘popular geopolitics’ that emphasise cultural clashes and outright religious wars. (Shim 2016, Williams and Boyce 2013).

In conclusion, the consequences of weakened democracy could in fact be dire. In a rather alarming tone in an article in the Guardian George Monbiot of the Guardian writes: “Eventually the anger that cannot be assuaged through policy will be turned outwards, towards other nations (…) I now believe that we will see war between the major powers within my lifetime.” Alternative scenarios to increasing conflict require an honest political debate about the global impacts of local action and the commitments and responsibilities that we share. Independence, if understood as greater citizen participation, democracy, inclusion and capacity-building could in fact be a vital resource. However, denial of mutual reliance and reluctance to engage in common action will have higher social, economic and environmental costs that we perhaps presently imagine.

References

Arbair, P. (2016): #Brexit, the populist surge and the crisis of complexity, July 5, https://paularbair.wordpress.com/2016/07/05/brexit-the-populist-surge-and-the-crisis-of-complexity/ (Accessed: 06.2017)

Balzacq, T. (2005): The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context. European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 365-386.

Deneen, P. (2009): How a Culture Dies, December 3, https://www.onfaith.co/onfaith/2009/12/03/the-death-of-cultures/3512 (Accessed: 04.2017)

Drenthen, M. (2010): NIMBY and the ethics of the particular. Ethics, Place and Environment, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 321-323.

Larsen, K.S., Krumov, K., Le, H.V., Ommundsen, R., Veer, K.V.D. (2009): Threat Perception and Attitudes toward Documented and Undocumented Immigrants in the United States: Framing the Debate and Conflict Resolution. European Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 115-134.

Mitchell, J. (2017): A Renewed Republican Party. American Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 7-30.

Monbiot, G. (2016): Trump’s climate denial is just one of the forces that point towards war, The Guardian, November 23, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/23/donald-trump-climate-change-war?INTCMP=sfl (Accessed: 06.2017)

O’Meara, M. (2013): New Culture, New Right: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe. Arktos, London

Rumelili, B. (2015): Identity and Desecuritisation: The Pitfalls of Conflating Ontological and Physical Security. Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 52-74.

Shim, D. (2016): Between the International and the Everyday: Geopolitics and Imaginaries of Home. International Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 597-613.

Reviews

Teodor Gyelnik

Central European Service for Cross-Border Initiatives (CESCI)

teodor.gyelnik@cesci-net.eu

Hynek Böhm and Emil Drápela – Cross-border cooperation as a reconciliation tool: Example from the East Czech-Polish borders. Regional & Federal Studies, Vol. 27. Issue 3, pp. 305-319.

Hynek Böhm and Emil Drápela offer an interesting reading of cross-border cooperation in their analysis which was published in Regional & Federal Studies in 2017. Main aim of their paper was to investigate the Czech-Polish Euroregion Tesin/Cieszyn Silesia and the utilization of cross-border cooperation as a secondary foreign policy in order to promote peacekeeping, reconciliation and mutual understanding between the two nations of the region.

The authors identified the following hypothesis, “secondary foreign policy of NCGs1 and NGOs[2] of Euroregion Tesin/Cieszyn Silesia is mainly done via EU-funded cross-border co-operation. This has a reconciliation function because it helps to establish functional relationships and partnerships and diminishes significantly potentially negative perception of neighbours.” Simply, the article investigates whether the Euroegion Tesin/Cieszyn Silesia acts as a tool of reconciliation or not.

Understanding of cross-border cooperation as a secondary foreign policy is highly important because the process of cross-border interactions links those borders of the European continent which were the scenes of armed conflicts and fights, thus nations and border areas are loaded with historical traumas and troubled past. To be more specific, the Czech-Polish border with its extension of 800 km^2 became a subject of conflict between Poland and Czechoslovakia after the First World War, in 1919. The scene of conflict that happened in 1919 is almost identical with the geographical structure of the Euroregion Těšínské Slezsko/Śląsk Cieszyński, hence covering historical pain and distress by cross-border interactions and cooperation. Moreover, the border changes promoted that substantial Polish minority lives on the Czech part of this region, i.e. around 20% of the population declares their Polish nationality and they use Polish language as their mother tongue.

In the article, the authors identified and understood cross-border cooperation as a specific form of secondary foreign policy. This secondary foreign policy is implemented by local and regional actors, and it helps to overcome historical burdens and barriers that were generated by the troubled past deeds, by the border structures and through their changes and post-wart effects. Cross-border cooperation has been successfully utilized as a reconciliation tool and as a secondary foreign policy in the Western part of the European continent since the 50s of the 20th century, i.e. it significantly supported the German and French settlement after the Second World War, hence strengthening the progress of European integration. Nevertheless, interactions in Central Europe were limited before the fall of the socialist regimes; subsequently, organized and institutional cross-border interactions and cooperation were introduced in the 90s, when the socialist regimes were substituted by democratic and parliamentary political systems. However, it is important to mention that the separated Polish families maintained contacts across the Czechoslovak – Polish borders and they met even during the communist period.

Interesting fact is that the Czech-German and Polish-German cooperation supported historical reconciliation and settlement, but this reconciliation attempt was neither transmitted into the Czech-Polish cross-border cooperation nor into the national policies supporting Czech-Polish cooperation. Lack of this reconciliation within the Czech and Polish relations may be partly explained by the post-Cold War developments in Central Europe, namely the Czech Republic and Poland implemented close cooperation in order to fulfil the integration tasks either to the western military structures, like NATO, or to western political structures, like the European Communities. What is more, both Poland and the Czech Republic were the founding members of the Visegrád Group, together with Hungary, in 1991. Subsequently, it seemed that these countries cooperated smoothly and there was no need to insert reconciliation into the cross-border cooperation domains.

The first steps of cooperation were done by the local authorities of Polish Cieszyn and Czech Český Těšín, and their successful cooperation triggered further activities and interactions. Subsequently, the Tesin/Cieszyn Silesia Euroregion was established which cover around 1400 km^2 with 630 000 inhabitants, from which 360 000 live in the Czech part, while the remaining 270 000 in the Polish part of the region. Cross-border cooperation of the Euroregion were mainly clustered around the field of culture, sport and passenger traffic that supported non-investment and people-to-people projects; nevertheless, the topics of reconciliation, history and/or peacebuilding were significantly left out from the agreement, thus cooperation of the partners only slightly touched the problematic, burdened and difficult areas between the two European nations. Consequently, cross-border projects which worked with historical topics were rare. Moreover, majority of those projects that worked with history concentrated on unburdened historical periods, like the periods of the Second World War and/or Communism, mainly because there was no principal difference between the Czechs and the Poles during these periods. Nonetheless, these historical periods bypass the troubled and more sensitive topics that would need to be solved.

Totally, 16 projects were identified which dealt with historical topics, but none of them was proposed by participating municipalities and non-central governments. That means non-governmental organizations played a major role in promoting and submitting controversial historical topics. The authors interpret this behaviour (p. 9) of municipalities and non-central government that they did not want to open ‘Pandora’s box’ of nationalist topics and issues. That means local municipalities were afraid of negative media attention, which could have been attracted by burdened historical topics; local municipalities were afraid that troubled historical themes could enrage the inhabitants of the region, thus turning public opinion against the elected local leaders; and local municipalities did not want to risk and jeopardize the contours of cross-border cooperation. However, NGOs were not under the stress of negative publicity by the media, they did not fear of losing sympathy and they were financed by external funding, mainly from the EU, hence NGOs were the actors which tended to open and submit the controversial historical topics.

Totally six controversial topics were submitted, but interesting is that five of them were done by the Polish minority organizations from the Czech Republic in cooperation with their Polish partners, and the projects were implemented. Simply, those projects which highlighted troubled and controversial histories pushed both partners out of their comfort zone and they had to work with very hard and sensitive topics. The interviewed experts underlined that the most controversial project was with the title, ‘Zaolzie Region Now’. This project was submitted by the Polish minority in the Czech Republic. The biggest disagreement between the two nations was generated by a map of the Zaolzie region, which was an outcome of the project. This map visualized the region through a historical context during the period of Polish occupation after the Munich Treaty in 1938. The main disagreement between the partners was the fact that the prepared map missed the Czech names of the municipalities of the borderland area. On the other side, there was only one controversial project from the Czech side that attempted to create a Museum of Military History of Tesin/Cieszyn Silesia, but the project was not implemented and it was withdrew with the aim to avoid disagreements and further controversies.

In other words, the number of submitted controversial projects was very low and it was only around 2 percent from the total cross-border cooperating projects. This means that the project promoters do not keen on putting forward controversies and troubled projects. Subsequently, cross-border activities of the Euroregion Tesin/Cieszyn Silesia do not really fulfil the functions of secondary foreign policy since non-central governments are not interested in focusing on mutual reconciliation. Moreover, the non-importance of reconciliation within the frames of cross-border cooperation was confirmed by the interviewees, too. The interviewees expressed that they had not thought that cross-border cooperation of the Euroregion was equipped with any reconciliation role and task.

To conclude, peacekeeping and reconciliation of troubled past do not figure as principal and crucial motivations of the secondary foreign policy within the Euroregion. Subsequently, peacekeeping and reconciliation of cross-border cooperation rather appear only as a resulting side-effect of interactions, i.e. cooperation and search for common solutions, promoted by the EU funds, successfully helped to deconstruct the negative image about the neighbours in the Euroregion. However, the studied region still has two substantially different histories, namely one history from Polish perspectives and one history from Czech perspectives, and cross-border interactions have not altered this dual reading of history.

Jarosław Jańczak (2017): Town Twinning in Europe. Understanding Manifestations and Strategies. Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 32. Issue 4, pp. 477-495.

Jarosław Jańczak offers a thorough analysis and reading about town-twinning processes in the European continent. The paper was published in the Journal of Borderlands Studies in 2017. The author categorizes various schemes of town-twinning cooperation and its empirical development. The analyses was built on primary and secondary literature and on semi-structured interviews with the actors who were involved within the town-twinning cross-border cooperation.

First of all, it is important to underline that the phenomenon of town-twinning existed also before the European integration, hence it is not the integration itself which has created it. That means twinning cooperation was part of the interwar period development as a specific reaction and response to new divisions that were created by the World War. Nevertheless, the European integration process and dynamics, which were powerfully triggered after the Second World War, have successfully absorbed and incorporated this form of cross-border cooperation, but without making town-twinning process as a formal part of the integration itself.

Town twinning is profoundly time and place specific activity and it involves flexible forms of cooperation, hence strict and broad generalizations might miss important elements and features of this form of cross-border interactions. In other words, the main European integration theories, like neo-functionalism, constructivism and/or inter-governmentalism are unable to fully grasp and explain the tendencies that appear around town twinning phenomenon. They mainly concentrate on state-structures, values, norms and behaviour, thus they tend to be general, state oriented and they apply too distant approaches which cannot functionally explain town-twinning. These grand-theories unwittingly ignore important elements and aspects of town twinning and they do not represent the most appropriate theoretical approaches and explanations for understanding of the twinning. Consequently, it can be expressed that the direct link between the grand integration theories and town twinning cross-border cooperation needs to be profoundly improved and developed.

The author gives two important and open questions (p. 478-479) relating to the phenomenon of town twinning cooperation, “why do towns integrate across borders, and how does it happen?” Subsequently, the article explores the tendencies and processes that surround this form of cross-border interaction.

At the beginning of the study, the author gives a brief and succinct picture that notable terminological chaos is present in the domain of town-twinning. Several terminologies are applied in order to characterize and describe the process, like ‘connected cities’, ‘trans-border cities’, ‘partnership cities’, ‘double cities’, ‘twin cities’, ‘Euro cities’, ‘twin towns’, ‘border double towns’, ‘boundary twin towns’ and many other theoretical phrases are used. Hence, it can be seen that twin town cooperation is under intense terminological discussion. The most important feature of this cooperation is that town twinning cooperation always involves two parts, two border cities. Within the contemporary constellation of twin town cooperation, 24 twin town interactions can be identified, which include 48 towns, in Europe.

According to Jańczak, twinning cooperation might be understood in two different ways. First, town twinning is built on spatial-historical features, strongly fuelled by common origin and shared political, social and economic processes. In this case, twinning is understood as a specific result of border shifts and divisions/cutting of urban settlements into two parts. That means twinning allows that the divided cities partially might regain some aspects of their unity. Second, town twinning is generated through current inter-city relations that is supported by mutual cooperation, togetherness and shared orientation, hence cooperation between cities appears as certain strategy in order to overcome the separating character of borders. Subsequently, town twinning is principally generated by the existing borders, but cooperation does not need to be automatically built on the idea of shared history, language, culture and/or genes.

The author identifies six important and definable waves in the European history which deeply shaped and influenced the process of town twinning. The first wave is represented by the survivors of the medieval territorial order. Twin towns of this wave can be found on the Iberian Peninsula between Span and Portugal, i.e. Tui-Valença and Irún-Hendaye. The second wave resulted from the Napoleonic wars that divided the existing towns with new borders, e.g. Rhienfelden (Baden) – Rheinfelden (AG), Launfenburg (Baden) – Laufenburg (AG), Haparando – Tornio, etc. New borders after the First World War which deeply restructured the space and borders in the central part of Europe represent the third wave, i.e. České Velenice – Gmünd, Bad Radkersburg – Gornja Radgona, Komárno – Komárom, Štúrovo – Esztergom, etc. The Second World War continued the division of space and it triggered the fourth wave with cooperating cities like, Frankfurt (Oder) – Słubice, Guben – Gubin, Terespol – Brest, Görlitz – Zgorzelec and Gorizia – Nova Gorica. The fifth wave is the so called ‹connected towns› which resulted either from infrastructural projects or connections of towns on two sides of the borders, while the last and the latest wave is an outcome of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the resulting new borders of this process at the end of the 20th century. These six waves of twin towns show that cooperation mainly results from former territorial and military conflicts that redrafted the existing borders, putting people with same culture, history and language on two sides of political borders and political regimes. Moreover, these twin town waves clearly show an axis moving from the Western part of the continent, the Iberian Peninsula, towards East, Russia.

Moreover, the article contains a very interesting figure that portrays the model of border twin town’s creation. The model is structured around two basic axes. One axis contains the mode of behaviour of border creation and it moves from ‘peaceful coexistence legacy’ until ‘conflict legacy’, while the second axis indicates the ethnic structure between ‘ethnic homogeneity’ and ‘ethnic division’. Subsequently, the six waves of twin towns are put among these two axes (mode of behaviour and ethnic structure), thus presenting a constellation of their origin. The first two waves (survivors of the medieval territorial order and Napoleonic wars) of twin towns are visualized with relative peaceful coexistence and relative ethnic homogeneity; although, the second wave already confirms strong shift toward conflict legacy. The other two waves of twin towns were the outcome of World Wars, thus conflict legacy is powerfully dominant in their cases and at the same time they contain a strong shift towards ethnic diversity. The fifth and the sixth waves are partly different, the former is presented on the axis of peaceful coexistence legacy with strong ethnic diversity, while the latter indicates conflictual happenings and strong ethnic homogeneity.

In order to understand the town twinning phenomenon, the author looked at two different directions of cooperation, namely twinning cooperation as the result of top-down and bottom-up tendencies. The former involves a phenomenon when states employ the instrument of border twin towns in order to make friendship across the borders more visible and explicit. In this case, town twinning behaviour appears as so called ‘para-diplomacy’. In other words, twin town relations may be used to confirm good relations, thus alleviating the troubled past, “border twin towns are perfect locations for manifesting the new quality of the current situation” (p. 483). Moreover, border universities appear at this top-down level, too. Establishment of a university at the state borders might generate significant impacts within the cross-border area. Several examples may be found, like the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder) as result of the German-Polish reconciliation and cooperation; Collegium Polonicum in Słubice that was a result of academic cooperation between Germany and Poland; Angel Kanchev University in Ruse with Bulgarian-Romanian Interuniversity Europe Centre that is located in Giurgiu; and the Selye János University in the Slovakian city of Komárno that offers university teaching in Hungarian language. Simply, the top-down town twinning can be seen as specific tool of foreign policy which helps to overcome troubled past, thus promoting good neighbourhood relations.

The latter direction was the bottom up mode. It can be seen as a local answer and three distinguished models can be identified at this level. One is the so called ‘integration founders’. They are geographically located in the western part of the continent and they have been used to overcome historical burdens between two nations, hence they participate in the core of European relations. Examples of this mode is ‘Eurode’, established by Kerkrade and Herzogenrath in 1997 as the first Eurocity; Breisach as ‘Bridge to Europe’, Strasbourg as ‘Capital of Europe’, etc. Second mode is the ‘integration forerunners’ which implements cooperation at the borders that were created by a conflict. This group has been participating in the European project only recently, e.g. establishment of the ‘European Town’ by Görlitz and Zgorzelec; foundation of the ‘European Town of Gubin-Guben’ and/or the ‘Europe Place’ in Komárno. The third mode is the so called ‘good marriages’. This group collects those ones whose border relations are more peaceful and they do not have to put enormous energy to alleviate the historical troubles, like Baarle-Nassau and Baarle-Hertog that is claimed to be ‘one village, two communities, two nations’; ‘1 town, 2 states’ implemented by Valga and Valka and/or the cooperation between Tornio and Haparanda.

Other important and relevant factors also appear that may support or make cooperation harder. These factors include border regimes, like the Schengen internal space of the EU and external border; and ethnic, cultural homogeneity - heterogeneity. The Schengen area assures that the cooperating towns have access to political and financial resources which substantially support their cross-border cooperation. Although, if the cooperating twin towns are located on the external borders of the EU, it might deeply influence their abilities and resources that can be utilized in order to improve and develop cross-border interactions. Ethnic side also plays a key role within this process. Borders often separate people with common identity, culture and feelings, thus people with the same ‘cultural programming’ live on both sides of the border. Family, ethnic and cultural ties appear as strong and powerful basics which push the local authorities to develop twinning cooperation between two cities. Ethnic contacts are much deeper and they can easily overcome pure commercial contacts without any ethnic and identity linkages on both sides of the border. Subsequently, it can be expressed that the ethnic linkage seems to be the main motivating factor of cross-border town twinning interactions. An example can be given, cooperation between Terespol and Brest on an external Schengen border area, with ethnic diverse population, with low border infrastructure and strict border controls generate that the two communities maintain very low level of contacts; nevertheless, the cities of Narva and Ivangorod, which are located also on an external Schengen border, but they are inhabited by Russian speaking citizens, have strong social ties across the borders and they express strong feeling of togetherness.

The author claims that the most important aspects of town twinning are EU internal borders and ethnic homogeneity or mixture. That means the biggest support for twinning cooperation can be found among towns which are located within the EU internal border and where the cooperating towns are ethnically mixed and/or homogenous, e.g. in Gorizia – Nova Gorica, or Komárno – Komárom. Local authorities, NGOs and citizens are especially active within the cooperation of these cities. On the other side, the lowest cooperation activity can be found in those towns which are situated on the EU external border with ethnically separated population.

To conclude, the article gives a deep and thorough reading of town twinning phenomenon. It successfully presents the multidimensional and very complex structure of twinning process, covering historical establishment of relations from the Middle Ages until the disintegration of the Soviet Union; relations from peaceful coexistence until conflict legacy; and relations from ethnic homogeneity until ethnic diversity.

1 Non-central governments

2 Non-governmental organizations

Authors

Martin BARTHEL

University of Eastern Finland, Karelian Institute

martin.barthel@uef.fi

Teodor GYELNIK

Central European Service for Cross-Border Initiatives (CESCI)

teodor.gyelnik@cesci-net.eu

Virpi KAISTO

University of Eastern Finland, Karelian Institute

virpi.kaisto@uef.fi

Jussi P. LAINE

University of Eastern Finland, Karelian Institute

Jussi.laine@uef.fi

James W. SCOTT

University of Eastern Finland, Karelian Institute

james.scott@uef.fi

Fulgêncio Lucas SEDA

Police Sciences Academy (ACIPOL)

lucas_seda@yahoo.co.uk

Polona SITAR

Institute of Culture and Memory Studies, Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts

polona.sitar@zrc-sazu.si

Hiroshi TANAKA

Ritsumeikan University, School of Economics

hirotana@ec.ritsumei.ac.jp

Zs. Bottlik - T. Gyelník - Gy. Ocskay (eds) (2017):

Changes in the representation of a borderscape.

The case of the Mária Valéria bridge

At the end of 2017 CESCI published a book of studies with theoretical idea of ‘phantom borders’ in the focus. The idea, having been introduced in the domain of border studies in the 2010’s, means (intra)European borders are mainly permeable and porous, but limitations hindering cross-border cooperation are still present.

In cooperation of the European Institution and the planning department of CESCI, and called upon by the Europa Regional, the journal of Leibniz Institution in Leipzig, an abstract was submitted back in 2014 on a cross-border mental mapping research, which was approved by the editors. Whilst preparing the study, it became clear that the accepted topic (Changes in the space usage of people living in the region centred around Esztergom-Štúrovo due to the opening of the Mária Valéria bridge) requires a more extended research than anticipated. This is why we decided to publish our results based on a broader study, regardless of the call.

The case study area chosen for our research is criss-crossed by „natural” borders (rivers) although these borders were always overcome by continuous urban hinterlands and the spatial organization of society. Here, the disconnectedness of public sectors as well as the emergence of local cross-border agglomerations are experienced at the same time. The region, centred by the twin cities of Esztergom and Štúrovo at the Slovak - Hungarian border, having initially not been hindered by any administrative obstacles experienced numerous changes concerning the physical location of the border and the strengthening or even weakening of its dividing role in the course of the past century. Traditional coherence and the familiar feeling of separation are both implemented in the collective spatial knowledge of the population of this area. During the research, besides illustrating these historical aspects, the highest attention was paid to the examination of the most recent changes coming with the integration to Schengen.

To explore our study focus, we tried to gather authors with different orientation; consequently, several different research methods were utilized and applied, thus assuring a colourful and multidisciplinary research approach. To be specific, our edited book contains four different research approaches, including semi-structured interviews with the representatives of the local communities; quantitative study of traffic counting and questionnaires; mental mapping in two Slovakian and two Hungarian cities; and finally desk research with the study and critical reflection of the existing literature.

Available on the following link:

http://cesci-net.eu/phantom-borders-publication

Table of Contents

Y2017_0a_belso_cimlap

Y2017_0b_contents

Y2017_01_SCOTT_Editors_Note

Y2017_02_SCOTT_Globalisation

Y2017_03_LAINE_Ethics

Y2017_04_GYELNIK_Double_speed

Y2017_05_SITAR_Shopping_Yugoslavia

Y2017_06_BARTHEL_Border_Connectivtiy

Y2017_07_SEDA_Africa

Y2017_08_KAISTO_Concept_Neighborhood

Y2017_09_TANAKA_Regional_Architecture

Y2017_10_SCOTT_Commentary

Y2017_11_GYELNIK_Review

Y2017_12_authors

Y2017_13_publication