I.     INTRODUCTION

Editor’s Note

In keeping with the momentum already established by the European Institute of Esztergom in its 2014 Cross Border Review, this edition highlights a number of issues related to borders and cross-border cooperation (CBC) that shed light on Europe’s internal contradictions and tensions.  The last two years, but 2015 in particular, were times of hard bordering and re-bordering. Nevertheless, despite geopolitical tensions, cross-border cooperation was maintained by numerous stakeholders at the EU’s external borders. Since the beginning of the new Cohesion Policy programming period in 2014, several assessments of the impacts of EU support for CBC in Central and Eastern Europe point to a mixed picture. The conviction and commitment of local stakeholders, for example in the case of Czech, Hungarian and Polish CBC, remains unbroken, but institutional, structural and often attitudinal hurdles persist in ways that EU policy instruments have not been able to address

One feature in the year’s review is a closer look at the situation of EU-Russian cooperation contexts, which, in the words of Jarosław Jańczak resemble “forgotten borders” at the EU’s external neighbourhood. As cross-border relations between the European Union and post-Soviet states have evolved rapidly during the last two decades with cities, regions, states and civil society opening new avenues of communication with their neighbours. One major conditioning factor underlying this cooperation is the EU’s desire to assume a stabilizing but also transformative role in the Post-Soviet context. The European Neighbourhood Policy represents one of the main instruments of the EU’s ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’, the principal aim of which is to establish a greater regional context for economic growth and free trade, social modernization, political stability and security. This project, which includes the idea of Eastern Partnership (EaP) with Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and other states, exists in a nervous tension with the ambitious but troubled EU-Russia partnership. ENP, EaP as well as the EU-Russia “Common Spaces” are informed by discourses of ‘co-development’ and ‘mutual interdependence’ that are part of the ideational and visionary foundations of EU political community. However, with the refugee crisis and EU-Russia tensions it appears that the EU’s relations with its neighbours are increasingly characterized by a ‘hard territoriality’ that privileges security issues, border management and sovereignty. Concerns with undocumented migration, cross-border crime and terrorism as well as continuing visa restrictions on non-EU citizens could reinforce obstacles to co-operation, conjuring fears of an emerging ‘Fortress Europe’ that effectively divides the continent.

EU-Russian CBC is thus a litmus test of the possibilities and limits of local and regional initiative in developing closer cross-border ties across the EU’s external borders. Again, the remarkable ability of local actors to develop coping strategies despite an unfavourable geopolitical backdrop and limited EU resources indicated that the need for CBC is generally understood as more than mere ‘symbolic politics’.  Similarly, political, cultural and cognitive borders are broadly understood to be resources in the organization of everyday social relations. Another clear message that the 2015 Cross-Border Review is the fact that borders have ambivalent impacts. The ambivalent nature of borders stems, among other things, from difficulties in reconciling public life with the private sphere, and a simultaneous need for closure, openness and connectedness.

Despite European visions of open borders, Europe’s boundaries are in many ways markers of inequality, exclusion and, as such, symbols of unfairness. This is not simply a question of socio-economic disparity but one of recognition, acceptance, visibility and engagement. In their original understandings as a development platform, even when not always carried through in concrete implementation, regional and local cross-border cooperation was a political innovation in that it sought to create new communities of interest beyond traditional national orientations. This also involved debunking entrenched stereotypes and resentment between societies by promoting dialogue.

Fairness in cross-border cooperation thus, in our view, requires greater social understanding and engagement and contain elements of concrete development programmes. As part of successful future implementation, for example, it will be important to identify areas of social and cultural cooperation that: 1) resonate with local aspirations and local conceptualisations of policy priorities (e.g. in education, research, entrepreneurship, gender issues, health, linguistic rights, regional development), 2) promote partnerships between civil society organisations, public and private sector actors, the EU as well as other international organisations, 3) enhance everyday (e.g. educational, cultural, economic mobility) within the EU and between the EU and its neighbours and 4) serve the EU’s own primary interests in promoting stability, the rule of law and economic development. In sum, fairness requires resolve on the part of the EU to ‘even out’ a playing field that for historical, economic, geographic and other reasons is not even and will not be for generations to come. Access to the EU and the opportunities it offers should be a major incentive for both the EU and neighbouring states to engage in more substantial and meaningful regional cooperation.

What this edition contains---

James W. Scott

II.   THEORY

Metamorphosis of sovereignty and bareness in the post-1989 world politics

Teodor Gyelnik

Introduction

When Foucault offered a thorough analysis of ‘madness’, he was not interested in what madness means, but in how the changing understanding of madness has been altered over several times in history (Foucault 1988). The approach of this study is highly motivated by Foucauldian reading, hence the paper is not interested in questions: what does sovereignty mean, is there a decline of nation-state/modern sovereignty; but the research attention is directed toward the changing nature of sovereignty over times.

An intense debate has been evolving around the issue of sovereignty and its changes, countless articles and academic books are published about sovereignty (e.g. Derrida 2009; 2011; Hardt, Negri 2001; Jackson 2007; Bartelson 2014; Vaughan-Williams 2009; Bauman, Bordoni 2014; Agamben 1995; Foucault 1980; Agnew 2009). Diener and Hagan (2012) note, any change in the meaning and interpretation of sovereignty deeply transforms the landscape, too. Thus, if we want to understand contemporary border phenomena, which oscillate between ‘global flattening’, described by Friedman (2005), and between the new ‘renaissance of heavy borders’, either in Europe, brilliantly described by Matthew Carr (2012) or the barrier/border dichotomy between the ‘locals’ and the ‘globals’ (Blij 2009), it is equally important to look at other side of the coin, namely sovereignty.

In other words, the post-Cold War environment and shifts regarding sovereignty questions should be investigated in order to understand borders and their significance in the contemporary global context. What is immediately visible is that the post-1989 reading of sovereignty directly recalls a ‘historic return’ to ideas of deep inequality, conditions of colonialism and imperialism, and international phenomena such as trusteeship and/or tutelage. The common ground of the post-Cold War constellation of sovereignty and the colonial interpretation of sovereignty is the fact that both periods supported the idea of hierarchical construction and differentiation between full sovereignty on one side and gradated sovereignty on another side.

The main aim of this paper is to analyze transformations of sovereignty triggered by the geopolitical earthquake caused by the collapse of socialism, the disappearance of the USSR, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fast spread of liberal, market logics. Furthermore, weak and underdeveloped states started to collapse within the new global constellation, many of them were socially constructed as quasi-states (Inayatullah 1996; Doty 1996), and they have become the explicit representative of ‘contemporary pollution’ (Blaney, Inayatullah 2004); consequently, their sovereignty has been opened to narrative, discursive and theoretical change.

The study offers a qualitative approach based on desk research that scrutinises published articles/books regarding sovereignty after 1989 with the attempt to put them into a common analytical frame of ‘sovereignty change’. The paper is divided into 5 parts. The first part gives a brief general introduction into the issue of sovereignty; second part looks at the historical changes within the meaning of sovereignty; third part introduces the issue of endogenous inequality in the realm of sovereignty; fourth part analyses Giorgio Agamben, theory of exception with the aim to apply his theory on sovereignty within international politics; the last part of the paper attempts to demonstrate a bare/pornographised sovereignty in the post-1989 world.

Some general patterns about sovereignty

Sovereignty is a European concept introduced after the religious Thirty Years’ War. It established a specific international environment with the attributes of territorial sovereignty, commonly acknowledged as the ‘Westphalian state system’, where states are equal to each other, the state is the highest authority within its own territory and where other states cannot intervene into the domestic issues of other states. The establishment of sovereign power goes hand in hand with the establishment of clearly and explicitly identified borders, thus sovereignty and territory/border are the two sides of the same coin. Subsequently, this sovereignty was diffused to the rest of the world through colonialism and European imperial power and interests.

There are two principal readings of states and state sovereignty. The first are realist and liberal readings provide by Hans Morgenthau (1978) and Kenneth Waltz (1979) respectively. Both claim that the state is an independent agent in competition and potential conflict with other states. The analysis of sovereignty from their perspective is unimportant and misleading, sovereignty either exists or it does not as it. Challenges to such rationalist theories that assume sovereignty represents a ‘natural state’ has opened spaces for different interpretations, such as institutional or post-structural readings of sovereignty which claim that states and sovereignty need to be analysed in a much wider perspective since they are directly embedded within cultural frameworks (Strang 2006). State/sovereignty is not viewed as an independent agent of pure power, but as part of a much wider social structure. In this view, the state is an identity and an agent, while sovereignty is an institution and discourse, and both are in constant and permanent change. In other words, states are defined through claims of sovereignty while sovereignty is defined through interaction and practice. Hence, “neither state nor sovereignty should be assumed or taken as given, fixed, or immutable” (Biersteker, Weber 2006, 11). In this reading, borders and the meanings around the borders are not static, they are historically contingent with reflection on complex political, social and discursive frames. Consequently, the study claims that the notion of sovereignty is historically contingent and it aims to explore the changes after 1989. Next part of the paper looks at the historical changes of sovereignty during its history.

Sovereignty and historical contingency

One of the principal features of sovereignty is its character of ceaseless change, thus sovereignty is neither static, nor an unchangeable notion, but it has liquid character and it articulates itself in different ways in different historical periods (Hobson 2012; Biersteker, Weber 1996; Doty 1996; Inayatullah 1996; Bartelson 2014). It was not the change in the political philosophy which pushed for change in the meaning of sovereignty, but rather historical changes, various transformations in the European world system determined the alteration of sovereignty itself (Anghie 2004; Yannis 2002).

Unequal sovereignty between entities has been a norm rather than an exception within the international realm, in other words equality within the realm of sovereignty is rather an incident within the international legal order (Kingsbury 2002). ‘Unequal sovereign’ is a position where the Other is simply excluded, thus exclusion becomes the central pillar of the Western legal tradition (Hurrell 2008; Agamben 1995; 2005; Young 1991). Similar notions were articulated by Lévinas (cited by Vasey 2005), who claimed that Western philosophy suffers from ‘philosophical allergy’, namely, the West has been preoccupied with the horror of the Other and its position. This phenomenon of exclusiveness reached its highest stage with Hegel who in his ‘Philosophy of Right’ (§ 351) states: “the civilised nation is conscious that the rights of barbarians are unequal to its own and treats their autonomy as only a formality.” Subsequently, a list of legal scholars, such as Oppenheim or Westlake, started to build their theory about sovereignty on this exclusionist premise, legitimised exclusion and inequality. But Lorimer went the furthest, claiming that the world is divided between the inner civilised circle and the outsider states of criminals, the unchristian and imbecilic (Simpson 2004; Anghie 2006; Kingsbury 2002).

The first theoretician of sovereignty and international law is considered to be a Spanish Bishop, Francisco de Vitoria. He identified Spanish sovereignty in the context of intercourse with the American Indian population and societies. Sovereignty was narrated as a ‘sovereign’s right to wage war’ against those who breach natural law, like freedom to travel and/or freedom of commerce. This form of sovereignty established a doctrine of inequality and the idea of just wars (Todorov 2002). In other words, the Vitorian reading of sovereignty in relation to the Indian territory was narrated in two principal ways. First, the Indians, as entities excluded from the realm of sovereignty, while the Christians, as armoured with unlimited power of sovereignty through just/limitless war against the pagans. “Once the initial determination had been made and accepted that the colonial world was not sovereign, the discipline could then create for itself, and present as inevitable and natural, the grand redeeming project of bringing the marginalised into the realm of sovereignty, civilizing the uncivilised, and developing the juridical techniques and institutions necessary for this great mission.” (Anghie 2004, 30)

The rise of scientific-analytical readings of society and international law started to alter the interpretation of sovereignty from a religious/divine/naturalist reading, established by Vitoria and /or Sepúlveda, towards a different reading of sovereignty influenced by the concept of civilization and standards (Simpson 2004; Suzuki 2009; Gong 2002). This re-articulation happened when the Europeans subjugated the world and the colonised/coloniser dichotomy was established. Within this frame, only the European/coloniser could be attributed as sovereign because it was civilised and it fulfilled the Western standards of society, while the non-West/colonised was excluded from the sovereign realm with the pretence of barbarism and non-fulfilment of the universal standards. Simply, Europe became a subject of sovereignty and the non-Europe became an object of sovereignty, i.e. sovereignty meant power, authority, autonomy and prestige for Europe, while at the same time sovereignty meant the exact negation of power, authority, autonomy and prestige in the non-Western world.

Subsequently, a deep gradation of sovereignty and a three-way division of the world was introduced. Liberal interpretations allowed for an introduction of several different zones in the world with different sovereign capacities (Kingsbury 2002; Hobson 2012; 2006; Simpson 2004). The barbaric/savage areas were excluded and became subject to imperial sovereignty of Europe, targets of unequal treaties, targets of capitulations, targets of gunboat diplomacy and targets of massive legal harmonisation (Zarakol 2011; Ringmar 2013). The only way to acquire non-European sovereignty was the acceptance of total harmonisation and acceptance of western social order (Fidler 2000). Simply, non-European sovereignty was acquired at the moment when the non-European Self/identity/meaning/order was totally erased. This phenomenon directly reminds Kafka and his writing about the gatekeeper and the man in ‘Before the law’, “The man, who has equipped himself with many things for is journey, spends everything, no matter how valuable, to win over the gatekeeper. The latter takes it all.”

20th century pragmatism and the First World War altered positivist understandings of sovereignty into a more problem-oriented and economic reading, proposing an enlightened colonialism where the welfare of the colonised people was underlined. Subsequently, economic incentives and activities were emphasised within the concept of sovereignty, and colonies started to be seen/read through economic prism of labour and productivity. Thus, it was a period of gradated sovereignty overridden by economics and economic power.

World Wars, Holocaust and the brutal destruction of the European continent directly hit the colonial idea of superiority. West was challenged by several phenomena, like the Soviet Union, its socialist/communist thesis which clashed with the Western economic principles on meta-level; furthermore, decolonization, the Cuban revolution, the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the American defeat in Vietnam, independence of Ghana and/or establishment of the Bandung Conference all generated a ground for substantial criticism. Subsequently, the previous notion of sovereignty could not be maintained, hence it needed an epistemic change which accommodated itself to the expanded idea of self-definition. Namely, a conditional sovereignty was proposed where the newly independent states had to accept the existing legal rules. However, the appearance of multinational companies, which were often the descendants of the colonial companies, started to substantially undermine the issue of state sovereignty. Consequently, a new set of international law was introduced with deep respect of private property, in order to protect the risky private investments in the new independent sovereign states; although, the new legal settlement was outside of the municipal law of the state. In other words, sovereignty was reinterpreted with the reflection towards multinational companies that acquired international personality. The contract between a state and a company was characterised as a contract between legal partners, hence either the state was decreased to the level of company or a multinational company was increased into the level of a sovereign state. This change meant that the state lost its power to change the contract because of ‘pacta sunt sunservanda’, Anghie writes (2004, 233), “As a consequence, we return, then, to a situation where Western corporations operating in the developing world, like their predecessors, the East India company and other such trading companies, acquire a quasi-sovereign status.

In the nineteenth century, ‘sovereign’ corporations acquired sovereignty over native peoples by entering into treaties with them -- a practice which gave rise to the argument that these native entities were in some respect sovereign -- if only for the limited purposes of transferring their sovereignty to the corporation. Now, the reverse relationship was being enacted: the Third World state, by contracting with the corporation, was providing it with a quasi-sovereign status – which gave it significant powers, not least of which was an elevation of its status to the international plane.”

Nevertheless, the Cold War environment challenged the West, its colonial/imperialist policy on meta-level (e.g. Lazarus 2011; Jones 2007), generating a global order, where West was more constrained. This was an ‘incidental’ period, when the normative structure of sovereign equality was established through the new introduced system of law, like Nuremberg, which emphasised criminal responsibility of individuals rather than states; San Francisco conference, where states became the members of the United Nations; and The Declaration on Colonial Peoples, that underlined that inadequacy in educational, economic, social and/or political  realm cannot be used as a pretext of delayed independence (Simpson 2004). In other words, it was a time, when states appeared to be less explicitly unequal.

However, the changes at the end of the 20th century substantially altered the legal order and the reading/interpretation of sovereignty. An old ruling norm has returned where the essential equality of states, like right to exist, right to choose the way of existence and the right to be a full participant in the international realm were denied. All these rights of unique equality created a normative constraint on intervention into other states at any desire, but overcoming these constraints, a new liberal order has been established with its ‘anti-pluralist’ orientation, where the exclusion became the ‘normality’ (Simpson 2004); consequently, the late liberal world puts the outlaw states outside of legal reach, outside the constraint of law, hence establishing a frontier between inside and outside (Alvarez 2001). Bishai (2012, 207) aptly describes the phenomenon, “societies deemed to be outlaws might then be treated differently than the traditional entitlement to sovereign equality would require. They may be singled out for sanctions and forceful intervention in the name of protecting the liberal and decent segment of international society.” Following this discussion of changes within the meaning of sovereignty during its history, the next part looks at the issue of endogenous inequality within the concept of sovereignty.

Endogenous inequality of sovereignty

The issue of sovereignty is always linked to the question and notion of inequality (Kingsbury 2002). The centuries old intercourse between Europe and the rest of the world was not based on the partnership between two equal sovereigns, but it was between sovereign European states and non-European/uncivilised societies, “Within the axiomatic framework which decrees that European states are sovereign while non-European states are not, there is only one means of relating the history of the non-European world: it is a history of the incorporation of the peoples of Africa, Asia, the Americas and the Pacific into an international law which is explicitly European, and yet, universal.” (Anghie 2004, 5-6)

Even in the brief intermezzo during the Cold War environment, when a constraint was put on foreign interventions through the appearance of meta-alternative to capitalism (see Ali 2009; Hobson 2012; Lazarus 2011; Jones 2007), a pluralist theory of sovereignty was introduced (Simpson 2004), where states seemed to be sovereign to pursue their own political/economic line and diversity of thought (e.g. Bull 1977). It was an international order where a reciprocal commitment to non-intervention was at the centre, hence preventing the predations of the powerful over the weak(er) (Hurrell 2008). Nevertheless, inequality was still inbuilt through material dimension since nobody talked/thought about welfare redistribution and material equalization between the rich and the poor (Simpson 2004).

Fall of the Soviet Union, loss of legitimacy of the far left/communism, disappearance of other alternatives, capitulation of social-democracy, introduction of market fundamentalism/neoliberalism indicated that a historical change is under way. As Laclau (2007) writes, historical change has an automatic influence on the identity structure, too. That means formulation of the new post-Cold War constellation, like ‘victory’ of liberal capitalism, liberal democracy and the ‘end of history’, deeply intervened into the Western thinking, where it started to be seen as an owner of the ‘Historical Truth’ and as the latest stage of human progress. At the same time, states started to fail, either economically or politically/institutionally. Subsequently, the ideas about failing/rouge/quasi-states started to re-emerge from their ashes, and state weakness has become the major issue of the post-Cold War politics (Hurrell 2008); consequently, the post-Cold War constellation has substantially altered thinking about sovereignty, especially, about the issue of non-Western sovereignty.

IR theories after 1989 began to generate an interest in reflecting the ‘standards of civilization’ which were profound determinants of the world order and politics during the last two centuries (see Gong 2002; Bowden, Seabrooke 2006; Bowden 2009). The changed international environment and its interpretation automatically brought new legal interpretations of the meaning of sovereignty, because different meanings in sovereignty are direct translations of political realties into legal forms, to be specific, “colonialism was central to the constitution of international law in that many of the basic doctrines of international law -- including, most importantly, sovereignty doctrine -- were forged out of the attempt to create a legal system that could account for relations between the European and non-European worlds in the colonial confrontation” (Anghie 2004, 3). In other words, the changed international constellation and world order mean a substantial alteration of the thinking about sovereignty, namely the issue of sovereign inequality has massively returned in its explicit form (Thorup 2010; Chandler 2003; 2002; Simpson 2004).

First of all, the idea of new barbarism has re-emerged. This re-appearance is not only visible in the writings of Kaplan (1994), Cooper (2000; 2002), or in the writing of a marxist Eric Hobsbawm (1994), but it returns because the West situates itself ‘beyond Westphalia’, beyond the traditional meaning, where sovereignty is linked with limitation and voluntary self-constraint (Thorup 2010). The idea emerges that the Western notion of sovereignty has passed itself into a new level, narrated as the next stage of political development. To be specific, Cooper (2000; 2002) proposed the idea of postmodern state where the state sovereignty is voluntarily limited and restricted. Consequently, the new exercise of sovereignty should be given as an example for the rest of the world, Keohane (2002, 757) explicitly notes it, “contemporary troubled societies will learn to accept the pooled sovereignty only after they have gone through internecine warfare as severe as that experienced in Europe between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries.” Specifically, the post-Cold War cosmopolitan turn interprets and sees sovereignty as a barrier which substantively prevents the emergence and appearance of a new/progressive form of politics where political communities are not limited by boundaries and barriers, thus creating a postnational constellation, like it can be implicit find in the writings of Habermas and/or Held (Lawson, Shilliam 2009).

Subsequently, being a modern state becomes the problem itself, namely ‘states behave more dangerously than market/business ever have done it, hence it is better to be at risk to capitalism than to be at risk to communism or military government’ (Giddens cited by Giddens, Hutton 2000, 25). Moreover, David Held (2005, 155) started to directly stigmatise the issue of state sovereignty and the principle of recognition of sovereign power, to be specific, “the recognition of effective power as legitimate power has a highly problematic history, and has led to many brutal regimes being wrongly regarded as equally legitimate members of the international community.”, thus claiming that the membership within the realm of global community should not be automatically guaranteed, but it should be limited to democratic states, defenders of democratic law (e.g. Held 1995, 232; Kagan 2008; Ikenberry, Slaughter 2006, 8; Tesón 2003; Rawls 1999; Garton Ash in Thorup 2010).

The new post-Cold War constellation, promoted by Western democratic state, is armoured with profoundly limited universality for the non-western states. The idea when the civilization and Western way of (political) life were the standards and they represented an entrance into the ‘family of nations’ (Hobson 2006; Bowden 2009; Gong 2002; Anghie 2004) seems to be returned as the cosmopolitan humanitarians have started to reinterpret the issue of post-1989 meaning of sovereignty. Quasi-states do not fulfil the new global standards and their exclusion is legitimated. The regime of purity and pollution (see in Blaney, Inayatullah 2004), also noticed by Foucault (1988) in terms of the leper and the vagabond/poor/’deranged minds’, has been rearticulated in the post-Cold War environment, where the failing states represent the ‘old barbarian societies’. Subsequently, David Chandler (2002) writes that we are the direct eyewitness that a sovereign inequality is under new institutionalization.

Simply, sovereignty is not a given and exact thing, but it is formulated and created through ideas and practice (Kayaoğlu 2010) and with the rise of humanitarianism and human rights, new domains of sovereign inequality have been opened, where neither sovereignty nor the application of international law is universal (Simpson 2004). This narrative turn directly reminds Hobson´s thesis (2014, 558) that the fundamental driver of international relations is hierarchy, instead of the well celebrated anarchy, “we need to recognise that international theory has always operationalized a provincialized-hierarchical conception of world politics that masquerades as the universal” which formulates a space for gradated sovereignty. The next part of the paper investigates the Agambenian reading of sovereignty and the act of exclusion.

Giorgio Agamben, exception, exclusion and bare sovereignty

Sovereignty and border issues are mutually interconnected. Although, the issue of borders has been under profound change, as Balibar notes (cited by Vaughan-Williams 2009, 6) ‘borders are no longer at the border’, hence there is a need for a leap and alternative thinking about borders and sovereignty. In order to move forward the sovereignty/border issue, I turn to Giorgio Agamben and his theory of exception and sovereignty. Agamben (1995, 12) sees sovereignty, inspired by Carl Schmitt, as an inside and as an outside phenomenon, where the former is the constitution/domestic juridical frame, while the latter is the paradigm of state of exception and exclusion. Subsequently, exception, as sovereign power, plays a central role and through this decision the excluded is expelled from the general/rule/juridical order.

Agamben offers an alternative reading of border/sovereignty interpretation, he moves away from the mainstream inside/outside approach (e.g. see Walker 1992), and offers a reading of sovereignty/borders in a much more complex setting, where the limits of sovereignty/borders are not fixed, but they depend on discourse, narration, speeches and acts which decide about whether certain lives are worth to be respected or expelled, excluded, excommunicated and/or sacked. This decision is a ‘performance’ which identifies the limits/borders of political communities and it becomes the ‘generalised biopolitical border’ (Vaughan-Williams 2009) with capacity of deep identity/identification of who/what we are and who/what they are.

However, this exclusion, which is a peculiarity of Western politics (Agamben 1995, 7), is not a pure and unpolluted exclusion but an ‘inclusive exclusion.’ As Deleuze and Guattari (2005, 360) similarly note, sovereignty rules through its capacity of internalization. That means the exclusion is a direct and explicit implementation of sovereign power over the excluded, “what is excluded in the exception maintains itself in relation to the rule in the form of the rule’s suspension. (…) The rule applies to the exception in no longer applying (…) The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule (…) the exception is included in the normal case precisely because it does not belong to it” (Agamben 1995, 13-14, 16-17). In other words, the exclusion is a road into a zone of indistinction, into a grey zone of werewolf. Consequently, the entity which is expelled into this zone is the bare life/homo sacer. Agamben writes (1995, 55), “The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life -- that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed – is the life that has been captured in this sphere. (…) The sacredness of life, which is invoked today as an absolutely fundamental right in opposition to sovereign power, in fact originally expresses precisely both life’s subjection to a power over death and life’s irreparable exposure in the relation of abandonment.”

While Agamben sees this border reading in the case of an individual who is at the centre of sovereign decision, the paper uses the Agambenian reading of sovereignty/exception into international politics after 1989. According to Agamben, exception is the original element of politics (Agamben 1995, 117; 2005, 3, 6-7) and it is a dominant paradigm within contemporary political constellation (Agamben 2005, 2), and the established generalised space of exception is oriented toward the margins, periphery, edges and/or outer lying areas of sovereign space. Thus, the ‘decision to exempt/bareness’ becomes the shores of politics as it begins to coincide with the political realm (Agamben 1995, 7), it becomes the border. Simply, it is a decision that certain sovereignties are worth of living and certain sovereignties are not; consequently, it is the birth of ‘bare sovereignty’.

Hence, bare sovereignty is the outlaw/rouge/failing/weak/quasi-state expelled from (Western) civilization, it is at the margins of international society, at the edges of international law; subsequently, its sovereignty can be suspended and pushed into the realm of bareness. Nevertheless, exclusion is polluted and the outlaw state is included through exclusion, so it may become the object of unlimited sovereign power. Hence bare sovereignty and the use of sovereign power results in a ‘pornographized sovereignty’, i.e. it becomes a sovereignty to whom whatever ‘dirty fantasy’ can be tried: either attack, regime change, market opening, asset privatization and/or humanitarian intervention.

Simply, production of bareness and pornographization of sovereignty is a form of subjectivity where the borders and clear boundaries are in flux, where identity is restructured. Next part of the paper looks at the specific exclusionist tendency of sovereignty in the post-1989 environment.

Emergence of bare/pornographised sovereignty after 1989

What is immediately visible in the post-1989 world is that the idea of paternalism and trusteeship is on explicit return as a way to solve the problem of failed, outlaw and rouge states and as a way to interpret their sovereignty. Ideas of paternalism and/or (neo)trusteeship have generated a specific political reality, where the Western liberal/well-governed and well-ordered states are identified as standards of civilization, while others are seen as stigmatised; subsequently, sovereignty has taken up bare, that is ‘pornographised’ contour of the post-Cold War constellations, thus the immediate effect is the direct alteration of the principle of sovereignty for some states. Derrida (2009; 2011) underlines that there is a common feature between the ‘sovereign’ and the ‘beast’, namely both of them are beyond the law; although, the sovereign is above the law and representative of the Law itself, while the beast is outside the law and being outside means to “situate the place where the law does not appear, or is not respected or get violated” (Derrida 2009, 17). Exactly this is the moment when bareness, pornographization and/or the beast comes to life.

When the other is stigmatised and excluded, there is a possibility to rewrite its sovereignty too. Paul Johnson immediately noted in 1993 that the civilised world has a mission, namely to help to the desperate, failing states, go there, govern them and return them normal way of life. Michael Walzer claims that the non-existence of other functional and effective alternatives to the issue of failed states, the Western states have to use the old practice of trusteeship, even if it may appear as activity from the colonial history of Europe. Moreover, Farer (2003) writes that paternalism is the possibility to alleviate suffering and to bring hope to the people and to substitute the corrupt leaders with technocratic political advisers; or paternalism is a way how to fill the empty legal frame of the failing state with real empirical content (Kreijen 2004), thus here is a high need for neo-trusteeship (Fearon, Laitin 2004). What is more, Krasner (2004) and/or Max Boot (2002) indicate that trusteeship could be a possible alternative instead of full/’ordinary sovereignty’.

The idea of post-nationalism, humanitarianism, cosmopolitanism have reformulated the non-Western sovereignty, hence the Westphalian idea of sovereignty with substantial limitation of intervention is no longer applied, but rather new creative forms of devaluated sovereignties are proposed. Robert Keohane (2003) came up with the idea of ‘gradation of sovereignty’, where ‘different versions of qualified sovereignty’ are proposed for the weak states. That means sovereignty needs to be taken out from the ‘all or nothing’ frame and several middle grounds/gradations need to be inserted between them in order to appropriately manage the world order and the weak states. Thus, humanitarian intervention and external limitation are no longer in direct opposition with the state sovereignty, but rather they can be a suitable conditions for future of domestic sovereignty. What is important is that these gradations may directly require some states to renounce their claim (Thorup 2010; Rawls 1999; Bowden 2009) and request for Westphalian/full sovereignty, what is applied in the case of Western states, i.e. “Hence, in bad neighbourhoods the nominal alternative of recreating Westphalian sovereignty may be even less of an option than in good ones” (Keohane 2003, 296). Furthermore, Jeffry Herbts (1996; 2005) comes up with the idea that Westphalian sovereignty needs to be explicitly terminated. That means the Westphalian sovereignty is an unusable concept for the majority of Africa because those countries are unable to govern themselves, thus they cannot be considered/treated as fully sovereign states. Herbst calls for alternatives to sovereign states, specifically, non-functioning states may be ‘decertificated’ from their Westphalian sovereignty, “decertification could be the first step in recognizing that a state has died (…) it would actually be in the long-term interest of the great powers to create a new category for state that really can no longer considered sovereign.” (Herbst 1996, 143-144); subsequently, after the decertification process, the international community should help to (re)consider some possible alternatives of sovereignty. The next idea of bare sovereignty is proposed by Krasner (2004, 105) who proposes the idea of ‘shared sovereignty’, “possibilities for shared sovereignty in which national rulers would use their international legal sovereignty to legitimate institutions within their states in which authority was shared between internal and external actors”. Moreover, well-governed states are put into a position of helper to the badly governed/collapsed states. What is more, he explicitly claims (1990) that sovereignty should have not been accorded to those states which lack history, practice, knowledge and experience in making an organised state. What is more, Ignatieff (2003) claims that “Regime change is an imperial task par excellence, since it assumes that the empire’s interest has a right to trump the sovereignty of a state”.

Beyond shared sovereignty, Kreijen (2004) moves further and proposes the idea of divestment of sovereignty. In other words, failed/outlaw states should be divested from their sovereignty, their legal existence should be terminated, recognition withdrew, thus there is a need to bury the legal existence of the state into an end and to promote trusteeship and new empirical content (Kreijen 2004). Moreover, sovereignty can be directly excluded from the legal realm and international law/protection if it does not fulfil the legal standards (Richardson 1997). Fernandó Tesón situates the non-liberal states as burdened/outlaw states with either too little government (anarchy) or too much government (tyranny). These state, where the measure of government is inappropriate, is not protected by their sovereignty (Tesón 2011, 2), hence sovereignty cannot be an institutional escape from humanitarian intervention (Tesón 2011, 5). At this point, an Agambenian ‘exclusive inclusion’ happens, namely “non-liberal government should not be treated as member in good standing of the international community” (Tesón 2003, 98). In other words, the non-adaptive, outlaw state is expelled from the legal realm of sovereignty, it loses its full form of sovereignty and the sovereign protection through international law is evaporated; however, the exclusion, which brings the outlaw state into its pure bareness is once again included within the international community through obligation of the well-governed states and their direct humanitarian intervention even at the costs of innocent lives (Tesón 2003, 117). As such the post-1989 constellation explicitly demonstrates huge changes within sovereignty, namely, non-Western states can easily lose their sovereignty, while the Western part of the world maintains its hyper-valorised sovereignty.

Conclusion

This brief study has analysed the issue of sovereignty and its ceaseless change with emphasis on the post-Cold War environment. It has become clear that in the post-1989 context, there is have been clear shifts regarding sovereignty and its meaning. While the Cold-War environment produced a relatively uniform notion of sovereignty, the post-1989 environment has been characterized by many of unequal notions of sovereignty in which full and gradated sovereignties are profoundly differentiated from each other. Those quasi-states which are expelled from the full dimension of sovereignty enter into a zone without clear definitions, which is a zone of bareness and bare sovereignty. However, this zone does not represent a clear expulsion, but the excluded bare sovereignty is once again included through pornographized sovereignty. Simply, borders between poor/rich, developed/underdeveloped states are radically restructured through narrative frames of sovereignty as a ‘generalised biopolitical border’.

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The “Forgotten Border” between Poland and Kaliningrad Oblast. De- and Re-Boundarization of the Russian-EU Neighborhood

Jarosław Jańczak

Introduction

The dynamics of Central European border transformations are marked by several tendencies that primarily result from the process of European integration. The erosion and/or political and social de-emphasis of borders is a landmark in the growing unity of states and changing nature of statehood within the European Union. Ideas and solutions originating from the western part of the continent have easily penetrated central and eastern areas, particularly with the 2004 enlargements.  This has also be the case with the analysis of borders and cross-border relations in the region – a situation that is perhaps most visible with regard to German-Polish, German-Czech or Slovak-Hungarian relations, where old territorial disputes marked by long-lasting border separation were finally (partly or entirely) closed and replaced with permeable border regimes operating under the new normative scheme of reconciliation and integration. Against this background, the border with Kaliningrad Oblast – a part of the Russian Federation sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania in the middle of the enlarged EU space – manifested for a long time the old legacies of separation, even strengthened by the new external Schengen border regime after 2007. This border experienced changes much later than others in the region and became a sort of “forgotten border”, with its own problems and limitations.

The aim of this paper is to test the border dynamics of the Polish-Kaliningrad Oblast border by relating them to the context of European integration. The conceptual framework of boundarization and frontierization is used, as well as the theoretical tools of European integration studies. It is claimed that the de-boundarization visible after 2012 is fueled by local motives of a neo-functional nature. This is sometimes in line, but sometimes collides, with the intergovernmental game of the supranational and national centers on this border, who use it instrumentally for achieving their own goals.

Conceptual framework

To debate the abovementioned issues a theoretical concept needs to be introduced, framing further interpretation of empirical developments. The ever-evolving field of border studies already offers several interesting propositions for theoretical-explanatory mechanisms. However, none of them has been widely recognized as a fully-fledged “border theory”. On the other hand, dozens of models explaining specific border developments contribute to understanding border-related processes. This investigation takes into account both these processes and conceptually explores the changes on the Kaliningrad Oblast border in a dual way: on the one hand, seeing it as a phenomenon belonging to the sphere of international relations identifies the European integration process as the main factor framing current developments there. On the other, the phenomena in the field are conceptually related closer to border studies and border related processes. Consequently a dual theoretical approach is proposed here. On the one hand, there are grand European integration theories, for example neo-functionalism, (liberal) intergovernmentalism and (social) constructivism, that are considered to have significant explanatory potential for analyzing interactions between the EU and Russia. On the other, there are border-related concepts that help in exploring the issue, for example (de-)boundarization, the down-scaling mechanism and the metaphor of the laboratory.

Border relations in the light of grand European integration theories

Early post-Second World War integration theories focused on the reasons for integration (Diez, Wiener 2004, 7), the question of how to avoid war (Beichelt 2006, 163) and practically-oriented propositions, as in the case of the communication theory of integration (Deutsch 1964) and the federalism/functionalism debate (Mitrany 1944). These theories were soon partly marginalized by so-called “grand theories” that tried to explain and understand the reasons for and the mechanisms of integration. While referring to Europe, they aspired to be universal both in terms of geography and content. Here, three concepts have dominated within a multiplicity of theories and approaches: neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and constructivism (Nugent 1999). Due to their universalism, these theories can be described as the most promising in explaining border relations in present-day Europe.

Neo-functionalism is based on a (neo-)liberal approach to comprehending reality, and concentrates on the elimination of barriers and consequently the free flow of people and goods, especially free trade, leading to improvements in the satisfaction of existing needs (Haas 1964). The political aims of stability and peaceful coexistence are best achievable with economic instruments that are functionally oriented. Initial decisions, concentrating on pooling divided resources, initiate the mechanism of “spillover,” which leads to the inclusion of further areas of non-economic character to the integration basket. It “refers to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth” (Lindberg 1963, 123). The weakening position of nation-states is assisted by the increasing importance of the supranational level, and the gradual supplementation of national power centers with a supranational umbrella. This should be followed by changes in societies’ allegiances turning towards them. This school of thought assumes, consequently, the linearity of processes and their practical orientation, as well as rationality in the formation of preferences.

The second of the schools, intergovernmentalism, is rooted in a neo-realistic approach to international relations (Waltz 1979). It considers traditional attributes of a state as crucial in international relations, and consequently approaches integration as interactions between states, both based on principles of independence and sovereignty (Hoffmann 1966). State representatives negotiate solutions, taking national interests as key indicators of their integration aims. Power remains at the national level, transfer of competences is undesirable. Liberal intergovernmentalism focuses on the instrumental transfer of competences (Moravcsik 1993; Moravcsik 1998).

The third of the grand theories, (social) constructivism, considers the integration process as being constituted by the norms and values responsible for unification and proliferation. The process is consequently socially constructed (Diez, Wiener 2004). This usually happens together with the ‘windows of opportunity,’ when old norms and values are undermined by their low efficiency, ‘individual agency,’ with key actors proposing new norms and values, and finally their internalization by the people in the collective socialization process (Wilga 2001, 48).

The three grand theories in turn indicate three different motives behind international integration. These are, respectively, functionally oriented gains in better satisfying needs, the interests of states and, finally, similarity of norms, values and identities. The question remains, though, if and to what extent the theories of regional integration are applicable to border conditions and micro-scale border investigation? The author believes that they possess, due to their declared universalism, great explanatory potential here, by framing the perspective on both the causes and mechanisms of cross-border relations. At the same time their customization to micro-circumstances by concentrating on regional and local territorial units is necessary, allowing them to become a prism for considering cross-border interactions.

The neo-functional approach is consequently highly applicable for understanding cross-border collaboration and integration, both of which are inspired by chances created in the top-down logics but answer locally existing needs. Border regime liberalization, manifested in the elimination of obstacles to the free flow of goods and people across borders, is considered to be the starting point. Local inhabitants and local authorities, too, use this opportunity, as they are interested in overcoming their border-related handicaps resulting from peripherality and underdevelopment. Both result in the better satisfaction of locally existing needs, at the same time, however, the first, local (cross-border) policies, often also functionally oriented, appear. Initially related to trade, exchange of goods and services, gradually, however, spilling over into public policies that obtain a cross-border flavor. This is especially visible in areas with noticeable deficits, where common (cross-border) usage of previously unavailable resources leads to functionally oriented collaboration and integration of specific sectors (transportation systems, water and sewage networks, educational offers, etc.). Finally, both sides try to improve the coordination of the system by attempts at creating a common institutional level where decision-making can also be shared, with executive power on both sides of the border.

Additionally, the intergovernmental and neo-realistic approaches display a high potential for cross-border collaboration and integration. From this perspective they are seen as the central authorities’ strategies in achieving national interests. The latter can vary and be differently defined, spanning from equipping peripheral and underdeveloped regions with access to an external development fund, to improving relations with a neighboring state or facilitating the path to deepen relations with the European Union. National policies are often manifested in cross-border collaboration of border territorial units, sometimes in purely symbolic ways. The latter (in practice, the local authorities) usually eagerly take this chance, considering it a window of opportunity for attracting attention and overcoming the disadvantages of a peripheral location. It happens that they take those opportunities ‘too seriously’ and, employing this para-diplomacy, undermine competences in foreign policy traditionally belonging to the center. This additionally undermines the Westphalian principle of exclusive and unambiguous control of national territory. That sort of situation results sometimes in tensions between national centers and local actors with regard to forms of cross-border collaboration and integration.

The social constructivist perspective considers cross-border cooperation as a process of standardization of norms and values, and a (re)construction of cross-border identities. It is based on strengthened feelings of mutual belonging that eliminates the dividing character of state boundaries.

(De-)boundarization, down-scaling and the metaphor of the laboratory

The concept of boundarization is an element of the de-bordering debate and the myth of a borderless world. The European Union is seen to embody the post-Cold War process of erosion and elimination of classically understood borders and a shift from their spatial understanding from immutable institutions towards flexible social constructs. Distinguishing two manifestations of border organization can be helpful here. Starting with the most widely recognized understanding of a border as an instrument of distinguishing “us” from “non-us”, it is necessary, however, to deepen its conceptualization, by differentiating “frontiers” from “boundaries” (Kristof 1959).

A frontier is a space where the influences, cultures, values, goods, and so on of the neighboring structures mix (Walters 2004, 687-688; Browning, Joenniemi 2008, 529). Individuals living in frontiers, often display openness, diversity, multilingualism, and so on  (O’Dowd, Wilson 2002, 8). Together with the Peace of Westphalia and the modern (nation) state creation in Europe, states started to look for “more or less strict territorial limits” (Evans, Newnham 1998, 185), separating exclusive sovereignties (O’Dowd, Wilson 2002, 8) and standardizing controlled spaces as well as “nationalizing their inhabitants.” The post-war integration processes led to the erosion of borders in Europe and de-boundarization followed in many cases by the (re)frontierization of state edges.

It is, however, not only the nature of the border, but also its understanding that plays a role in border processes, as well as the understanding the role of border processes themselves. Down-scaling offers an interesting opportunity here. Border processes in Europe in recent decades have often been seen as a manifestation of European integration processes in the down-scaled perspective.

Changing the scale of analysis has been considered analytically useful in border studies (Kaiser, Nikiforova 2008). As Vladimir Kolossov claims, “the scale of analysis is not naturally determined, but represents a social construct” (Kolossov 2005, 628). Down-scaling of investigation in border studies, manifested in the concentration on border territorial units, leads, among others, to the concept of an ‘integration laboratory’ (Bürkner 2015, 4-7, 21). Here, continental integration (and integration-related) processes are more observable, additionally following the argument, that “during history the areas involved in cross-border cooperation and those involved in European integration were practically the same” (Pasi 2007, 73).

Border scholars, in their attempts to theorize twinning in Europe, have suggested two main explanations behind this process. Firstly, it has been indicated that border units collaborate across borders, illustrating European-wide processes of integration, or more precisely, a down-scaled European Union. They were, consequently, to play the role of micro-scale laboratories of integration processes. Jouni Häkli (2011, 21) stresses that “the European Union (…) can be seen as an experimentation (…) allowing for local and transnational ties to bundle and overcome Europe’s all too territorial past.” Collaboration usually involves experimenting (Joenniemi, Sergunin 2011, 233). Alberto Gasparini sees on the border an environment of openness and cosmopolitanism in everyday practices (Gasparini 2008), so the European project can be tested here, as whole or sectorally (Gasparini 1999-2000).

On the other hand, another explanation was proposed, stressing the instrumental approach of border regions to the EU-created environment, and considering cross-border interactions as a strategy for territorial units’ self-positioning within national systems by increasing resources (through access to what was located on the other border side) and competing better than other towns in the own state (Ehlers, Buursink, Boekema 2001, 5).

From Eastern Prussia to Kaliningrad exclave

To understand the current border processes on the Polish-Russian border in the Kaliningrad Oblast, a brief look at the geographical and structural features seems to be necessary. The region of Kaliningrad is nowadays inhabited by about one million people, almost exclusively Russians, living on an area of 15,000 square kilometers. Being a part of the Russian Federation, it forms an exclave located 600 kilometers from Russia proper, and is isolated from it by Poland and Lithuania as well as Belarus (Map 1). The border between the Kaliningrad Oblast and both Poland and Lithuania is at the same time a border of the European Union and Russian Federation.

Map 1. Kaliningrad Oblast

Source: Vinokurov 2007, 1.

However, to further frame the context of the border processes taking place today, both on the continental and local scales, a short historical context has to be introduced. The area of the contemporary Kaliningrad Oblast was in the early middle ages inhabited by a pagan tribe of Prussians. Their conquering by the German Teutonic Order resulted on the one hand in their Germanization (assisted by a massive influx of German settlers), on the other with a long-lasting territorial and cultural conflict between the Teutonic State and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. From 1618, Prussia was in personal union with Brandenburg, soon forming the most dynamic of the German states. The two provinces were separated by Polish Pomerania, which resulted in a new set of territorial conflicts and in Prussian participation in the partitioning of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. Prussia very soon became an initiator of the reunification of Germany in 1871 and a pillar of its political, economic and cultural system. The collapse of the German Reich in 1918 resulted in the rebirth of Poland and a new territorial conflict between both states. As a result of the Treaty of Versailles, Poland obtained the region of Pomerania (being mainly Slavic and Catholic), the province of Eastern Prussia (mainly German and protestant, with the exception of its southern Slavic outskirts) remained an German exclave separated from Germany proper by a strip of Polish territory (Maroszek 2007). This caused constant political tensions between interwar Poland and Germany, symbolically manifested in the German claims for an exterritorial corridor to Eastern Prussia, and eventually became one of the reasons for the Second World War, as it started with the German attack on Poland in September 1939. What is, however, relevant is the first boundarization of the province after the First World War. The new Polish-German border separated spaces previously belonging for over one hundred years to the same political, legal and economic system. Now, Polonization and Germanization campaigns were internally unifying both states and politically boundarizing the previously existing internal cultural and ethnic frontiers.

The Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in 1945 resulted in the flight and later expulsion of the entire German population of Eastern Prussia. Following the decision of the Yalta Conference, the eastern border of Germany was moved westwards, and eventually Eastern Prussia was liquidated as a state with no territory and no population. Its space was divided with a horizontal line into two parts, the southern part was (re)incorporated into Poland (and filled with Polish settlers), the northern became a part of the Soviet Union as a component of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Sakson 2014, 110). Its capital’s name was changed from the German Königsberg to the Russian Kaliningrad (Mallion 2007, 531), after Mikhail Kalinin, a Soviet war hero (Nureev, Latov 2010, 82), the region became the Kaliningrad Oblast. The new border cut across existing infrastructure and communication corridors, including 10 out of 13 railways and 30 out of 32 roads (Anisiewicz 2012, 51).

The region of Kaliningrad was repopulated with new inhabitants, mainly Russians (Szegedi Aranyossyné 2014, 68) from those territories of Russia that were especially heavily affected by the destruction of the Second World War. Additionally, it became a military base, which resulted in the majority of the population being involved in the defense system, especially the army.

It is important to note that the province was boundarized at three levels in the post-war period. First, it was cut off from its historical and ethnic roots and filled with a new population, entirely alienated (which was a part of the official policy of de-Germanization) from the cultural legacies of the space. Second, it was physically isolated by the new international boundary with Poland. The new borderline was closed (Gromadzki, Wilk 2001), with – in practice – no border crossings for individuals and no possibility of building any form of cross-border interactions at any level. Third, it was also isolated by the internal administrative boundary within the Soviet Union from neighboring Soviet Lithuania. Being a closed military area, special permission was required to enter it or settle there. Consequently, it remained inaccessible to institutions and individuals on the Lithuanian side of the border (Sakson 2014, 110).

The next significant change resulted from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Lithuanian independence. Suddenly, the Kaliningrad Oblast became an exclave of the Russian Federation, located 600 kilometers away from Russia proper (and closer to capitals like Warsaw or Vilnius). This was followed by a deep internal, political and economic crisis in Russia, resulting in the decomposition of the military structures and, consequently, the region losing its previous function. Economic depression caused further problems, and even put into question the form of Moscow’s control over this territory. This was manifested in several political concepts defining the future of the exclave, spanning from “the fourth Baltic State” (where Kaliningrad was to act together with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for integration with the western structures, being a forerunner of Russia’s integration with the West), to the concept of transforming it into a new Hong Kong (and resettling the citizens of the British colony after its transfer to China in 1997).

At the same time, however, the region experienced a de-boundarization process for the first time in its post-war history. In 1991, the space of the Kaliningrad Oblast was opened to foreigners (Palmowski, Kondratowicz 2009, 5). The first border crossings were set up on the border with Poland and Lithuania, which, together with a relatively liberal border regime, created visible (but not mass) cross-border movement for the first time. There have been twenty border crossing points built in the Kaliningrad Oblast until today (Fedorov, Korneevets 2011, 55) including seven with Poland, eight with Lithuania and five sea points (Szymański 2014, 96-97).

The trade volume between Poland and the Kaliningrad Oblast grew significantly, and multiplied by ten in the decade from 1996-2006 alone (Palmowski, Kondratowicz 2009, 7), with over 600 Polish companies registered in the region. In 1996 the Kaliningrad Oblast obtained the status of a free economic zone, which was to be the impetus for enhancing the economic development of the region, but also to create a “gateway to Russia” (Palmowski, Kondratowicz 2009, 7). This was settled in the strategy of recovering the regional economy that in the decade of 1990s experienced a deep depression, with the industrial and agricultural production shrinking respectively by 70 and 50% (Cichocki, Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, et al. 2001, 54). It resulted in increase of production in the following years (Usanov 2005, 124). It should be stressed, however, that the first decade after the collapse of communism was marked by relatively weak cross-border relations between local institutional actors from the Kaliningrad Oblast and northern Poland as well as relatively intensive trade contacts, also those belonging to the gray economy (Andreasen 2002, 106).

The EU accession of both Poland and Lithuania in 2004 followed by their Schengen Zone membership in 2007 (as well as their NATO membership earlier) (Sirutavièius, Stanytë– Toloèkienë 2002) complicated border relations on two levels. First, due to the new border regime, it significantly reduced cross border contacts. Alexander Sergunin (2007, 87) enumerates several obstacles affecting Kaliningrad with regard to border obstacles resulting from the EU membership of Poland and Lithuania. First of all was the visa regime, introduced in 2003 as one of the consequences of the expected eastern enlargement. It not only created difficulties in crossing the border and cross-border contacts of commercial and non-commercial character. It also complicated the circulation of Russian citizens between the exclave and Russia proper. Russian claims from 1993-94 and 2001 for a transit corridor though Belarus and Poland (Sakson 2014, 111) were associated in Polish public debate with the German exterritorial corridor postulate from the interwar period, which resulted in waking up territorial perceptions rooted in historical conflictive legacies. The agreement from 2002 partly solved the problem, introducing the so-called Facilitated Transit Document for transfer via Lithuanian territory (Oldberg 2015, 4). But, still, prior to the Polish entry to the EU, about three million visitors form Kaliningrad entered Poland annually. In 2009, it was only around one million (Studzińska 2014, 527). Consequently, one of the most pressing political aims became the elimination of the divisive nature of this newly established external EU boundary.

Second, it created a situation of the exclave being a potential source of conflict (Sergunin 2007, 86), related to both geopolitical issues as well as the perception of sovereignty and territoriality. Even earlier, the issue of military transit between Kaliningrad and Russia was a matter of problematic negotiations with Lithuania (Laurinavičius 2002). At the same time, a conflict of interests with regard to the cross-border cooperation between Moscow and local actors in Kaliningrad could be observed. For example, the central authorities favored introducing some sort of local border traffic facility testing the visa free regime between the EU and Russia based on Kaliningrad. The centre was accused by Kaliningrad and the local population of ignoring local needs where they collided with the central interests – especially geopolitical ones (Rogoża, Wierzbowska-Miazga, et al. 2012, 57).

To summarize this part, it needs to be stressed that the historical legacies of border related issues between the Kaliningrad Oblast and Poland are deeply rooted in the experience of separation and boundarization. The most recent history has been marked by territorial conflicts, population resettlements and the necessity of constantly demonstrating territorial control. This resulted in boundarization which regardless of the period (German, Soviet or European) isolated the space and people in the region from the neighboring structures. The end of the communist period brought the first signs of de-boundarization.

De-boundarization: between a laboratory for EU-Russia relations and a local development scheme

The period after 2004, however, reveals new tendencies on the investigated border. For the first time, a deep debate on the expected character of this border can be detected, with the aim of deboundarizing the separation line. This debate was conducted at two levels, continental and regional, revealing two ways of thinking about the problem.

On the one hand, the border’s openness was considered to be a matter of de-scaled relations between the European Union and Russia. On the other, it was a matter of the development strategy of the local territorial units on the literal scale. The former reveals the intergovernmentally led process of structuring mutual relations, but also of negotiating in one’s own interests. The latter is based on neo-functionally understood needs satisfaction that, due to cross-border exchange, was to bring benefits to the actors involved. The former represents the top-down logics of the border debate, the latter the bottom-up.  In the following sections both perspectives will be debated and, additionally, the consequences of the de-boundarization will be outlined.

De-boundarization as a laboratory of EU-Russian relations

Already at the beginning of the new millennium, Kaliningrad was considered “as a pilot region for enhanced co-operation between Russia and the EU in the twenty-first Century” (Holtom 2002, 36). The idea of openness between the EU and Russia implemented in the Kaliningrad Oblast was rooted in the idea of the external Europeanization of the former and the “pilot region” of the latter. The border here is one of three lines where Russia directly neighbors the EU, on its border with Finland, Estonia and Latvia. Consequently, this is a “litmus paper” of mutual relations, constituting laboratory where they can be tested. This intergovernmental approach was strongly affected by national interest, it contained, however, also some elements of a more idealistic approach to relations with the west.

The internal Russian debate on Kaliningrad’s role and position seems to play a relevant role here, too. At least two camps could be identified here (Sergunin 2007, 89-91). On the one hand, geopolitical realists consider the exclave as a battlefield between the West and Russia, where the former aims at exploitation, or even cutting off the region from its state (with the historical argument of Germany playing the key role here). This approach was often visible in the official circles of the central power and has been radiating in declarations and decisions related to the remilitarization of the region (Vitunic 2003). On the other hand, liberals believed that “Kaliningrad will be further opened up for international cooperation to become a Russian Hong Kong, a <gate-way> region that could help Russia to be gradually integrated in the European multilateral institutions […]. They believe that due to its unique geo-economic location, Kaliningrad has a chance to be a <pioneer> Russian region to be included in the regional and sub-regional cooperation” (Sergunin 2007, 92).

Eventually, Kaliningrad was soon labeled as “the <pilot region> in EU-Russia relations” (Sergunin 2007, 86), which was especially visible after the turning point of the eastern enlargement and was present in political declarations of both the Kremlin and local authorities (Musiałowicz 2006). As Alexander Sergunin points out (2007, 87), many in Russia saw “[…] Kaliningrad as a historical chance for Russia to be integrated into Western civilization. For this school, Kaliningrad is a <gateway> […], a region of cooperation rather than confrontation”. Evgeny Vinokurov (2004, 1) claimed that “Kaliningrad can serve both Russia and the EU as a pilot/model region of integration as well as a booster, connecting chain, and a litmus test of cooperation within the dialogue on EU-Russian Common Spaces.”

De-boundarization as a local phenomenon

De-boundarization was, however, not only a declared intergovernmental idea proposed in the EU-Russia laboratory. Its other dimension was a bottom-up process, creating a local answer to the created environment. It has manifested visibly in the Local Border Traffic agreement (LBT) and its consequences.

It is important to note here that the Kaliningrad Oblast belongs to the less developed regions in this part of Europe. At the same time it is surrounded by regions, both in Poland and Lithuania, that also belong to the poorest and the most underdeveloped regions in their respective states. In Poland, it is the Warmińsko-Mazurskie region directly neighboring Kaliningrad. This results, consequently, in a “double peripheriality” in relation to Russia and its centers, as well as to the EU and its resources (Vinokurov 2007, 13-14). Border openness and cross-border interactions were considered, consequently, at the local level on both sides as a tool for economic development, overcoming peripherality by the creation of functional contacts. The most important element seems here to be the border traffic agreement.

The LBT agreement was negotiated by Poland and Russia with the support of the European Commission. Lithuania was also interested in LBT, starting a debate with Russia already in 2007 (Romanovskiy, Romanovskaja 2014, 117-118). Here, however, lack of success moved the negotiation beyond 2012, and a similar scheme facilitating visa free movement of people was difficult – the conflict over Ukraine froze the further negotiations (Oldberg 2015, 4).

The LBT agreement entered into force on July 27, 2012 (Voynikov, Malinina 2014, 131) (Mały). The area covered by it contains the whole territory of the Kaliningrad Oblast and several counties in two Polish regions: in the Pomorskie region, they are Puck and Gdynia municipality, Sopot municipality, Gdańsk municipality and Gdańsk, Nowy Dwór and Malbork counties. In the Warmińsko-Mazurskie region: Elbląg municipality and Elbląg, Braniewo, Lidzbark and Bartoszyce counties, Olsztyn municipality and Olsztyn, Kętrzyn, Mrągów, Węgorzewo, Giżycko, Gołdap and Olecko counties (CPRDU 2013, 5). The area on the Polish side, consequently, covers a population of almost two million people (CPRDU 2013, 5) in two regions of different character (the economically dynamic and highly developed metropolitan areas of the Pomorskie region and the rural, underdeveloped territories of Warmińsko-Mazurskie). Together with the population of the Kaliningrad Oblast, there are about three million people entitled to cross the border without a visa (Map 2).

The visa free regime for local inhabitants automatically contributed to a massive increase of the traffic volume of individuals crossing the border, especially with shopping as the main aim. Within the next 12 months the number of visitors jumped to over six million. However, it was already expected earlier that not only the numbers but also the quality of mutual contacts should be altered. “The change in mental attitude means that the Kaliningrad Partnership should not follow the current state of EU-Russia relations, but should develop a dynamics of its own” (Medvedev 2005, 26).  This was so, especially as there were already other institutional forms of cross-border cooperation that could be used under the new circumstances, for example the Euroregions (Baltic, Neman, Saule, Lyna-Lava, and Sheshupe) (Fedorov, Korneevets 2011, 50) or cross-border projects (for example the project "Warmia and Mazury – Kaliningrad Oblast. Working across borders", launched under the Lithuania-Poland-Russia ENPI Cross-border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013 (Projekt 2014) concentrating on labor market challenges on both border sides).

Map 2. Local Border Traffic area in Kaliningrad Oblast and northern Poland

Source: Studzińska 2014, 529

The outcomes

The LTB very quickly reorganized the border relations on the Polish-Kaliningrad Oblast border, intensifying cross-border movement and creating links, mainly of functional character, but also changing (or rather creating) the mutual perception and increasing understanding among Poles and Russians.

The outcomes of the new situation have been investigated in several field studies. The qualitative and quantitative research (with a sample of over 1,000 respondents) conducted in 2013 by the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding on Polish side of the border revealed an interesting picture of the LBT’s consequences for de-boundarization processes (CPRDU 2013).

First of all, the new regime resulted in a massive influx of Russian visitors to the Polish side of the border. The opposite direction has not been significant in terms of numbers (over 70% of Poles from the LBT area declared they had never been to the Kaliningrad Oblast). The main incentives pushing the Russian visitors is the price differences, as well as the higher quality of products and, sometimes, simply their availability on the Polish side of the border. These are mainly foodstuffs (CPRDU 2014, 18). Poles mainly buy tobacco and alcohol on the Russian side (CPRDU 2013).

On the other hand, cultural and touristic attractions (especially those offered by Gdańsk, Gdynia and Sopot) tend to play a more and more important role. Poles do not see the Kaliningrad Region as offering similarly attractive magnets. Additionally, the inhabitants of the Warmińsko-Mazurskie region, being among the poorest Polish citizens, can hardly afford to execute non-commercial visits to the Russian side.

The visa free regime on the border contributed significantly to the development of border tourism on the Polish side of the border, which had been almost non-existent before 2012. The growth in numbers was assisted by the changing destinations – the metropolitan area of Gdańsk started to dominate. Additionally, the Russian visitors prefer a high standard of tourist offer, manifested by the choice of four and five star hotels. In the Warmińsko-Mazurskie region they became the second largest group of foreign visitors (after the Germans, engaged in so-called “sentimental tourism”), similar to Gdańsk (Studzińska 2014, 531-532). One or two day weekend trips to Poland dominate among visitors from Kaliningrad  (Studzińska 2014, 531).

It is important to note that the predominant character of mutual contacts was trade and service. As this was the first experience of mutual relations in the border context, it constructed specific perceptions of the other side. Especially in Poland, Russian visitors were soon labeled “good customers”, with relatively large financial resources (CPRDU 2013).

Another interesting consequence of the new situation was the appreciation of the Russian language on the local labor market on the Polish side of the border. Within a couple of months of the LBT’s introduction it became one of the competences required by local entrepreneurs, especially in shopping and services (CPRDU 2013). The situation was supplemented with Russian being physically visible in written form (product descriptions, menus in restaurants) as well as in services available in this language in most of the shops and restaurants, as well as big brand companies, like IKEA on the Polish side of the border.

It is important to note that the counties on the Polish side of the border benefit from the situation unequally. This leads to a situation where many of the local governments are also working on development strategies to attract Russian visitors, on the one side, and lobbying to open new border crossing points closer to their territory on the other (Studzińska, Nowicka 2014, 280). For many local inhabitants of the border counties in the Warmińsko-Mazurskie region, the border is a working place and the main source of income, so the more liberal border regime is enabling them to more intensively use border related opportunities (Studzińska, Nowicka 2014, 282).

It is important to note that Poles from the non-LBT territories are put off visiting Kaliningrad by formalities. Applying for a visa in Gdańsk contradicts the Schengen visa free regime which the Poles declare to be one of the most visible results of Polish EU membership (CPRDU 2013).

The main pattern of the Polish visits to Kaliningrad Oblast is based on shopping trips in the very narrow border strip (Studzińska 2014). Price differences play the key role here, together with the tax free mechanism being another advantage of the cross-border trade.

The LBT regime not only deboundarized the border, but for the first time in recent history opened a window of opportunity for direct, large-scale contacts of Poles and Russians, with over 70% of Poles in the region seeing the presence of Russian visitors in everyday situations (CPRDU 2013). It seems that similarly to the border processes on the German-Polish border after 1990, here, too, the initial phase of the changes is fueled by the neo-functional nature of commercial contacts using asymmetries in income and prices on both border sides. What makes this border different from the German-Polish one, however, is the political context of the national polices. If the former was strongly determined by the reconciliation process and centrally organized support for functional, but also normative contacts, here, the last element is missing. A survey by the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding conducted on over 1,000 Kaliningrad residents (CPRDU 2014) showed, however, that the Poles were perceived positively in the Russian region.

Another interesting element is how the gains from the open border are evaluated by the local border people. Almost 70% of respondents of the CPRDU survey in Poland (2013, 25) declared that, in their opinion, both sides benefited equally from mutual contacts, but the vast majority saw them, however, in the economic sphere, very few in non-economic fields. In the case of Kaliningrad inhabitants, the same proportions (45% each) believed the visa-free regime was beneficial for both sides and not only for Poland (CPRDU 2014, 18).

One of the elements reflecting the new type of problems was infrastructure. The busiest border crossing was Grzechotki-Mamonowo II and Gronowo-Mamonowo, both located on the Kaliningrad-Gdańsk route. What was noticeable was the underdeveloped border and transportation corridors, resulting in traffic jams on the border (Studzińska 2014, 529).

At the end of this section it is important to note that not all the border crossings were related to the LBT in 2013. But still, this new facility intensified border crossings significantly. However, the everyday contacts between Polish and Russian citizens have not created “in-depth” mutual understanding yet (CPRDU 2013). This is, on the other hand, a long-lasting process that also on the German-Polish borderland is only beginning to bring results after 25 years of relatively unlimited contacts.

The “new Cold War”: towards re-boundarization?

The linearly developing cross-border contacts expected to spill over from economic relations to other fields were unexpectedly interrupted by the context of the international situation, namely the conflict in Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea, and the Russian separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine supported by the Russian Federation not only spoiled the newly created basic trust across the Polish-Kaliningrad border, but also brought western restrictions on Russia and its officials, as well as Russian responses in the forms of embargoes on numerous categories of products from the EU. In the case of the investigated border it meant a double re-boundarization threat, affecting both the social as well as institutional dimension. This “new Cold War” danger undermined the period of de-boundarization already experienced, albeit for a short period. It is interesting how various actors involved in cross-border interactions reacted to this new situation.

First of all, the issue of the embargoes on EU products made cross-border traffic more difficult. Kaliningrad was strongly affected by the Russian counter-embargo introduced during the Ukrainian war, especially as it had been much more closely linked to the EU markets than the rest of the state. Earlier, more than one third of the region’s food imports originated from the EU, including almost all of the meat consumed there (Oldberg 2015, 5). On the other hand, it resulted in shortages of many products in Kaliningrad and a growth in individual imports. But at the same time, the legal limitations made trade more difficult, for example, the limit of 5 kg of shopping per person, or restrictions on specific categories of food products being a part of the counter-embargo. The dropping value of the rouble as a consequence of the economic crisis in Russia contributed significantly to this process, equalizing prices on both border sides and making cross-border shopping less beneficial.

A similar process affected the border with Lithuania. Already in September and October 2013, during Lithuania’s presidency of the EU and under the circumstances of finalizing the Association Agreement with Ukraine, checks on the border with Lithuania were increased, especially with regard to the traffic, which was considered to be a political pressure on this state (Sakson 2014, 118-119). These central policies on Kaliningrad Oblast were also manifested in the ideas of the remilitarization of the exclave (Simons 2014) or oppression of “aliens”, visible, for example, in the denial of permission for building a mosque there by local Muslims (Arnold 2014).

On the other hand, the border again started to appear in people’s minds, which could result locally in re-boundarization. For example, in 2014 the new-old narration was visible in the Kaliningrad media on the Polish approach to Russian visitors. Numerous reports of physical attacks on Russians in Poland, especially in Gdańsk, were reported (rarely being based in reality). The news itself, however, was what, on the other hand, was considered in Poland to be an organized media operation to discourage the local population from cross-border visits. In 2015, similar news stories appeared, but on a smaller scale (Siegień 2015). In 2014, social media in Kaliningrad were also full of information about Polish border guards checking Russian cars with regard to technical standards, which was evaluated as a form of deliberate oppression.

As a result of the above described processes, in 2014 the number of tourists visiting Poland from Russia decreased by about 40% (Oldberg 2015, 4). This was especially visible in the first months of this year, in the autumn, the situation improved slightly. Interestingly, the number of Poles visiting the Kaliningrad Oblast has not changed, which could be explained by their more limited earlier share and their more practical orientation of earning a living.

The next phase of development of mutual cross-border contacts was marked by the events of 2015 and various attempts to overcome the situation. The more difficult things became, the more obvious was the fact that the contextual factor of the international situation was unlikely to change.

It is important here to mark that the previous research already revealed that both Poles and Russians tended to ignore the “national” and “historical” context of both states’ relations, and saw them mainly in the context of consumption (CPRDU 2013). Especially in the Polish part of the border region, following neo-functional principles, it was the business logics that framed the relations with Russians (Siegień 2015). Already in 2014, Gdańsk prepared a big promotional campaign in the Russian media in Kaliningrad, trying to encourage the local inhabitants to visit Poland again.

Similar tendencies can be noted on the Kaliningrad side, however differently constructed. On the one hand, already before the Ukrainian crisis, voices that “Kaliningrad must refrain from integrating into the EU faster than the rest of Russia” were loudly heard in Russia (Malevskaya 2012, 36). On the other, however, the level of “internationalization” of the local population was high, also due to the cross-border developments of 2012 and 2013. As Andrea Szegedi Aranyossyné (2014, 70) remarks, “20% of the young people [from Kaliningrad] between 18–24 years of age have never been to the motherland, while they have travelled to foreign countries many times already.” 60% of inhabitants possess international passports (compared to 25% in Russia proper), one fourth have a Schengen visa (Oldberg 2015, 4).

The most recent data provided by border guards reveals that the number of border crossings was constantly increasing until the middle of 2015, the total level is, however, lower than in the previous years.

Conclusions

This investigation has shown the processes of the de-boundarization and re-boundarization tendencies on the border between Poland and the Russian Kaliningrad Oblast. They have been rooted in a functional and intergovernmental understanding of integration in Europe. The border changes there reflected the play of interests of the national centers, especially the de-scaled relations between the EU and Russia, making the region a laboratory for mutual interactions. On the other, however, they reflected local needs, especially related to development.

The exclave itself was placed in a very interesting context. As Grzegorz Gromadzki and Andrzej Wilk (2001, 4) pointed our “[o]n the one hand, the new political situation in Europe had led to the isolation of Kaliningrad from its <mother country>, whilst on the other hand it facilitated greater contact with the outside world. It turned out that the case of the enclave presented both a handicap to and an opportunity for the region.” This led to further debate. As Artur Usanov and Alexander Kharin claim (2014, 13), “[i]n the 1990s discussions on the future of Kaliningrad were often formulated as a choice between Kaliningrad being a <fortress> vs. economic <gateway> (or Russian Hong Kong in the Baltic region). In the first decade of the 2000s, despite all the problems and difficulties, it seemed that Kaliningrad’s pathway [was] much closer to the second option than the first one. However, in the last few years the direction has changed.”

The LBT opened a new chapter in border relations in the region, starting a de-boundarization process. Kinga Dudzińska and Anna Maria Dyner (2013,1) claim that “[s]mall border traffic […] between the Republic of Poland and the Russian Federation has proved to be a success story in its social, economic and cultural dimensions. Issuing local residents with permits to cross the border between Russia’s Kaliningrad region and several counties in Poland’s Pomorskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie regions has boosted mutual contacts, benefitted the tourism and retail sectors, and spurred scientific collaboration, youth exchanges, and cooperation among NGOs.” The current political tensions at the central level undermined this process, making re-boundarization one of the possible scenarios for the future. On the other hand, counter-tendencies are visible there as well.

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EUBORDERREGIONS and the analysis of Cross-Border Cooperation at the EU’s external frontiers

Sarolta Németh, James W. Scott

Introduction

EUBORDERREGIONS, funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Innovation, was a four-year project that explored relationships between borders, cooperation and development at the European Union’s external boundaries. The project represents the regional policy/development strand of border studies (see Kolosov 2005), since it investigates the relationship between regional/territorial development and interactions across the border. This particular aspect of analysing borders has become popular in Europe for two interrelated reasons (Németh et al. 2013). National borders became differentiated with the Schengen Agreement in 1985, with which novel centre-periphery relationships as well as new integration and co-operation zones emerged. This in turn had led to an increased attention to the impact of borders on regional and territorial development. The European Commission itself became interested in monitoring – and funding targeted researches on – the development of its ‘fringes’. Hence the project introduced here has important regional development policy implications on multiple (regional, national and European) levels.

Regions on both sides of the EU’s new external borders are generally far from large economic centres and lack many of the employment opportunities available elsewhere. A major reason for this situation can be traced to the historical divisions that have emerged within Europe since the 19th Century. This legacy of division has been difficult to overcome – even 20 years after the end of the Cold War and 50 years after de-colonisation in Northern Africa. However, economic disadvantages should not obscure the fact that these border regions are rich in history and therefore key to understanding many of the challenges facing European societies both within and outside the EU.

One central question that guided the project was whether this border location, and cross-border co-operation in particular, can emerge as a regional development resource, and whether cross-border co-operation could promote greater social interaction and a dynamic interface between the EU and its neighbours. Regions at the EU’s outer borders are affected – both positively and negatively – by increasing interaction with neighbouring states. As a result, the understanding of the future development perspectives of these regions will be crucial to addressing core-periphery contradictions, economic and demographic imbalances as well as general sustainability issues within the EU as a whole. A major challenge in this respect is that of strengthening an enlarged EU while avoiding new divisions that security policies, visas and restrictive border regimes could impose.

The analytical approach: Bordering, scales of action, geopolitical context

For its purposes, the project defined ‘Cross-border Cooperation’ (CBC) in terms of political projects carried out by state, private and third sector actors with the express goal of extracting benefit from joint initiatives in various economic, social, environmental and political fields. Through new forms of political and economic interaction – both institutional and informal – it has been suggested that greater cost-effectiveness in public investment can be achieved, economic complementarities exploited, the scope for strategic planning widened and environmental problems more directly and effectively addressed.

The EUBORDERREGIONS approach has been based on a development of the state of the art in border studies and research into cross-border cooperation. We have thus understood cross-border cooperation in terms of a nexus between bordering processes, spatial scales of networking and geopolitical contexts. The present state of debate indicates that the field of border studies has opened up possibilities for investigating the rationales behind everyday border-making by understanding borders as institutions, processes and symbols. Borders are thus not given, they emerge through socio-political border-making or bordering that takes place within society (van Houtum, Naerssen 2002; Scott 2012). As such, it is the process of bordering which brings diverse types of borders within a single frame of analysis.

The concept of bordering also raises a series of interesting questions regarding the power relations involved in the making of borders; this manifests itself, for example, in tensions between the local constitution and external determination of borders in society. This has been amply considered in debates on region-building (see, for example, Keating 1997; Allen, Cochrane 2007; Davoudi, Strange 2009; Jonas 2012). However, these questions remain relatively underdeveloped in the border studies literature. These two generalised border-configuring contexts are not mutually exclusive; they co-exist as elements of social construction that both reference specific geographical spaces as well as functional relationships that are often less territorially fixed.

During the past decade the external borders of the European Union have been re-shaped by a number of overlapping, sometimes intersecting EU policies, among them: new EU geopolitics, EU cohesion policy, security policy, migration policy, neighbourhood policy and other political initiatives. At the same time, EU borders and border regions have also been shaped by economic, political and socio-cultural re-scaling at the local level – often in response to pressures of globalisation. Located at the interface of “East” and “West”, areas straddling the EU’s external borders embody the diversity of economic development and social transformation trajectories that have emerged since the late 1980s. The progressing confrontation of ‘western’ welfare state models with South European poorhouse capitalism and East European post-transition capitalism has produced subtle systemic divides both inside the EU and between the EU and its neighbours. These divides do not only refer to differences in political cultures, ideologies and regulatory approaches. They also involve the social (re)construction of scales. Local and regional agents make use of re-scaling in order to cope with the challenge of changing imbalances, such as in the continual production of social, economic and spatial disparities (Jessop 2014). Such scales particularly involve borders as socially constructed dividing lines between regions of different economic wealth, political systems, national and subnational societies, and social communities (including ethnic groups).

For local people, borders provide opportunities to adapt to changes in national and supranational modes of production and political regulation, yet at the same time they constrain such adaptation. For an agent involved in (re)bordering, scales created by networks and social relations are simultaneously present, though endowed with changing situational significance and intensity. In contrast to other social environments, the variability of re-scaling that bordering and the selective uses of borders imply is significantly enhanced since borders are more exposed to external intervention, contestation, spatial mobility and structural change. Changes in economic structure, political order or the geopolitical constellation of power trigger local responses to the effect that scales are continually, and sometimes even abruptly, re-ordered. In this way, the EU external border is a (geo)political context which fixes a “European” scale as opposed to national and regional scales existing beyond the EU territory. It produces a structural framework which is exploited in different ways by different actors.

The focus on development perspectives and the local reception of EU and national policies centred on cohesion indeed implies a scalar perspective. Local stakeholders often address problems at different scales that those within which overarching EU and national policies operate: it is through the implementation of local/regional policies which deviate from such top-down perspectives that ‘border-specific’ responses to general structural trends emerge.

In the EUBORDERREGIONS project, relevant research questions have addressed issues of scale-building and working with different spatial scales. What social, economic and spatial frameworks of relevance are maintained by local/regional stakeholders when defining development problems and positive aims of development? Are the EU-centred framings that have been provided by the EU Single Market, cohesion policies, migration regimes etc. really considered conducive to regional economic and social development? Which alternative scales (e.g. via global trade and globalized networks, strivings for local autonomy) have been addressed? What happens as soon as these scales are elaborated and implemented?

Within the framework of this project, bordering and scalarity have been developed as a conceptual tool for comparing CBC along the EU’s external borders. In order to reduce the complexity that a study of highly heterogeneous border areas signifies, this project has chosen to focus on cross-border networks themselves as the primary site of cooperation, region-building and multilevel processes of bordering. With this perspective, which contextualises CBC in terms of geopolitical considerations, scales of interaction and the negotiations of cross-border cooperation, EUBORDERREGIONS has developed several case studies. The Finnish-Russian case study is offered below in this yearbook.

Objectives and implementation

The project applied a multiple-case study approach in order to produce regional- or case-specific research results, as well as messages that bear relevance to higher, European level policy making and the advancement of general border theories. Mainly qualitative research methods were used, with a few additional ‘semi-quantitative’ attempts such as co-operation network analysis and an assessment of socio-economic development and disparities in the selected regions. The technical reason for this was the scarcity and poor comparability of data about the EU-neighbourhood. Besides, it was understood that intricate policy-related and institutional processes of territorial cohesion and the important geopolitical contexts cannot be explained in terms of statistical figures. The information sources and data collection methods included repeated on-site observations, about fifty expert interviews with key stakeholders in each case, geopolitical and policy analyses and the review of experiences from other border studies carried out at the external borders. A standard case study template for findings was used across the project, formed around the common research questions and shared typologies in EUBORDERREGIONS to facilitate ex-post comparisons and to distil messages from their individual findings that help to move towards more general model(s). Furthermore, in order to valorise findings in the regional, and also in the national contexts, stakeholder fora with the participation of main regional (as well as relevant national-level) actors were facilitated in the regions towards the end of the extensive fieldwork period. These stakeholder forums addressed a few specific problems related to the studied borders, and with a focussed debate, aimed also at contributing towards solving those issues. Meanwhile, the participants were informed about the parallel researches at other external borders, giving them the opportunity to position their ‘case’ in wider European processes. As such, these events could serve not only as a tool for data collection and verification, but also as an interface between policy and research on the regional-national level. (Németh et al. 2013)

The project’s general objective has been to identify challenges to economic, social and territorial cohesion as well as regional development potentials as exemplified by different borderlands at the EU’s external frontiers. In order to achieve this, EUBORDERREGIONS aimed at developing a coherent multidimensional framework for the analysis of socio-economic, political and policy-related factors that impact on: 1) border region development and 2) strategies of cross-border cooperation (see more detail in Table 1). At the same time, the project also aimed to develop theoretical perspectives linking border region situations, regional development and EU Cohesion Policy. This work provided a rich contextual backdrop for studying the potentials of cross-border cooperation at the EU’s external borders. Socio-economic data, on the one hand, contributed an updated profile of the different development issues at stake. On the other hand, a review of geopolitical and regional policy issues that characterise the ‘neighbourhood’ situation highlighted the cooperation challenges facing external border regions. Contextual data was instrumental in refining the research questions and their implementation in case study analysis.

Table 1. Research Objectives of EUBORDERREGIONS

Research objective:

Analytical parameters

To identify through case studies at the local/regional level, relevant structural and social factors that condition future development prospects:

Detecting the main fields of cross-border networking, and the types of organisations engaged in CBC networks.

Detecting imbalances, asymmetries in the CBC networks.

Contextualisations of local impacts of geopolitical, border-related and EU/national/regional policy processes

In terms of a “bottom-up” approach: to understand how local communities perceive and interpret local/regional development within a wider European context:

Describing and comparing the participation of subnational and national actors; understanding the position and role of local and regional stakeholders in CBC networks and the differences across the border in these terms.

To develop multilevel policy options for regions at the EU’s external borders:

Identification of entrance points for policy intervention to lower barrier effects posed by the border in the way of efficient CBC.

Understanding variations in the level of participation by different stakeholder types and ways for policy to help CBC programmes be more balanced and inclusive and reflecting local and regional development aims.

Defining the ways to fix existing imbalances and gaps in the network and defining those actors through whom certain collaborative energies could be boosted and harnessed from the network.

Conclusions - Results of EUBORDERREGIONS

EUBORDERREGIONS has focused on economic, social, cultural, political and environmental factors of transnational importance that will influence development and condition development options in regions at the external borders of the EU. Importantly, the project has shed critical light on how local and regional-level CBC at the EU’s external borders functions in practice. It has taken into account different mesoregional contexts that affect interaction between the EU and its Neighbourhood. Furthermore, EUBORDERREGIONS has developed a cross-cutting approach that both analyses the socio-economic dimensions of regional change in more global terms and focuses on selected regional case studies of cohesion challenges and development potentials.

The areas that have been investigated by EUBORDERREGIONS can be seen as external-border laboratories of European territorial co-operation above and beyond strictly economic issues. The project team has analysed potential consequences of increasing cross-border interaction for the development of regions at the EU’s external borders and, in this way, contribute to scientific and policy debate on the future of economic, social and territorial cohesion within the EU. Local development issues in 11 case study regions have been framed within a wider European perspective and thus as interfaces between development dynamics and policy frameworks operating within the EU, on the one hand, and in neighbouring countries, on the other. In doing this, the project has also contributed to the state of the art of policy-oriented research on regional development and cohesion within Europe.

Some of the border regions under scrutiny in the project have become borderlands at the eastern edges of the EU with the several waves of the enlargement of the European Union - of 1981 (Greece), 1995 (Finland and Austria), 2004 (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) and 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). Since the ‘Iron Curtain’ vanished, both between East and West as well as within the former Soviet Union, citizens, communities and regions have attempted to open new avenues of communication with their neighbours across state borders. Furthermore, in those contexts where states have (re)gained their independence (e.g. Baltic States, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Balkans) and new borders have emerged, Euroregions, economic partnerships, twin-city investments, cross-border urban networks and similar forms of interaction have also come into being. As such, more open borders, the EU enlargement process and a new quality of multilateral relationships between the EU and its ‘neighbourhood’ have increased the international salience of social affairs, economic development, minority rights, cross-border employment and trade, the environment, etc.

Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that regions at the EU’s external borders represent a considerable challenge to national development policies as well as to European cohesion. It is, of course, unrealistic to treat external border regions as a homogeneous group; they are, in fact, quite diverse. However, they most certainly share common problems in terms of “peripherality” and challenges to their future development. As the EU Report Regions 2020 indicates (2008), most (external) border regions in Southern and Eastern Europe are subject to multiple vulnerabilities and globalisation challenges. Low labour productivity, high unemployment, low levels of economic diversification, de-population of rural regions and, in many areas, demographic decline are some of the problems that exacerbate this regional vulnerability. In addition, future development potentials of the EU’s southernmost and easternmost regions will emerge against the backdrop of considerable structural, financial, political and “cognitive” constraints. These regions are, by and large, ‘double peripheries’ (being peripheral within the periphery), i.e. are “not only far from the dynamic centres of “Core Europe” but often distant from prosperous national centres as well” (Roll 2009). Many of them continue to suffer from outmigration, de-industrialisation, and negative demographic trends. In addition, neighbouring regions on the other side of the border are similarly disadvantaged. The regions under consideration are thus potential areas of serious social problems, especially if living standards continue to stagnate.

The research indicates that increasing interaction with neighbouring states such as Russia (and Kaliningrad), Belarus, Ukraine, Turkey, Morocco, Egypt – and beyond – could have major impacts on the development perspectives of these regions – both in positive and negative terms. In positive terms, these border areas often function as ‘gateways’ for the European Union, situated as they are at important transcontinental road and railway networks (although mostly distant from major airports). To the extent that they develop locational strengths beyond mere transit spaces for goods, people and infrastructure, cooperation within urban networks on both sides of the border could contribute to economic dynamism and socio-cultural development. However, such development perspectives cannot be separated from geopolitical concerns and border-related problems that necessitate effective security and border-management policies. Environmental problems, the illegal trafficking of humans, the smuggling of harmful goods, illegal immigration and more general cross-border activities of organised crime must be dealt with decisively. It is these European and national concerns, rather than local interests, that affect economic, political and legal barriers, such as those inherent in labour market and foreign resident legislation, and that, ultimately, affect socio-economic mobility, innovation transfer and flexibility.

References

ALLEN, J., COCHRANE, C. (2007): Beyond the territorial fix: Regional assemblages, politics and power. Regional Studies, Vol. 41. No. 9, pp. 1161–1175.

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EUBORDERREGIONS project (2011-2015), European Regions, EU External Borders and the Immediate Neighbours – Analysing Regional Development Options through Policies and Practices of Cross-Border Co-operation, funded within the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme, www.euborderregions.eu.

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III. PRACTICE

Czech-Polish Borders: Comparison of the EU Funds for Cross-Border Co-operation of Schools in Selected Euroregions

Hynek Böhm

Introduction

Although subject to advanced processes of integration, the territory of the European Union does not yet represent a fully functional unit. The existence of differing administrative systems creates barriers to the balanced development of different European regions. Border areas constitute approximately 40% of the EU’s territory and are home to one third of its 500 million citizens. These areas are often economically weak, with relatively underdeveloped infrastructure and significantly higher unemployment in comparison to more central regions within their respective states (Böhm 2014).

Cross-border cooperation has an important role to play in eliminating these barriers. The question is whether cross-border co-operation (CBC) is being understood as something natural and desirable, also by others than stakeholder and realisers of cross-border co-operation projects, as even present-day post-modern societies have been constructing their identities mainly on belonging to certain nationalities and/or states. In the light of this many cross-border co-operation stakeholders think and underline that it is important to confront populations living in border areas with cross-border co-operation as soon as possible, ideally at school age. The earlier children are exposed to contact with their fellows from neighbouring countries the bigger is probability that they will understand cross-border contacts and co-operation as something natural, nice and desirable.

Goal, methods and working hypothesis

In this paper I would like to focus on the role of EU funds, mainly INTERREG programmes, on cross-border co-operation between schools in selected areas of the Czech-Polish borderlands. I will deal with preschools, primary and secondary schools that generally work with pupils and students aged between 3 and 19 years of age. The role of universities will not be a central focus.  The main goal of the paper is a critical comparison of the use of INTERREG funds, mainly under the microprojects scheme, in cross-border co-operation of schools in three selected Euroregions on Czech-Polish borders: Euroregion Těšínské Slezsko – Śląsk Cieszyński (later on the English translation Euroregion Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia will be used), Euroregion Silesia and Euroregion Nisa-Nysa-Neisse. This comparison will attempt analyse the contribution of other actors – mainly secretariats of the euroregions concerned - to the co-operation of schools.

The reasons why I selected for this discussion three out of six Euroregions on the Czech-Polish borders can be clarified as follows: Euroregion Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia is situated at the very east of this border, in an area where Czech-Polish relations have a chequered history: both countries – the former Czechoslovakia and Poland were involved in a short armed conflict to obtain the whole territory of Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia after World War I; the conflict ended in the division of the whole territory across the river Olza and the Bohumín-Žilina railway between both countries. Approximately one fourth of the entire population living on the Czech side declares themselves as Poles and use Polish as their mother tongue. There is almost no language barrier in the whole Euroregion, a local dialect based on Polish is spoken on both sides of the borders (or is at least well understood on the Czech side by people with Czech nationality). Cross-border contacts have been maintained since the division – for example, once separated families have again met. No major population exchange occurred since the borders appeared in 1920.

Euroregion Silesia is also historically quite colourful. The Euroregion is situated at the eastern part of the Czech-Polish borders and the Czech part, with its centre in Opava, includes an area of the historically Prussian “Hlučínsko – Hultschin” region that came under the Czechoslovak administration after 1918. The Polish side of the Euroregion, with Raciborz as its seat, lies on a territory which used to belong to the Germany until 1945. A major population change occurred mainly on the Polish, but – to the lesser amount – also on the Czech side of the Euroregion. To some degree the language barriers between Poles and Czechs here are significantly larger than in Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia, but general understanding is still very good. There are few Poles living on the Czech side of the Euroregion and no Czechs on the Polish side.

Euroregion Nisa-Nysa-Neisse is a trilateral Czech-Polish-German construction, which was partly an important political symbol when inaugurated already in 1991. There was a major population exchange on the Polish and Czech side of the territory of the current Euroregion in 1938, as a result of this, Germans became the majority population on the Czech side before World War II and the Polish part of the Euroregion belonged to Germany until 1945. After 1945, when the new western Polish border was established on the Nysa/Neisse and Odra/Oder rivers, major population exchange yet again took place. We can thus say that the population is largely new on both Polish and Czech sides of the Euroregion. The language barrier is also rather significant and creates – unlike in other two Euroregions – a real co-operation obstacle.

I will try to verify the following working hypothesis: the most frequent use of INTERREG funds in cross-border co-operation of schools could be found in the Euroregion Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia, due to the historical links between both parts of the Euroregion and almost non-existing language barrier. The lowest intensity and quality of cross-border contact shall be found in the Euroregion Nisa-Nysa-Neisse. The Euroregions will act as cross-border co-operation drivers, mainly thanks to the EU funds/INTERREG microprojects schemes they administer.

To verify this hypothesis mainly quantitative research methods with some qualitative elements were applied. The role of EU funds as a motivation to establish cross-border co-operation will be analysed in the paper, more concretely relationship between microprojects´ scheme under the Czech-Polish INTERREG programmes and their use by schools. We will compare the multitude and nature of the CROSS- cross-border co-operation projects supported. Based upon the findings from that stage we will conduct interviews with cross-border co-operation stakeholders and some project promoters. The scope of this qualitative research will on the one hand be rather modest, on the other hand nevertheless quite representative.

Theoretical background

The cross-border co-operation and forms of its governance have been subject of attention of many researchers since the beginning of 1960s, or at least when the first cross-border co-operation structures emerged on Dutch-German borders. The first of them, the Euregio, offered a “terminus technicus” to be used when setting up cross-border co-operation structures in the future (i.a. Dokoupil 1999).  Euroregions have been understood as almost synonymous with cross-border co-operation or cross-border regions. According to Schmitt-Eggner (1998), a cross-border region is not only a territory, but is also its engine. This foresees the existence of a specialized body responsible for cross-border co-operation management. Contribution of these specialized bodies towards cross-border co-operation of schools will therefore be assessed.

Regions are among the key recipients of EU funds. When cross-border co-operation was connected with EU funds via the INTERREG programme in the end of 1980s, the number of cross-border initiatives dramatically increased (Böhm 2014).  Some authors (e.g. Scott 2000) consider working with INTERREG a primary purpose of Euroregions. Therefore we will attempt to analyse the role of EU funds as a motivation for cross-border co-operation of schools.

Amin and Thrift (1994) contributed with their “institutional thickness“ concept to institutional theories of regional development. This partial theory says that institutions are not formal organisations only, but they mainly create informal conventions, habits, network of relations, which stabilize and stimulate performance of regional economies. Success of regions in the long-term horizon is then dependant on the ability of local actors to create such institutions, which can create good framework conditions for economic and social regional development (Rumpel 2002). We will assess in this paper how three selected Euroregions create conditions for efficient cross-border co-operation of schools.

Whereas cross-border co-operation has presented a frequent field of interest for researchers representing many scientific disciplines, the cross-border co-operation in education has attracted considerable less attention so far. When talking about cross-border co-operation of school an reflection of geographical proximities of neighbouring country in school curricula in Czech-Polish conditions I was only able to find dissertation thesis of Ondřej Lochman (2009), who called for „more in depth research of attitudes and knowledge of pupils in the Euroregion Nisa towards/about their neighbours. Hand in hand with this, research should be done on forms of implementation of European dimension in schools of the Euroregion Nisa that would be focused on the school written curricula and teachers“ (Lochman 2009).

Map of the Czech-Polish border

Source: INTERREG Czech Republic – Poland 2014 - 2020

Geographical and political confines of selected target territories/Euroregions

The Czech-Polish borderline is with its 792 kilometres one of the longest in Europe (it is the longest Polish and the second longest Czech state border). As many other borders in Central and Eastern Europe, this one also experienced many changes during the 20th Century. The creation of Poland and Czechoslovakia was one result of World War I. As mentioned above, short military conflicts between both countries ended in international arbitrage in 1920 when the questioned territory of Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia was divided between both countries along the river and railway and not according to the nationality - most of the inhabitants of the Czech part in fact declared Polish nationality. Furthermore, because of that division the relations between both countries –Czechoslovakia and Poland – remained rather cold in the period between both World Wars. Tensions resulted in a short Polish occupation of the Czech side of the Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia, which followed the Treaty of Munich in the end of September 1938 and which ended a year later when Nazis conquered Poland.

After end of World War II, the original 1920 borderline was restored. As German-Polish and Polish-Soviet borders moved westwards the border changed accordingly. Despite the fact that both countries belonged to the eastern Soviet-dominated bloc, the permeability of borders was rather low and cross-border co-operation virtually non-existing. Polish-Czechoslovak relations within the divided region intensified only after 1989, when totalitarian regimes in Poland and Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic collapsed. Both countries declared their intention to join the western co-operation structures and decided upon intensification of mutual regional co-operation when establishing regional Visegrad group in 1991. The 1990s also brought with them the creation of cross-border co-operation mechanisms at the lower levels of public administration in all countries of ex-Soviet bloc. Initially Euroregions were created between municipalities representing western or the eastern part of Europe (such as trilateral Czech-Polish-German Euroregion Nisa-Nysa-Neisse founded in 1991), later on they were also founded between countries of the former eastern bloc themselves, including the Czech-Polish borderline (both Euroregions Silesia and Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia, founded in 1998).

Definition of the Euroregion

The Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) sets the following criteria for the identification of Euroregions (Lochman 2009):

·         an association of local and regional authorities on either side of the national border,

·         a crossborder association with a permanent secretariat and a technical and administrative team with its own resources;

·         in the private sector, based on non-profit-making associations or foundations on either side of the border in accordance with the respective national law in force;

·         in the public sector, based on inter-state agreements, dealing among other things, with the participation of territorial authorities.

Euroregion Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia

After 1989, i.e. after the downfall of the totalitarian regimes in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Polish-Czech relations in the divided Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia region intensified. The first steps within the framework of cooperation were made by the local authorities of Polish Cieszyn and Czech Český Těšín, and it was an impulse for further activities. Formal cooperation between both cities commenced after the signing of the agreement on regional cooperation on 24 March 1993 in Český Těšín. Three years later another agreement was signed, pursuant to which a coordinating group responsible for the further development of Polish-Czech cooperation was established. The group's tasks comprised the exchange of information in the field of culture, sports and passenger traffic. The thriving cooperation in the field of information exchange naturally turned into an idea of the formation of a Euroregion.

The agreement on the Euroregion’s establishment was signed on 22 April 1998. It is a voluntary community of Polish and Czech municipal associations in the broadly understood region of Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia. The Euroregion is situated in the borderland area in southern Poland and the north-eastern Czech Republic, close to Slovakia. It covers the area of 1400 km^2, which is inhabited by 630 000 people (of which 360 000 live in the Czech part, and 270 000 in the Polish part). The Olza River is a natural axis in the territory; towns Cieszyn and Český Těšín, the heart of the region, are situated on its banks. On the Polish side it comprises 16 municipalities of the Silesian Voivodeship and 1 district – the Cieszyn district, and on the Czech side around 40 municipalities (Olszewski, Kasperek, Olszewska, Böhm, Madziova 2015). The objectives of the Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia Euroregion include the support of the borderland development in such fields as:

·         the exchange of experience and information concerning the region's development,

·         the exchange of experience and information concerning the labour market,

·         cooperation in spatial planning,

·         solving problems with transportation, traffic and communication as well as citizens' security,

·         solving problems concerning ecology and the natural environment,

·         cooperation in the scope of prevention and elimination of the consequences of natural disasters,

·         cooperation in the sphere of economy and trade,

·         the development of tourism and passenger traffic, including further improvement of cross-border traffic,

·         campaigns supporting the development of culture, education and sports, in particular the exchange of information concerning these activities,

·         cultural exchange and protection of the shared cultural heritage,

·         cooperation of rescue services and mountain rescue services in the euroregion,

·         cooperation between schools and youths in the euroregion.

Within the existing capabilities, the Euroregion supports the interests of municipalities, associations, organizations and natural persons which correspond to its developmental objectives, and enters into international agreements on cross-border cooperation. Cross-border cooperation within the Euroregion concentrates on the management of European funds supporting the region's development in the economic, social and cultural sphere, as well as the effective execution of its own projects implemented jointly by the partners of the Euroregion agreement.

Euroregion Silesia

Euroregion Silesia references the common history of Polish and Czech Silesia, which until 1742 was entirely under the rule of the Habsburgs. After losing the war with the Prussian King Frederick II the greater part of Silesia was taken over by Prussia, and the newly established border slowed down, and over time completely stopped the development of mutual contacts. The divided area was never merged back, and after World War II - Upper Silesia became part of Poland and Czech Silesia part of Czechoslovakia. Although, only a “green border" was dividing both countries, the border itself was closely guarded and the border crossing was possible only in a few designated areas. Contact between people from both sides of the border and the development of cross-border cooperation has been made possible after democratic changes that took place in both countries in 1989. The real culmination of a cross-border cooperation on the Czech and Polish border occurred in the 1990s.

Euroregion Silesia was founded on 20th August 1998). At the beginning it covered only a few cities, towns and communes of the Polish and Czech side with a minimum of human resources and technical facilities. Today, Euroregion Silesia has almost eighty members (municipalities), its Polish seat is in Racibórz and the Czech in Opava. The Czech part of the Euroregion is located in the Moravian -Silesian Region and covers an area of four of its six districts. The area constituting the Polish part of Silesia Euroregion is located within the voivodships of Silesia and Opole. The main task of Euroregion is to initiate and coordinate projects in the field of economy, expansion of cross-border infrastructure, environmental protection, tourism, social and cultural heritage and cultural and educational activities. The representatives of Euroregion underline their focus on CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION in the area of developing human contacts, social initiatives and educational events (Euroregion Silesia 2015).

Euroregion Nisa-Nysa-Neisse

The founding conference of Euroregion Nisa was held on May 23rd – 25th 1991 in Zittau, under the auspices of three presidents: Vaclav Havel, Richard von Weizsäcker and Lech Wałęsa. Over 300 representatives of borderland communities from the three countries took part in the event. The decision to establish the “Triangle of Three Lands”190 was a milestone for the future of the region. The Conference adopted a memorandum that defined the intentions, forms and scope of future cooperation. The Euroregion was officially established in December 1991 during the 1st meeting of the Euroregion’s council. At that time it was the first cross-border structure for Central – East Europe and deserved a very high level of positive political attention (Lochman 2009). In a legal sense it is a voluntary community of communes from the region. It is not a legal entity as constructed under the legislation of participant countries as all its authorities work in accordance with the legal standards of their countries. The three associations of Polish, German and Czech municipalities and other public actors create Euroregion Nisa.

In 2004 Euroregion Nisa had 1 674 480 inhabitants, including 583 441 in Poland, 649 380 in Germany, 441 659 in the Czech Republic. The area of the Euroregion, after the recent change to its administrative reform in Poland, includes 10.6 thousand. km2, of which Poland takes part 4 thousand km2 (37.7%), German 3.1 thousand. km2, and the Czech Republic 3.5 thousand km^2 (Lochman 2009). The main goals of the region defined in the Agreement on a framework of cooperation for the Euroregion are the following:

·         elimination of the negative impact of the state border,

·         improvement of the living standards of the Euroregion’s residents,

·         improvement of the natural and cultural life conditions,

·         development of the economic potential in the area of the Euroregion, supporting all actions at the national level which bring the participant countries to EU integration (Euroregion Nisa-Nysa-Neisse).

Basic information about the Euroregions

Euroregion

Founding date

Nr. of inhabitants in thousands

Surface in thousand in sq.km

Nr. of members

Total

CZ

PL

DE

Total

CZ

PL

DE

Total

CZ

PL

DE

Nisa-Nysa-Neisse

21.12.1991

1578

426

590

571

12 591

2499

5595

4497

295

131

51

113

Silesia

20.9.1998

771

488

283

2732

1224

1508

76

56

20

Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia

22.4.1998

672

360

312

1730

763

967

29

12

17

Source: Sitek 2015

Scope of activities of Euroregions

When comparing statutes of all three euroregions we can state that scope of their co-operation activities is very similar. Only Euroregion Nisa-Nysa-Neisse declares lower number of co-operation activities, but this must be attributed partly to the higher number of co-operation partners and the year of construction (already 1991); in practice the co-operation scope does not differ much from another Euroregions.

Co-operation field

Nisa

Těšínské Slezsko

Silesia

Information exchange

X

X

X

Economic development

X

X

Environmental protection

X

Crisis and natural disaster management

X

X

Cultural exchange

X

X

Education, youth and sports

X

X

Tourism

X

X

Technical infrastructure

X

Regional development

X

X

Transport and communications

X

Human resources development and quality of life

X

Labour market

X

X

Spatial planning

X

Source: Sitek 2015

European Funds

One of the major tasks of all three Euroregions is management of the parts of INTERREG bilateral cross—border co-operation programmes. This is represented by a so-called "small project fund" used to finance the smallest projects, especially non-investment and people-to-people ones. These projects represent cooperation of local communities at both sides of the border. Their aim is the development in the fields of human relations, mutual educational, cultural, sports and leisure time activities, public service etc.

All three Euroregions obtained a possibility to co-manage these grant schemes relatively shortly after their creation: already in the end of 1990s the Phare pre-accession programme had its cross-border co-operation branch. Although Czech Republic - Poland programme was directed especially to support big investment projects, the "Joint Small Project Fund" (JSPF) supported smaller non-investment "people-to-people" projects was an integral part of the programme as well. The JSPF was constituted in the form of a grant scheme financing small projects up to 50,000 EUR per project. The total amount earmarked for small projects represented 10 % of total financial means of the programme each year.

As the JSPF was a very successful tool for support non-investment "people-to-people" projects, in 2004, when the Initiative INTERREG IIIA the Czech Republic - Poland started, the JSPF was replaced with a similar tool - so called Micro-project Fund/Microprojects Scheme. The allocation of 5.1 million EUR, which was a subsidy of the European Regional Development Fund, was intended for the whole duration of the programme and represented 15 % of total financial measures. Maximum financial support was 20,000 EUR per project.

The largest sum of financial means for the small projects of local communities was earmarked in Operational Programme of Cross-border Cooperation the Czech Republic - the Republic of Poland 2007-2013 (OP CBC CZ-PL). The Micro-project Fund represented a flexible instrument for implementation of the smallest projects of the Programme, both non-investment and small investment ones up to 30,000 EUR, with total cost of the joint complementary project up to 60,000 EUR. In total, 20 % of the total programme allocation was allocated to the Micro-project Fund (i.e. in total 43 891 869 EUR from the European Regional Development Fund).

The eligible area of the Micro-project Fund was identical with those of the OP CBC CZ-PL and six Euroregions have been made responsible for managing microprojects schemes: Nisa - Nysa, Glacensis, Praděd - Pradziad, Silesia, Těšínské Slezsko - Śląsk Cieszyński, Beskydy - Beskidy. What is important: the same principles, structures and comparable amounts will apply also for the work with the new INTERREG CZ-PL programme in 2014 – 2020 period.

Euroregion Silesia

In 2007 – 2013 period the Czech part of the Euroregion approved 199 microprojects for future funding, the amount approved reached 3,2 million EURO. Out of these projects 58 were directly implemented by elementary or secondary schools or NGO founded by teachers, moreover some 10 projects were implemented by universities. More than one third of all project, more concretely 34%, were focusing on the co-operation in the field of education.

This number highly exceeds the numbers recorder in other two analysed euroregions. This can be attributed to the special attention which both euroregional secretariats dedicate to the co-operation of schools. This accent was repeatedly stressed by all interviewed experts, who underlined that Euroregion Silesia is known in “euroregional circles” as “schools euroregion”.  The most active project beneficiary in the field of education was Elementary and Secondary School of Vítkov.

Euroregion Nisa-Nysa-Neisse

In 2007 – 2013 period the Czech part of the Euroregion Nisa approved 234 microprojects for future funding, the amount approved reached some 2,9 million EURO. Out of these projects 36 were directly implemented by elementary or secondary schools or NGO founded by teachers, moreover some 4 projects were implemented by local university. This means that some 17% of all supported projects were directly focused on the co-operation in the field of education. The most active project beneficiary was Municipal Leisure-time Education Centre Turnov.

Euroregion Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia

There are difficulties in obtaining data from the Czech side of Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia Euroregion, therefore we selected from all (Polish and Czech) projects supported. There was the lowest share of school co-operation project in the Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia Euroregion, only 39 out of 284 supported projects. This number also includes 5 co-operation projects submitted by universities. The total number of supported projects in the field of education slightly exceeds only 13%. The most active project beneficiary was the elementary school for Polish minority with seat in (Czech) Bystřice, which implemented 6 projects.

Use of Czech-Polish cross-border co-operation programme outside the microprojects scheme

Except for the possibilities offer by microprojects schemes schools could also have used the funds from the “big” Czech-Polish cross-border co-operation programme, which was the most generously funded cross-border co-operation programme in the whole in EU in 2007 – 2013; given the length of the border and the fact that border region still belong among the poorer ones in the EU this will also continue in 2014 – 2020 programming period. The 2007 – 2013 CZ Czech-Polish Cross-Border Co-operation programme worked with financial envelope of 219,46 mil. €. It supported project in three thematic priorites, focused on 1) transport, environment and risk management, 2) co-operation in the field of entrepreneurship and tourism – which also involved co-operation of education providers and 3) co-operation of public institutions.

Subpriority/measure 2.3 was supporting co-operation in the field of education; there were some 11 mil. € allocated for this, part of this allocation must have been sent to other subpriorities of the programme due to relative lack of interest to implement projects in this field compared with another cooperation areas such as tourism. According to available sources there were 20 projects supported in the field subpriority 2.3 operation in the field of education. None of these projects was led by elementary or secondary school; sometimes they only were parts of the partnerships. Out of these twenty projects the vast majority was implemented on the eastern part of the border: five projects were implemented and led by Technical University Ostrava, mostly in partnership with the Opole University of Technology, other most active project promoter was Palacky University in Olomouc with four projects.

Three other important public universities with seats in the western part of the border area (Technical University of Liberec, University of Pardubice and University of Hradec Králové) did not implement any project. This can partly be attributed to the fact that these schools don´t have their natural counterpart in the Polish side of the border in the programme territory, but it also gives a picture of the lesser intensity of mutual contacts in the field of education in the western part of the Czech-Polish border. Except for the universities other important promoters of educational projects on Czech side of the borders come from Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia Euroregion and at least partly employ people who represent Polish minority living in the Czech Republic. The best possible example is the Pedagogical Centre for Polish Minority Education in Český Těšín, which implemented four innovative projects in 2007 – 2013 period and which primarily focuses on creating cross-border networks of co-operating schools.

Based on the outcomes of the analysis of the use of the funds from Czech-Polish Cross-Border Co-operation Operation Programme - both in the “big” programme as well as under the microprojects scheme – we can conclude that the role of strong institutions in initiating and supporting CBC of schools is important – this can be documented by good results of Euroregion Nisa-Nysa-Neisse in promoting cross-border co-operation of schools under own microprocts´scheme, compared with low involvement of schools from this Euroregion in the use of the “big” programme, where the Euroregion has no decisive compentences.

Conclusions

This article has attempted to verify the working hypothesis according to which the most frequent use of INTERREG funds in cross-border co-operation between schools can be found in the Euroregion Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia, due to the historical links between both parts of the Euroregion and almost non-existing language barrier.  It also expected its lowest intensity and quality in the Euroregion Nisa-Nysa-Neisse.

This working hypothesis was not confirmed. Research very clearly showed that certain “default setting” of Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia Euroregion has not automatically brought along the highest number of co-operation activities in the field of education – only partially in the use of “big” programme, jointly with subject from Euroregion Silesia, but it was absolutely different in the use of microprojects´ scheme managed by Euroregion. This must be attributed to the fact that co-operation of schools has not been understood as a “top-priority” by mainly Czech part of secretariat, which supported projects submitted by municipalities mostly. This applies mainly for the Czech side of Euroregion – the Polish schools can apply for funding only via municipalities as they don´t have legal personality.

The analysis of the use of INTERREG funds under the “big” programme showed that subjects from Euroregion Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia belong, jointly with those from Euroregion Silesia – mainly Technical University of Ostrava, to the frontrunners in the use of these funds for co-operation. Therefore we can conclude that that the statement in previous paragraph that co-operation of schools has not been understood as a “top-priority” by mainly Czech part of secretariat is correct.

This contrasts with approach showed by representatives of Euroregion Silesia, who articulated co-operation between schools as a very priority and developed much effort to make it happen – which has clearly been achieved. Representatives of Euroregion Nisa-Nysa-Neisse, where the working hypothesis expected the lowest co-operation intensity, managed to support higher share of co-operation projects between schools than Euroregion Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia, where the co-operation was surprisingly lowest one – which sharply contrasts with the most favourable default co-operation settings. Interviewed experts expressed also certain reservedness of Czech part of the secretariat towards supporting projects of cross-border co-operation between Polish minority schools from the Czech side with schools from Polish side (with reference to the Polish-Polish co-operation – this problem has not been encountered in outstanding part of the borderline). To conclude this part: the most important precondition for implementation of cross-border co-operation is not any “default setting, characterized by minimal language barrier and a joint history, but a will to co-operate and existence of institutions creating (CBC favourable) conditions.

This leads us to the full confirmation of secondary working hypothesis stating that Euroregional structures have been acting as co-operation drivers, mainly thanks to the EU funds they administer. The most illustrative in this are the excellent results achieved by Euroregion Silesia and also Euroregion Nisa-Nysa-Neisse in animating and promoting the cross-border co-operation of schools.

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Spatial impact of CBC projects 2007-2013 on the Bulgarian economy: realities and alternatives

Kosyo Stoychev

Introduction

Spatial economic development is well grounded in theoretical debate but the premises that inform this debate are often constrained by restrictive understandings of social behaviours and rationalities. Contemporary spatial economic processes are complex. Controversially, for example, areas that should be well off from a theoretical (and geographical-location) point of view are in fact suffering from regional disparities, low investment rates, unemployment and “backward” economic approaches. It took more than 50 years for economists to get back to economic geography and questions about where economic activity takes place and why (Fujita et al. 2001) For economic geographers and practitioners it was even more difficult to redirect their cognitive processes and discourses, especially for those who are used to descriptive approaches for answering quantitative questions and gathering numbers for long-term longitudinal study.

This “reflex” is still alive, but the great advantage of geography is its attempt to work with people, cities, urbanization contexts and regions - the real subjects and objects of the economic world. However, every time where - spatial policy, regional policy, economic policy, urban policy and etc., are involved, we have to operate with the science of systematic economic geography. (Dicken, Lloyd 1972) The establishment and management of the “European market” made new problems to solve by deepening the international economic and especially integration at the discussions edge. This is the key word that is describing the new approach, which is totally under the rule “learning by doing” and that is why it is much more a policy and after a practice. EU enlargement made great opportunities for new ground for general theories concerning areas such as economic growth, international trade, new trade theory, smart specialization, innovations, low carbon economy and smart cities and regions. Moreover, these processes must take place in particular geographical areas with specific histories, local cultures, civil sensibilities and future expectations.

The first step of the integration process is cooperation and especially territorial cooperation, the greatest value of which is: “...helping to ensure that borders are not barriers, bringing Europeans closer together, helping to solve common problems, facilitating the sharing of ideas and assets, and encouraging strategic work towards common goals.” (http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/). In accordance with this, territorial cooperation needs to engage with borders, common problems, ideas and goals. Anyway, if the observer looks closer at states in South-East Europe and especially in the Balkan Peninsula, we will find many small states spatially oriented to their first rank central place city, usually the capital. All important infrastructures, skilled labour and finances are concentrated in these centres and the capital city plays the role of distributor for all range of services and products to the rest of the state. This spatial logic has perpetuated frustrating regional disparities that exist in terms of labour opportunities and costs, asset values and capital rates of return. The next rank size cities are at least 3-4 ranges lower than the first rank city. In that way, if a spatial concept, project or just an idea does not directly serve the capital’s needs, the chance for its realization is dramatically reduced.

The main idea of the current paper is to test the assumption that if we redirect funds outside the first rank cities we receive increasing returns in target areas and sustainable spatial change. In our model assumption, Bulgaria is a testing ground and its cross-border regions are test areas that receive external support. CBC Programmes are the political and the financial tool that operate on the assumption that external investments change internal social, economic, technical and functional spatial structures.

Bulgaria and Territorial Cooperation Policy 2007-2013

Bulgaria is a South-East European country and EU member state. The total length of the borders is 2245 km (378 maritime), total area of 111 000 sq. km and 5 neighbour countries – Romania (EU), Serbia, FYROM, Greece (EU) and Turkey.

Bulgarian borders

Romania

Serbia

FYROM

Greece

Turkey

Black sea

Bulgaria

609

341

165

493

259

378

Of which river are:

470

26

-

64

126

-

That geographical location makes Bulgaria a European, Danubian, Balkan and Black Sea state, located very close to important geo-economic and geopolitical hubs. In addition, Bulgaria’s 20th Century economic history has a socialistic legacy, the locational decisions of which still dominate present spatial structures. As a result all the settlement system, type of urbanization, elements of public infrastructure and basic companies are located in a small number of first rank cities, which plays the role of “centripetal forces” to labour and investments. (Krugman 1998) The rest of the territory is dominated by agricultural landscapes; the town and the cities have a poor market potential and suffer structural difficulties. For the last 25 years the population has been decreasing, indicating the highest negative rate for all EU states and with a high degree of emigration. However, the most significant spatial change is the very recent and uneven distribution among the cities. The result of this has been highly depopulated areas, all of which are now part of Bulgaria’s post-accession CBC areas. In this way, we have to be clear that the formation of those areas on the Bulgarian map started at the beginning of 1970s and is the result of urbanization policies. Even today and despite close proximity to the biggest cities, villages are still dominated by agriculture, and not high-quality suburban development. In 2013 three non CBC districts Sofia, Plovdiv and Varna made up for 34.17% of the national population and 53.18% of the national GDP. All these accumulations are realized in the so called regulative borders of the cities which in that way are totally 1701 sq. Km. (1,53% of the national territory) These, circumstances must be kept in mind when discuss the CBC policies and project results and its influence over Bulgarian economy.

Change in population by municipalities for the period 2001-2011

In the period 2007-2013 Bulgaria realized joint CBC programmes with Romania, Serbia, FYROM, Greece and Turkey. In addition, the country participated in the Joint Operational Programme "Black Sea Basin" Operational Programme for transnational cooperation "Southeastern Europe 2007-2013", INTERREG IVC, ESPON, INTERACT and URBACT. The present article concerns only CBC programmes, since their financial resources and spatial impact is significant for the territory of Bulgaria. In the period 2007-2013 Bulgaria realized a significant number of projects which played a significant role for the CBC regions of the country. Several calls for projects were involved that can be summarized as follows:

Romania-Bulgaria Cross Border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013

Number of projects

Share /%/

Budget of projects

Share /%/

Priority Axis 1: Accesibility

28

16,7

100 085 735,35

38,7

Priority Axis 2: Environment

34

20,2

91 698 259,29

35,4

Priority Axis 3: Economic and Social Development

106

63,1

67 051 304,47

25,9

Total Value:

168

100,00

258 835 299,11

100,00

Bulgaria - Serbia IPA Cross-Border Programme 2007-2013

Number of projects

Share /%/

Budget of projects

Share /%/

Priority Axis 1 Development of small-scale infrastructure

26

18,3

13 469 914,03

49,6

Priority Axis 1 Development of small-scale infrastructure

Key Area: Infrastructure concerning environmental issues

7

4,9

2 685 328,71

9,9

Priority Axis 1 Development of small-scale infrastructure

Key Area: Assistance for project preparation

3

2,1

116 932,80

0,4

Priority Axis 2 Enhancing capacity for joint planning, problem solving and development

Key Area: Links and networking on institutional, business and educational levels

34

23,9

3 741 020,78

13,8

Priority Axis 2 Enhancing capacity for joint planning, problem solving and development

Key Area: Sustainable development through efficient utilization of regional resources

41

28,9

4 874 066,61

17,9

Priority Axis 2 Enhancing capacity for joint planning, problem solving and development

Key Area: People to People Actions

31

21,8

2 273 067,88

8,4

Total Value:

142

100,00

27 160 330,81

100,00

IPA Cross Border Programme CCI Number: 2007CB16IPO007 Bulgaria – Macedonia (FYROM)

Number of projects

Share /%/

Budget of projects

Share /%/

Priority Axis 1 Economic development and social cohesion

Sphere of Intervention: Economic Development

13

24,5

1 778 405,26

17,4

Priority Axis 1 Economic development and social cohesion

Sphere of Intervention: Social Cohesion

14

26,4

2 696 399,39

26,4

Priority Axis 1 Economic development and social cohesion

Sphere of Intervention: Project Preparation

1

1,9

45 138,87

0,4

Priority Axis 2 Improvement the quality of life

Sphere of Intervention: utilization of Eco resources

12

22,6

3 290 356,66

32,2

Priority Axis 2 Improvement the quality of life

Sphere of Intervention: utilization of cultural resources

13

24,5

2 413 330,71

23,6

Total Value:

53

100,00

10 223 630,89

100,00

European Territorial Cooperation Programme “Greece-Bulgaria 2007-2013”

Number of projects

Share /%/

Budget of projects

Share /%/

Priority Axis 1 Quality of life

Area of intervention: Protection Management & Promotion of the Environmental Resources

12

16,4

8 964 022,15

11,6

Priority Axis 1 Quality of life

Area of intervention: Protection, Management & Promotion of the Cultural Resources

12

16,4

12 857 461,96

16,6

Priority Axis 1 Quality of life

Area of intervention: Cooperation and Networking on Health and Social Welfare Issues

22

30,1

27 075 252,74

35,0

Priority Axis 2 Accessibility

Area of intervention: Development of the Road & Railway Network

2

2,7

2 309 546,31

3,0

Priority Axis 3 Competitiveness

Area of intervention: Support and Valorisation of Human Resources - Support of Preparatory Actions in View of the Open Labour Market

11

15,1

12 088 692,70

15,6

Priority Axis 3 Competitiveness

Area of intervention: Encouragement of Entrepreneurship & Actions that Cope with the Restructuring of the Economy

10

13,7

10 409 605,71

13,5

Priority Axis 3 Competitiveness

Area of intervention: Promotion of Cooperation between Research, Technological and Academic Institutions and Business Organizations

4

5,5

3 561 399,74

4,6

Total Value:

73

100,00

77 265 981,31

100,00

Bulgaria - Turkey IPA Cross-border Programme CCI No: 2007CB16IPO008

Number of projects

Share /%/

Budget of projects

Share /%/

Priority Axis 1 Sustainable Social and Economic Development

Sphere of Intervention: Improvement of the social development and social cohesion links

15

21,7

1 521 137,19

11,4

Priority Axis 1 Sustainable Social and Economic Development

Sphere of Intervention: Economy Competitiveness increasing

12

17,4

1 917 566,50

14,3

Priority Axis 1 Sustainable Social and Economic Development

Sphere of Intervention: Infrastructural support for the improvement of the economic potential of the co-operation area

11

15,9

4 227 414,77

31,6

Priority Axis 2 Improvement of the quality of life

Sphere of Intervention: Protection of environment, nature and historical and cultural heritage

20

29,0

3 656 516,69

27,3

Priority Axis 2 Improvement of the quality of life

Sphere of Intervention: Capacity building for sustainable use of natural resources, cultural and historical heritage

11

15,9

2 058 895,29

15,4

Total Value:

69

100,00

13 381 530,44

100,00

For the whole period, 505 projects with a total of more than 386,866,000 Euros were funded. The priority axes and the interventions concern many different areas “soft” and “investment” projects, but mainly - social cohesion, protection of the environment, tangible and intangible heritage, infrastructure, economy and human capital. In accordance with that policy approach the CBC programmes were targeting a wide range of objectives and actually they tried to concern all the basic factors. In one hand this must be respected as an approach which will lead to the assumption “everything is important”, but on the other hand it is a symptom assuming that the CBC programmes concerning Bulgaria are “dealing with everything” and “satisfies everybody”.

The model assumptions

CBC project costs are transferred to the local economy in both ways, first new assets, salaries and skills to the beneficiaries and second, new sales to subcontractors. Estimates of spatial impacts can be made using a model where the impact is represented as value of a particular economic sector. The CBC projects have the tendency to follow equality between the states in accordance with benefits and funds. Since there are no exact data for the fund allocations between the countries (only for CBC projects in Romania and Greece are available), we shall make the general assumption that the funds are allocated equally. Following this tip the funds allocated to Bulgaria after all the project implementation will be about 193 433 386 Euro for the whole period 2007-2013 or 27 633 340.00 euro average per year (0.0673% of the GDP in 2013).

The impact of the CBC funds can be more precisely estimated when the economic data for Sofia, Plovdiv and Varna are removed from the calculations. The reason for this decision is that these first rank size cities are non-CBC and secondly, they exert too a great an “agglomeration shadow” in the spatial structures of Bulgaria “centripetal” forces, thus potentially skewing and distorting the final results. The data used in the model for CBC area exclude the GVA of the districts Sofia city, Plovdiv and Varna. The rest districts are included since the CBC projects always involve the wider geographical scope of influence.

The basic model is a simplified version of Dynamic Shift-Share analysis. There is only one basic assumption - the CBC programme funds are assumed to be presented like an economic sector of Bulgarian economy equal to NACE.BG 2003 and the all the project costs are presented like sector Gross value added (GVA).  The identification of the sector in the model will be “EU funds sector” and the territory we test is called CBC area.

Dynamic Shift-Share analysis methodology

Shift-share analysis allows us to decompose overall dynamics growth into three components, national growth, industrial structure (industrial mix) and regional competition. The component "National growth" (N) measures the increases in the GVA, which would arise if all the sectors of the economy grew with the national GVA rate. The final process of formula required to make a verification of the results obtained. It is based on the logic that regional growth equals the sum of the regional share and the shift.

Category

Formulas

1

Gross value added at constant prices at the period start

(-)

2

Gross value added at constant prices at the period end

3

Real change in  growth

= -

4

The national component in the growth of GVA

(-)

5

Total shift

= - (

6

Differential effect (Regional effect)

-

7

Proportional effect (Industrial mix)

-  - -

The differential effect represents that part of total regional change that is due to the fact that regional / local industries can develop in a different ways from the same sector at the national level. The proportional effect represents that part of the total regional change, which can be explained by joining, mixing the economic activities of the region in combination with the overall national trend in the development of various economic sectors. Proportional share or effect arises from the fact that nationally some sectors growing faster or slower than others. As a result, the regions 'specialized' in the national fast-growing industries will be subject to a positive proportional effect (regardless of the fact how the industry is developing as a regional aspect). The proportional and differential effect sums are forming the total shift (T).The final verification procedure requires the sum of categories 1 to 4 to be equal to the sum of the categories 6 and 7, i.e. Category 5 - the total shift.

The basic indicator that we shall involve in the model assessment is the Gross Value Added (GVA). Nevertheless, the CBC projects are targeting many objectives, but all of them support the formation for the GVA of all the classical economic sectors. In that way we assume the funds as a particular amount of GVA. The second question that we should decide is the distribution of the funds over the whole period of time. In general the CBC 2007-2013 projects have several calls and the average project implementation period is 18-24 months. In that way the most significant years should be 2009 and 2013. In accordance to that we assume that in the both years are allocated at least 50 % of the funds to the beneficiaries and subcontractors (Based on a calculation of 193 433 386 Euro for the whole period).

Dynamic Shift-Share analysis – GVA 2007-2013

The analysis indicates several very interesting points. First, for all the economic sectors the GVA grew in the period 2007-2013, except sector F (Construction).  The situation is similar with all the sectors in the CBC areas, but sectors A, J, M_N, R_U experience growth of more than 50%. The next column 8 shows, what would be the growth of each CBC area sector if all of them were growing with the average national GVA rate of 28.42%. The data on 8a shows the difference between columns 8 and 5 and answer the question about the positive or negative contribution by the state policies GVA growth in the CBC areas. For the whole period, the State Growth Effect on the CBC areas is positive to all the sectors.  Column 9 indicates the Total shift, calculated by the difference between the GVA 2013 and the expected GVA growth (Columns 6 and 8). Column 10 shows the data of the CBC expected growth rate if all the CBC sectors were growing at the national sector rate. The important differential effect is calculated between the differences of the 2013 GVA of each sector and the expected shift (Columns 6 and 10). It is interesting to note that all the economic sectors in the CBC area are expecting positive differential effects. That means that these sectors follow and are dependent on national-level trends and policies within each sector. Even sector F (Construction) expects a positive differential effect, which means that the slowdown at the national level was faster that in CBC areas. In general the differential effect has provided 1029 million Euros to the CBC areas. The only sector with a negative differential effect is the EU funds /CBC Programmes/. This means that in Bulgaria the growth of projects, investment and GVA in all other EU funded programmes (Operational programmes) is growing faster that the projects, funds, investments and respectively GVA in CBC Programmes. In other words, EU funding and absorption effects at the national level are growing much faster than the CBC sector and areas. Another positive result of these data is that all the sectors have locally grown in the CBC areas and that local effects are positive.

The proportional effect shows the mixture with the national trends. Regions specialized in nationally fast growing sectors will have a positive proportional effect.

Dynamic Shift-Share Analysis of the Bulgarian economy and CBC* sector – Cross indicator GVA 2007-2013, Million Euro

NACE 2003

GVA Bulgaria

2007

GVA Bulgaria

2013

Shift %

CBC areas GVA

2007

CBC areas GVA

2013

Shift  %

Expected GVA  growth based on 28,42%

State

Growth Effect

Total

shift

Expected

shift

Differential

effect

Proportional

effect

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

8а

9

10

11

12

A

1 509

1893

25,47

905

1 514

67,30

1162,42

257,25

351,92

1136

379

-26,67

B_E

6 313

8020

27,04

3 093

4 090

32,22

3972,58

879,15

117,68

3929,85

160

-42,73

F

2 097

1656

-21,03

1 027

844

-17,80

1319,32

291,97

-474,87

811,33

33

-507,99

G_I

5 759

7409

28,66

2 822

3 779

33,91

3623,79

801,96

155,04

3630,64

148

6,85

J

993

1950

96,27

487

994

104,28

625,06

138,33

369,25

955,31

39

330,25

K

2 012

2490

23,75

986

1 270

28,80

1266,00

280,17

3,75

1219,95

50

-46,04

L

3 059

3721

21,65

1 499

1 898

26,62

1924,76

425,96

-27,00

1823,34

74

-101,42

M_N

1 322

1937

46,49

648

988

52,47

832,01

184,13

155,80

949,07

39

117,06

O_Q

3 354

4657

38,86

1 643

2 375

44,52

2110,48

467,06

264,65

2281,98

93

171,50

R_U

553

903

63,39

271

460

70,06

347,67

76,94

112,72

442,34

18

94,67

EU funds

300

3333

1011,00

30

193

543,33

38,53

8,53

154,47

333,30

-140

294,77

EU* funds

-300

-3333

Total

26 970

34635

28,42

13381

18213

36,11

17222,61

3841,45

990,39

17184,47

1029

-38,15

The current data in column 12 indicate some very important issues. The general rule is that regions characterized by slow-growing or stagnating industries will account for a negative proportional effect. In the current case the sectors A, B_E, F, K and L are suffering in negative proportion compared to CBC areas. The general proportional effect to the CBC area is negative (-38,15) which means that CBC areas are overrepresented by weak economic sectors and lack competitiveness. The important issues are the facts that the proportional effect of the EU funds is 94, 77 controversially of negative differential effect. This result was expected, since the EU funds sector is growing faster at national level and disperses positive mixture effect on the CBC areas and its sectors.

Conclusion

The data show that Bulgarian CBC programmes with Romania, Serbia and Greece play the most important role in territorial cooperation. These CBC regions suffer from heavy depopulation. The beneficiaries were very active in the period 2007-2013 and the total number of 505 projects is a good result. The CBC areas are expecting the programming to continue even more active and to involve the territories more effectively.

The shift-share analysis shows that the general trends are positive in accordance to the CBC areas and sectors. The EU funding is playing an important role in the CBC area development. The CBC programming contributes to 154.47 million Euros - Total shift. This is less the totally invested money (193mln.euro) because of the negative differential effect, which cause money flows outside the CBC areas. In addition, it shows that regional growth is slower than the national growth in accordance to the CBC areas. The other important issue is the non-competitive specialization of the CBC areas that is proved by the negative proportional effects for many sectors, which in the first rank size cities and regions are in recession. If these tendencies continue in the period 2014-2020 the CBC areas will remain specialized in sectors nationally slowing down, which will deepen their negative trends in investments, demographic, social and economic indicators.

The number of the priority axes in the CBC programmes must be decreased and only few cross-sector territorial interventions should be funded. The wide scope of the programmes supply many beneficiaries with funds, but neglects interconnections between sectors and misses the point of specialization. These results are indicated by the data about the proportional effects that situate CBC areas within sectors with lower GVA and less optimistic perspectives. The CBC Programmes must be more integrated with the Operational programmes that have been implemented nationally in Bulgaria in order to achieve more meaningful positive and synergy effects. At it is, cross-border programs are only very loosely connected to the private sector which is not a major beneficiary. In general the programmes cater to local administration and the NGO sector. This is one of the possible explanations for the negative proportional effects regarding the sectors within which the CBC target areas are specialized.

References

BARFF R., PRENTICE, K. (1988): Dynamic Shift-Share Analysis. Growth and Change, Vol. 19. No. 2, pp. 1–10.

LLOYD, P., DICKEN, P. (1972): Location in space: a theoretical approach to economic geography. Harper & Row, New York

KRUGMAN, P. (1998): The Role of Geography in Development. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington

KRUGMAN, P., VENABLES, J. A. (1993): Integration, Specialization and Adjustment. NBER Working paper № 4559, the National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge

PORTER, M. (2000): Location, competition and economic development: Local clusters in a global economy. Economic Development Quarterly, Vol. 14. No. 1, pp. 15-34.

PORTER, M. (2000): Regions and the new economics of competition. In: Scott, A. J. (eds.): Global City-Regions. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 139-157.

SCOTT, A., STORPER, M. (2003): Regions, Globalization, Development. Regional Studies, Vol. 37. No. 6-7, pp. 549-578.

SHEPPARD, E. (2000): Geography or Economics? Conceptions of Space, Time, Interdependence, and Agency. In: Clark, G., Feldman, P. M., Gertler, S. M. (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 99-125.

STOYCHEV, K. (2012): Locational approaches for Regional development. Sofia University Press, Sofia

Internet References

JOINT PROGRAMMING DOCUMENT, BULGARIA/ROMANIA, 2003-2006.

http://www.mdrl.ro/_documente/cbc/2004_2006/RoBg/programare/JPD_ro_bg.pdf (Accessed: 08.2015)

ROMANIA - BULGARIA CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION PROGRAMME 2014-2020.

http://cbcromaniabulgaria.eu/  (Accessed: 08.2015)

EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL COOPERATION PROGRAMME GREECE-BULGARIA 2007-2013

http://www.greece-bulgaria.eu/ (Accessed: 08.2015)

BULGARIA-SERBIA IPA CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION PROGRAMME 2007-2013

http://www.ipacbc-bgrs.eu/ (Accessed: 08.2015)

BULGARIA-MACEDONIA IPA CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION PROGRAMME 2007-2013

http://www.ipa-cbc-007.eu/ (Accessed: 08.2015)

BULGARIA-TURKEY IPA CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION PROGRAMME 2007-2013

http://www.ipacbc-bgtr.eu/ (Accessed: 08.2015)

EU STRUCTURAL FUNDS,

http://www.eufunds.bg/en/page/21 (Accessed: 08.2015)

MINISTRY OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Online] Available from: http://mrrb.government.bg/?controller=category&catid=87 (Accessed: 08.2015)

A Large Metropolis and its Small Neighbours: Co-operation and Interaction Across the Southern Section of the Finnish-Russian Border[1]

Sarolta Németh, Matti Fritsch and Heikki Eskelinen

Introduction

This paper takes on a regional development perspective in studying a border. It analyses the conditions and perceptions of development on the two sides of the southernmost section of the Finnish – Russian border, with a special attention to cross-border interactions and co-operation. Understandably, the issues of historical legacies, cultural sensitivities and geopolitical volatility are also discussed, to the extent that cross-border flows and co-operation (CBC) may take place and the functions and perceptions of the border as well as the attached development perspectives are (re-)defined.

In order to get a sensible picture of prospective development in this region, one needs to go beyond generalisations emerging from recent political polemics with and about Russia, or concerning the one-sided conditionalities and dependencies assumed between the EU and its neighbours. In order to achieve this, this study implements a bottom-up approach, or in other words, is concerned especially with local and regional perspectives on issues such as the border regime, cross-border flows, investments and co-operation occurring across this particular border, as well as the border-locational advantages and risks seen by the actual residents of the cities and regions concerned. This is done in the strong belief – or starting hypothesis – that although higher-level (national and EU/international) politics do set the basic frameworks for interactions, i.e. the permeability of the given border and instruments supporting CBC, and therefore is a strong determinant of developments, the actual drivers and content of these interactions originate in local-regional needs and interests.

The following is a summary along the lines briefly explained above of the main findings from research carried out between 2012 and 2014, when also the majority of the empirical data was collected (Euborderregions; Németh et al. 2014; Scott, Németh 2015). The information processed in the analysis below comes from over 50 expert interviews made on the two sides of the border, as well as notes taken at a stakeholder forum organised by the authors on the Finnish side of the border in 2013. Information was also collected from existing studies on Finnish-Russian cross-border co-operation and from a number of quantitative data sources. Regular personal observation and the systematic review of local and regional media and policy documents provided additional sources of information for this study.

The basic setting

The Finnish–Russian border is a roughly north/south international border 1 340 km in length, running mostly through uninhabited taiga forests and sparsely populated rural areas and not following any particular natural feature or river. It is also part of the external border of both the Schengen Area and the European Union. The present study focuses on the southernmost stretch of this long border and the regions on its two sides (see Figure 1 and Table 1).

To some extent, this borderland is lop-sided as its Russian side, besides the Leningrad Region (oblast’), includes the metropolis of St. Petersburg whereas its Finnish side contains two small Finnish regions, Etelä-Karjala (South Karelia) and Kymenlaakso with middle-size cities as their administrative centres. Although the Finnish capital, Helsinki lies further west, and therefore is excluded from the strictly defined border region, it is important to note that a large share of flows and processes happening across this stretch of the Finnish-Russian border occur between these two major metropolitan areas. This border region also represents an important interface for interactions between Finland/EU and Russia, indicated for example by the high volumes of transit trade through the Finnish harbours of Helsinki and Kotka-Hamina towards and from Russia and the popularity of Schengen visas issued by the Finnish Consulate in St. Petersburg.

The southernmost Finnish-Russian border region (and CBC programme area)

The land border located within the region in focus is approximately 135 km long and contains four out of the nine international border-crossing points along the Finnish-Russian border. These four crossing points also deal with the largest volumes of passengers and goods; one of them (Vainikkala) is catering only for the railway line between Helsinki and St. Petersburg. The three border crossing stations open for car traffic are, from North to South, Imatra-Svetogorsk, Nuijamaa-Brusnitsnoe and Vaalimaa-Torfyanovka. About a third of the total cross-border traffic between the two countries goes through the southernmost, and busiest, crossing point at Vaalimaa-Torfyanovka (to St. Petersburg and Vyborg), also acting as the primary connection to Russia via Finland. This southern east-west corridor is also part of the EU’s TEN-T Nordic triangle railway/road axis and can therefore be regarded as a transport corridor of European importance.

As regards institutionalised cross-border co-operation, the border region in focus more or less coincides with the Southeast Finland – Russia co-operation programme area of the CBC programmes under the former European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI, 2007-2013), and its successor, the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI, 2014-2020)[2]. This CBC programme area is the southernmost one of three EU-supported cross-border co-operation programmes operating across the Finnish-Russian border, bearing some specific traits that make it very different from the other two (the Karelia and the Kolarctic CBC programme areas) (see, for example, Fritsch et al. 2015).

Basic socio-economic indicators of the Southeast Finland – Russia border region

Population 31.12.2012

Population density 1.1.2013

Length of shared border with RU/FI (approx.), km

FINLAND

5 426 674

18

1 300

Kymenlaakso

181 421

35

18

Etelä-Karjala

132 355

25

120

RUSSIA

141 914 509

9

1 300

City of St. Petersburg

4 600 276

3 390

0

Leningrad region

1 629 595

20

130

Sources: Statistics Finland; and Federal State Statistics Service (Census 2010). Years: 2012 for Finland and 2010 for Russia

Regional development processes, socio-economic relations and flows

Zooming into the southernmost Finnish-Russian border region, one can see that the centre-periphery and regional disparity patterns are not very straightforward. Finland is one of the more developed countries of the EU, yet the regions on the Finnish side of this border have been facing significant negative socio-economic trends as a result of restructuring of their traditional (forest-based) industrial sector, in which the border had played only a small role; this restructuring is connected to global changes in this industry. The increasing permeability of the border, and other factors such as the recent economic revival of St. Petersburg and its population after the fall of the Soviet Union, have led to positive cushioning effects for the economies of the two Finnish regions. On the other side of the border we see a recently emerging growth-pole, a concentration of wealth and intense development in and around the Federal City of St. Petersburg; which is obviously not due to close proximity to the Finnish border. Beyond it, there is a sparsely populated and underdeveloped hinterland including also places that are near the border.

Demographic developments also indicate a somewhat reverse situation in this borderland: Finnish regions with stagnating or declining population and the Russian part of the borderland with growing population due most to migration patterns. Additionally to these, the region’s location on the axis between the St. Petersburg conurbation and the Helsinki metropolitan area renders certain places in between important for transit flows and logistics, and tourism (from the Finnish perspective, for example, Kotka and Lappeenranta, respectively).

Furthermore, there are no clear-cut asymmetries in wealth or in the rates of economic development across this section of the Finnish-Russian border. There is no doubt that on the Russian side there has been considerable catching up since the transition crisis of the 1990s in terms of economic and social development, but this is on the average, which is affected by the presence and weight of St. Petersburg. There are substantial gaps in living standards across the area of Leningrad region and St. Petersburg; and even more importantly, social inequality is much higher on the Russian side than in the Finnish regions (or generally, in Finland). There is, however, a clear asymmetry visible in all border region dynamics rooted in a single cause: in terms of scale, the whole of Finland more or less can be seen as a border region to St. Petersburg.

Interrelationships with geopolitics and the role of the EU

After the Second World War, the border between Finland and the Soviet Union was, apart from centrally organised bilateral co-operation, essentially closed. The relationship between the superpower and the small Nordic country was based on the Agreement of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance. However, there were some major challenges emerging to this relatively simple setting: Finland succeeded in becoming a member of several international organisations and finally, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, joined the EU in 1995. In fact, Finland saw joining the EU as an opportunity to transfer bilateral negations about certain major issues to a higher, EU-Russian, level.

Generally, although the Finnish-Russian border was not too long ago a contested one, with military conflicts, current relations between the two countries as well as cross-border co-operation are signified by pragmatism and are mostly void of historical baggage; this approach, however, has become again difficult in the current geopolitical conditions.  It is important to mention that the situation between Russia and the EU is very different from that of EU-external borderlands with countries that are involved in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Russia is not part of the ENP as it opted for a more equal arrangement under the Common Spaces Agreement with EU. This also means that Russia is having its own foreign policy and trade objectives that do not correspond to those of the EU. What actually is happening on the regional level in terms of CBC is conditioned by the border regime (Schengen, visa requirement) and the availability of the ENPI funding, i.e. the resources for CBC.

From Russia’s re-emergence as a more assertive international actor comes the more mutual nature of cross-border co-operation: on the programme level, since 2010, Russia provided its own funding, and had therefore also equal weight in the decisions related to the content of CBC, for example with regard to the calls and the selection process. Due to this commitment and co-ownership, mutuality has also improved. This of course makes it difficult for the EU to impose any ‘Europeanization’ on Russia through the CBC Programme; while Russia can also be a driving force for, for instance, infrastructural projects, which have been less in focus on the Finnish/EU side. Geopolitics matters and EU-Russian relations play a role to the extent that it has an impact on the regional level in the way that it could ‘open or close the tap’ of ENPI funds, for instance. Nevertheless, there has remained a certain degree of uncertainty in Finland, too, regarding both Russia’s and the EU’s next moves.

Conditionality imposed by the EU has lost its relevance completely since 2000. As the EU is unable to impose – via any conditionality – its standards on the Russian side, there is no homogenization of the neighbourhood here in terms of institutions or administrative procedures, etc. Joint ENPI programme management structures are implemented on the Russian side, too, but being more EU-inspired than Russian, are also a bit lop-sided, e.g. due to general institutional-cultural differences between the two countries. In turn, the self-assertiveness of Russian politics towards the EU potentially has an impact on Russian public opinion and practices concerning interaction and co-operation with the European Union. Therefore, it is increasingly recognised that instead of direct efforts of ‘Europeanizing’ Russian practices, mutual learning has to be supported about each other’s ways of doing things, e.g. EU bureaucracy meeting Russian administrative procedures in governing ENPI-funded projects and situation-sensitive solutions to bridge differences by way of which cross-border interactions can function. Nevertheless, in sectors which have a specific international dimension, such as higher education, one can see some increasing compliance with EU structures in Russia. As an example, the recent Bologna-friendly reform of the higher education in Russia, which also supports CBC in this field in our region, can be mentioned in this context.

Finally, as a more recent influence on relations, so far the strongest impact of the crisis of the Ukraine on the Finnish-Russian borderlands has been the rapid reduction of tourism from Russia as a result of the plummeting rouble. Macro-political volatility has generally been filtered through the relatively pragmatic, technocratic and stable regional and national institutions responsible for Finnish-Russian co-operation. Delay or even potential abolishment of the EU-Russian CBC programming instruments, which is not on the cards right now, as a result the geopolitical situation could have a major negative impact on CBC activities in the border region. It is also important to note that higher-level, geopolitically or economically induced changes in terms of trade and tourism are difficult to influence or counteract locally, and the longer-term consequence is that business co-operation is likely to reduce as many Finnish companies have now severely burned their paws in Russia.

Changing local perceptions and development scenarios

From the perspective of Finnish citizens towards Russians, there has been an obvious trajectory since the 1990s from a negative image of the ‘other’ towards building mutual trust, although there is a lingering basic scepticism or at least some reservations from the Finnish side towards Russian practices. Yet in general one can say that Finnish perceptions of the border, and of Russian people, have changed favourably from ‘poor folks’ to ‘rich shoppers’, which is partly due to increased encounters in the past decades and also for pragmatic economic considerations.  Finnish stakeholders perceive themselves as experienced and having the know-how in, co-operating with Russians, which is seen also as a regional development resource and competitive advantage, i.e. located at the gateway to Russia. Regional authorities and other stakeholders on the Finnish side strive to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the proximity of the border, i.e. by increased tourism and trade flows, migration of highly skilled workers. For example, tourism has turned into a regional development variable in the recent years for regional policy makers on the Finnish side in the  area under investigation, e.g. flows, new jobs, etc. . Also, the prospect of a potential visa-free travel provided the base for positive expectations in the region until 2014.

From the Finnish perspective, rapid economic development and a huge market in St. Petersburg are seen as important resources for regional development on the Finnish side, while the increased permeability of the border and a generation shift on both sides - meaning, for instance, distantiation from the past and better communication skills - facilitate flows and interactions that generate this development. Additionally, Finnish organisations are increasingly seen internationally as ‘Russia experts’, with experience and established contacts with Russian organisations. As a result, they are perceived as valuable partners to international networks, which contributes to the growth of the network capital of these organisations and their regions.

Although there is no specific regional development strategy by the Finnish State to utilise the border as a resource, the regional aspirations have been nationally supported by the fact that the Finnish State has done a lot in terms of investing into hard infrastructures, e.g. transport and logistics, and into improving the administrative and governance context, e.g. visa centres and the Team Finland approach used also towards Russia, in order to utilise Finland’s and its border regions’ competitive advantage out of their position as a bridgehead/gateway to Russia. The two Finnish regions in the case study also have tried to market themselves as soft-landing platforms, centres of knowledge, for businesses oriented to Russia, or for Russian businesses wanting to internationalise. The Finnish ELY centres, regional councils and local development companies have been instrumental in this. The cities of Southeast Finland applied for funding from the national INKA (Innovative Cities) funding programme to focus on certain areas of their expertise, e.g. in logistics, transport, commerce, research and education, related to Russia and CBC with Russian regions, but the support was not granted from the programme in the end. Also the EU-Russia Innovation Forum held in Lappeenranta (the administrative centre of Etelä-Karjala) indicates this aspect of border proximity, i.e. utilised as a resource for regional competitiveness.

There is no shared cross-border regional identity traceable in the studied Finnish-Russian border region. Even on the local level such cross-border identity is weak: the ‘twin city’ concept is little internalised by the population of Imatra and Svetogorsk (the only example of a town-pair located in close proximity to each other across this section of the Finnish-Russian border), despite the fact that it has a special relevance to the CBC activities of certain organisations, e.g. schools, sports clubs.

It is also important to mention, nevertheless, that for many of the most influential actors in the Finnish regions in this case-study area, CBC with Leningrad region and St. Petersburg can be seen as a testing ground of co-operation with Russian partners in general; and their sometimes rather explicit aim is to reach to Moscow and other of Russia, especially the ‘European’ parts. This lack of territorial framing of co-operation is especially valid for the cross-border activities of businesses.

Policy options for the Finnish regions

Finally, in light of the above bottom-up perceptions of the border, i.e. mainly as a development resource, and turning now to the Finnish side of the border, it is interesting to look at their consequences to actual and optimal policies. The research has shown that there are instances where the national policies do not match the needs of the regions that come from their policy orientations and strategies related to their border location. Such is the case with the regional governments on the Finnish side trying to assign new areas for retail department outside urban centres to cater for Russian shoppers´ demand, which received a negative reception from the national planning system, i.e. the Ministry of the Environment. Another example from Finland concerns language education initiatives to replace Swedish as the first foreign language at school with Russian in the eastern border areas clashing with national legislation. The key question is how much flexibility the national institutions can show to regional needs. A more constructive discussion and joint work towards common goals could be facilitated by more thorough understanding of regional and local needs at the national level.

The Finnish media analysis and the interviews indicate that despite the considerable enthusiasm about the potentials coming from the border location, there are voices of caution, too. There is considerable concern on both the regional and national levels that despite the rapid increase in terms of Russian tourism, ‘not all eggs should be put into the Russian basket’; interactions between the EU/Finland and Russia can be rather volatile. The recent crisis related to Ukraine underlines this concern.

There has been a long period of continuous co-operation between actors in Finland and Russia on various levels and within different frameworks, which has led to significant capacity building on both sides, not only in terms of ‘Europeanizing’ (to a minor extent) Russian practices, but also in terms of Finnish actors understanding and accepting the ways things work on the other side of the border. As a consequence, it has been learnt that despite the lack of standard practices across the border, co-operation can work if there is mutuality and pragmatism prevailing. Therefore, interventions from the EU and national level should support these in the future to maximise benefits from CBC.

It should not be forgotten that the existence of St. Petersburg in relative proximity of this border has a major imprint on basically anything happening in terms of cross-border interactions and development dynamics via its mere size, economic weight, and the scale it is operating on.

Conclusions

The border region in focus in this study is one of the many borderlands along the external border of the European Union. However, it is an atypical one in the way that the regions on neither sides can be considered clearly as an economic periphery. There have been regional development processes at work that are unrelated, or only indirectly linked to the border location of the constituent regions of this borderland, but there are also several developments that are obviously the results of this location. These different kinds of factors and processes interrelate when they motivate and frame cross-border co-operation – and when they give rise to development visions and policies on the local-regional level. An important observation is that in terms of any signs of territorial integration, we see that there are still major asymmetries across the border, e.g. tourism flows are unidirectional; and there is no joint planning of infrastructures, no harmonisation of regional development strategies on the two sides of the border.

The research findings related to local-regional perceptions are also somewhat biased in the same way: neighbouring Russia, especially the close proximity of St. Petersburg, is more visible in the visions and strategies of the Finnish regions than the closeness of EU/Finland in the development strategies of the Russian side of the border. So, as a final point, some multi-level policy-relevant messages could be formulated based on the findings in particular from the Finnish perspective. Firstly, it is found that there is a need for a more efficient co-ordination/matching of regional/local and national policies as regards the border and its effects. Also, cautiousness about excessive focus on Russia has existed and has increased significantly with the new geopolitical setting: also in the future, putting “all eggs into one basket” should be avoided. Finally, the pragmatic approach has so far shielded CBC on the ground from the potential effects of geopolitical tensions, but it is an important message for higher-level policy making that the continuity of EU-funded programmes is essential: the EU plays a facilitating role in a variety of ways, e.g. funding and trade regulations, but especially without the incentives from the ENPI (ENI) programmes much less CBC would take place in the border region.

References

EUBORDERREGIONS PROJECt, www.euborderregions.eu (Accessed: 01.11.2015)

FRITSCH, M., NÉMETH, S., PIIPPONEN, M., YAROVOY, G. (2015): Whose partnership? Regional participatory arrangement in CBC programming on the Finnish-Russian border. European Planning Studies, published online 19/10/2015, DOI: 10.1080/09654313.2015.1096916.

NÉMETH, S., FRITSCH, M., ESKELINEN, H., NIKIFOROVA, E. (2014): Cross-Border Co-operation and Interaction between Southeast Finland and its Neighbouring Russian Regions of Leningrad Oblast’ and St. Petersburg. Case Study Report. Euborderregions research project funded under the EU FP7 Programme. www.euborderregions.eu/research-content/case-studies (Accessed: 01.11.2015)

SCOTT, J., NÉMETH, S. (2015): Final Scientific Report of EUBORDERREGIONS: EU External Borders and the Immediate Neighbours. Analysing Regional Development Options through Policies and Practices of Cross-Border Cop-operation.

Indicators of Cross-Border Impact: Mental mapping, position-generator, and language skills. A methodological recommendation.

László Letenyei, András Morauszki[3]

Introduction

The European Union spent 6 milliard Euros on supporting cross-border cooperation in the 2007-2013 programming period. During the current development programme, which ends in 2020, another 6.6 milliard Euros have been secured for this purpose.[4] Examining the effects of projects sponsored by these programmes is therefore justified. However, it is our opinion that indicators drawing upon the changing numbers in enterprises and jobs, and upon various markers of equality, are not suitable for gauging the indirect effects these projects exerted on society, yet these are the indicators used so far. The purpose of the eMMAP project has been to create a measuring tool that facilitates measurement of the direct social effects of cross-border cooperation support. The measuring tool is composed of three elements:

1.      Mental mapping

2.      Estimating social capital

3.      Examining language skills

In designing the measuring tool, it was important that it should be suitable for paper-based questionnaires and surveys conducted online or via poll-takers. Therefore, the measuring tool has been created in two versions, according to the respective requirements of both methods. For online surveys, an ‘Online Mapping System’ has been designed within the project. This system implements the above mentioned methodologies and can be used flexibly. Both cross-sectional and longitudinal examinations can be done with the recommended measuring tools to gauge the effectiveness of cross-border programmes.We have demonstrated the suitability of both methodology and tool for gauging the direct social effects of cross-border support programmes in a pilot study. The pilot study consisted of a paper-based and an online part. Research with a paper-based survey was conducted on four sites close to the border: Esztergom and Mosonmagyaróvár in Hungary, and Párkány (Štúrovo) and Somorja (Šamorín) in Slovakia. The sample consisted of 500 people in total, 125 people filled out the questionnaire on each site.

The pilot study’s other part was conducted with the help of a newly developed ‘Online Mental Map Editor’ software, on a sample of Hungarian and Slovakian enterprises. The online sample consisted of 500 people (250 Hungarians, 250 Slovakians, company close to the border). In both countries, the survey was conducted in many phases: first, we sent the questionnaires by email to a list of addresses, then (if there was no reply) we augmented the data through a series of phone interviews. In this case we cannot speak of a representative sample, our goal was to prove the software’s applicability.

Mental mapping

The method of mental mapping is based on the fact that using space redraws the actual image of that particular space in our minds, and affects what we perceive as near or distant, our own or alien. Mental or cognitive mapping “is a process composed of a series of psychological transformations by which an individual acquires, codes, stores, recalls and decodes information about (…) his everyday spatial environment.” (Down, Stea 1973, quoted in Letenyei 2006, 149). The method of mental mapping is suitable for collecting and interpreting maps in people’s minds. Some subjective elements of consciousness are shared by many individuals: orientation points, routes, boundaries. The mental map being created captures one part of the space, as seen from one or more persons’ points of view, and thus reflects the mental perceptions of these persons. Interpretation can take the form of a database or a graph, a map. (Letenyei 2006). Collection of data can take many forms:

1.      purely quantitative form

2.      purely qualitative, not drawing-based form

3.      freely drawn maps, aided by free recall of images

4.      map drawing with the purpose of standardisation

5.      can be based on existing images or maps

However, regardless of the method used, two types of date are collected:

1.      information pertaining to the area (Lynch 1960):

a.      names and extent of mental spaces

b.      borderlines, boundaries

c.       orientation points, landmarks

d.      routes

e.      junctions

2.      data reflecting the interviewee’s opinion

a.      their familiarity with the elements on the mental map

b.      cognitive elements pertaining to the area (opinions, stereotypes)

c.       data pertaining to the interviewee

The measuring tool we recommend consists of two parts: first, we urge the interviewee to come up with geographical data through free recall (kötetlen felidézés), then we ask them to identify these on a map. The next part of research is called oriented recall, during which the results of free recall are placed on a common platform. As part of quantitative data collection, we asked participants to name mental spaces, that is, places where they had been most often. We asked more questions about these places. Furthermore, participants could name five more places they had visited (three, in online surveys).

Referring to the place they named first, we asked them how many times they had been there, what they thought of people living there, and whether they could imagine spending a few weeks there on holiday, or living and working there for a few years. Next, we asked the participant to give us a mental tour of the place, naming landmarks and sights. Thus we could establish how well the interviewee knew the place. We also asked participants to describe a longer journey they made into a neighbouring country, name their starting point, destination, a place they travelled through, and junctions or landmarks.

The fundamental step of paper-based survey was having participants draw a map on white paper (with free recall method). Mental spaces specified had to be marked on a hand drawn map of a neighbouring country, along with anything else the participants wanted to mark. The computer’s algorithm was somewhat different, and used a combination of free és oriented recall. We targeted each mental space element three times:

1.      through free recall

2.      through a multiple-choice identification of the element recalled freely

3.      identifying the element on the map.

For instance, when we wanted to know which country a participant from Slovakia had visited more often, we used a three-step method. First we asked for free recall: which Hungarian town or village have you visited most frequently? The written answer, in our experience, mostly (though not always) referred to the question. In this case, for example, although the question explicitly asked for a town or village, most answers simply said “Balaton”, meaning the participant had been on holiday somewhere around Lake Balaton; or “Pest” which could mean either Budapest or any district in Budapest (which is not Buda) or County Pest. During free recall, people sometimes name a town or mental space which has not appeared on any official list of Hungarian geographic list of place names for a long time (e.g. Hard which has been part of Németkér for some time). As a next step we asked the interviewee to choose the place he meant from a list. At this point, the algorithm offers a few names from ones typed in previously, but the entire list of Hungarian place names can be searched, similarly to GPS devices. Ideally, the participant can point to the place he had in mind (e.g. specify Balatonfüred if he’d said Balaton, Budapest for Pest, Németkér for Hard). In other cases, this does not happen (e.g. Hard remains Hard, or the participant cannot name a specific town or village near Balaton as they’d been to a different one every year on holiday).

Finally, the participant was asked to mark the mental space category named at step 1. on a map. Together, steps 2 and 3 work as control questions to a degree (does the participant know what is the official name of the place where he’d been most frequently, and where it is situated). The finished questionnaires are available on the research project’s website: www.emmap.org

Position generator

As a social effect of projects supporting cross-border cooperation, people living on opposite sides of the border interact more frequently, and the density of their social networks increases with the appearance of cross-border connections. To gauge interviewees’ cross-border social connections, we chose the so-called position generator method (Lin, Dumin 1986; Lin, Fu, Hsung 2001). With this method, the participant has to tell if he knows people in different professions. The method enables us to ask further questions about these people (as was the case in the pilot study), such as whether the nature of their acquaintanceship was personal or functional, but we can ask about other features of these connections. The method of position generator is more suitable for assessing the connections of individuals living near the border than other methods which examine egocentric networks of connections (name generator, power-source generator)

The name generator method is based on examining certain close relationships of the participant. Questions refer typically to connections the participant feels are the closest (Wellman 1979), people with whom the participant shares important problems (Marsden 1987), people from whom they can ask for help (Fischer 1982). Beyond naming such connections, the participant has to answer further questions relating to people they have named, questions referring to gender, age, ethic/national background, profession, etc. Since this makes answering questions put by the name generator is relatively time consuming, the method is only suitable for assessing a restricted number of relationships. Since the extent of an average person’s circle of acquaintances can run to hundreds of people, the name generator is less suitable for examining the composition and diversity of personal networks, and more appropriate to assess so-called strong connections (Granovetter 1973; Lin, Erickson 2008b)

With the resource generator method (Snijders 1999; Van der Gaag, Snijders 2005) participants are asked about different resources they have access to through their connections: for example, is there anyone they know who can repair cars, owns a car, speaks foreign languages, is involved in politics, owns a holiday home abroad, is knowledgeable in financial matters, can give medical advice, is able to lend a substantial amount of money. As can be seen from this list, the number of relevant resources is big, and in many cases it is impossible to define relevant resources, since these can change depending on situations in life, cultures, and geographical areas. Therefore, this method, albeit suitable for mapping weak bonds (Granovetter 1973), is not without problems when applied in practice. At the same time, these resources often centralize in certain social positions, which supports the point of applying the resource generator, as does the fact that van der Gaag, Snijders & Flap (2008) have shown that there is a strong correlation between the results of the resource generator and the position generator. Therefore, the more easily applicable position generator can substitute the resource generator.

International experience points to the reliability and validity of the position generator method, and the fact that it works well in combination with other data collecting methods, thus it is applicable in both face-to-face and online surveys. The fact that answering one batch of questions takes up relatively little time, and thus participants are more willing to provide answers, is another advantage. The position generator has been used successfully in many countries with diverse cultures, which means adapting the method internationally is perfectly possible (Lin, Erickson 2008b).

Examples of international applications of position generator items (based on Lin–Erickson 2008, edited by authors)

van der Gaag – Snijders – Flap (Netherlands)

Fu (Taiwan)

Bian (China)

Lin – Ao (USA)

Johnson (Mongolia)

Angelusz – Tardos (Hungary)

Lawyer

Physician

Scientist

Professor

Politician

Engineer

Doctor

Lawyer

Government official

Lawyer

Big business owner

Entrepreneur

Policymaker

Owner of large firm

Accountant

CEO

Doctor

Manager/director

Engineer

Assemblyman/woman

Cook

Congressman

Lawyer

High school teacher

Information technologist

Manager of large firm

College teacher

Production manager

Foreign agency worker

Accountant

Manager

High school teacher

School teacher

Middle school teacher

Foreign company worker

Lawyer

Director of a company

Division head

Clerk

Personnel manager

Government worker

Actor/actress

Trade union manager

Reporter

Industrial worker

Writer

Bank worker

Journalist

Scientist

Nurse

Engineer

Nurse

Lama

Scientist

Higher civil servant

Owner of small firm

Party official

Computer programmer

Teacher

Politician

Estate agent

Policeman/woman

Police

Administrative assistant

Librarian

Physician

Mechanic

Electrician/plumber

Salesperson

Accountant

Nurse

Banker

Teacher

Truck driver

Legal staff

Policeman

Small business owner

Boutique owner

Police officer

Office workman/guard

Manager

Farmer

Taxicab driver

Businessman

Secretary

Housemaid, cleaning worker

Nurse

Receptionist

Small kiosk owner

Guard

Insurance agent

Waiter/waitress

Operator in a factory

Waiter/waitress

Waiter/waitress

Bookkeeper/accountant

Physician

Hair dresser

Housecleaner

Skilled worker

Musician/artist/writer

Business professional

Taxi driver

Factory worker

Nurse

Chauffeur

Security guard

Unskilled worker

Engine driver

Domestic worker

Housemaid

Driver

Hairdresser

Janitor

Farmer

Cook

Hotel bell

Local council employee

Farmer

Sales person

Foreman

Railroad worker

Postman

Truck driver

Sales employee

Cleaner

Unskilled labourer

Construction worker

List of the position generator’s question items measuring service preferences and entrepreneurial networks

Position generator items

(Do you know a…)

Preferred services

(Do you have a favourite…)

Entrepreneurial networks

(Do you know a/an…)

1.     plumber

15. tractor driver

1.     coffee shop, bars?

1.     company with a similar profile to yours?

2.     engineer

16. domestic help

2.     taxi service

2.     lawyer (company profile)

3.     educator

17. car mechanic

3.     bakery

3.     accountant

4.     lawyer/judge

18. CEO

4.     pharmacy

4.     company site (that can be registered)

5.     nurse

19. council employee

5.     gas station

5.     accommodation (hotel, inn)

6.     small business

20. dentist

6.     restaurant

6.     free accommodation

7.     doctor

21. unskilled worker

7.     town

7.     car rental company

8.     journalist, reporter

22. IT professional / system manager

8.     village

8.     leasing company

9.     hairdresser

9.     internet provider*

9.     IT professional / system manager

10. representative / government official in a senior position

10. mobile phone provider

10. social insurance administrator

11. electrician

11. notary

12. priest/minister

12. potential employee

13. stone mason

13. potential market (retailer, etc.)

14. policeman

14. supplier

When selecting positions, an effort should be made to select those which are suitable for assessing the diversity of the participant’s network along both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of social structure. At the same time, we should strive to include positions in the survey options which are relevant in the specific circumstances, that is, for the people living in cross-border areas. These positions, as we have indicated above, do not represent merely different segments of social structure. They also represent resources the participant may want to access. Most of the positions we recommend also appear in accessible international studies (see studies in Lin, Erickson 2008a.), and we provide further positions we regard as relevant. We did not include every position featuring in international research studies in our survey, since we did not believe them to be relevant in the context of assessing cross-border impact. For example, we do not think it is relevant to include flexible and traditional work schedules among the horizontal dimensions of social structure, or the equal representation of all milieus. However, milieus identified by Róbert Angelusz and Róbert Tardos (2008) (managerial/professional, public sector/cultural intelligentsia, market-based/service sector, working class/urban and agricultural/rural milieus) are each represented by at least one position.

As in the case of the position generator, we recommend that attitudes to different services should be assessed: participants are asked to name their favourite service types and places (town, village) from the list, both in the country where the survey is conducted and in the neighbouring country. Furthermore, participants are asked to indicate how often they avail themselves of these. In the case of entrepreneurs, these questions should be supplemented with similar ones targeted at accessing resources relevant specifically to the company. The questions referring to services and entrepreneurial connections are an innovation of this project, no other research has employed them so far.

Language skills

The proposed measuring tool’s third component measures how proficient people are in the official language of the neighbouring country. As an innovation, the project measures familiarity with the language of the neighbouring country with the help of a word list. The list is used to examine active and passive vocabulary and visual recognition contains words (and accompanying images) which are relevant for people travelling to neighbouring countries: primarily certain services, public institutions, expressions relating to transport and traffic, and related pictures. These are expressions one can come across in public places, can be acquired during frequent visits to the country in question even if the visitor does not speak the local language at all. Furthermore, these concepts play an important role in getting about, from using maps to asking for directions.

Items of scale measuring language skills in Hungarian and Slovakian (items in italics only appear in the paper-based questionnaire, items in bold appear in the online survey, too)

Hungarian

Slovakian

English

1.

rendőrség

polícia

police

2.

közjegyző

notár

notary

3.

(vasút)állom ás

železničná stanica

train station

4.

vonat

vlak

train

5.

kórház/rendelőintézet

nemocnica/poliklinika

hospital

6.

bankautomata/ATM

bankomat

ATM

7.

gyógyszertár

lekáreň

pharmacy

8.

posta

pošta

post office

9.

étterem/fogadó

reštaurácia/reštaurant/hostinec

restaurant

10.

színház

divadlo

theatre

11.

iskola

škola

school

12.

templom

kostol

church

13.

élelmiszerüzlet/közért

potraviny

grocery

14.

tér

námestie

square

15.

mozi

kino

cinema

16.

szálloda

hotel

hotel

17.

utca

ulica

street

18.

megálló

zastávka

(bus) stop

19.

városháza/községháza

mestský úrad/obecný úrad/radnica

town hall

20.

könyvtár

knižnica

library

21.

kávézó

kaviareň

café

22.

orvos

lekár/doctor

doctor

23.

újságárus

novinový stánok/predavač novín

newsstand

24.

művelődési ház/kultúrház

osvetové stredisko/kultúrny dom/dom kultúry

community centre

25.

benzinkút

čerpacia stanica/benzínka/benzínová pumpa

petrol station

26.

kocsma

krčma

pub

This list contains words both rarely and frequently used, public institutions, services, buildings, and transport vehicles mentioned both rarely and frequently, along with loanwords and words which differ from the corresponding expressions of popular international languages. Therefore, the list is suitable to measure a wide scale of language proficiency. The list does not contain words connected to private life or words which participants may or may not have come across, depending on the participant’s particular situation, taste, preferences, and other idiosyncrasies (consumer items, food items, animals or plants). In case a word has more forms in use, such as one official and one popular version, it is practical to list these in surveys conducted by poll-takers.

Answering the poll-taker’s questions, the interviewee first has to translate words in the language of the country where the survey was conducted, into the language of the neighbouring country. This was to test the participant’s active vocabulary. Next came testing the passive vocabulary: words not included in the active vocabulary had to be translated from the language of the neighbouring country into the language of the survey-hosting country. Finally, the interviewee was expected to recognize what the images accompanying the expressions which do not feature either in their active or in their passive vocabulary. At compiling the book of images, it was an important factor that the picture should have been made in the neighbouring country. This way, we could decide if the participant could recognize buildings and institutions of the neighbouring country by certain characteristics, such as exterior, plaques, and inscriptions.

To prevent problems arising from typos in the online survey, instead of asking the participant to type in the translated word, it makes sense to ask them to choose from a list the one word they think corresponds to the word or picture given by the survey. There should be words with the same spelling and words with similar meaning among the incorrect answers. The process of measuring vocabulary is the same as in the case of paper-based survey: first, we examine active vocabulary, next passive vocabulary, and finally, we examine visual recognition.

It is important that assessing language skills should be supplemented by a control question in the last group of questions of the survey, through which first language and other spoken foreign languages can be isolated from the effect of visits to the neighbouring country. This is particularly important in cases of large numbers of minorities living close to the border whose language is the same as the official language of the neighbouring country.

Information regarding interviewees

In the final part of the survey, we have questions relating to the interviewee or, in case of companies, the company. In order of keeping the questions internationally comparable, we used ones included in international assessments, such as in assessing education and subjective personal income. For assessing education levels, in the interest of keeping results internationally comparable, the number of school grades passed was also taken into account besides the highest acquired qualification. We included one of the commonly used questions of the European Social Survey for the subjective evaluation of incomes.

As a methodological innovation, for the latter we formulated indirect questions for which we hoped participants would not refuse to give answers at the rate of other surveys on income. One of these hidden indicator questions asked the participant to give an estimate of how much a family with two children spend on Christmas presents (or, in summer, on their summer holiday). An indirect indicator of assets is asking the participant to give an estimate of house prices in the area where they live.

Rejected research questions

As we were designing the survey, we considered but ultimately rejected using the so-called Bogardus-scale. This scale, measuring social distances and often used in research programmes focusing on interethnic relationships and areas close to the border (Bogardus 1933) is an accepted form of gauging attitudes to individuals of different ethnicity, nationality, or skin colour. It has been used in a number of international studies. Participants declare what is the nearest relationship they deem acceptable to maintain with people of certain features (e.g. nationality) – such as family, neighbour, resident of the same country, tourist visiting the country, etc.

Nevertheless, because of the singular ethnic composition of the cross-border areas of our research, we deemed the Bogardus-scale to be less suitable to provide a valid measurement of people’s attitudes to those living across the border. One of the main reasons for this is that setting up relevant ethnic-national categories is problematic in a situation where the presence of in-between, mixed identities alongside obvious categories, and the potentially diverse interpretations of “Hungarian” and “Slovakian” identities given by participants make using this scale questionable. Furthermore, establishing the relevant categories regarding the scale’s international employability raises many problems. The general extent and dimensions of a person’s prejudices are less relevant questions for our subject.

References

ANGELUSZ, R., TARDOS, R. (2008): Assessing Social Capital and Attainment Dynamics: Position Generator Applications in Hungary, 1987-2003. In: Lin, N., Erickson, B. H. (eds.): Social capital: An International Research Program. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 394–420.

BOGARDUS, E. S. (1933): A Social Distance Scale. Sociology & Social Research, Vol. 17, pp. 265-271.

DOWNS, R. M., STEA, D. (eds.) (1973): Image and environment: cognitive mapping and spatial behavior. Aldin Publishing Company, Chicago

FISCHER, C. S. (1982): To Dwell among Friends: Personal Networks in Town and City. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

VAN DER GAAG, M. P. J., SNIJDERS, T. A. B., FLAP, H. D. (2008): Position Generator measures and their relationship to other social capital measures. In: Lin, N., Erickson, B. H. (eds.): Social capital: An International Research Program. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 27–48.

GRANOVETTER, M. (1973): The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78. No. 6, pp. 1360-1380.

LETENYEI L. (eds.) (2006): Településkutatás I. TeTT könyvek, Budapest

LIN, N., DUMIN, M. (1986): Access to Occupations Through Social Ties. Social Networks, Vol. 8. No. 4, pp. 365-385.

LIN, N., ERICKSON, B. H. (eds.) (2008): Social Capital: An International Research Program. Oxford University Press, Oxford

LIN, N., ERICKSON, B. H. (2008): Theory, Measurement, and the Research Enterprise on Social Capital. In: Lin, N., Erickson, B. H. (eds.): Social Capital: An International Research Program. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1-26.

LIN, N., FU, Y., HSUNG, R. (2001): The Position Generator: Measurement Techniques for Social Capital. In: Lin, N., Cook, K., Burt, R. S. (eds.): Social Capital: Theory and Research. Aldine de Gruyter, New York, pp. 57–81.

LYNCH, K. (1960): The Image of the City. MIT Press, Cambridge

MARSDEN, P. V. (1987): Core Discussion Networks of Americans. American Sociological Review, Vol. 52. No. 1, pp. 122-131.

WELLMAN, B. (1979): The Community Question: The Intimate Networks of East Yorkers. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 84. No. 5, pp. 1201-1231.

IV. WORKSHOPS

Cross-border territorial monitoring

Márton Pete (2014)

Originally published as: Pete M. (2014): Határon átnyúló területi monitoring. Területi statisztika, ISSN 0018-7828 , 2014. 17.(54.): 6. p. pp. 623-626.

The 2nd seminar on Cross-Border Territorial Observation was held on 30th September, 2014 at the French Institute of Budapest, organized by the Central European Service for Cross-Border Initiatives (CESCI) with the support of the Hungarian Ministry of Public Administration and Justice along with that of the French Institute.

The territorial cohesion of the European Union does not only require the opening of the internal borders together with the removal of legal and administrative barriers but also the correct measurement and analysis of the integration process, based on objective data. At the same time the publication of statistical data is basically a national competence, therefore the territorial units and the timing of data collection, as well as its methodology are largely different in each countries. However, the differences largely hinder the evaluation of territorial, economic and social processes on European level, moreover datasheets rarely reflect on phenomena which move beyond domestic frameworks e.g. cross-border movements.

Although Eurostat collects data on EU Member States (and on some non-member countries) on the basis of a uniform methodology, the relatively narrow circle and low currency of available data, on the one hand, and the dominance of inadequate territorial levels (NUTS-2 and NUTS-3) in data collection from the point of view of the evaluation of local cross-border interactions, on the other hand, are important concerns. The revelation of processes referring to the deepening of the European social and economic integration above state borders presupposes the high level harmonisation of the production, collection and analysis of statistical data. Nevertheless, this is unthinkable without the cooperation of the appropriate institutions of statistics and spatial planning.

The first seminar on Cross-Border Territorial Observation was held in Nancy in 2012, , initiated by the Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière (MOT; FR), the Interministerial Delegation for Territorial Development and Regional Attractiveness (DATAR; FR) and the National Federation of the Public Urban Planning Agencies (FNAU; FR). At the conference, the participating countries (France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy) agreed on the establishment of a working committee responsible for the harmonisation of the statistical data collected in border regions.

The aim of the event in Budapest was to expand the process launched by the first seminar to the area of Central and Eastern Europe. The evaluation of cross-border interactions is highly topical within the macroregion. The average size of countries is much smaller than in Western Europe and the number of borders is significantly higher, moreover they constituted almost impenetrable barriers in the decades of socialism between the neighbouring countries. The EU accession not only enabled the former socialist countries the opening up of these physical barriers but also brought about the opportunity to the joint exploitation of local resources and locational advantages as well. However, strategic planning necessitates the objective interpretation and evaluation of these given conditions and spontaneous processes, based on a wide range of statistical indicators.

In this respect, the seminar aimed at raise awareness in relevant actors from the macroregion, such as data collecting, planning and decision making institutions, on the importance of the harmonisation of territorial data collection, and also attempted to lay the ground for the cooperation of Central and Eastern European countries among themselves and with older Member States as well. The first and foremost tool for this was the presentation of best practise examples of cross-border cooperation on territorial statistics from Western Europe.

As the first point on the agenda the participants were welcomed by Gyula Ocskay, Secretary General, in the name of the organizers, and by the deputies of the principal supporters of the event, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (according to the changes occurred in the governmental structure) from the governmental side and the French Institute of Budapest from the host side. Moreover, both of the two most important Europe-wide professional organizations in cross-border cooperation, the Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière (MOT; FR) and the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR; DE) were represented by their Secretary Generals. Both of them insisted that the success of cross-border cooperation must be measurable, so to prove for European decision makers that it worth to support cross-border cooperation from community funds.

In the course of the first panel experts from different professional fields were raising awareness about the problems resulting from the lack of appropriate comparable data and territorial monitoring, thereby underpinning the importance of statistical cooperation initiatives and identifying the most important target areas of data collection and processing.

Difficulties in data acquisition occurring during scientific research projects were interpreted by Professor James Wesley Scott, executive secretary of Association of Borderlands Studies. He insisted, that though scientific researches always must begin with the identification of methodology and necessary statistical data, according his experiences, this latter element is rarely at disposal without any gap, therefore each project need to handle this problem. Moreover, local specificities ought to receive special emphasis in territorial analyses, this is however not feasible with only using statistical indicators, the harmonisation of quantitative and qualitative methods is indispensable.

The introduction of the activities of General Directorate for Equal Opportunities between Territories (CGET; FR) enabled the participants to understand the position of a governmental agency. The institution is not only involved in statistical data generation but also in its collection, and active professional partnerships are established both with international (e.g Eurostat) and national statistical institutions, as well as with various operators, such as with French railways (SNCF).

Mátyás Jaschitz, Director of Planning at Central European Service for Cross-Border Initiatives (CESCI; HU) assessed the concerns of statistical information from the aspect of cross-border strategic planning. Data is essential for planning, however several problems occur such as the lack or inaccessibility of statistical indicators as well as their incompatibility. Statistical data collected according to different national methodologies likely lead to false conclusions in the analysis of border regions whilst appropriate maps would certainly reflect many regional problems.

Evidence-based strategic planning is also important at the allocation of development resources, mainly those of the EU INTERREG funding for a more efficient use. This was underpinned by the words of representative of INTERACT Viborg, who reflected at the importance of territorial monitoring through the experiences of the ex-post evaluation of the INTERREG III program. An informational website (KEEP) was launched in the aftermath of the evaluation, targeting the introduction of projects implemented in the framework of INTERREG, based on statistical data. This online database is however yet unbalanced, as for its territorial and thematic scope as well.

In the framework of the second panel already implemented ideas and projects were introduced which can be considered as best practice examples for cross-border territorial monitoring and data collection and proved to be inspiring according to the feedback of the audience.

The first presentation introduced a statistical atlas, completed within the framework of a Spanish-Portuguese partnership. The content of the atlas covers the areas of Galicia and Northern Portugal and was published on a yearly basis between 1995 and 2003, as well as between 2010 and 2012, therefore not only the current situation can be shown, but also long-term trends may also be recognized. A further emphasis was given to be kept in mind in the course of the editorial work, that the atlas may only contain comparable statistical indicators from the two sides of the border.

Another best practice example was the Örestat Model, which was established in 1998, so to observe the intensifying cross-border economic and social interactions in the Denmark-Sweden border region, which ultimately led to the construction of the Öresund Bridge in 2000. The creation of the database was eased by the basically similar statistical systems of the Scandinavian countries, but was largely hindered by administrative, methodological and financial concerns.

The third and probably most spectacular best practice project was the SIGRS-GISOR geographical information system, which is the result of a more than four decade long French-German-Swiss cooperation and covers the area of the Upper Rhine Valley. The project itself was launched in 1999 and both the creation of the structural background and the completion of the database took several years each. However, the practical application of the system has only recently been accomplished. Its usefulness was demonstrated through a range of thematic maps, which also contributed to the publication of several studies and the creation the expert platforms.

All the presentations on these three above informational systems mentioned the problem of financing, a major concern for the operators of these systems. Their establishment was largely based on INTERREG/ETC funds, however the maintenance of the finalised systems cannot count on community support anymore, according to the European Council. Therefore, the need for financing may require the involvement of alternative financial tools in the near future.

A possible solution for this problem, the LOCATOR geo-information system was introduced in the last presentation of the session by the representatives of the Regional development agency for the Technology Region Aachen. This application was elaborated for companies aiming to invest in the area of the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion, therewith to find the most appropriate location for their activities. The profit of this service is supposed to cover the costs of the system. The completion of the structure of the application took 45 months and was finished by the summer of 2014. However, according to its authors, the full operativeness of the application needs another five years. As a result of its market orientation, the system will likely not be appropriate for scientific purposes.

The speakers of the closing panel reflected on how community-level regional policy and cross-border territorial monitoring can support each other in the near future.

The presentation of the MOT on the Nancy initiative (2012) enabled the participants to have an insight on the importance of cross-border monitoring from the point of view of France. The borders of the country are crossed daily by around 360 000 commuters, though this phenomenon and many others remained invisible for a long time for policy makers. The Nancy initiative managed to form a strategic committee and a technical working group later on, aiming at the revelation of the cross-border relevance of some priority areas such as R+D, healthcare and the above mentioned labour market, respectively.

The subsequent steps in Community regional policy were supposed to be made under the Italian, Latvian and Luxemburgish presidencies. The notions of the Luxemburgish presidency were briefly presented by government counsellor Jean-Claude Sinner. An important goal would be the quality turn in the fields of territorial cohesion and urban policy, besides the evaluation of the long-term tendencies of INTERREG, as it already celebrates its 25 years in 2015.

As a closure for this session Nathalie Verschelde from the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy of the European Commission provided with a summary on the expected future role of the INTERREG programme. The continuation of the programme is by all means essential, as it has already important goals. However, it is not favourable when its support plays a decisive role, instead it should rather stimulate local energies. There are some fine examples for this, which should be investigated and taken into consideration when elaborating future development ideas.

This moment, namely the importance of the adoption of best practices is likely the most important conclusion of the conference for the actors of Central and Eastern Europe. The above case study projects which reflect the results of several decades of cooperation mean good models for the new Member States for the establishment of partnerships in the field of statistics, which may then contribute to the increasing efficiency of the INTERREG Programme and therewith to that of the Community regional policy.

The 1st Berlin Border Seminar, 8th-11th of November 2014, Berlin (Germany)

Martin Barthel

On the 9th of November 2014, Berlin celebrated the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The celebration included a 15 kilometer-long art installation with 8000 illuminated balloons that recreating the contours of the former wall within the cityscape. The so-called border of lights marked the most spectacular event celebrating the anniversary.

The Berlin based think-tank Comparative Research Network (CRN) organized together with the VERA Centre for Russian and Border studies at the University of Eastern Finland (UEF) and the Dag Hammarskjöld University College for Diplomacy and international relations in Zagreb an academic highlight dedicated to memorize the fall of the wall.

The aim of the Berlin Border Seminar was to provide young scholars a forum to discuss their border related research papers with experienced practitioners in the field. The academic discussion was adjoined by excursions which had been concentrated on the history of the Berlin Wall as state and system border, it's visible and invisible marks on the cityscape and current discourses on the border regimes of the European Union.

The keynotes concentrated on different aspects of the 25th Anniversary. Dr. Paul Fryer, from the Department for Geographical Studies at the UEF revisited the field of Soviet studies and emphasized on the reoccurring relevance of the field in the context of the Ukrainian Crisis. Prof. James Scott, director of the Comparative Research Network, spoke about border making as an urban daily practices. He included samples of place making and bordering from Berlin in his presentation. Prof. Ilkka Liikanen, director of VERA, talked about the changing relevance of borders in post-socialistic context. Martin Barthel, Head of Programme at CRN presented a paper on the remaining significance of the Berlin Wall on the identity of the city. Dr. Beatrix Haselsberger of the Vienna University of Technology presented her research on decoding borders.

The thematic sessions summarized a wide variety of border related topics from different disciplines and geographic areas. Regional case studies had been given by Dr. Reza Kheyroddin and Mehdi Razpour (Iran University of Science and Technology, Teheran) who talked about the Iranian/Iraqi Border region, Mehmonsho Sharifov (University of Bergen), focused on Tajikistan, Lucas Fulgencio (institute of Social Studies, The Hague) on the intra-southern migration between Mozambique and South Africa and Krisztina La-Torre presented a paper on cross-border trade at the Hungarian-Ukrainian border.

A special session was dedicated to the border issues within Poland. Ewelina Barthel (Jagielonian University Kraków) spoke about cross-border commuting in the area of Szczecin. Stanislaw Domaniewski (UEF) presented current issues at the border to Kaliningrad. Jan Smutek (University Szczecin) compared the international cooperation of Polish cities and Alicja Fajfer (UEF) spoke about the linguistic identity of Slavic minorities in Poland.

The session on border theory was moderated by Dr. Joni Virkkunen (Head of Research at VERA), he was followed by Miika Raudaskoski (UEF), who presented changing concepts of the Finnish Eastern Border followed by Aaron Waggoner (University of El Paso). His presentation conceptualized religion, gender and development in the context of the global borderlands. Virpi Kaisto (University of Lappeenranta) talked about methods to study borders from a spatial point of view just before Zvonimir Zavecki (Dag Hammarskjöld) concluded the session with reflections on Mackinder’s geopolitical viewpoints.

The final session was moderated by Dr. Goran Bandov, the vice-dean of the Dag Hamarskjöld University College and was assigned for borders in former Yugoslavia. Polona Sitar (Slovenian Academy of Science and Arts) presented her research on cross-border shopping in former Yugoslavia and Giuseppe Pichecha compared the policies in multiethnic Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

Thanks to the involvement of Prof. Cengiz Demir, chief editor of the International Journal of Contemporary Economic and Administrative Studies (IJCEAS) selected papers from the seminar will be published in a special edition in spring 2016.

The scientific presentations created the academic frame of the seminar. The frame was filled with fruitful discussions and exchanges on the papers but as well thematic excursions along the former wall strip. Visits to the official wall memorial and an exhibition in a former border checkpoint provided a historic overview and hands-on insights on the current memory discourses. A second excursion was dedicated to the current situation of the wall strip. The excursion uncovered socio-economic trends in the city (as segregation and gentrification), the state of the reunification, the importance of the wall for the collective identity of Berlin and last but not least discourses on de-and re-bordering in Europe.

Overall more than 30 scholars from 15 countries made the seminar a fruitful event, which will be repeated in 2016. The fall of the wall might be 25 years away, but the remaining impact of the wall was not just felt in the city but as well during the seminar.

V.   PROCEEDINGS

Association for Borderland Studies 1st World Conference

9-13 June 2014, Joensuu, Finland – St. Petersburg, Russia

Jussi Laine

The Association for Borderland Studies’ first-ever World Conference was held on June 9-13 in Joensuu, Finland and St. Petersburg, Russia. The event was hosted by the VERA Centre for Russian and Border Studies at the University of Eastern Finland in cooperation with the Centre for Independent Social Research and the European University at St. Petersburg, Russia.  While the Association was initially formed in 1976 by scholars focussed upon the United States-Mexico borderlands, it was decided in 2012 that it had become necessary to renew some of the traditional logistical and organizational practices in order to better accommodate the ever more international and diverse membership base. Rather than merely initiating yet another competing border conference series among dozens of established and high profile events, the goal was to provide a gathering not tied to one specific location, which can bring together various scholarly networks and the wider border studies community.

The basic premise of the first ABS World Conference was that while all the borders throughout the world are prone to the same global phenomena, there are various different context specific responses to these trends. All borders are unique. Talking about borders in general fashion thus obscures more than it illuminates.  As verified, for example, by recent developments in Ukraine, the issue of borders, their functions and changing significance and symbolism presently looms larger than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The commonplace of global de-bordering, supported by optimistic notions of globalization and a new post-Cold War world order, has succumbed to the reality of increasing complexity and instability in the world system. We can recognize global megatrends that are changing the nature of borders while, at the same time, there are obviously different regional responses and counter tendencies in these trends that we need to pay attention to in our work.

The ABS World Conference offered a weeklong program bringing together an interdisciplinary cohort of not just academics, but also representatives of government agencies, other public bodies and NGOs from the Americas, Asia, Africa, Australasia and Europe. While the official conference program did not commence until the Monday morning, a number of pre-conference events took place during the preceding weekend. In the afternoon of June 7, after the closure of the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) Executive Committee meeting, a videoconference took place with CBC promoters in other continents to commemorate the “African Borders Day” and in order to support the proposal of declaration of 7th of June (Day of African Borders) as the International Day of Integration across National Boundaries. Participants from South and Central America, Africa, the EU and the Russian-Ukrainian borders connected with Joensuu via videoconference, where a number of AEBR and ABS representatives had the chance to participate as well. The videoconference was monitored by the AEBR Secretary General, Martin Guillermo Ramírez, and streamed from the premises of the Regional Council of Northern Karelia. Dr. Jussi Laine delivered a statement and greetings on behalf of the ABS and the upcoming World conference organizers during the videoconference. The participants of the videoconference decided to send a letter to the heads of states, requesting support for the initiative to propose the General Assembly of the United Nations the establishment of 7th of June as the International Day of Integration across National Boundaries. The participant considered that the relevance of this initiative was not only symbolic, but would also contains two significant factors. On the one hand, it is about the promotion of peace and understanding between neighbouring communities on both sides of national boundaries, but it is also about an African initiative to become global.

The cooperation between ABS and AEBR continued the following day, when a joint pre-conference Round Table Meeting “Co-operation between research community and regional actors in CBC was organized. A number of representatives from the Canadian led “Borders in Globalization” (BIG) project also took part in the event. The roundtable moderated by the ABS past-president Prof. Victor Konrad, Carleton University in Canada, rounded up 40-plus participants from the AEBR Executive Committee, representatives from the BIG project, local stakeholders as well as other participants of the ABS conference. It aimed to bring together stakeholder from the different sectors of the society to ponder, among other things, how high-level academic research on borders and cross-border cooperation could be translated in to practice for the benefit of the broader community, and which kind of methods and networks could be used for the common interests. The event concluded with lively discussion, a joint lunch and networking opportunities.

The official kick-off of the World conference took place on Monday, June 9, 2014. A conscious effort was made in both appealing to the Association’s past while looking towards a more expansive future in its plenary sessions. Speakers provided a marvellous cross-section of the potential of this gathering for the future. The opening ceremony consisted of the inaugural address as well as welcome words by the organizers, the Rector of the University of Eastern Finland, Dr. Tarja Cronberg from the European Parliament, and last but certainly not least by the President of the Association for Borderlands Studies, Dr. Martin van der Velde. It was followed by the first of the keynote presentations delivered by Prof. Oscar J. Martinez, producer of ground-breaking work on the US-Mexico borderlands as well as a founding member and a former president of ABS, who demonstrated the Association’s connections with its own past.

Another highlight of the first day was the concluding special plenary, in which Prof. Anssi Paasi (University of Oulu, Finland) and Prof. David Newman (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel) revisited their highly cited 1998 paper “Boundaries and Fences in a Postmodern World” published in Progress in Human Geography. Since then, the paper has become a seminal article in the emergence and renaissance of border studies, perhaps largely because its, then, revolutionary focus on the need to infuse the study of borders with new meanings in the light of the globalization debate, drawing on social and political theory well beyond the traditional geographical and political science focus on the topic. After the plenary session, Prof. Newman was presented with an award, marking his retirement from editing the Geopolitics after fifteen years, by his successor Dr. Virginie Mamadouh. Along with keynote presentations from two distinguished border scholars from Russia and Finland, Prof. Alexander Filippov (Higher School of Economics/Russian Academy of Sciences) and Prof. Anssi Paasi (University of Oulu), the organizers had invited presentations from acknowledged leaders in the field, Prof. Anne-Laure Amilhat Szary (Université Joseph Fourier) and Prof. Paul Nugent (University of Edinburgh). All the featured presentations pointed towards a bright future for border studies in different and exciting new ways.

The main substance of the conference was of course its parallel sessions, 111 in total. They were filled with presentations ranging from fascinating case studies to more theoretically inclined and methodological ones. The same globalization that has driven the expansion of the geographical spread of the association’s members and concerns was also visible in this decision to cross the border during the conference. Given the ABS’s devotion to the greater understanding of borders through multidisciplinary approaches and perspectives from all border contexts worldwide, the themes of the session provide a far-reaching cross-section of today’s border studies. The still-ongoing tug-of-war between Russia and Ukraine only underlined the importance and significance of what the conference sought to achieve, bringing home to everyone the importance of further work on the borders that exist between us and how they are functioning today, in a world crisscrossed by markers and means of inclusion and exclusion. However, the conflict caused a number of practical, last minute, complications. As a number of participants could not, or chose not, to get the Russian visa, several panels originally scheduled to be held on the Russian side had to be rescheduled for the first two days of the conference organized on the Finnish side. This obviously meant that the number of simultaneous parallel sessions was higher than planned, but fortunately the unexpectedly high participation rates guaranteed sufficient attendance in all of the rooms. On the Russian side, the sessions had to compete in popularity with the World Cup in Brazil, which happened to kick-off on the very same day the ABS conference moved to the Russian side. Despite the large screens conveniently placed in the every corner of the bar at the hotel the conference was held, there was no doubt that the sessions drew the longer straw.

The excitement and enthusiasm of the sessions on offer during the four days of the conference were matched by the more social sides of the occasion. These included a delightful reception generously hosted by Mayor of Joensuu in the city’s Art Museum. During the reception the three winners of the Student Paper Award were also announced. Another experience to remember was certainly the bus ride between the two venues taking six busloads of excited participants on an illuminating – though long – ride through the divided region of Karelia from Joensuu through Eastern Finland to the Russian metropolis of Saint Petersburg. Stops were made first on the Finnish side at Imatra and then in historic city Vyborg, which Finland lost to the Soviet Union during World War II in 1944. Getting a sizeable and highly international group of scholars across the strictly controlled border in an organized and timely fashion was of course the culmination point of that trip that had caused a lot of apprehensions during the months leading to the conference, especially given the contemporary geopolitical climate. The vigorous preparatory work paid off and the six busses crossed the border with relative ease, but not completely without problems. The impact of the contemporary political tensions was felt most tangibly by a Ukrainian participant, who was regrettably ultimately refused entry to Russia.

In all 537 proposals were received from 64 different countries. Due to the logistical, financial – as well as geopolitical – reasons, the actual numbers certainly came down from that a little bit, but still more than 420 participants from 53 countries made their way to the conference – far more than the 250 participants that organizers had anticipated.

In addition to individual participants, the aim of the conference was to bring together other relevant border studies networks to discuss issues of common concern. ABORNE – the African Borderlands Research Network, the Association of European Border Regions, the Finnish Association for Russian and East European Studies, and the Federation of Finnish Learned Societies contributed both financially as well as substantively to the conference. In addition to ABORNE chairman Prof. Nugent’s keynote address, ABORNE and the African Union Border Programme (AUBP) held a joint book launch of several recent volumes during the conference, and organized seven Africa-themed panels and round tables as part of the overall conference program.

In all, the first ABS World Conference did not only convene the largest and most representative gathering of border specialists from around the globe, but also this first international conference of its kind established a benchmark for the development and integration of border studies.

The Second EUBORDERSCAPES Conference: “Borders at the Interface”

December 8-11, 2014, Beer-Sheva (Israel)

Renen Yezersky and James Scott

Ben Gurion University in Beer-Sheva (Israel) organized and hosted the conference and workshop, "Borders at the Interface", during the second week of December 2014 (December 7-11). The conference was a result of productive cooperation between the FP7 consortium on Euroborderscapes, the newly founded Geopolitics Chair at Ben-Gurion University, along with three dynamic research centres at BGU, the Herzog Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, the Centre for the Study of European Politics and Society (CSEPS) and the Tamar Golan Centre for African Studies.

In its geopolitical context, Israel is located at the interface of three major regions – Europe, Asia and Africa. The region itself is the interface of cultures and the world’s great monotheistic religions, partly explaining the fact that it continues to be one of the world's largest geopolitical shatterbelts and the focus for ethnic, religious and territorial conflict. Against the backdrop of Israel’s unique context, the conference sessions dealt with contemporary border research in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, alongside sessions that were fully devoted to discussions about Israel’s borders and its relationship with Europe and its Arab neighbours (for  the full program of the conference[5]).

The conference incorporated two days of tours to Israeli border areas. On December 9th, conference participants visited the Israel-Jordan border and began the tour in the southern point of the Kinneret Lake (Sea of Galilee). An expert from "Friends of the Earth Middle East" (FoEME) introduced the participants of the conference to the complex geopolitical and environmental issues that impact he region’s trans-boundary environmental resources through an in-depth look at the Jordan River Valley.  Throughout the tour, the FoEME guide highlighted how sustainable management of the region’s natural resources can serve as a catalyst towards wider peacemaking efforts and how cooperative management frameworks can be part of a future settlement between Israel and Palestine. During the tour, participants visited several sites including: the old Gesher (the southern entrance to the Jordan River); the village Auja and the EcoCenter in it; and Kaser El-Yahud.  The group travelled back to Beer-Sheva through the Dead-Sea road and completed the day with a viewing of the movie “The Syrian Bride”.

On the last day of the conference (December 11th), participants took part in a field trip organized by “Ir Amim” focusing on the separation barrier in Jerusalem. Ir Amim’s study tours provide a ground level exposure to East Jerusalem, creating a platform for critically assessing the notion of Jerusalem as the “eternal, undivided capital of Israel” and understanding the city’s fundamental role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The field trip included stops through several East Jerusalem neighborhoods and utilized key observation points to provide the context for understanding how developing facts on the ground impact the future of a secure, democratic Israeli state. The tour focused on Israeli policy related to the separation barrier, government construction plans in East Jerusalem, Israeli settlements and national parks built in the heart of Palestinian neighbourhoods, the legal status of East Jerusalem residents and policies impacting the Palestinian community. During the tour, participants visited numerous sites including; the separation barrier between the Jewish neighbourhood Gilo and the city of Bethlehem; the Har Homa neighbourhood; Palestinian neighbourhoods Umm Tuba and Sur Baher; Goldman Promenade, Armon Hanatziv; the separation barrier in Abu Dis; and Mount Scopus.

VI. BOOK REVIEWS

Filippo Celata and Raffaella Coletti (eds.) (2015) Neighbourhood Policy and the Construction of the European External Borders, Springer, Cham, 201pp.

Jenő Hámory

This volume, which contains seven chapters, was published as part of Springer’s GeoJournal Library Series (volume no. 115). The two editors, Filippo Celata and Raffaella Coletti, both from the Department MEMOTEF (Dipartimento di Metodi e Modelli per L’Economia, il Territorio e la Finanza) of the University of Rome “La Sapienza”, collected and edited an interesting list of studies on different aspects of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), one of the most important external policy instruments of the European Union since the big wave of enlargement in 2004.

ENP is employed by the EU in order to facilitate closer cooperation with its eastern and southern neighbours. With ENP the EU seeks to to achieve the strongest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic progress and integration. Generally, the basic principles guiding this cooperation are in line with the more general canon of EU values, such as: democracy, rule of law, human rights and social cohesion, together with good governance, market economy, support to civic activities and sustainable development. In the last EU budget period (2007-2013) a total of EUR15 billion were allocated in the forms of financial grants, technical and policy support to the sixteen countries participating in the ENP. Twelve of them are active participants in the ENP: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Ukraine. Algeria is currently negotiating an ENP action plan, whereas Belarus, Libya and Syria, albeit being part of the ENP in general (political) terms, remain, for the moment, outside most of its support structures.

Border studies have always been in the forefront of basic and applied research on EU policies, strategies and developments. Interestingly, as it is stated in James W. Scott’s study “Bordering, Border Politics and Cross-Border Cooperation in Europe”, they have, in recent years, become a sort of counter-narrative to globalisation discourses of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Neighbourhood policy is gaining importance in the external policy “tool kit” of Europe partly to facilitate a counterbalancing force to criticisms concerning the EU trying to build a “Fortress Europe”: an obviously mistaken notion expressed by a very high number of researchers and politicians, policy-makers as well. Nevertheless, the notion “Fortress Europe” occasionally comes to surface even as of today in international discussions.

The authors in this volume extensively discuss the various aspects of bordering, border-crossing, region-building along the borders, history and future perspectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The various “case” studies in the book are followed by two more comprehensive studies which put the neighbourhood policy issue into a wider, international, macro-regional and global perspective: one on macro-regional strategies and the rescaling of the EU external geopolitics and another on the relationship between the aims, efforts, strategies and policies applied by global empires (namely China, Russia and the United States) and EU neighbourhood (external) policies.

The study “The European Neighbourhood Policy, Region-Building and Bordering”, written by Filippo Celata, Raffaella Coletti and Enrica Polizzi, points out that the basic neighbourhood policy and its subsequent “tooling process” grew out, to a great extent, of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of the EU. As a result, ever since the ENP was intellectually “conceived” more attention has been paid to the Mediterranean element, sometimes even to the detriment of the East European component. Since the ENP countries are not candidates for accession many also claim that both the EU level neighbourhood policy and its implementation has been aimed more at bordering (i.e. separating “us” from “them”) than at cross-bordering (i.e. bringing the two sides of the border as close as possible to one another).

Cross-border cooperation, as perhaps the most important (and most ambitious) component of EU level Neighbourhood Policy, has played a pivotal role in the formation of the European Union’s external policies as a whole. This role is introduced and analysed in detail in the study on “Cross-Border Cooperation along the EU’s External Frontiers” written jointly by the two editors of the book. At the same time, it has greatly contributed to encouraging local and sub-regional initiatives as well. The authors explain and blend geopolitical, institutional, topological approaches and perspectives as well as those referring to the joint social and cultural embeddedness of borders in the life of those living in these areas in both sides of EU borders.

The relationship between cross–border cooperation and territorial cohesion policies of the EU is also discussed in detail and a critical analysis is given on the objectives, proximity, efficiency, value system, governance levels of all the Neighbourhood Policy programmes carried out in the last (2007-2013) programming period.

In the study on the “Future Perspectives for the European Neighbourhood Policy”, written by Battistina Cugusi, the options to develop the array of neighbourhood policy instruments into hard external policy means and measures available for the EU in the future are highlighted. The study goes in depth into the reasons of political instability and economic difficulties in the last eight or so years characterising both the EU-countries and their neighbours involved in the EU’s various European Neighbourhood Policy programmes. It is pointed out that, as a response to the economic crisis in 2008, new priorities have been set since 2011 in the Neighbourhood Policy of the EU. The new features demonstrate a clear effort to facilitate deeper democracy, to support civil society, social movements and, in general, civic participation in these countries, to help them achieve a stronger, more conclusive and sustainable economic growth, to reach a higher level of mobility, and, finally, to make progress in a number of economic and financial fields (among others, deep and comprehensive free trade agreements). Geopolitical and macro-economic considerations will obviously influence these goals, namely, that, in some cases, autocrats and important energy supplying countries are handled differently by the EU from the other ENP countries or their leaders. In the future the principle “more for more” (more funds to those countries which make more effort to cooperate with their EU partners in the economic, social, civil society or governance fields) is likely to prevail or even gain more ground.

Macro-regional strategies have been a clear effort on part of the EU countries to remap the political (and, for that matter, the economic and social) space of the European Union. The first in this field was the Baltic Sea Macro-Regional Strategy in 2003 followed by those prepared for the Danube, the Adriatic-Ionian and the Alpine macro-regions. Similar macro-regional strategies for the North Sea, Atlantic Arc and Mediterranean area are also in the pipeline. These strategies and their medium and long-term implications are discussed in the study “Macro-Regional Strategies and the Rescaling of the EU External Geopolitics” written by Andrea Stocchiero. Their implementation has so far been only a partial success since the famous (or infamous) “three NOs” (no new legislation, no new funding and no new institutions) seriously hamper their more rapid unfolding either at regional or EU levels. The Danube macro-regional strategy and, to a lesser extent, the Adriatic-Ionian Macro-Regional Strategy may prove in the future to be natural testing grounds for rescaling EU level external political priorities because both strategies involve member countries, pre-accession ones and also those not scheduled for accession. All these macro-regional strategies will have to face the challenges of efficiency, governance, community and, since they include non-EU countries, and especially neighbouring countries, external challenges as well in the future.

The attitudes, efforts, strategies, political, economic and security interests of three modern-time global powers (or ‘empires’ as used by the authors) are discussed in the study on “Global Empires and the European Neighbourhood: China, Russia and the US” written by Andriy Bryn and Raffaella Coletti. These powers are all keenly interested in, and want to establish an ever closer cooperation with, the ENP countries. They regard them as potential allies in their strategic security, political and economic endeavours. The European Union is at a certain institutional and organisational disadvantage, namely, that due to its polycentric governance and political system it sometimes finds it difficult to speak with a single voice in international relations. The ENP is a good example of the EU as being a “normative power” trying to share its own common values and principles: the more these countries adjust to common European norms and principles the more they will be integrated with the EU. This normative approach is likely to be more streamlined and refined in the future, as a result of the growing worldwide interest in the ENP in general and in the countries involved in the ENP in particular. The political, security and economic “chess-game” is played between the EU and its global rivals simultaneously on at least three “chess-boards”, Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus and the Mediterranean. Different interests will be pursued, different rules will be applied in each of the big ENP spaces by both the EU, in some cases even by some EU members, and by each of the three global rivals as well.

The study “Beyond Fortress ‘EU’rope? Bordering and Cross-Bordering along the European External Frontiers” written by Filippo Celata and Raffaella Coletti underlines that the establishment of the ENP was, in many ways, the EU’s response to the challenges arising as an aftermath of the 2004 enlargements. Its aim was first to guarantee the security and stability of the Union along its new borders, secondly, to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and it neighbours and, thirdly, to foster relations with these countries of strategic, geopolitical and geo-economic relevance for the EU as a global actor. The ENP, as a result, should function as a countervailing force against the notion of “Fortress Europe”, representing, instead, the idea of a “wider Europe”. A number of decision-makers and researchers regard the establishment of the ENP as a shift of balance in the mid-2000s from the Mediterranean to Eastern Europe. It is, however, not a series of acts of philanthropy but reflects the hard realities of 21st century European policy. Its relatively “soft”, normative approach to implement the various ENP-programmes and projects is in contrast to the relatively hard approach applied, for instance, by the United States in its international aid and support programmes.

The ENP is based upon the principle of “positive conditionality”. It should be accompanied by a set of incentives for these countries to carry out their domestic reforms. Those countries should receive funds (or more funds) which commit themselves to political reforms, trade liberalisation and to economic reforms. The overwhelming role of central political authorities should be limited in the future. The ENP is likely to move towards a more balanced regionalisation process and a variety of regional policies across different geographical scales in the future thus forming a further layer of regionalisation. Its cross-border component may efficiently contribute to mitigating the effects of the “who’s in – who’s out’ logic that has lingers in other EU policies and policy instruments. It may also help in promoting the implementation of European Cohesion Policy in neighbouring regions by cutting efficiently through the traditional, albeit valid, logic of concentric circles of integration (Euro-zone, Schengen area, European Union, countries in pre-accession, neighbouring countries, with some natural overlaps among several of these circles) so prevalent in the thinking of many influential European academics, researchers and policy-makers.

Péter Balogh (2014): Perpetual borders: German-Polish cross-border contacts in the Szczecin area. Stockholm: Stockholm University, Department of Human Geography, 2014. (Södertörn doctoral dissertations; 92.)

Márton Pete

The doctoral dissertation of Péter Balogh was published by Stockholm University in 2014 (the year it was defended), although the volume is also included in the Södertörn Doctoral Dissertations series as the author had a dual affiliation during his doctoral studies, at the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) of Södertörn University apart from the Department of Human Geography at Stockholm University.

In his work, BALOGH deals with the changes occurring in a borderland once the state border ceased to act as a physical barrier for movements and flows. The territorial focus of the research was put on the German-Polish borderland, more precisely on the wider area of the agglomeration of Szczecin. The dissertation is part of the output of the interdisciplinary research project ‘The influence of political territorial hierarchies on local development and relations in cross-border areas: the role of Szczecin as a central place in relation to the divided Pomeranian hinterland’, implemented between 2008 and 2013 and financed by the Baltic Sea Foundation.

The dissertation and the whole project are already interesting for the choice of the study area. The German-Polish border has for long been an important symbolic line of division between East and West. Since the Age of Enlightenment, the Prussian-Polish border has widely been considered among leading thinkers, beginning with Voltaire, as the border between the barbarian Eastern and the civilized Western Europe (for more on this issue see Wolff 1994). Despite coming from a few intellectuals, this notion subsequently became widely influential, and in the 20th century this partition received a new emphasis after World War II. Though the German-Polish border was an internal border within the communist bloc, after the German reunification it ended up being referred to as a border between an Eastern and a Western country. Other important issues were the late (post-1945) emergence of the current border coupled with the expulsion of Germans from Poland, and the subsequent isolation policy of the socialist countries which all contributed to the deterioration of cross-border ties.

The dissertation mainly focuses on the changes that occurred in the last decade, as result of EU and Schengen accession, taking into consideration at the same time such changes that were awaited but did not occur. After comparing different pre-EU enlargement plans and visions for the area’s development with practices and realities of recent years, the author suggests that ‘earlier imaginations on the development potentials have not quite materialised, although some of them were probably too optimistic’ (p. 7.).

Accordingly, the main research question of the dissertation is: In which respects has the gradual opening of the border been leading to Szczecin’s emergence as a cross-border centre of the northern Polish-German borderland, as predicted or desired by a number of commentators? This larger question was broken down into more specific questions that guided the four individual papers of the author that were incorporated within the dissertation (Paper I-IV). The questions are: How and why has the opening of the border affected both sides in terms of

·         cross-border cooperation, spatial planning and regional development? (Papers I and II)

·         discourses, decisions and actions of local and regional elites? (Paper III)

·         attitudes of local German and Polish residents towards each other? (Paper IV)

A secondary research question is: Are the attitudes of Germans and Poles towards each other different at the border in the study area compared to the bi-national level at large? (pp. 17-18.)

Another important element was the investigation of the discourses on and the attitudes toward the other side of the border among local and regional elites, and local residents. As BALOGH puts it ‘this [study] revealed a polarised attitudinal landscape’ (p. 7.) which is ‘in line with other studies showing that identities are particularly accentuated in border situations, where the Other is more frequently encountered’ (p. 7.).

Both of these problems can be derived from the difficult 20th century history of the area. The changes of the German-Polish border after the two world wars, mainly WWII, led to hostilities and distrust between the neighbouring states which are proven to be still effective nowadays. Underpinned by a succinct though encompassing introduction on the conflicts of the historical past, the author keeps on insisting that ‘interlinkages between two sides of a borderland are not necessarily taking place just because physical barriers are lifted: there must often be a motivation there for crossing an international boundary’ (p. 16.). This sentence is of key importance, not only in terms of the border between Germany and Poland, but also for many other ones, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. This explains clearly the remarkable difference between the expectations and the reality concerning the success of cross-border cooperation in post-2004 Member States, where many awaited an automatic upturn along the borders but only few border regions showed real dynamism until now.

Balogh suggests that the Szczecin area does not belong to the successful borderlands. He bases his argumentation on a multi-sided analysis, which unfolds in the four individual, though interconnecting papers. Balogh at first concentrates on the infrastructural conditions (Paper I; Lundén et al. 2009), mostly traffic infrastructure, as its development in the 20th century was not immune at all from political factors. Central governmental policy aimed at connecting the city to the central areas of Poland, while fully ignoring the development of crucial cross-border ties (a pure application of what Michael Mann called “infrastructural power”, see Mann 1984). This resulted in the unfavourable economic development status of the city and still exercises a negative influence in our days.

In the following part (Paper II; Balogh 2015) the author develops further the question of the connection between the city and its cross-border hinterland, concentrating on the articulation of the city’s role in both the smaller and the larger geographic space in planning documents. He ends up suggesting that though the city tries to live its own life, the fear from German influence is taken for serious on the Polish side, mainly from above (central state administration). This attitude results in both administrative and psychological burdens when it comes to the overcoming of the border.

The next chapter (Paper III; Balogh brings the reader deeper into methodological concerns, namely the positionality of the researcher as an outsider. The author, although admitting that its appreciation is contested, praises this position as it enabled him and his colleagues to gain ‘interesting and sometimes even sensitive information’ (p. 101.) as they were conducting interviews with local elites on the German and Polish sides of the border. After presenting a brief though far-reaching introduction on how subjective factors (such as the age or the professional background of the interviewer) can influence the outcome of an interview, BALOGH uses the gained information to depict an image on the attitude of local elites towards cross-border cooperation. Through a comprehensive study on the most important recurring elements of the interviews, complemented with some noticeable citations from the interviewees, the author concludes by revealing three patterns. At first, he suggests that ‘blaming the other side is not unusual on both sides of the border’ (p. 106.) when it comes to the difficulties of cross-border cooperation. Secondly, ‘de-emphasising the importance of cooperation is more common on the Polish side’ (p. 106.) which seems to be a result of the difficult historical past and the fear from German expansion. Finally, BALOGH puts as a reinforcement for this above view on Polish reluctance that ‘the discourse of re-establishing the historically coherent region [of Szczecin] is clearly present on the German side, but lacks almost entirely on the Polish side’ (p. 106.). At this point, the final conclusion of Balogh, suggesting that ‘borders survive in attitudes, narratives and discourses even once the physical barriers have been lifted’ (p. 106.), is of crucial importance not only for this Paper III, but also in answering the research questions of the dissertation.

In the final paper (Paper IV; Balogh 2013b) Balogh develops further the research on the attitude of the locals through the assessment of the outcomes of a questionnaire, carried out in seven German villages located at or close to the border. These villages were known to have been affected by cross-border movements, mainly by Polish incoming migration as well as commuting. Through surveying both local Germans and Poles, the author attempted to learn more about the dissolution of the border between these people. He ends up concluding that identities tend to remain clear and obvious, and the “in-betweenness”, the emergence of a cross-border identity observed by Gielis (2009) at the Dutch-German border, was generally not taking place. Migrants ‘rarely cross the mental and cultural borders between two national communities’ (Balogh 2013b: p. 202.). This also supports the author’s finding that the opening of the borders does not lead automatically to their dissolution.

In the concluding discussion, as it has already been premised by the individual papers, the author suggests that ‘[w]hile some important cross-border developments have been taking shape in the Szczecin area of the German-Polish borderland over the past years, social and economic life remain strongly influenced by the presence of the state border’ (p. 56.). Obviously, this notion could be valid for a wide range of border regions, not only at the German-Polish border, and even not only in Central and Eastern Europe but rather overall in Europe. Nevertheless, the importance of the dissertation lies not only in this conclusion, but much more on the well-structured analyses, which succeeds in placing appropriately actual local and regional problems in the broader historical, political, economic, and social context. Through this introduction, one can have an insight not only into the concerns of German-Polish relations, but also many of the very basic difficulties of cross-border cooperation along the borders of former socialist post-2004 EU Member States. Taking into consideration the findings of such an overarching problem analysis would likely contribute to a more targeted community policy planning.

References

BALOGH P. (2015): Changing patterns of city-hinterland relations in Central and East European borderlands: Szczecin on the edge of Poland and Germany. In: Buček, J., Ryder, A. (eds.): Governance in Transition. Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 175-194.

BALOGH, P. (2013a): The Outsider Advantage: Interviewing Planners and other Elites in the Polish-German Borderland. Journal of Settlements and Spatial Planning, Vol. 4. No. 1, pp. 101-108.

BALOGH, P. (2013b): Sleeping abroad but working at home: Cross-border residential mobility between transnationalism and (re)bordering. Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, Vol. 95. No. 2, pp. 189-204.

GIELIS, R. (2009): Borders make the difference: migrant transnationalism as a border experience. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, No. 100, pp. 598–609.

LUNDÉN, T, MELLBOURN, A., VON WEDEL, J., BALOGH, P. (2009): Szczecin. A Cross-Border Center of Conflict and Cooperation. In: Jańczak, J. (eds.): Conflict and Cooperation in Divided Cities. Logos Verlag, Berlin, pp. 109-121.

MANN, M. (1984): The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results. European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie, Vol. 25, No. 2, Tending the roots: nationalism and populism, pp. 185-213.

WOLFF, L. (1994): Inventing Eastern Europe: the map of civilization on the mind of the enlightenment. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA

Alfred J. Rieber (2014): The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Rise of Early Modern Empires to the end of the First World War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 640 pp.

Teodor Gyelnik

This book provides a ‘comparative history of Empires’, whereby the author has analysed modern Eurasian empires and their strategies regarding peripheral areas, the borderlands. In other words, the primary object of the book is to investigate Eurasian ‘borderlands’ and their interaction with the imperial centers. What is immediately visible in Rieber’s book is that he implicitly separates two ‘great narratives of Empires’. To be exact, the ‘first great narrative of Empire’ is represented by nomadic empires with their irregular and unpredictable rhythm of warfare and trade. Progressively, the first great narrative was altered by massive centralization and agriculture, and this change altered the nature of the empires too. Hence, a ‘second great narrative of Empires’ was born.

The basic hypothesis of the book is that all the major conflicts of the Eurasian space were situated in the borderlands of multinational empires, thus the term ‘borderlands’ becomes the key word in Rieber’s historical approach. A principal feature which shaped Eurasia, its geo-cultural space and its borderlands were mass population movements, caused by factors including migration, deportation and/or colonialism; consequently, a multifarious ‘demographic kaleidoscope’ emerged with a highly varied population. This ‘kaleidoscope’ resulted in the unparalleled complexity of the Eurasian space, itself rather unclearly defined in geographical terms. Rieber (2014, 59) defines the term ‘borderland’ in the following way: “like frontier, the term borderland signifies the fluidity of geographical concepts in Eurasian imperial space. It is used in the following pages to describe territories on the periphery of the multicultural states that were carved out of the shifting frontiers and incorporated into the imperial system as separate administrative units, sometimes with autonomous institutions, reflecting their distinctive political and cultural features. Their status and relationship with the center of imperial power could change over time.”

The consolidation of the early modern Eurasian empires in the 16th and 17th centuries was followed by the introduction of a specific behaviour, where all the Eurasian empires started to be engaged in territorial competition. The early modern empires, imitating the nomadic ones, were eager to shift their frontiers and incorporate further territories and borderlands, nevertheless, this imperial expansion clashed with the imperial expansion and interests of other empires. This imperial expansion and conflicts created ‘contested frontiers’/borderlands, and these borderland territories were simply ‘carved out’ from the ‘contested frontiers’ and were incorporated into the Empire. Nevertheless, the incorporated borderlands/imperial frontiers were profoundly different from the imperial mainstream and this divergence was demonstrated in political, economic or in cultural/religious sphere. The existing diversity between center and periphery prevented an easy and smooth incorporation of the borderlands into the imperial framework; consequently, the status of the borderlands was never static, but it generated a space of ceaseless fights and tensions with the imperial center.

The book claims that tensions over the borderlands took two meta-frames. The first meta-frame embodied an inner conflict, namely the borderlands were the scenes of ceaseless fight over culture, identity and institutionalism within the imperial system, which attempted to assimilate the borderlands and to make the subjugated people imperially manageable, through linguistic assimilation and/or religious conversion. That means the borderlands represented an ‘inner cultural frontier’, where the rivalry between the imperial center and the subjugated people varied from accommodation/agreement to rebellion. The second meta-frame of ceaseless fight over the borderlands happened between the competing sovereign states/empires, thus the borderlands represented ‘outer military frontiers’. This meta-frame was a fight where numerous multinational states started to compete/fight for territory, resources, population and/or prestige by means of colonization and imperialism. Consequently, the borderlands were the territories of unstable shatter zones and sites of numerous/ceaseless small and big wars.

The book reflects the relationship between the center and the borderlands, and this relationship was never static or harmonious, but it did prove to be flexible and very accommodating to different conditions. The first chapter identifies the relationship between the center and periphery within the dimension of ‘imperial space’. The immediate attempt within this dimension was the identification of a specific identity structure where the civilized Self was separated from the barbarian Other. This identity distance was usually demonstrated by walls, e.g. in Rome, Persia and/or China. Nevertheless, the imperial eager constructed two strategies within the imperial space, namely, accommodation and resistance. Rieber describes these two strategies (2014, 64): “There was no discernible pattern of reaction to imperial rule within the borderlands. From the earliest conquests to the mid-twentieth century, individuals and whole social groups passed from accommodation to resistance and back again, oscillating between resignation and defiance as psychological moods.” In other words, accommodation meant a wide spectre of political approach, from passive acceptance of external imperial authority to active political cooperation, or even identification with the hegemonic/imperial structures. On the other hand, the strategy of resistance represented a hard ‘inner cultural frontier’ when the subjugated and oppressed people decided to fight against the metropolitan center. This strategy stretched from micro-level warfare, small acts of everyday resistance, to rebellion as the most extreme form of resistance. Hence, rebellions testified the most serious challenge of the imperial system, to be specific, “rebellions haunted the multicultural states by raising the spectre of foreign intervention. They were a constant reminder of the fragility of imperial rule over the borderlands.” (Rieber 2014, 77)

The second important imperial strategy of the modern Empires was the imagination and management of imperial ideologies and cultural practices. This strategy was important because it had the capacity to generate an ‘imaginary community’ and feeling of togetherness within the Empire, thus fulfilling its function as cultural and/or identity ‘glue’. Simply, the basic aim and object of this strategy was to envisage specific historical narratives, their continuity with the present times and to legitimise imperial rule in the whole territory of the Empire. These emphasized that subjects of the Empire, from the center to the periphery/borderlands, are uniquely bound together. In order to fulfil its mission, imperial ideology had to avoid any form of rigidity and needed to be very flexible, thus the imperial cultural practice was exceptionally adaptive to any changes in the Empire. To be exact, “Imperial policies of assimilation also varied over time and place between the coercive and the enlightened. Forced conversion and the imposition of linguistic uniformity alternated with toleration, co-optation of elites and acceptance of cultural diversity as long as it did not lead to disruptive proselytizing. To a considerable degree flexibility became a part of the ideology itself.”  (Rieber 2014, 81-82)

The creation of this ‘feeling of togetherness’ was performed by several elements of imperial ideology, like divine dynastic secession, invention of intellectuals serving the state, imagination of specific cultural practices which served to glorify the ruler, his/her legitimacy, authority, power and his/her exceptional ability to intimidate rivals/foreigners/strangers. This imperial strategy was fed by myths, narratives and traditions; subsequently, they were transmitted to the elite and society through imperial rites, ceremonies and monuments. Moreover, the imperial cultural practice was an endeavour to impress its elite, general public and foreigners through coronations, military reviews, religious ceremonies and/or urban structure/design. Nevertheless, the generated imperial cultural traditions about the continuous legitimacy and relevance of the Empire were fully fictitious. Thus Rieber’s reading of imperial ideology as cultural practice is in theoretical agreement with Eric Hobsbawm (1983), who claims that the imagined traditions are usually quite recent cultural products in spite of the fact that they are seen/deemed/presented as very old in their origin and which emanate from the ‘first times’. These are the ‘invented traditions’ which attempt to socialize specific values and establish a continuity with the past. In other words, the imperial ideologies attempted to culturally socialize the epistemological framework of the population, thus maintaining the unity and legitimacy of Empire and/or imperial control.

The next chapter analyses a further imperial relationship between the center and the borderlands, namely imperial institutions like army, bureaucracy and elites. Imperial army played a crucial role in maintaining the Empire. It was an effective tool to deal with the erosion of the ruler’s sovereignty and it could function as an ‘imperial glue’. Borderlands were territories which were incompletely assimilated territories; subsequently, the army had to hold them together and bring order there. The army and its roles functioned until the last days of the Empire; what is more, the army was the critical point and determinant of the Empire. RIEBER (2014, 167) underlines the importance of the army as an imperial institution in the following way: “In the end, the collapse came about when the loyalty and cohesion of the army began to dissolve. Long serving as the glue of imperial rule, the army ultimately became its solvent.” The second feature of the imperial institution was the bureaucracy/administration. It supported the armed forces through mobilization of human, financial resources; it managed and administered imperial policy, be it assimilation or autonomy. Furthermore, the bureaucratic and administrative system attempted to perform a supplementary integrative task, specifically, to gather the population of the Empire (often profoundly diverse) into a common administrative and bureaucratic system. Simply, the imperial administration and the bureaucratic institutions assured that the borderlands accepted imperial rule and the different cultural traditions of the Empire, and in a moment when the borderlands denied to accept the cultural practices, the imperial army was sent in in order to restore ‘imperial normality’.

The emergence of centralized state systems, as the ‘second great narrative of Empire’, created frontiers which became the zones of encounter between organized state systems and empires. A consequence of these encounters were the ‘complex frontiers’ where the centralized empires were engaged in violent and peaceful intercourse with other centralized states and other social groups. These frontiers were constantly re-drawn through long and prolonged wars and diplomatic negotiations. The identified ‘complex frontiers’ are the following: the Baltic littoral, the Western Balkans (Triplex Confinium), Danubian frontier, Pontic steppe, Caucasian isthmus, Tans Caspia and Inner Asia. In other words, complex frontiers and the tensions over the frontier territory substantially weakened the empires and they laid down the background and milieu of their later collapse.

Tensions over imperial frontiers resulted in imperial crises and they established a new phase of relations between the imperial center and the borderlands. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the Eurasian empires started to lose their power and vitality. This weakening was often accelerated by the borderland frontiers. Rieber (2014, 424) writes, imperial crisis “often, if not always, originated in conflicts over the borderlands where the ruling elites had failed to solve the most fundamental security problems of imperial rule.” Simply, waging ceaseless wars within the ‘complex frontiers’ led to a substantial loss of imperial power; subsequently, it opened the space for an increased tendency of foreign interventions, not only among the Eurasian empires (e.g. the Habsburg intervention into Ottoman territory and/or the Russian intervention into the Ottoman, Qajar and Qing empires) but new foreign/Western empires entered into the imperial game through an indirect form of imperialism. These ‘outer military frontiers’ prepared an appropriate space for ‘inner cultural frontier’, namely domestic upheavals which questioned and challenged the imperial framework, especially in the borderlands. The imperial structure and the elites attempted to react through a set of reforms/constitutionalism, like the introduction of a constitution, electoral changes, extended suffrage, and/or cultural toleration. However, these changes and reforms started to paralyze the empire itself because the reforms further undermined the position, cultural traditions/practices and prestige of the imperial elite. Rieber identifies the reforms as ‘dialectic’ in their nature. Simply, reforms were drafted by empires as instruments to manage imperial crisis, but those reforms directly attacked and destroyed the heart of the Empire.

That means this was the time when multicultural empires underwent deep and structural challenges and major internal destabilization, e.g. a loss of imperial/ruling legitimacy, emergence of nationalist tendencies and forces, socialist movements, popularization of an idea about democratic settlement and/or substantial pressure for economic/political changes. Beyond all these ‘inner’ and ‘outer frontiers’, the First World War resulted in changes, breakaway of critical borderlands and dissolution of the Eurasian empires. Deep inner and outer defeats and challenges “…led to the dissolution of the empires, the breakaway or attempted breakaway of the borderlands, and a complex process of reconstituting new state systems on their ruined foundations.” (Rieber 2014, 424-425)

A new post-imperial period took place, where the direct/explicit connections, either psychical, internal market, social or communicative ties were severely broken and totally disintegrated. The appearance of new ideologies and their rising influence; birth of new states, often copying the former imperial behaviour of ruthlessness like assimilation, resettlement or expulsion; huge mass population movements; constant war lines; civil wars and foreign interventions drew new geography and new borderlands and shatter zones in the Eurasian territory. As Rieber claims (2014, 532), “burdened with legacies of imperial rule, the successors could not inscribe their solutions to the problems posed by persistent factors on a clean slate.”

An important element of RIEBER’S theory is that the direction of influence/effect is not only a ‘one way ticket’, where the centre ultimately influences the borderlands and frontiers, as it is usually acknowledged in the mainstream approach. But there is a mutual and delicate relationship where the borderlands are able to generate deep changes through ‘inner cultural frontier’ within the imperial centre too. To be exact, “this book has argued, what happened on the peripheries of the centers of power was far more significant than has generally been recognized. Frontier wars (…) had profound effects on the ideologies and institutions of imperial rule.” (Rieber 2014, 615) Simply, incorporation of new territories into the Empire had a side-effect, namely the Empire acquired new problems/threats that needed to be ‘digested’ by it. These (side)effects of the borderlands/imperial frontiers included a wide scale from loss of homogeneity of the imperial capitals, their cosmopolitan turn, appropriation of new and new threats to the stability of the center, profound military threats and relocation of the capitals.

In other words, the demonstrated logic between center and periphery resembles a postcolonial approach which deeply acknowledges that the borderlands/periphery/conquered lands had a huge impact on the metropolitan center. For example Edward Said (1979), Jack Goody (2006), Alain Grosrichard (1998) and/or Rana Kabbani (2008) claim that that it was the imagination about the borderlands as backward/sexual/despotic which ultimately constructed and shaped the identity of the center. It was Frantz Fanon (1963) who claimed that colonial tensions and strain caused that the ‘muscles of the periphery (colonized people) were always ready to strike’, what lead to phenomenon where the Empire needed to be always ready to discipline the colonial people. Consequently, the constant military/police readiness in the empires generated a phenomenon what Foucault calls as ‘disciplined society’. Moreover, Antony Anghie (2004) gave a penetrating analysis that sovereignty and changes in the legal concept of sovereignty (from its naturalist reading to the idea self-defensive sovereignty) are primarily emanating from the colonial periphery. In other words, changes within the concept of sovereignty were not driven by theoretical progress performed in the center, but the idea of sovereignty was accommodated and updated in order to appropriately react to the challenges of the borderlands.

This book offers a study about ‘comparative history of Empires’. It is important to note that ‘comparative history of Empires’ is a widespread topic and a popular theme among the writers, academics, and “ordinary” readers since these comparative studies describe and analyse issues like imperial structures, imperial behaviour, growth of capitalism, advance of globalization, its homogenizing inclination and formulation of development frames. Nevertheless, most of the studies which analyse ‘comparative history of Empires’ concentrate on Western powers, Western forms of imperialism and colonialism, thus the Eurasian empires and their imperial behaviour are often overshadowed. Subsequently, Rieber’s analysis is a highly added value within this topic because it elaborated a profound and penetrating analysis of modern Eurasian empires and their imperial practice. The only shortcoming of the book is that it overloads the reader with historical facts and information, thus giving a feeling that the reader reads a dry history book.

The principal message of Rieber and his historical analysis of empires/borderlands is the hypothesis that the major conflicts in the Eurasian landscape happened in the shatter zones/complex frontiers and these shatter zones were the scenes of prolonged, lengthy and exhaustive wars. Despite the dissolution of Eurasian empires into numerous smaller entities, tensions in these former complex frontiers have not disappeared. What is more, the same complex frontiers, which rallied the empires into wars, are the principal ‘theatres’ of contemporary Eurasian frozen conflicts. For example, the contemporary frontiers of the Western Balkans, like the protracted and long crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and its loss of territories, the birth of Kosovo, the FYROM and its conflict with Albania and/or Greece; contemporary conflicts of the Caucasian isthmus include frozen conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; the ceaseless geopolitical tension in the Baltic littoral; political turbulences in the Trans Caspian frontier, like upheavals in Kirgizstan or Uzbekistan; prolonged Uygur conflict with the central Chinese administration in Xinjiang, clashes and self-immolations in Tibet are found in the complex frontier of Inner Asia; hot conflicts in the complex frontier of Pontic steppe, like tensions in the Crimean Peninsula, Donetsk and Luhansk; and finally the Danubian frontier, like Transnistria and many others. In the end, the most important message of Rieber’s ‘The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands’ is that the old/former cradles of the Eurasian conflicts and wars are still present as latent and dormant geopolitical/geo-cultural volcanos in the Eurasian space, which may erupt at any time.

References

ANGHIE, A. (2004): Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law)

FANON, F. (1963): The Wretched of the Earth. Grove Press, New York

GOODY, J. (2006): The Theft of History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Canto Classics)

GROSRICHARD, A. (1998): The Sultan´s Court: European Fantasies of the East. Verso, London

HOBSBAWM, E. (1983): Introduction: Inventing Traditions. In: Hobsbawm, E and Ranger, T. (eds.): The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1-15.

KABBANI, R. (2008): Imperial Fictions: Europe´s Myth of Orient. Saqi, London

RIEBER, J. A. (2014): The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Rise of Early Modern Empires to the End of the First World War. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

SAID, E. (1979): Orientalism. Vintage Books, New York

von Hirschhausen, B.; Grandits, H.; Kraft, C.; Müller, D.; Serrier, T. (2015): Phantomgrenzen. Räume und Akteure in der Zeit neu denken

Márton Pete

The title Phantomgrenzen. Räume und Akteure in der Zeit neu denken (Phantom borders. Rethinking spaces and actors in the time), was published in June 2015, by Wallstein Verlag GmbH, Göttingen, Germany. The book assembles a collection of studies being the first outcomes of the project Phantomgrenzen in Ostmitteleuropa (Phantom borders in East Central Europe), launched in 2011 and supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF); in addition, it is supposed to be the first volume of a planned series.

“A metaphor is a creative metaphor, if it sheds light on the object of the explanation in a way that inspires new researches. […] A creative metaphor is like gaining an altered viewpoint over a complex landscape, which can never be completely overseen as a whole, but might be observed in a better, more complete and less disturbed way from the new viewpoint”. The volume starts with these above thoughts of Peter Finke and continues with introducing its creative metaphor, the “phantom border”, which puts the historical conditionality of regional differences and characteristic features in a new perspective. The declared objective of the volume by introducing this new concept is to “contribute to the understanding of a region, which was shaped by a particularly large number of border changes in the recent history”. The basic premise of the volume is that in spite of cross-border relations and integration in East Central and Southeast Europe, the defunct territorial framework of the former Habsburg, Prussian, Ottoman etc. states still shape the societies of the region. The authors focus on the question of how the phenomenon of phantom borders and spaces can be explained and whether this phenomenon is determined by traditional structures or it is (re)produced by political, scientific or social discourses.

The authors define the precise research questions in the foreword of the volume which are the following:

·         How can be explained that despite the territorial policies of nation-states and the cross-border networking of people and places past – e.g. Habsburg, Ottoman or Soviet – state territories still shape the societies of East Central and Southeast Europe?

·         What disappears, and what and in whatever form survives from the former state territorial bodies?

·         Can the disappeared borders have a further effect and if so, how and through which actors are they specifically updated in the present?

·         What kind of ‘altered viewpoint’, in the words of Finke, can researchers gain if they do not consider the past of a region in an essentialist way as completed and unalterable, but as a memory which can be recalled and upgraded by the actors?

·         What kinds of scientific perspectives can be opened if regions are not any more considered as territorial units resulting from a more or less linear ‘transformation continuum’, but rather as the outcomes of the continuous reassessment of historical reminiscences and material heritage?

In Chapter 1 the five authors (v. Hirschhausen, Grandits, Kraft, Müller, Serrier) establish a definition on the concept of phantom borders. According to this, phantom borders are “former, mostly political borders or territorial divisions, which continue to structure (geographical) space even after they ceased to be institutionalised”. The authors intend to base the conceptualisation on both classical structuralist and constructivist approaches with the aim to elaborate a third approach beside them. Phantom borders are not defined either as unalterable structures or as purely discursive constructions, but as the outcomes of the interaction between three interwoven levels: phantom borders are imagined in mental maps and discourses at the same time, individual actors experience and perceive them; everyday practices form and continuously update them; and finally systematic political and administrative interventions implement them.

In Chapter 2 Dietmar Müller examines the relationship between the concept of phantom borders and historical regions. As an example he points at the Balkans as a historical region and bases his argumentation on the outcomes of the scientific debate between historians Maria Todorova and Holm Sundhaussen from 1999 to 2003, which was not primarily about the demarcation of this historical spatial construction in geographic terms but much more about the raison d'être of the creation of such space-constructs. As an empirical example, the author cites inter-war Romania, where the different legal cultures of the distinct parts of the newly unified country, in this case the differences in land registry, reproduced the borders between the inhabitants of the two historical regions.

In Chapter 3 Béatrice von Hirschhausen presents within the framework of a micro-level case study analysis, how to shed new light on regionalization processes by using the phantom border concept. Her observation targets rural areas in distinct regions within Romania, where locals favour remarkably different household investments. A definite example for this is canalization in rural areas around the turn of the Millennium, which drew a sharp line between the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Kingdom of Romania as the infrastructural development showed diverging pace on the two sides of this same line. Connecting this in parallel with the diverse perceived spaces and experience horizons of local people, the author notices the temporal dynamics of regionalization, suggesting that regions are timely mutable constructions.

In Chapter 4 Thomas Serrier addresses the question how the remembrance paradigm and its different variations relate to the phantom border concept. The author attempts to examine phantom borders and areas not in the context of the individual time-layers of the past, but in that of the selective and dynamic processes of collective memory. Definite examples are the territories of the former Prussian and Habsburg states inhabited by German-speaking population (e.g. Silesia, Sudetenland), which kept their historical-cultural characteristics long after the expulsion of Germans e.g. through memory transfers between the different ethnic groups or memories related to certain places.

In Chapter 5 Hannes Grandits examines the influence of some phantom borders, emerging out from the radical transformation of certain regions in East Central and Southeast European after 1989. According to the author, the revival of former borders is due to popular nostalgia, on the one hand, and to specific ways of reliving the people’s historical ‘knowledge stock’, on the other hand. In the years of rapid transformation, such as the break-up of Yugoslavia, existing knowledge systems also undergo radical shifts, and this contributes to the reassessment of the existing territorial division. In such cases the return of former territorial entities is rather a general than an exceptional case. From this perspective the author introduces Croatia’s recent struggle for independence, along with the secession of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (the former Military Frontier), as well as the reshaping of the historic Epirus/Çamëria region, crossed by the Greek-Albanian border, at the beginning of the 1990s as illustrations.

In the final Chapter Claudia Kraft points out how the postcolonial perspective sheds new light on the spatial and temporal situation of the post-socialist Eastern Europe. Instead of taking this perspective on board, the author attempts to adapt it, to make it applicable for the specific circumstances of the East Central European region. In her approach the phantom border concept understands the time-space complex as a part of the interplay between experiences, notions and constructions about space, which enables the elaboration of a kind of post-socialist historiography that might be able to decentralize the dominant (Western) European viewpoint.

To sum up, by introducing the phantom border concept, the volume contributes significantly to the examination of the fault lines of human society in the geographical space of East Central and Southeast Europe. The examination of the emergence and persistence of these dividing lines takes into account both social notions, individual and collective experiences, as well as physical and social spaces equally. The raison d'être of the complex analysis of all these factors can hardly be questioned in a region, the territorial pattern of which is still characterized by disintegration, in spite of the Western European integration process reaching the region in the last decades. Over the past few years it has become obvious that the Western European discourse on a borderless Europe would remain largely illusionary in this region. This present title clearly reflects on the fact that in contrast to the example of Western European core areas, integration is yet to deconstruct the borders of this region and should not necessarily focus on the ones on the maps, but rather on those in our minds.

[1] The Finnish-Russian Case Study (Németh et al. 2014) of the Euborderregions research project (2011-2015) was funded by the European Commission under its Seventh Framework Programme, and was prepared by the authors in co-operation with Elena Nikiforova at the Centre for Independent Social Research, St Petersburg. This paper also relies on the executive summary provided in section 2.3 of the Euborderregions Final Scientific Report (Scott, Németh 2015).

[2] The programme area also includes the region of South Savo, which we exclude here as a region not situated directly on the border.

[3] Commissioned by the European Citizen Foundation, within the framework of project nr. HU-SK/1101/1.2.1/0266 in 2015. www.emmap.org

[4] Co-operation across borders – Regional Policy – European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index.cfm/en/policy/cooperation/european-territorial/cross-border/, 2015.05.07.)

[5] http://www.geog.bgu.ac.il/fastSite/coursesFiles/fp7/program.pdf

Table of Contents

I.     Introduction

Editor’s Note

II.   Theory

Metamorphosis of sovereignty and bareness in the post-1989 world politics

The “Forgotten Border” between Poland and Kaliningrad Oblast. De- and Re-Boundarization of the Russian-EU Neighborhood

EUBORDERREGIONS and the analysis of Cross-Border Cooperation at the EU’s external frontiers

III. Practice

Czech-Polish Borders: Comparison of the EU Funds for Cross-Border Co-operation of Schools in Selected Euroregions

Spatial impact of CBC projects 2007-2013 on the Bulgarian economy: realities and alternatives

A Large Metropolis and its Small Neighbours: Co-operation and Interaction Across the Southern Section of the Finnish-Russian Border[1]

Indicators of Cross-Border Impact: Mental mapping, position-generator, and language skills. A methodological recommendation.

IV. Workshops

Cross-border territorial monitoring

The 1st Berlin Border Seminar, 8th-11th of November 2014, Berlin (Germany)

V.   Proceedings

Association for Borderland Studies 1st World Conference

The Second EUBORDERSCAPES Conference: “Borders at the Interface”

VI. Book Reviews

Filippo Celata and Raffaella Coletti (eds.) (2015) Neighbourhood Policy and the Construction of the European External Borders, Springer, Cham, 201pp.

Péter Balogh (2014): Perpetual borders: German-Polish cross-border contacts in the Szczecin area. Stockholm: Stockholm University, Department of Human Geography, 2014. (Södertörn doctoral dissertations; 92.)

Alfred J. Rieber (2014): The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Rise of Early Modern Empires to the end of the First World War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 640 pp.

von Hirschhausen, B.; Grandits, H.; Kraft, C.; Müller, D.; Serrier, T. (2015): Phantomgrenzen. Räume und Akteure in der Zeit neu denken